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zig are immense and decisive. did not quit Leipzig in person until ten o'clock in the morning of the 19th. Finding that a fire of musketry had already commenced at the Ranstabt gate, towards Lutzen, he was obliged to depart by the Pegau gate. The allied armies had taken 15 generals, and amongst them Generals Regnier and Lauriston, commanding corps d'armée. Prince Poniatowsky was drowned in attempting to pass the Elster. The body of General Dumorestier, chief of the staff of the 11th corps, was found in the river, and more than 1000 men were drowned in it. The Duke of Bassano escaped on foot. Marshal Ney is supposed to have been wounded. More than 250 pieces of cannon, 900 caissons, and above 15,000 prisoners, have fallen into the hands of the allies, besides several eagles and colours. The enemy has abandoned more than 23,000 sick and wounded, with the whole of the hospital esta blishment.

"The total loss of the French army must exceed 60,000 men. According to every calculation, the Emperor Napoleon has been able to save from the general disaster not more than 75,000 or 80,000 men. The allied armies are in motion to pursue him, and every moment are brought in prisoners, baggage, and artillery. The German and Polish troops desert from the French standards in crowds; and every thing announces that the liberty of Germany has been conquered at Leipzig.

"It is inconceivable how a man, who commanded in thirty pitched battles, and who had exalted himself by military glory, in appropriating to himself that of all the old French generals, should have been capable of concentrating his army in so unfavourable a position as that in which he had placed it. The Elster and the Pleisse in his rear, a marshy ground to traverse, and only a single bridge for the pas

VOL. VI. PRT I.

sage of 100,000 men and 3000 baggage waggons. Every one asks, Is this the great captain who has hitherto made Europe tremble?"

Such was the termination of this succession of combats; the annals of Europe, ensanguined as they are, had never yet presented any thing on so grand a scale. Famine and pestilence, which follow in the train of war, did their part, and co-operated with the sword in the work of death. The retreat of Buonaparte was such as might have been expected; a powerful army was behind, and clouds of light troops were far advanced before him. A daily loss of artillery, baggage, and prisoners, marked his course from the Saale to the Maine.

All hope of making head against the allies in Germany, on the Rhine, or even on the French side of the Rhine, seemed chimerical. Buonaparte had never before been in a dilemma like the present. When he witnessed the destruction of his fleet at the battle of the Nile, his retreat, indeed, was cut off from a field of ambition, on which he had rashly entered; when he was beaten before the walls of Jaffa, his way to Egypt was still open, and he escaped without interruption; when he slept amid the ashes of Moscow, although the vision of glory which led him thither deserted his pillow, he dreamt not of the withering blasts which were to cut off his army on its return. Amid all these calamities his spirit never forsook him; but the perils of his present situation were manifest in all their appalling aggravations. A victorious army was already in the south of his no longer "sacred France;" his army in Germany was nearly annihilated; and the conquerors were ready on all sides to bear him down.

The retreat of Buonaparte was beset with difficulties. The Bavarian troops, 35,000 strong, had taken post at Hannau to impede his movements.

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Had Blucher followed by the same route which the French army had taken, its destruction would have been inevitable; but the Prussian general, by an unfortunate, though very natural, calculation, supposed that, as the Bavarian army was on the Maine, Buonaparte would not retire by that route, but would cross the Rhine at Coblentz. Upon this place Blucher accordingly directed his march. Buonaparte, thereapproaching Hannau, could turn his whole remaining force, amount ing to 70 or 80,000 men, against the Bavarian army, which did not exceed 30,000. Wrede, however, with the most gallant determination, resolved to stand the unequal contest ; and for two days this army maintained itself gloriously, with severe loss indeed, but without any signal defeat. Wrede himself received a wound, which, at first, threatened to prove mortal, but from which he fortunately recovered. It was impossible, however, with forces so far inferior, to avoid being pushed aside; and Buonaparte was thus enabled to proceed on the road to Frankfort. He did not stop in that city, but continued his march; and on the 7th of November he crossed the Rhine with his whole army, leaving behind

were in preparation for the ruler of France. Holland, by a great movement, emancipated herself from the French yoke; and, by a bloodless counter-revolution, asserted her ancient rights, and proved her undiminished attachment to the house of Orange. Commissioners, deputed by the provisional government, repaired to England, to invite the return of the Prince of Orange, and to renew the friendship and alliance of the Dutch with Great Britain. Nothing was ever effected with more wisdom than this counter-revolution. The Dutch, instead of revenging upon the engines of French tyranny the insults and oppressions of twenty years, contented themselves with dismissing them, and establishing a provisional government until the arrival of the Prince of Orange. The inhabitants of the different towns formed themselves into municipal guards, to preserve the public tranquillity, and to prevent the people from breaking out into excesses against the enemy. But the interesting events which occurred in Holland will demand a separate chapter.

By the movements of the army of the north of Germany, the regency of the electorate of Hanover was re-esta

him all his conquests, and all his tow-blished, and the enemy now occupied ering hopes of universal dominion. on the Lower Elbe only Harburg, Stade, and the small fort of Hasse. The inhabitants of all classes displayed at Hanover, and at other places of the electorate, proofs of the most touching affection for their sovereign. Bernadotte, whose fortune it formerly was to command them as an enemy's general, had the happiness to receive testimonies of their gratitude for the manner in which he had then acted towards them.

He returned to Paris on the 9th, having sent before him twenty stands of colours taken by his victorious armies in the battles of Weissen, Leipzig, and Hannau! These trophies were presented with much solemnity to Her Imperial Majesty. Cardinal Maury pronounced an appropriate oration over them, in which he proved that Buonaparte's late resolution to retire upon the Rhine was a proof of his wisdom and genius, no less signal than his former plan to maintain the line of the Elbe!

In the midst of these solemn and interesting proceedings, new disasters

The head-quarters of the grand allied army were removed to Frankfort. Thus, then, the great efforts of France in 1813, had the same results as those she made in 1812. "The French le

gions," said Bernadotte," which caused the world to tremble, are retiring and seeking safety behind the Rhine, the natural frontier of France, and which would be still a barrier of iron had not Napoleon wished to subjugate all nations, and to ravish from them their liberties. Although these limits appear fixed by nature, the Russian army presents itself before them, because Napoleon went to seek the Rus sians at Moscow; the Prussian army appears before them, because in breach of his sworn faith Napoleon still retains the fortresses of that monarchy; the army of Austria appears before them because she has insults to revenge, and because she recollects that after the peace of Presburg, the title of Emperor of Germany was torn from her supreme chief. If the Swedes are there also, it is because, amid profound peace, and in violation of the most solemn treaties, Napoleon treacherously surprised them at Stralsund, and insulted them at Stockholm. The allies regret the misfortunes of the French; they lament the calamities which the war brings in its train; and, far from being dazzled, like Napoleon, by the success with which Providence has favoured their arms, they are ardently desirous of peace. All nations sigh for that boon of Heaven, and Napoleon alone has hitherto placed himself in opposition to the happiness of the world. Hence all the princes, lately his allies, hastened to abjure the ties which connected him with them; even those whose states had been aggran dised in consequence of his power or influence, renounced the aggrandisement which they owed to his pretended friendship. In pursuing the noble object of all its efforts, that of a general peace, the army of the north of Germany could not permit an enemy's force to be cantoned upon its communications.-Pamplona," continued this spirited writer," has capitulated.

The victorious troops of the Marquis of Wellington are now upon French ground; it is for having attacked the Spaniards in the bosom of peace, that the peaceful inhabitants of the Adour behold an enemy's army upon its banks. The Emperor of Russia's, the Emperor of Austria's, the King of Prussia's, and other formidable armies, are upon the banks of the Rhine. One single object directs these masses-a general peace, founded upon natural limits, the sole guarantee of its solidity. Amid the miseries which have so long desolated the continent, the instruments have been as much to be pitied as the victims; and it is the happiness of Frenchmen, as well as that of their own nations, that the allied sovereigns desire. War can have but one honourable object-a conquest which alone is desirable and just-peace. Millions of voices demand it of the French people. Will they be deaf to the voice of humanity, of reason, and of their dearest interests? Where is the Frenchman who has not been profoundly affected in reading the reply of Napoleon to the senate? The president of that assembly, in the name of France, demands peace of the emperor; and this sovereign, who for two years has been the witness of the death of 600,000 men, replies coldly, and merely says, that posterity shall acknowledge that the existing circumstances were not above him.' Thus the Emperor Napoleon does not wish for peace; and as Europe desires it, she ought to prepare to obtain it by means of arms. Let us hope that the wishes of the French will unite with those of Europe."

6

The grand allied army, consisting of the Austrian, Bavarian, and part of the Russian and Prussian armies, was now on the Maine, the respective sovereigns being at Frankfort Dresden, with its garrison of 16,000 men, under St Cyr and Count Lobau, sur

rendered to the Russians. The French were not allowed terms of capitulation; the whole of their troops became prisoners of war; and the Russian force, which had been employed before this capital, was now at liberty to undertake other operations.-The rown Prince, with about 40,000 Russian and Prussian troops, had left Bremen for Holland, where General Winzengerode's corps had already arrived; General Bulow was between Munster and Arnheim; Benningsen and Walmoden, with the Hanoverians, and General Aldercrantz with the Swedes, were marching against Davoust and the Danes.

The town of Arnheim, important on account of its position, was taken by General Bulow on the 30th of November; the garrison was put to the sword. This severity was inflicted as some retaliation for the cruelties committed by the French at the little town of Woerden in Holland. The annals of the revolution, sanguinary as they are, record nothing more atrocious than the conduct of the enemy at this place. The town was taken by a small detachment of Dutch national guards on the 23d, and the French garrison was permitted to retire without injury or molestation. The next day they returned, reinforced by troops from Utrecht, and retook the town by storm. Then was acted a scene the most revolting to humanity. The old and the young were indiscriminately massacred; three generations were at once swept away. The heart sickens at the contemplation of such a scene; but the recollection of it, as it nerved the arms of the Prussians for vengeance, so it may serve to justify their inexorable determination.

the end of the year. Many of them had already offered to surrender, on condition that the garrisons should be allowed to return to France. But the consequence of such an arrangement would have been to give Buonaparte an army of above 50,000 men; the garrisons of Magdeburg, Dantzic, Torgau, and Wittenberg, amounted to that number. They might have promised, indeed, not to serve against the allies for a certain time, or until they had been regularly exchanged; but the allies were too well acquainted with the character of the French govern. ment to place confidence in such engagements. Before the armistice expired in the month of August, the allies had offered, through the medium of Austria, to treat for the evacuation of the Prussian fortresses, but Buonaparte rejected these offers with indignation. Now that he was beyond the Rhine, however, he was willing to negociate for their surrender.

It was generally supposed, that this offer to negociate concerning the fortresses had a reference to other objects. In the Austrian manifesto, certain expressions occurred, from which Buonaparte might have been induced to believe that negociation was still practicable, if he chose to accede to reasonable terms. This belief probably led him to risk the hostile operations which terminated so fatally for him. Perhaps he said to himself, " I will at least try the chances of war. I may be victorious, and then I shall be able to negociate on better terms; but if beaten, I shall be able, at all events, to treat upon the same terms which I now reject." He appears to have been but imperfectly aware of the great changes which recent events had produced. His retreat had been a flight after one of the most signal defeats experienced by any general-a flight, in which the conqueror was so close upon him, that his escape was a matter of the greatest

Buonaparte now proposed to treat for the surrender of all the fortresses on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula: his proposal was rejected, as the fortresses were in the last stage of resistance, and might be expected to fall by

difficulty. He had on the Elbe 220,000 men; he carried to the Rnine not more than 50,000. While he remained on the Elbe, many of the German princes were his allies; when on the Rhine, not a single German ally was left to him. While he was on the Elbe, Hanover, Westphalia, and Holland, were still under his yoke; he was now on the Rhine, with Hanover, Westphalia, all Germany, and all Holland against him. The people of the Netherlands were ready to throw off his authority; and the combined armies, in tremendous force, were ready to pass the Rhine. In such circumstances did the allies reject his insidious offer for the abandonment of the fortresses. The evacuation of the important fortresses of Breda, Wilhelm stadt, and Helvoetsluys, in Holland, without the slightest resistance, proved that the necessities of Buonaparte were now so great, as to induce him to relinquish his former policy of keeping strong garrisons, in every place of importance, occupied by his armies. Some of these fortresses were capable of making a vigorous resistance, and of standing a long siege. Buonaparte, however, fought no longer for conquest, but for safety-not with the hope of reestablishing his former power and reputation, but for existence. Fortresses were comparatively of little importance to him; his great object was to collect and concentrate an army, to enable him to oppose a barrier to the torrent which threatened to overwhelm him. The allies, therefore, did not pause in their career to besiege fortresses; they marched on against the enemy's main force, aware that if they could beat down the grand army, the fortresses must afterwards fall of them

selves.

memorable declaration of their views and policy. The French government, they remarked, had ordered a new levy of 300,000 conscripts. The motives of the senatus consultum to that effect, contained an appeal to the allied powers. They, therefore, found themselves called upon to promulgate anew, in the face of the world, the views which guided them in the war; the principles which formed the basis of their conduct, their wishes, and their determinations. They did not make war upon France, but against that preponderance which, to the misfortune of Europe and of France itself, the Emperor Napoleon had too long exercised beyond the limits of his dominions. Victory had conducted them to the banks of the Rhine. The first use which they had made of victory had been to offer peace to the French emperor. An attitude strengthened by the accession of all the sovereigns and princes of Germany had no influence on the conditions of that peace. These conditions were formed on the independence of the French empire, as well as on the independence of the other states of Europe. The views of the powers were just in their object, generous and liberal in their application, giving security to all, and honourable to each. The sovereigns desired that France might be great, powerful, and happy; because the French power, in a state of greatness and strength, is one of the foundations of the social edifice of Europe. They wished that France might be happy-that French commerce might revive-that the arts might again flou rish; because a great people can only be tranquil in proportion as it is happy. They offered to confirm to the French empire an extent of territory which France under her kings never knew; because a valiant nation does not fall from its rank, by having in its turn experienced reverses in an obstinate

The combined armies had now advanced to the Rhine; and on the first of December, the sovereigns issued the

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