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HISTORY OF EUROPE,

FOR 1813,

CHAPTER I.

Meeting of Parliament.-Prince Regent's Speech on opening the Session.Debates on the Address.-Sir Francis Burdett's Motion concerning the Regency.

THE new parliament met on the 24th of November, 1812. After the usual formalities had been gone through, the Prince Regent, on the 30th of the same month, pronounced from the throne a speech which embraced a comprehensive view of the great events

of the year. His royal highness stated, that he had been induced to take the earliest opportunity of meeting his parliament after the late elections; and he was persuaded they would cordially participate in the satisfaction, which he derived from the improvement of the state of public affairs during the course of the year. That the valour displayed by his majesty's forces, and those of his allies, in the peninsula, on 10 many occasions during the last campaign, and the consummate skill with which the operations had been

conducted by general the Marquis of Wellington, had led to consequences of the utmost importance to the common cause. By transferring the war into the interior of Spain, and by the glorious and ever-memorable victory obtained at Salamanca, he had compelled the enemy to raise the siege of Cadiz; and the southern provinces of the kingdom had been thus delivered from the armies of France. Although his royal highness could not but regret that the efforts of the French, combined with a view to one great operation, had rendered it necessary to withdraw from the siege of Bur gos, and to evacuate Madrid, for the purpose of concentrating the main body of the allied forces; these efforts of the enemy had however been attended with important sacrifices on his part, which must materially con

tribute to extend the resources and facilitate the exertions of the Spanish nation. His royal highness expressed his firm reliance on the determination of parliament to continue every aid in support of a contest which had first given to the continent of Europe, the example of persevering and successful resistance to the power of France, and on which not only the liberties of the nations of the peninsula, but the best interests of his majesty's dominions essentially depended.

The restoration of peace betwixt his majesty and the courts of St Petersburgh and Stockholm was an nounced, and copies of the treaties were laid before parliament. The exertions of the Russian empire were highly applauded. By the magnanimity of its emperor, by the zeal and disinterestedness of all ranks of his subjects, by the firmness and intrepidity of his forces, the presumptuous expectations of the enemy had been signally disap pointed. The enthusiasm of the Russian people had increased with the difficulties of the contest, and the dangers with which they were surrounded. They had submitted to sacrifices of which there are few examples in the history of the world. A confident hope was expressed by his royal high. ness, that the determined perseverance of his imperial majesty would be crowned with ultimate success; and that this contest, in its result, would have the effect of establishing, upon a foundation never to be shaken, the security and independence of the Russian empire. The proof of confidence which his royal highness had received from his imperial majesty, who had recently sent his fleets to the ports of this country, was in the highest degree gratifying; and it was added, that his imperial majesty might rely on the fixed determination of his royal highness to afford him the most cordial

support in the great contest in which he was engaged.

The conclusion of a supplementary treaty with the regency of Sicily, the object of which was to provide for the more extensive application of the military force of the Sicilian government to offensive operations, was also announced; this measure, combined with the liberal principles now happily prevailing in the councils of his Sicilian majesty, was calculated to augment his power and resources, and, at the same time, to render them essentially serviceable to the common cause.

The declaration of war by the government of the United States of America, was said, in the speech, to have been made under circumstances which might have afforded a reasonable expectation, that the amicable relations betwixt the two nations would not long be interrupted; but the conduct and pretensions of the American government had hitherto prevented the conclusion of any pacific arrangement. The measures of hostility, on the part of America, had been principally directed against the adjoining British provinces, and every effort had been made to seduce the inhabitants of them from their allegiance to his majesty. The proofs, however, of loyalty and attachment received from his majesty's subjects in North America, were highly satisfactory. The attempts of the enemy to invade Upper Canada, had not only proved abortive, but, by the judicious arrangements of the governor-general, and by the skill and decision with which the military operations had been conducted, the forces of the enemy assembled for that purpose in one quarter, had been compelled to capitulate, and in another had been completely defeated. The best efforts of his royal highness should not be wanting for restoring the relations of peace and amity between the two

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countries; but until this object could be attained, without sacrificing the maritime rights of Great Britain, he relied upon the cordial support of parliament in a vigorous prosecution of the war. The prince concluded by stating, that the approaching expiration of the charter of the East India company, rendered it necessary that the early attention of parliament should be called to the propriety of providing for the future government of the Indian provinces of the British empire.

A very wide field of discussion was entered into by the members of both houses of parliament, when the ad. dress was moved; and a comprehensive survey was taken of the state of public affairs. Athough men of all parties approved of the general spirit which pervaded the address (which was of course an echo of the speech,) the alleged practical errors of administration were the subject of severe censure. It was admitted, indeed, that the address would have been most unsatisfactory, had it, with respect to the great contest in the peninsula, or the cause in which the Emperor of Russia was engaged, assumed in any degree a lower tone than that which pervaded it. "Nothing less, it was observed, was demanded by the interests of the country, by a proper zeal for our own honour, or by a true regard to the wetfare of our allies, embarked in the same great cause with ourselves. The speech from the throne anticipated wisdom, firmness, and prudence, from parliament on the present trying occasion, when the eyes of Europe, nay, of the world, were fixed upon us. There was nothing novel in this language to be sure, but there was the most splendid novelty in the circumstances to which it was applied. Parliament would exercise the same wisdom, it would evince the same perse

verance, it would display the same firmness, especially on the great question of the war in the peninsula, as it had hitherto shewn. That country, it was remarked, at this moment naturally excited the most lively interestfor great as the triumphs achieved there had been, they were not unchequered by misfortune. But, as it was certainly the highest mark of wisdom to persevere, with reasonable grounds of hope, in the face of danger and difficulty, so it was the highest character of firmness to meet the tide of success without intoxication, to analyze the grounds upon which it depended, and from that analysis, carefully and cautiously pursued, to deduce one general and consistent ground of public action. Even if our success had been general and unqualified, a wise man would say to those who represented an enlightened nation, to those who were prepared and anxious to do their duty-be not led away by this success-be not intoxicated with it-let not its lustre so dazzle your faculties, that you perceive neither whence it originated, how it may be rendered permanent, nor to what ultimate objects it may be applied. We had, indeed, done much in Spain; but, what still remained to be done? And that question naturally led to a review of the events which had taken place there, since the time when Lord Wellington was before Badajoz. From the very commencement of the struggle in the peninsula, the only solid ground of success, the only practical system of resistance which could be adopted, was to awaken in the people of Spain a spirit of hostility to France, and to succour and aid that hostility upon a broad and extensive scale of operations. With our force and resources properly directed in that way, great advantages might be expected, and final triumph be ensured. It was, indeed, very clear, that the ruler of

France never would desist from his object, till some overwhelming force should interrupt the career of his ambition. If the Spanish people could once bring themselves to feel that there was no evil to be put in competition for a moment with that of submission to the government of France; that loss of property, loss of relations, loss of all that was dear to them, loss of life itself, was small and insignificant, compared to that tremendous and overwhelming calamity-submission to France; if they could be brought to this pitch of patriotism and resistance, every thing might then be hoped from the contest. Our efforts co-operating with this general feeling, might have been productive of the greatest benefits. The person who now ruled over the destinies of France would, were such a system pursued, either find himself, by the success of our arms, reduced to the necessity of a bandoning the cause; or his ambition, leading him to exert all his means and energies in this one quarter, would rouse his secret enemies in other parts of Europe, who would seize the opportunity of his reverses in Spain, to shake off his yoke. He would then be compelled to divide his forces; and a prospect of more easy success to our efforts in the peninsula would be opened. Such it was said was the view which ought to be taken of the contest in Spain, and with regard to the spirit of universal hostility in the Spanish people, which was so essential to success, that had been produced in its fullest force in the course of last year. The success of the British arms in Spain had moreover been felt and considered in Russia as the salvation of that country; had it not been for our triumphs in the peninsula, the leader of France would have been able to direct a military force against Russia, so vast and overwhelming as to preclude the hope of successful resist

ance. But was not all this foreseen, and was not this the very basis on which the system to be pursued in our present situation should be founded? What then followed from this view of the subject? The moment it was known that such efforts were making in Russia, the moment it was known that resistance was commencing on the one side, ought we not to have made every effort on the other,ought we not to have strained all the resources of the country to their very utmost; and if we were honest in our professions respecting the common cause, ought we not to have seized the momentous crisis which had occurred, to strike one grand and decisive blow?

"It became a great question therefore, whether the system of policy which had hitherto been pursued was founded upon just and extended principles; whether an able and efficient direction of our resources had been made; whether such means as the country possessed had been fully employed; and whether upon the whole, the result had been such as the nation had a right to expect, from the possession of those means, and the just application of them.-The true and legitimate object of the contest was, the expulsion of the French armies from Spain: this was the plain and practical view of the matter; it was intelligible to all; and it became necessary to enquire what had been done in the course of the year towards its accomplishment, compared with what might have been done if our resources had been properly, wisely, and efficiently employed Now the war in the peninsula had been carried on in a way totally inadequate to the accomplishment of the only practical object of the contest. Let us look back to the period of the reduction of Badajoz-the beginning of April last. At that time the great general who.com

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manded our armies in Spain having reduced that important fortress, his next step, it was natural to suppose, especially at that season of the year, would be to expel the French from the south of Spain But why did he not do so? Because his means were deficient; because he was under the necessity of abandoning his object-that of marching against Soult, and raising the siege of Cadiz, his resources being inadequate; and he was under the necessity of marching northward with his army, because in the north of Spain there was no force which he could leave sufficient to check the progress of Marmont. To the north he accordingly did proceed, and there he was, from the operation of the same causes, compelled to remain on the frontiers of Spain till the 13th of June, and by that time Marmont's army was in such - a state, from the accession of reinforcements, that it became doubtful whether the British commander could safely advance. But why did he remain inactive so long? Because his means of advancing were insufficient; because he wanted money, and supplies of every sort; because he had not the common means of transport to convey his artillery. At last, however, Lord Wel. lington advanced without a battering train, not because he thought it unnecessary for the success of his military operations, but because he literally had not the means of transporting it. After Lord Wellington did advance, what was his real situation? He had advanced because he expected powerful cooperation on the other side of the peninsula, agreeably to the plan concerted with him even when he was before Badajoz. He must have expected the assistance of this force, therefore, at the time of his advance into Spain; for, had he not so expected it, his advance into that country would have been unjustifiable, even though success had ultimately attended his progress.

It was certain, however, that he remained a considerable time on the frontier, waiting for intelligence of the arrival of this co-operating force, but waiting in vain; he then advanced, still confident in his hope that it would arrive in time to make a strong diversion in his favour. But he soon discovered (as every one knew) the army of Marmont to be much more numerous than he had expected. Nor was that all he found: he learned that Suchet had detached a corps to unite with Joseph's army, which made his force efficient to co-operate with the army under Marmont. What was the consequence? On the 17th of July, five days before the battle of Salamanca, Lord Wellington commanded, not a feigned, but a real retreat; and this retreat he continued during the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and till late in the day of the 22d. But why did he retreat? Why did this great general retreat? Because his means were inadequate. He had no money; he had not even 20,000 dollars in his military chest. The richest brigade in the army did not possess more than 3000 dollars; and what were the means left to this deserted general to recruit his finances? Forty thousand dollars had been sent to Cadiz for the use of the Spaniards. these he was forced to intercept, and apply to the exigencies of the British army. Upon a fair comparison of his force with that of Marmont, and taking into calculation the reinforcements so lately received by Joseph's army from Marshal Suchet, which the latter would have been unable to spare if the Sicilian expedition had arrived in due time on the eastern coast of Spain, Lord Wellington deemed it most prudent to retreat. Here was a proof that his means were inadequate ; and this deficiency of force arose chiefly, if not entirely, from the tardy and ineffectual co-operation of the Sicilian expedition.

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