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mountains ranging to a height of 7000 feet, and valleys producing all the necessaries of life, and to a great extent unexplored. If those valleys do not equal in fertility the famed valley of the Herirud, they are surpassed by no other. From the chief town, Mashhad, the march to the capital, Teheran, is easy, the surface being level the whole way. From Teheran to the ancient capital, Ispahan, the distance is only 220 miles; and, as the Afghans found in 1722, when Ispahan is gained, all Persia collapses.

be utilised, would constitute a necessity on the part of the defenders of India to provide against it.

The third and most important advantage to Russia would be the command of the Persian Gulf, an advantage so great that it is not to be measured by words. The possession of the Persian Gulf will accrue to the Power of the first rank which shall hold Persia. Το obtain command of that Gulf has been the dream of every thoughtful Russian politician during the past fifty years. "We talk of India," they have said, "but we really want the Persian Gulf; and you English will not be able to prevent us." This is their dream, and it is a dream which may become a fact at any moment.

But a new base for future operations does not represent all, or nearly all, the advantages which Russia will reap from the occupation of Persia-an occupation, be it always borne in mind, which There is yet a fourth advantage may become an accomplished fact which will accrue to Russia from whenever, and as soon as, Russia her occupation of Persia, and that chooses. Not only will she gain is the supply of men inured to the this new base, second only in value climate which it will place at her to that which Herat would afford, disposal. It is true that it is the but in Ispahan she will obtain a fashion to sneer at the Persians as position flanking the line from cowards, and I am free to admit Herat to Kandahar. It is all very that, as at present constituted, their well to object that that line is army is despicable. But their army covered by an impassable desert. is despicable because the men have The desert is there, but it is not no confidence in their officers, and impassable. That which has been the officers have no confidence once done may be done again. In in themselves or in one another. January, 1722, Mahmoud of Kan- But when a man has arisen to lead dahar marched from that city, at them-a Nadir Shah, for instance, the head of an army 25,000 strong, himself a Khorasani-the Persians in the direction of Ispahan. He have fought well. Under the took the route by way of Sistan to ieadership of that marvellous chiefKerman, by the siege of which tan they even beat the Russians. he was detained many days, and I am quite sure that were they thence, by way of Yezd, to the subjected to the same training as capital, arriving before it on the 7th are the Sikhs and the Gurkhas in March. It is not recorded that India, and officered by the same he experienced many difficulties officers, they would prove efficient from the nature of the country, or soldiers. And there can be no that he sustained any losses except reason why a similar result should from the swords of the Persians, not follow their incorporation into and even these were inconsider- the Russian army. able. The very fact that such a flanking position existed, and might

I have now given four reasons to prove the enormous advantage

which would accrue to Russia from her occupation of Persia: I have shown that such an occupation offers no difficulties; that, compared with an attack on India, it is the merest child's-play; and that it will be attempted as soon as opportunity offers, certainly long before the more difficult enterprise is even thought of. And yet this Fortnightly Reviewer, who professes to expose all the designs of Russia, to give in detail all her means of operating against British interests in Asia, and discusses the chances of success of an attempt to invade British India, avoids all reference to the subject, which is far more prominent in inner Russian politics than an attack on India which has prompted the recent movements of the Russian troops in Asia and to cover which, demonstrations are incessantly made against the frontiers of Afghanistan. Neglecting the substance, the Reviewer has exhausted all his energies to combat the shadow.

But this is not all. Even when he refers to the chances of success of an invasion of India by Russia, the Reviewer greatly underrates the advantages at the disposal of the latter Power. He says, for instance, that he doubts "whether the Russians have more than a few hundred Turcoman cavalry ready for a long march." What then, I may ask, has become of the survivors of the defeat of Geok Tépé in January 1881? Of the many thousand Turkmans who fought, some thousands at least submitted. What, too, has become of the Turkmans of Merv? The whole of these yielded without striking a blow, and we may be sure that Russia did not slaughter them in cold blood. It cannot be that they have no trained horses. The testimony of many travellers, from

Burnes down to Vambéry, proves that there has ever been an abundance of horses among the Turkman tribes: horses ready to do the work of the desert, hardy, stouthearted, full of endurance. No: in those nomadic countries it is safe to assert that history repeats itself. From the earliest days, from Mahmoud of Ghazni down to Nadir Shah, the Turkman cavalry have invariably taken service with the conqueror of their desert homes, more especially when they have realised the fact that that conqueror desires to lead them to pastures rich in booty. As light cavalry they can scarcely be sur passed; they are accustomed to Eastern warfare; they make war support war. With such men Russia could ill dispense, and we may be sure that she has not dispensed with them. There are, at this moment, not hundreds, but thousands, of them at the beck and call of Russia.

Again, the Reviewer adds:" But above all, I think that Russia would have, for a great number of years to come, far more difficulty in finding the enormous train which would be necessary

for marching 100,000 men across from Herat to Kandahar, than we should find difficulty in supplying an army of 80,000 men at Kandahar." Is the writer, then, ignorant of the marvelous fertility of the valley of the Herirud; that its natural productions alone fit it to become the base of operations for an army second to none in the world? It may be that the irrigation works which fostered the natural fertility of the valley are in a state of disrepair; but a conqueror such as Russia, who never makes a step except to gain ground towards a predetermined goal, could in a very brief space of time repair those damages, and

restore to the "granary and garden of Central Asia" the prosperity which procured for it that significant title. Then, once more, the distance to Kandahar, what is it? Under 370 miles. The first 160 miles and the last 75 present but few difficulties to an army. Between the points reached by these two lines-that is, between Farrah and Girishkthe road is not easy, and there is a scarcity of water. But a great Power like Russia, which should have had time to settle in its new base on the Herirud, and it would not take long, would make light of such difficulties. It seems probable, indeed, that she will have a line of rail to Girishk before England has one to Kandahar. And then, on whose side would the difficulties be the greater? When the Russian line is open to Sarakhs, it will not, under the altered circumstances of the day, long stop short of Herat. And after that, it will go on, by easy stages, to Sabzwar, to Farrah, to Girishk. Between that place and Kandahar, or, possibly on the Helmand, not far from Girishk, will occur, in some future time, the inevitable conflict.

But if the Reviewer has underrated the power of Russia for mis chief, and misconceived her immediate aims, in Central Asia, he has, on the other hand, enormously exaggerated her striking capability in Europe. His estimate of the total mobilised army, amounting to four millions, is absurd. In the admirable article on the Russian army which appeared in Maga' for last month the correct figures are given. These figures, which are confirmed by Colonel Vogt's 'Die Europäischen Heeren der Gegenwart,' reduce the Reviewer's numbers by one-half. "How many of these," pertinently asks a writer

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in the 'St James's Gazette,' "could be assembled on the western border to confront a European foe? For of the above totals but 1,275,000 men, with 2982 guns, are available for this purpose, and 400,000 are reserve divisions with their artillery, whose formation would require considerable time. The best judges opine that nothing approaching a million could be brought into the field against a western enemy."

Whence, then, does the Reviewer obtain his four millions, a host which is to eat up Austria-Hungary, and the contemplation of which makes even Bismarck tremble? Not more than nine or ten years have elapsed since the whole might of Russia, aided by Roumania, was brought into the field to crush Turkey. Not only did she accomplish her self-imposed task with great difficulty, but unless she had corrupted more than one Turkish general, she would have failed altogether to accomplish it. Is it possible that she has grown so much within the last ten years as to be able now to meet in the field, without a pang, the combined armies of Germany and Austria-Hungary-this nation which then, though ably supported by allies, was but just able to cope with Turkey? Common-sense forbids one to think so. The historical conscience of every man who has studied the European question repels the idea. It cannot be, it is not, true.

One word more, and it is a word personal to myself. The Fortnightly Reviewer singles out for attack an idea I propounded a short time ago, to the effect that in the event of a war for existence between England and Russia it would be a wise policy to land a combined army of English and Turkish troops on the isthmus which separates the Black Sea from

the Caspian, and thus to sever the communications between Russia and her Asiatic army. I had not put forward this idea without much thought, or without the conviction that superficial critics would run foul of it. I am, however, spared the trouble of defending it in these pages, for this Reviewer, whilst attacking it in one place, completely justifies it in another. Whilst, in page 342, he calls it "mere map-maker's warfare," he admits, in page 344, "that the Russians themselves think that we could harm them in the Caucasus and keep them out of Asia Minor by cutting their maritime supplyline across the Black Sea." Further, in page 346, he allows that the very presence of an English fleet in the Black Sea would force the Russians "to keep in the Caucasus a vast force which would otherwise be available for service in Afghanistan or Persia." Surely, if the presence in the Black Sea of a British fleet alone would lock up "a vast force” in the Caucasus, the dread of the landing in those regions of a combined British and Turkish army would retain there all the troops which otherwise

would go to make up the invading army of Persia or of India. What an opportunity for England to recover her lost influence in the former country!

I have now concluded my criticisms. If, in many points, I have differed from the Fortnightly Reviewer, there are at all events some on which we are at perfect accord. I desire here publicly to thank him for his protest against the gratuitous unwise surrender of Port Hamilton, the reduction of the Horse Artillery, and the timorous policy regarding the New Hebrides: I wish to acknowledge the patriotic tone of his article, and to welcome his conviction, which I share, that whenever the tremendous battle between England and her colossal antagonist shall occur, England, if true to herself, will ultimately win. The conviction that an Englishman cannot be beaten has stood our countrymen in great stead on many a hard-contested field; but never has it been more necessary that such a conviction should be firmly held than it will be in the coming struggle between the Anglo-Saxon and the Russ.

G. B. MALLESON.

THE SONG OF THE BELL.

BY SCHILLER.

“Divos voco; mortuos plango: fulgura frango.”

Firmly walled up in the earth

The mould is set of well-burnt clay;
To-day the Bell must have its birth!
Then bustle, lads! To work, away!
Hotly from the brow

The sweat must trickle now,

If the work is to sound the master's praise.
But the blessing, it comes from above always.

With our grave task were fitly blended

A

grave and serious word or two:

If 'tis by goodly talk attended,

Then toil goes light and briskly through.

So let us now contemplate duly

What's shaped by our weak hands and thews;

The man is despicable truly,

Who ne'er his handiwork reviews.

'Tis this, that man's especial grace is,
For this was reason given, that he
Within his heart and soul retraces
The things his hand has made to be.

Logs of pine now have them ready,
Dry and seasoned well belike,
That the flames, compact and steady,
May against the cauldron strike.

The copper's fluxed; now in
Quickly throw the tin;

That the tough bell-metal so

Duly may combine and flow.

What in the pit there, darkly glooming,

Our hands with help of fire shall frame,

High in the belfry turret booming,

Our doings loudly shall proclaim. On many an ear, on many a morrow, 'Twill vibrate on to distant time, Will with the heavy-hearted sorrow,

And with the hymnal chorus chime.

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