surprized and delighted, for we expected to find an author, and we have found a man. Whilst those of good taste who look into a book, in the hope of finding a man, are altogether surprized to find an author: plus poetice quam humane locutus est. They confer the greatest honor on nature, who teach her that she can speak on all subjects, even theology. 29. The last thing that we discover in writing a book, is to know what to put at the beginning. 30. In a discourse, it is wrong to divert the mind from one thing to another, except to prevent weariness; and that only in the time when it is suitable, and not otherwise; for he who wishes to amuse inappropriately, wearies,―men will turn away their attention altogether. So difficult is it to obtain any thing from man, but by pleasure,-the current coin for which we are willing to give every thing. 31. What a vanity is painting which attracts admiration, by the resemblance of things, that in the original, we do not at all admire? 32. The same sense is materially affected by the words that convey it. The sense receives its dignity from the word, instead of imparting it to them. 33. Those who are accustomed to judge by feeling, understand but little in matters of reasoning; for they at once, penetrate the subject with one view, and are not accustomed to search for principles. Others, on the contrary, who are accustomed to reason from principles, comprehend little in matters of feeling; searching for principles, and not being able to discover them. True 34. True eloquence despises eloquence. morality despises morality; that is to say, the morality of the understanding, sets light by the morality of the fancy, which knows no rule. 35. All the false beauties that we condemn in Cicero, have their admirers in crowds. 36. To set light by philosophy, is the true philosophy. 37. Many persons understand a sermon, as they understand vespers. 38. Rivers are roads which move forward, and carry us to our destination. 39. Two faces which resemble each other, neither of which is ludicrous alone, excite a smile from their resemblance, when seen together. 40. Astrologers and Alchymists have some sound principles, but they abuse them. Now, the abuse of truth ought to be as much punished as the invention of falsehood. 44. I cannot forgive Descartes. He would willingly, in all his philosophy, have done without God, if he could; but he could not get on without letting him give the world a filip to set it a going; after that, he has nothing more to do with him. CHAPTER XXIX. ON EPICTETUS AND MONTAIGNE. EPICTETUS* is one of those philosophers of this world who have best known the duties of man. He would have him before all things, to regard God as his chief object, to be persuaded that he governs all things with justice, to submit to him cordially, and to follow him willingly as infinitely wise, and he affirms that this disposition would stay all his complaints and miseries, and prepare him to endure patiently the most distressing events. Say Never say, he enjoins, “I have lost that." rather, "I have restored it. My son is dead; I have surrendered him. My wife is dead; I have given her up." And so of every other good. "But he who deprived me of this good, is a wicked man.” Why distress yourself about him, by whom He who lent the A Stoic philosopher, who flourished during the latter part of the 1st century. His treatise on Morals has been translated from the Greek, by Mrs. Carter. A. E. blessing, sent to seek it again? While the use of it is permitted to you, regard it as a good belonging to others, as a traveller does in an inn." ❝ You should not wish," he continues, "that things should be as you desire, but you should wish that they may be as they are. Remember that you are here as an actor, and that you play that part which your master is pleased to appoint. If he gives you a short part, play short; if a long part, play long: remain on the stage as long as he pleases; appear on it rich or poor, according to his command. It is your duty to play well the part assigned; but to choose it, is the part of God. Set always before your eyes death and the evils which seem least bearable, and you would never think slightingly of any thing, nor desire any thing excessively." He shews in many ways what man should do. He wishes him to be humble, to hide his good resolutions, especially in their commencement, and to fulfil them secretly, for that nothing so much injures them as exposure. He never wearies of repeating that all the study and the desire of men should be, to know and to do the will of God. Such was the light of this great mind, who so well understood the duties of man; happy if he had as well known his weakness. But, after having so well understood what man ought to do, he loses himself in the presumption of that for which he thinks him equal."God," he says, "has given to every man the means of acquitting himself of all his obligations; these means are always in his power. We should only seek happiness by the means that are in our power. Since God has given them for that end, we ought to ascertain what is our liberty. Wealth, life, respect, are not in our power, and do not lead to God; but the mind cannot be forced to believe that which it knows to be false; nor the will to love that which it knows will make it miserable. These two powers then are perfectly free; and by these only can we make ourselves perfect,-know God perfectly, love him, obey him, please him, vanquish all vices, attain all virtues, and thus, make ourselves the holy companions of God." These proud notions lead Epictetus to other errors, such as, that the soul is a portion of the Divine essence; that pain and death are not evils; that we may kill ourselves when we are oppressed; that we may believe that God calls us, &c. 2. Montaigne,* born in a Christian land, made a profession of the Roman Catholic religion; and so far there was nothing peculiar about him. But as he wished to seek a system of morals, founded on reason, independently of the illumination of faith, he laid down his principles according to this supposition, and considered man as entirely destitute of a revelation. He places all things, therefore, in a state of doubt so general and universal, that man doubts; and this uncertainty returns restlessly upon itself in a circle perpetually, opposing equally those who affirm that every thing is uncertain, and those who affirm that nothing is; for he does not wish to give certainty in any thing. In this doubt which doubts itself, and in this ignorance which is ignorant of itself, consists the essence of his opinions. He cannot express it in posiitive terms; for, if he says, he doubts, he betrays himself by making it certain that he doubts; which being in form contrary to his intention, he is reduced to the necessity of explaining himself by a question; so that not wishing to say, I do not know; he asks, What do I know? And on this idea he has framed his device, in which he has written this motto, "Que sais je," under the scales of a balance, each containing a contradictory proposition, and consequently, hanging His * A French writer, who was born, 1533. He was taught Latin as his vernacular tongue. His absurd education furnished l'ope with some hints for his Martin Scriblerus. Essays, which were first published about 1595, are the oldest examples of this kind of writing. He was remarkable for his boldness and originality. Cowley, Sir William Temple, and others, were his imitators. Hence a new and interesting_department of English literature. A. E. in equilibrium. In fact, he is a pure Pyrrhonist. All his discourses, all his essays, proceed on this principle; and it is the only thing which he professes thoroughly to establish. He insensibly destroys all that passes for certain among men; not to establish the contrary with certainty; for to certainty he is chiefly hostile; but merely to make it appear that the evidence being equal on both sides, it is impossible to know where our confidence should be reposed. In this spirit he derides every thing like assurance. He combats, for instance, those who have thought to establish a grand remedy against legal processes by the multitude and the professed justice of the laws, as ifit were possible to annihilate the region of doubt in which litigation originates; as if we could throw a dam across the torrent of uncertainty, and restrain conjecture. He says, on this matter, that he would as soon commit his cause to the first passer by, as to the judges armed with law and precedent. He does not aim to change the order of the state; he does not pretend that his advice is better; he considers none good. He aims only to shew the vanity of the best received opinions, shewing that the annulling of all laws would sooner diminish the number of differences, than the multitude of laws which serve only to augment them; because the difficulties increase the more they are considered; the obscurities are multiplied by multiplied comments; and the surest way of understanding the sense of the passage is, not to examine it, but to determine on it at the first glance; for that the instant you look into it, all its clearness disappears. On this plan he judges at hap-hazard all human actions and historical facts, sometimes after one manner, sometimes after another, following freely the first impression, without controlling his thoughts by the rules of reason, which according to him, are all false guides. Delighted with shewing, in his own example, the contrarieties of the same mind in this illimitable field, it is the same to him whether he grows warm or not in a dispute, having always the means by one example or another, of shewing the weakness of |