ABSTRACT OF TITLE-continued. been repaid, unless perhaps, where the mortgage was only equitable (Drummond V. Tracy, John. 608). But a deed which does not affect the right to sell need not be abstracted. When it is necessary (as it almost always is), to shew the birth, death, or marriage of any person, the proper certificates of these facts must be produced; when it is necessary to prove a pedigree, as where a descent occurs in the course of the abstract, then the heirships must be proved if possible by strict evidence, i.e., by means of certificates of births, deaths, and marriages, and by the wills and letters of administration of persons having a possible prior title; but failing such proof, evidence of deeds, wills of relatives, extracts from parish books, from family Bibles, from tombstones, and such like, may be given. It should also be shewn that no outstanding interest requires to be got in, such as dower, freebench, curtesy, or any unsatisfied charge; also (in the usual case) that legacies charged on the land have been paid; also (if the property is sold free of land tax), the certificate of such redemption, together with the receipt and memorandum of registration, should be produced. In the case of leasehold properties, the abstract should shew the original lease and all subsequent assignments thereof, unless where the original lease is of very ancient date, when some of the mesne assignments may be left out. Also, when the lease is less than sixty years old, the lessor's title must be shewn. When land (whether freehold or leasehold), has devolved upon any one by the death of another since the 19th of May, 1853, the payment of succession duty must be shewn. By the Act 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 24, the wilful concealment of any document, or the falsification thereof, is a misde meanour. It is usual, however, to limit the contents of the abstract of title by special conditions of sale. See title CONDITIONS OF SALE. ABUTTALS (abutter). The buttings and boundings of land, either to the east, west, north, or south, shewing on what other lands or places it does abut. But strictly speaking, the sides on the breadth are properly adjacentes, i.e., lying or bordering, and only the ends on the length are abuttantes, i.e., abutting or bounding. Cowel. The importance of a careful statement of the abuttals in describing the parcels in conveyancing consists in the facility thereby afforded of establishing the identity of the lands or plots of land sold, at ABUTTALS-continued. almost any distance of time. Also, in criminal law, in indictments for those offences which the law regards as being of a local character, an accurate description is necessary, and this is often best given by abuttals. Thus, an indictment for not repairing a highway must specify the situation of the road within the parish; also, on an indictment for night poaching, the locus in quo must be described either by name, ownership, occupation, or abuttals, and it would not be sufficient to describe it as a certain close in the parish of A. And by the rules of pleading (H. T. 16 Vict. r. 18) in an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, the close must be designated in the declaration by name or abuttals, or other description, to avoid on the one hand the necessity of the defendant's pleading liberum tenementum, and on the other hand the necessity of the plaintiff's new assigning. Taylor on Evidence, 268, 327. ACCEPTANCE. An When a bill isꞌ drawn by A. B. upon C. D., and C. D. writes the word "accepted" and his name across the face of the bill, the bill becomes his acceptance. Such an acceptance is usually made by C. D. when he holds goods consigned to him by A. B. and not yet paid for, or when he is otherwise in debt to A. B. When he accepts it under other circumstances, the acceptance is for the accommodation or honour of the drawer. acceptance by E. F., who is not a party to the bill, would also be an acceptance for honour or accommodation, but in this case, for that of the drawee. Every acceptance must since 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 78, s. 2, be on the bill,- -a requisite which by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 6), is extended to a foreign bill as well as an inland one. An acceptance may be either general, as where the word "accepted," either alone or with the words "payable at" a particular place is written on the bill, or it may be special, as where the words "and not elsewhere are added to the particular place mentioned in the acceptance for payment. For the general law as to the liability of an acceptor, see title BILLS OF EXCHANGE. " ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT. The acceptance which is intended by the Statute of Frauds must either precede or be contemporaneous with the receipt of the goods, and as there can be no receipt without delivery, it follows that the acceptance must be separated from the receipt by the delivery, thus,-1, acceptance; 2, delivery, and 3, receipt. Consequently the acceptance signifies a mere expression of one's selection of the particular goods or article. ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT-contd. Upon the goods being delivered and received, the purchaser if dissatisfied with those sent may return them; consequently the acceptance and receipt which the statute speaks of does not preclude subsequent objection. ACCESS: See title BASTARD. ACCESSARY. A person guilty of a felonious offence, not by being the actor, or actual perpetrator, of the crime, nor by being present at its performance, but by being some way concerned therein, either before or after its commission. If he has been concerned in it before its commission he is termed an accessary before the fact; if after, an accessary after the fact. An accessary before the fact is defined to be one who, being absent at the time the crime is committed, yet procures, counsels, or commands another to commit it; and, in this case, absence is necessary to constitute him an accessary, for if he be present, he is guilty of the crime as principal. Thus if A. advises B. to kill another, and B. does it in the absence of A., in this case B. is principal and A. accessary to the murder. An accessary after the fact is one who, knowing a felony to have been committed, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon; and generally any assistance whatever given to a felon, to hinder his being apprehended, tried, or suffering punishment, makes such assister an accessary, as furnishing him with a horse to escape his pursuers, money or victuals to support him, a house or other shelter to conceal him, or using open force and violence to rescue or protect him (2 Hawk. P. C. 316, 317, 318). And now by stat. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 94, s. 1, it is enacted, that whoever shall become an accessary before the fact to any felony, may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished in all respects as if he were the principal felon. And by sect. 3 of the same statute, it is enacted, that whoever shall become an accessary after the fact to any felony, may be indicted and convicted either as an accessary after the fact to the principal felony, together with the principal felon, or after the conviction of the principal felon, or may be indicted and convicted of a substantive felony, whether the principal felon shall or shall not have been previously convicted, and may thereupon be punished in like manner as any accessary after the fact to the same felony, if convicted as an accessary, may be punished. And see generally the last-mentioned Act, which is intituled "An Act to consolidate and amend the Statute Law of England and Ireland relating to Accessaries to and Abettors of Indictable Offences." ACCESSARY-continued. To a misdemeanour there are no accessaries, as neither is there to the offence of high treason. See also title AIDERS AND ABETTORS. ACCESSIO. This is a term in Roman law used to denote a mode of acquisition of property by natural means; and the like use of the word is not uncommon in English law. Thus, the maxim "accessio cedit principali" denotes generally that an accessory thing when annexed to (as it naturally is annexed to) a principal thing becomes part and parcel of the latter, and thereupon and thereby becomes the property of the owner of the principal thing. This mode of acquisition is particularly illustrated by the Law of Fixtures, as well in English as in Roman law, the maxim of the English law being "Quidquid plantatur solo, solo cedit," and of the Roman law being "Omne quod inædificatur solo, solo cedit." (See Brown on Fixtures, 2nd ed. 1872.) But the principle is of universal application, applying to the incorporation of any substance of minor importance in, or its addition to, another substance of a larger or principal importance. By many civilians it is used as the general term, including in it the various more particular natural modes of acquisition, which are designated respectively Alluvio, Specificatio, Confusio, Commixtio. See these several titles. ACCIDENT. This is any unforeseen event that is not attributable to the contrivance or negligence of the party. It is a rule of all systems of jurisprudence that no one is liable for an accident, being purely such (Wakeman v. Robinson, 1 Bing. 213; 8 Moore, 63); but it is an equally universal rule, that the slightest negligence will exclude the defence of accident (Kearney v. London, Brighton, &c. Ry. Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. 411). But this nonliability from accident does not, of course, protect the purchaser of a specific chattel from payment of the price, in case the chattel is either injured or destroyed by accident. Tarling v. Baxter, Tudor's M. C. 596. The Courts of Equity go further than the Courts of Law, and attempt even to relieve parties against the consequences of accident, but within a limited group of cases only. Thus, if a party has, to begin with, a conscientious title to relief, then if the accident consists in the loss of a bond, or of a negotiable or non-negotiable instrument, the Court of Chancery will assist him to getting paid, upon the one condition of his giving a bond of indemnity to the obligor against any possible second payment; but the Courts of Law also have now ACCIDENT-continued. acquired jurisdiction to give relief in such cases upon the like condition, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125 (C. L. P. Act, 1854). Equity will also occasionally relieve in the case of a lost deed (Dalston v. Coatsworth, 1 P. Wms. 731). With reference to a destroyed instrument, whether the same is negotiable (Wright v. Maidstone, 1 K. & J. 708) or non-negotiable (Byles on Bills, 372), Equity seems to give no relief, inasmuch as the Law can do so. Sed quære, Hansard v. Robinson, 7 B. & C. 95. The Courts of Equity will also relieve against the defective execution of a power, but that only in favour of a purchaser (including a mortgagee or lessee), or of a creditor, or of a wife, a child, or a charity. They also relieve against mistaken payments by an executor, decreeing, for example, the residuary legatees or next of kin to make up, i e., refund, to an annuitant-legatee the diminution which the annuity fund may have sustained through a reduction in the value of stock, occasioned by Act of Parliament. But the Court refuses to extend its relief to cases of contract, for there the parties have been to some extent negligent in not providing against the particular casualty, e.g., the destruction of premises leased (Bullock v. Dommitt, 6 T. R. 650); and the relief which the Court gives to one party will never be given so as to prejudice another. White v. Nutts, 1 P. Wms. 61. ACCIDENTAL DEATH. For the law of compensation in the case of persons killed by railway accidents, see Lord Campbell's Act (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93); also the Act amending same (27 & 28 Vict. c. 95). By the latter Act any of the persons beneficially interested in the death may, when no action for compensation is brought within six months from the death by the executor or administrator of the deceased, bring such action; and the defendant is enabled to pay a lump sum of money into Court, without specifying the shares into which the same is to be divided among the parties interested. ACCIDENTS, INSURANCE AGAINST. The law of insurance in its general principles is applicable to this particular species of insurance. Thus, the assuring person must have an interest in the life of the assuree, under the stat. 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2 (Shilling v. Accidental Death Insurance Co., 2 H. & N. 42). Also, there must be a full disclosure of all circumstances material to the exposure to accidents (Shilling's Case, supra). It is usual in such policies to provide that the injury from the accident insured against shall be caused by some outward and visible means, a defence in law, consisting (as the name imports) of two parts; viz. something given or done to the plaintiff by the defendant as a satisfaction, and agreed to (or accorded) as such by the plaintiff. Therefore accord without satisfaction is not a good plea (Parker v. Ramsbottom, 3 B & C. 257), as neither is satisfaction without accord (Hardman v. Bellhouse, 9 M. & W. 596); but accord and satisfaction with one of several enures to the benefit of all (Wallace v. Rensall, 7 M. & W. 264; Nicholson v. Revill, 4 A. & E. 675). But the satisfaction must be complete and executed. Flocton v. Hall, 16 Q. B. 1039. In the case of an ascertained sum of money, a less sum is no satisfaction for the debt unless there is some additional consideration (Fitch v. Sutton, 5 East, 230; Cumber v. Wane, 1 Sm. L. C., 6th ed. 301); but in other cases the value of the satisfaction is not inquired into (Pinnel's Case, 5 Rep. 117 a: Curlewis v. Clark, 3 Exch. 375); excepting so far as to ascertain that the chattel given in satisfaction is of some value (Preston v. Christmas, 2 Wils. 86; Cartwright v. Cook, 3 B. & Ad. 701). One security is no satisfaction for another, unless it is of a higher or better quality than the original security; e. g., by being negotiable. Sibree v. Tripp, 15 M. & W. 23. After breach, accord and satisfaction is in general a good defence (when specially pleaded) to an action on any contract, whether made by parol or by specialty (Blake's Case, 6 Rep. 43 b); unless where a sum certain is payable under the specialty (Peytoe's Case, 9 Rep. 79 a); but before breach it is never a good defence to an action on a specialty "nam unumquodque eodem modo quo colligatur dissolvi debet." An accord and satisfaction obtained by fraud may be set aside in equity (Stewart v. Great Western Ry. Co. 2 De G. J. & S. 319); and a receipt given for money received as compensation under circumstances amounting to imposition, or even undue consideration, will not estop the injured party even at Law (Roberts v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co. 1 F. & F. 460; ACCOUNT (ACTION OF). An action which lies against a party to compel him to render an account to another with whom he has had transactions; and the writ by which this action was commenced was thence termed a writ of account (F. N. B. 116 to 119; Co. Litt. 172 a). From the greater facilities, however, which are afforded by the Courts of Equity in taking an account of profits or receipts, the action of account at law is now seldom resorted to, one of the most recent cases in which it was used being Beer v. Beer (12 C. B. 2). The action may still, however, be brought in a proper case; for by the common law, it lies against a bailiff or receiver; also, against one merchant at the suit of another for not rendering a reasonable account of profits; and by the stat. 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 27, it is made to lie by one joint tenant or tenant in common against the other as bailiff (although not expressly so appointed) for receiving more than comes to his just share or proportion. This action as between merchants and merchants was an exception to the Statute of Limitations (21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3), but since the M. L. A. Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97), s. 9, it is no longer so, the limit for bringing the action being now six years in all cases. The equitable jurisdiction in account applies in the following cases :-(1.) Where a principal asks for an account against his agent, there existing in this case a fiduciary relation between the parties (Mackenzie v. Johnston, 4 Mad. 373), but not in the converse case of agent against principal (Padwick v.Stanley, 9 Hare, 627) (2.) Where there are mutual accounts between plaintiff and defendant; i. e., when each of two parties has both received and paid on the other's account (Phillips v. Phillips, 9 Hare, 471). And (3.) where the accounts are of a very complicated character, and therefore not admitting of being examined on a trial at Nisi Prius. O'Connor v. Spaight, 1 Sch. & Lef. 305. ACCOUNTANT TO THE CROWN. This denotes generally one who receives money for the Crown, and is accountable therefor. The Crown has a lien upon the lands (other than the copyhold lands) of the accountant for any moneys he may misapply or become chargeable with, and such lien attaches as from the time he becomes such accountant, and continues to attach, even as against purchasers of the lands without notice (Coxhead's Case, F. Moore, 126). Since June 4th, 1839, every such lien of the Crown must be registered under 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, and under the Act 22 & ACCOUNTANT TO THE CROWN-contd. 23 Vict. c. 35, must be re-registered every five years; but since 1st November, 1865, no future lien is to affect a purchaser, although with notice, until a writ of execution has been registered, under 28 & 29 Vict. c. 104. See title CROWN DEBTS. ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL. This was an officer of the Court of Chancery, appointed by the statute, 12 Geo. 1, c. 32, but who has since been superseded by an officer called the Paymaster General of England, under the Chancery Funds Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 44), and the Chancery Fund Rules, 1872, which came into operation on the 7th January, 1873. See title PAYMASTER-GENERAL. ACCOUNTS CURRENT. These are running accounts, or open accounts. ACCOUNT STATED. This is nothing more than the admission of a balance due from one party to another; and that balance being due there is a debt; and the statement of the account implies a promise in law to pay the debt shewn by the balance. For an account stated, it is requisite that a sum certain should be due in certainty (Hughes v. Thorpe, 5 M. & W. 656); but the sum need not be payable in præsenti (Wheatley v. Williams, 1 M. & Ŵ. 533). The account must have been stated to the creditor himself or his agent, and is not sufficient if made to a stranger (Tucker v. Barrow, 7 B. & C. 623). The statement may be in writing or by word of mouth (Singleton v. Barrett, 2 C. & J. 368); an I. O. U. is evidence of an account stated (Jacobs v. Fisher, 1 C. B. 178). But to revive debts barred by statute, the account stated must be in writing, 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 1. An account stated is not conclusive, but an error therein may be shewn (Thomas v. Hawkes, 8 M. & W. 140); also, that an item therein is not a valid debt for want of consideration (French v. French, 2 M. & G. 644). It is, however, no objection to a debt that it arose upon a contract which was bad for want of writing within the Statute of Frauds (Cocking v. Ward, 1 C. B. 858), unless the contract has continued executory. Lord Falmouth v. Thomas, 1 C. & M. 89. It is a rule of law, that an infant cannot state an account (Trueman v. Hurst, 1 T. R. 40); upon attaining his age of twenty-one years he may, however, ratify such an account. Williams v. Moor, 11 M. & W. 256. ACCRETION. A mode of acquisition by natural law. See title ACCESSIO. ACCRUER, CLAUSE OF. This is an express clause frequently occurring in the case of gifts by deed or will to persons as tenants in common, providing that upon the death of one or more of the beneficiaries his or their shares shall go to the survivors or survivor. It is a rule of law, that there is "no survivorship upon survivorship; " i.e. that the clause of accruer extends only to the original, not also to the accrued, shares, unless in terms it is expressly made to extend to the latter also, which it customarily is made to do. Pain v. Benson, 3 Atk. 80. ACCUMULATIONS. The rule which limits the accumulation of the income of property used to be the rule of perpetuities, viz., a life or lives in being, twentyone years, and (where gestation actually existed) the period of gestation (Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372); but, in consequence of the supposed abuse of that rule in Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 112, and by virtue of the so-called Thellusson Act (39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 98), the period within which such accumulation may at the present day be lawfully directed is one or other severally, and not two or more together, of the following periods, namely: (1.) The life of the grantor; (4.) The minority or minorities of any The Thellusson Act applies both to real and to personal property; also, whether the direction to accumulate is given expressly in so many words, or arises by implication only (Macdonald v. Bryce, 2 Keen, 276), taking place by operation of law, and without regard to the question whether the accumulation, when it arises from an implied direction, takes place accidentally or necessarily (Evans v. Hellier, 5 Cl. & F. 114), and also without regard to the question whether the interests of takers are vested or not. Shaw v. Rhodes, 1 My. & Cr. 135. The direction to accumulate is, in the general case, void as to the excess only (Marshall v. Holloway, 2 Sw. 450); but where the direction exceeds not only the limit prescribed by the Thellusson Act, but also the rule of perpetuities, it is void ACCUMULATIONS continued. in toto, and not merely as to the excess. Boughton v. James, 1 Coll. 26. The Thellusson Act directs that the income directed to be accumulated shall, so far as the direction is void for excess, belong to the person or persons who" would have been entitled thereto if such accumulation had not been directed;" and the statute, in this part of it, has been construed as follows: I. As to realty, (1.) If there is no residuary devise the heir takes (Eyre v. Marsden, 2 Keen, 564); and in case of his death during the period of excess, the future income will go; (a.) In the case of the heir having taken a chattel interest, to his next of kin (Sewell v. Denny, 10 Beav. 315); and (b.) In the case of the heir having taken a freehold interest, to his, next of kin (1 Vict. c. 26, s. 6), as being at the best an interest pur autre vie only; (2.) If there is a residuary devise the residuary devisee takes. 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 25. II. As to personalty, (1.) If there is no residuary be- III. As to realty and personalty equally. If the income directed to be accumulated is the income of residue, then, (1.) So far as the residue consists of personal estate the next of kin take (Pride v. Fooks, 2 Beav. 430); but (2.) So far as the residue consists of real estate the heir takes. Wildes v. Davies, 1 Sm. & Giff. 475. The Thellússon Act itself excepts from its operation the following directions, namely: (1.) Provisions for the payment of the debts, whether of the settlor or testator (as the case may be), or |