death. On the contrary, they sincerely hope, at the commencement of a campaign or action, that they may find themselves alive and well at the end of it. There is, however, one thing regarding which I have no doubts, and that is, that to be shot down from behind a bush by Burman flint or matchlock is the ideal death of no man. Such, however, has been the fate of many a good soldier and sepoy during the past year.

It were easy to enter into greater detail about the guerilla warfare that our troops have waged in Upper Burma throughout the hot and rainy season of 1886; to dwell on the intense stifling heat, so trying to Europeans; to strive to depict the awful state of the so-called roads, several feet deep in mud and water, and for miles and miles traversing a network of flooded rice-fields; to describe the weary night-marches, and the passage of flooded streams and rivers. The refrain of the best known popular air among the troops in Upper Burma is, "One more river to cross." But there are scenes and facts to which no efforts of descriptive power can do justice. To be realised they must be experienced; and the experience is dearly bought. I had an idea that we should, during the past winter, have seen a good many visitors in Upper Burma. But such has not been the case, despite the unprecedented number

of

distinguished travellers who have spent the cold weather in India. And yet nothing is simpler and easier than a voyage up the Irrawaddy. Not that such a voyage would afford the globe-trotter any insight into the nature of military operations in Upper Burma. That can only be acquired by a trip into the interior, where are, or were, the fastnesses of Boh

Shwé, Buda Yaza, Hla-Oo, and other prominent rebel-leaders.

Before passing on to the military operations of the last two months, which have so materially contributed to the pacification of Upper Burma, there are one or two questions affecting the condition of the country that merit some notice. Within a very short time after the occupation of Mandalay, in November 1885, the basis of a Civil Government was established and martial law abolished. This step having received the sanc tion of the Government of India, a retrograde movement became difficult, if not impossible. Nevertheless it was the opinion of a numerous section of the Indian community, and one well qualified to judge, that the step was premature. Sir Charles Bernard resolutely set his face against any retrogression. That was but natural, the forward step having been taken at his instance, and he being the chief representative of the civil power. On the other hand, if rumour be true, the supreme military authority in Upper Burma advocated the restoration of martial law. This was also only natural. As a matter of fact, however, the exercise of civil power has been purely nominal. To all intents and purposes martial law has prevailed up to the present time. In a country that is under civil government, it is an understood thing that the resources of that government are sufficient to enforce order and respect for the civil laws. Such, as is well known, has not been the case. Early in 1886 large drafts of police-some seasoned soldiers from the native army of India, others raw recruits from the Punjab and North-West Provinces-were hastily raised and hurried off to Burma. When they arrived, they proved in the main

useless. They knew nothing of the Burmese language, they had few or no competent officers, they were without arms, equipment, clothing, training, or disciplinealmost without organisation. The year 1866 passed away in preparing this police force to be useful. In the meantime our regular troops controlled the country. The Government styled itself a Civil Administration, whereas without the aid of the troops it could not move a hand's turn. The name of power lay with the civilians, and the reality of it with the military. Thanks to the latter, the former have been enabled to maintain a semblance of jurisdiction up to the present time, when there is at least some hope of their being able ere long to render the civil administration a reality, and not a mere farce.

It is not pleasant to look back on the condition of Upper Burma for the first ten months of 1886. The retrospect presents no single feature that reflects credit on the administrative capacity of those with whom the responsibility rested. The only class that comes well out of the ordeal is the army of occupation, who, for ten months, struggled manfully to do their duty, despite climatic drawbacks and inadequate numbers. The experience therein gained enabled Major-General White, V.C., C.B. (now Sir George White, K. C. B.), to give the military authorities in India sound and reliable advice as to the best measure to be adopted to insure the permanent pacification of the country by the campaign of the winter of 1886 87. During the hot weather of 1886, General White had at his disposal only one regiment of cavalry (2d Madras Lancers) and a few hundred mounted infantry. Despite the almost impassable state of the country during the rains, and the

obstacles it presented to the effective operations of mounted troops, the cavalry and mounted infantry (especially the latter) did such good work, that General White decided to ask for three more regiments of cavalry, to arrive in Burma in October, and the augmentation of the mounted infantry to 825 men—i. e., eleven companies of 75 men each (25 British and 50 native soldiers), to be distributed among the several brigades. His request was granted. The three regiments of cavalry (1st Bombay Lancers, 3d Regiment Hyderabad Contingent Cavalry, and 7th Bengal Cavalry) all arrived in Upper Burma in October. By that time, too, some progress had been made in the formation and equipment of the eleven companies of mounted infantry, the whole being placed under the command of Major (now Brevet Lieut.-Colonel) Symons of the South Wales Borderers. The chief difficulty was the provision of a sufficient number of ponies for the mounted infantry. The Burmese ponies are well known, at least in India, and it may seem strange that difficulty should have been experienced in obtaining 825 ponies in a country with three to four millions of inhabitants. Still, so it has proved. However, the numbers and equipment of the mounted infantry were sufficiently complete to enable them to contribute very materially to the pacification of the country. the same time that the mounted branches of the service in Burma were largely increased, considerable additions were also made to the number of infantry battalions. The total strength of the troops was raised from about 15,000, the approximate hot-weather strength, to 25,000, including the Lower Burma garrisons. At the same time the police force, numbering

At

some 3000 or 4000 men, was just beginning to be sufficiently acquainted with drill and discipline, and police duties in general, to be of some use. In a short time the battalions of Panjabi police, now serving in Upper Burma, will form a very fine body of troops, fit not only for police work, but for any military duties. Their numbers are being largely augmented by recruiting in India, and by volunteers from all the native regiments now serving in Burma and also in India. It is hoped, by the commencement of the hot season, when a large proportion of the regular troops are to return to India, that there will be about 16,000 police, more or less perfectly trained, available in Burma for the maintenance of peace and the prompt repression of all attempts at a revival of rebellion and dacoity.

But I am rather anticipating. I must first give a brief account of the active operations of December 1886 and January 1887 before I pass to their results. Practically speaking, little was done before the close of November last both the climate and the state of the country, with its flooded roads and vast area of rice-fields, being unfavourable to active operations. The force under General White was apportioned into six brigades; and from 3000 to 4000 men, from one-fourth to one-third, being British soldiers, were placed at the disposal of each brigadier. Each brigade had approximately two squadrons of cavalry and two companies of mounted infantry. Artillery, of course, there was; but it may be fairly said that for all the use the guns have been during the past winter in Burma, they might just as well have been in India or Great Britain. Indeed this

winter campaign has been

essentially a campaign of the mounted branches. The infantry and artillery have not been in it. These two branches are invaluable when the enemy makes a stand; but when they persist in running away, there is only one branch of the service that is of any use, and that is the cavalry. Even the mounted infantry were not in it at all, when the cavalry were there. The advent of three regiments of cavalry, armed with lances, completely demoralised the Burmese rebels. The sight of a single lancer terrified them into headlong flight or abject submission. One sowar of the 1st Bombay Lancers alone routed forty or fifty rebels, and brought in, with the assistance of some friendly Burmans, a dozen prisoners. To use a sporting expression, all the big bags of the season have been made by the cavalry; and it is to the complete demoralisation that they set on foot among the rebels that we owe in a great measure the present comparatively quiet state of the country. As a matter of fact, had the enemy been worth anything at all, they would have inflicted severe losses on the cavalry. Nothing is easier for infantry than to worst cavalry in difficult country, cut up by ravines and covered with dense jungle. As a squadron marched along a narrow track in Indian file, many and many a time might the Burmese have poured volleys into them with disastrous effect. But from very fear they dare not do it. The old game of breast works and stockades was played out. The enemy had no thought but to avoid all contact with our troops, especially the cavalry and mounted infantry. The rebel leaders, with their following, hurried from place to place, getting no peace or rest, and ever fearful of surprise. The

was the cavalry and mounted infantry would drop in upon them about daybreak at their bivouacs, or in the villages, soon taught them that they were not safe if our troops were within twenty miles of them. To be rudely awakened at dawn from one's slumbers by the thunder of horses' feet, and then ridden down like a sounder of pig, must be very unpleasant. Still, such was the early morning meal that was not unfrequently prepared for a rebelgang that deemed itself secure in its jungle fastness. But despite the fact that our Burmese foeman rarely showed fight, few troops have ever had harder work than those that have taken part in these operations. It was one incessant march from the 1st of December 1886 to the 1st of February 1887, late and early, day and night. It was the only way to do it, the only way to catch our wary slippery foe. Many a time have the mounted branches covered forty or fifty miles in a day, and had several brushes with the enemy en route. On more than one occasion long marches (thirtyfive to forty miles) through difficult country lasted from twenty-five to thirty hours, the troops being under arms and on the move all that time. Fortunately the climate was tolerably favourable, the nights not being very cold nor the days very warm. It was real hard arduous work while it lasted; but the fruits of that work, and good work it was, are now being reaped in the dispersal of the rebels, the peaceful state of the country, and a well-earned rest for the troops. Not that it would be justifiable to assuine that the last spark of rebellion is stamped out. Far from it. Let the experiences of the past year teach us to indulge no such false delusion. It is but a year

since the Government of India talked of reducing the army of occupation in Burma at an early date. So far from its being reduced, it was augmented by 10,000. Now once more it is going to be reduced, but this time on good grounds.

The rebels have been so severely handled, that they will think twice before they again take the field against our troops. A very large body of trained police (by April) 1887 there should be some 10,000 available) are ready to replace the troops and garrison all the posts and stations. There seems now good ground for believing that Upper Burma is well on the road to pacification, and that the future is not distant when the troubles of the past will be repaid by a considerable surplus of revenue. The soil of Upper Burma is almost everywhere fertile. True, at present thousands of square miles are overgrown with jungle. But thousands of square miles, as many as the present scant population can till, are producing rich crops of rice, maize, cotton, oil-seed, jowari, &c. When the population increases new lands will be cleared and cultivated. The Irrawaddy, Sittang, and other large rivers, afford every facility for commerce. The Lower Burma railway system is being extended from Tonghoo vid Ningyan and Yemathen to Mandalay. The next step will be to carry it northward into Assam, and thence onward until it connects with our Indian railway system on the banks of the Brahmaputra. Good roads are now being constructed, or will be shortly, throughout the length and breadth of the land, both to facilitate trade and aid the repression of rebellion. The peaceful inhabitants-that is, those who have taken no active part against our troops-have received incontrovertible proof that we can con