fide with any of these contrary Opinions. We shall not meddle with the state of things unknown to us, but arguing only from what we know, fhall reft contented to conclude, that as the fimple Existence of matter was not fufficient to produce the Wonders of Nature, but 'twas neceffary fome External Principle should produce and direct its motion to that end; fo likewife that the motion of matter thus regulated and directed, was not fufficient to reflect upon its own Conceptions and manner of conceiving things, but there was an abfolute neceffity of fome caufe of a higher nature than matter or its motion, to put us into a condition of Thinking.

CHAP. VI.

Containing a further Confideration of the Ar guments for the Existence of God; together with the Spirituality and Immortality of the Soul, taken from the Principles of Phi lofophy.

IN

N the foregoing Chapters, we have but just opened this Matter; in this we shall fearch a little deeper into it, by going over the fame Principles again, which are too abftracted to be well understood at firft view, unless by Perfons very well exercifed in fuch Speculations.

There are Two ways of confidering the Univerfe, the one common to all Men who make any use of their Reason, and that is to obferve the feveral parts of it, the Connexion, Order and

peculiar Uses of those Parts, and endeavour to
discover in them fome Characters of the Wildom
of their Maker; the other, which is peculiar to
Philofophers, is to examin the Principles, the
Springs and Caufes of things, and to dive into
the very composition of them: Both these ways
equally lead us to the knowledge of God, but 'tis
the last we must at present infift upon.

We find in the World some matter, which
exists and which moves after fuch a manner; and
in fome portion of this matter, we find a Prin-
ciple which thinks, which reflects on it felf, which
judges of common Attributes, and that abstracts;
which applies the most perfect of its Idea, to a
Being Infinitely Perfect, and whofe Defires have no
bounds. If matter does not derive all these Per-
fections from it self, they must come to it from
without, and confequently there must be a God
who imparted them to it. Thus the Existence
of matter, motion, the differences of this motion,
Thought, and the differences of Thought, the Idea
we have of God, together with that fort of In-
finity we find in our Defires, do all prove the Exi-
ftence of God.

I. Matter does not exist Effentially and of it self. To apprehend which Truth, we need only fuppofe this undeniable Principle, viz. That every Being is determined to exift, either meerly because it is a Being; fo that 'tis effential to whatever exifts, to exift neceffarily; or elfe that it is determined to exift, by the help of some external Principle, which is the caufe of its being what it is; or laftly, that it is determined to exift by the fublime excellency of its own Nature; because having all manner of Perfections, it must needs have that of necessary existence,

D 4

It

A

It cannot be affirmed, that matter is determined to exist, meerly because it does exist, that is, because it exists in this moment, it does not follow from hence that it has exifted in that which is past, or must needs exist in that which is to come, because it does not appear to us, that those moments of existence have any natural or essential connexion one with another.

But t'will be objected perhaps, that every Being is determined to be, meerly because it is a Being, as nothing is determined not to exist, because it is nothing, which Principle is certainly falfe. For whether Thought be a fubftance or an accident, it is at least a Being in oppofition to nothing; it is something, and not an absolute nothing. Yet the Atheists do not believe that it has always been, or must always continue to be. They will grant you, that the Principle of it, which (as they imagin) is matter or motion, has always exifted, but they will not allow, that Thought which without doubt adds something to this motion and this matter, has always existed; and confequently 'tis falfe that a Being is as abfolutely determined to exift hereafter, and to have always existed to this time, meerly because it is a Being; as nothing is determined not to exist at all, and never to have existed, because it is nothing. The difference confifts in this, that nothing being a meer negation, has no need of any thing in order to its non-existence; whereas a Being which is fome thing pofitive, cannot exist any farther than the principle of its existence does fubfift, which is not the general quality of Being, fince we have already feen that there are Beings which do not always exift; but it must be, either an efficient caufe from whence it has received

all

all it has, or elfe the eminence of its own Perfections, which puts it in a condition above receiving any thing.

'Tis not by the eminence of its own Perfections that matter neceffarily exifts, fince it is so far from having all perfections, that it has scarcely any at all; which gave occasion to some to say, 'tis Tabula rafa, potentia fimpliciffima; which is capable of receiving any thing, but has nothing of its own. It may become bright, glittering, &c. but these are qualities 'tis in a capacity of acquiring, and which it had not before. Besides, according to the most rational part of Philofophers, they are mixt qualities, which are much lefs the motion of matter, than the Sensations of

the Mind.

A Being that is infinite, and has all manner of perfections, cannot but have that also of necessary exiftence; and a Being which necessarily exists, has all manner of perfections, those things are reciprocal. For did not an infinite Being neceffarily exift, 'twould be falfe to fay, it had all manner of perfections; for the principal perfection would be wanting, which is to exist effentially of it self, without the help or affiftance of any other Beings. Should a Being of a neceffary existence want any perfections, it would be limited; and if 'twere limited, fome principle or other must limit it; and if it had any Principle, it would not exist of it felf, which overthrows the Suppofition. Indeed, if it has not received its perfections, but derives them from itself, there's as much reason it should have all kind of perfections as any one of them, and have them all in an infinite, rather than a limited degree. For fince it has no principle of its existence, neither has it any principle to limit

its

its excellency and perfections to Ten or any other certain number of Degrees: Whence then could a Being that is of it felf, whatever it is, be limited in its excellence? Since therefore matter does not exist of it self, we must acknowledge a Supream Cause that gave it its existence.

II. If the existence of matter does not seem to be neceffary, much lefs will its motion appear to be fo. For if we know enough of the nature of matter, to know that it cannot be made incapable of receiving motion, unless it ceases to be what it is, we do alfo understand it well enough, to know, that it would not ceafe to be what it is, though it were not in actual Motion. This needs not be proved in Cartefius's Syftem of Philofophy, who pretends that Motion and Reft are Two Modes which matter does indifferently receive; neither will Ariftotle's Party have any thing to except against the truth of this principle.

As for Epicurus and his Followers, 'twould be eafie to convince them, by distinguishing Three forts of Bodies; viz. Senfible Bodies, A toms which compofe thefe Bodies, and the Parts which we must conceive to compose those parts.

Senfible Bodies do feem fometimes to be at rest, and fometimes in motion; this is certain: But the difficulty is to know, whence this reft of fenfible Bodies does proceed, and whether it is not contrary to Nature. It is pretended by fome, that the parts of fenfible Bodies are at reft, because their Atoms being lock'd one into another, do as it were by a mutual conflict refift each other's motion; and fo by that Oppofition, their course is stop'd.

But