3. ALL THINGS THAT ARE DONE IN THE WORLD, ARE DONE EITHER IMMEDIATELY BY GOD HIMSELF, OR BY CREATED IN TELLIGENT BEINGS; MATTER BEING CAPABLE OF NO LAWS OR POWERS. AND CONSEQUENLY THERE IS, PROPERLY SPEAKING, NO SUCH THING AS THE COURSE OR POWER OF NATURE. All things that are done in the world are done either immediately by God himself, or by created intelligent beings, matter being evidently not at all capable of any laws or powers whatsoever any more than it is capable of intelligence; excepting only this one negative power, that every part of it will of itfelf always and neceffarily continue in that ftate, whether of reft or motion, wherein it at prefent. is. So that all thofe things which we commonly fay are the effects of the natural powers of matter, and laws of motion, of gravitation, attraction, or the like, are indeed (if we will fpeak ftriatly and properly) the effects of God's acting upon matter continually and every moment, either immediately by himfe:f, or mediately by fome created intelligent beings (which obfervation by the way furnishes us, as has been before noted, with an excellent natural demonftration of Providence). Confequently there is no fuch thing as what men commonly call the courfe of nature, or the power of nature. The courfe of nature, truly and properly fpeaking, is nothing else but the will of God producing certain effects in a continued, regular, conftant, and uniform manner; which courfe or manner of acting, being in every moment perfectly arbitrary, is as easy to be altered at any time as to be preferved. And if (as feems most probable) this continual acting upon matter be performed by the fubferviency of created intelligences appointed to that purpose by the Supreme Creator; then it is as easy for any of them, and as much within their natural power (by the permiffion of God), to alter the course of nature at any time, or in any respect, as to preferve or continue it. THAT THEREFORE A MARACLE IS NOT RIGHTLY DEFINED TO BE THAT WHICH IS AGAINST THE COURSE OF NATURE, OR ABOVE THE NATURAL POWERS OF CREATED AGENTS. It is not, therefore, a right diftinétion, to define a miracle to be that which is against the courfe of nature; meaning, by the courfe of nature, the power of nature, or the natural powers of created agents. For, in this fenfe, it is no more againft the courfe of nature, for an angel to keep a man from finking in the water, than for a man to hold a ftone from falling in the air, by over-powering the law of gravitation; and yet the one is a miracle, the other not fo. In like manner, it is no more above the natural power of a created intelligence to ftop the motion of the fun or of a planet, than to continue to carry it on in its ufual courfe; and yet the former is a miracle, the latter not fo. But if by the courfe of nature be meant only (as it truly fignifies) the conftant and uniform manner of God's acting either immediately or mediately in preferving and continuing the order of the world; then, in that fense, indeed, a miracle may be rightly defined to be an effect produced contrary to the ufual courfe or order of nature, by the unufual in terpofition terpofition of fome intelligent being fuperior to men; as I fhall have occafion presently to obferve more particularly. THE UNREASONABLENESS OF THOSE WHO DENY THE POSSI BILITY OF MIRACLES IN GENERAL. And from this obfervation we may eafily difcover the vanity and unreasonableness of that obftinate prejudice which modern Deifts have univerfally taken up against the belief of miracles in general. They fee that things generally go on in a conftant and regular method, that the frame and order of the world is preferved by things being difpofed and managed in an uniform manner; that certain caufes produce certain effects in a continued fucceffion, according to certain fixed laws or rules; and from hence they conclude, very weakly and unphilofophically, that there are in matter certain neceffary laws or powers, the refult of which is that which they call the course of nature, which they think is impoffible to be changed or altered, and confequently that there can be no fuch thing as miracles. Whereas, on the contrary, if they would confider things duly, they could not but fee, that dull and lifelefs matter is utterly uncapable of obeying any laws, or of being indued with any powers, and that therefore that order and difpofition of things, which they vulgarly call the courfe of nature, cannot poffibly be any thing elfe but the arbitrary will and pleafure of God exerting itfelf and acting upon matter continually, either immediately by itself, or mediately by fome fubordinate intelligent agents, according to certain rules of uniformity and proportion, fixed indeed and conftant, but which yet are made fuch merely by arbitrary conftitution, not by any fort of neceffity in the things themfelves, as has been abundantly proved in my former difcourfe; and confequently it cannot be denied, but that it is altogether as eafy to alter the course of nature as to preferve it; that is, that miracles, excepting only that they are more unufual, are in themfelves, and in the nature and reafon of the thing, as credible in all refpects, and as eafy to be believed, as any of those we call natural effects. 4. SOME EFFECTS PROVE THE CONSTANT PROVIDENCE OF GOD, AND OTHERS PROVE THE OCCASIONAL INTER POSITION EITHER OF GOD HIMSELF, OR OF SOME INTELLIGENT BEING SUPERIOR TO MAN. Thofe effects which are produced in the world regularly and conftantly, which we call the works of nature, prove to us in general the being, the power, and the other attributes of God. Thole effects, which, upon any rare and extraordinary occafion, are produced in fuch manner, that it is manifeft they could neither have been done by any power or art of man, nor by what we call chance, that is, by any compofition or refult of thofe laws which are God's conftant and uniform actings upon matter; thefe undeniably prove to us the immediate and occafional interpofition either of God himself, or at leaft of fome intelligent agent fuperior to men, at that particular time, and on that particular account. For inftance, the regular and continual effects of the power of gravi tation, and of the laws of motion, of the mechanic, and of the animal powers; all these prove to us in general the being, the power, the prefence, and the conftant operation, either immediate or mediate, of God in the world. But if, upon any particular occafion, we should see a stone fufpended in the air, or a man walking upon the water, without any vifible fupport, a chronical difcafe cured by a word speaking, or a dead and corrupted body restored to life a moment; we could not then doubt, but there was an extraordinary interpofition either of God himself, in order to fignify his pleasure upon that particular occafion, or at least of fome in telligent agent far fuperior to man, in order to bring about fome particular defign. 5. WHETHER SUCH INTERPOSITION BE THE IMMEDIATE WORK OF GOD, OR SOME GOOD OR EVIL ANGEL, CAN HARD LY BE DISCOVERED MERELY BY THE WORK ITSELF. Whether fuch an extraordinary interpofition of fome power fuperior to men,be the immediate interpofition of God himself, or of fome good angel, or of fome evil angel, can hardly be diftinguished certainly merely by the work or miracle itteif (except there be a plain Creation of fomething out of nothing, which, as I have faid, there does not certainly appear to be in any of the miracles recorded in Scripture); because it is impoffible for us to know with any certainty, either that the natural power of good angels, or of evil ones, extends not beyond fuch or fuch a certain limit, or that God always reftrains them from exercifing their natural powers in producing fuch or fuch particular effects. Some fingular miracles, fuch as raifing the dead, there is indeed all the reafon in the world to believe are abfolutely beyond the power of evil fpirits to effect; because we have the greatest reafon to believe that the fouls of men are in the hand of God, and cannot be removed by the natural power of any inferior beings. But there are not many other inftances, wherein we can certainly fay or determine, that this or that particular thing is abfolutely beyond the natural power of good or evil fpirits. THAT THERE IS NO REASON TO SUPPOSE ALL THE WONDERS WORKED BY EVIL SPIRITS TO BE MERE DELUSIONS. It is not, therefore, a right diftinction to fuppofe the wonders which the fcripture attributes te evil fpirits to be mere præftigiæ, fleights, or delutions. For if the devil has any natural power of doing any thing at all, even but fo much as the meaneft of men, and be not reftrained by God from exercifing that natural power, it is evident he will be able, by reason of his invifibility, to work true and real miracles. Neither is it a right diftinction to fuppofe the miracles of evil fpirits not to be real effects in the things where they appear, but impofitions upon the fenfes of the fpectators; for, to impofe in this manner upon the senses of men (not by fleights and delufions, but by really fo affecting the organs of fense as to make things appear what they are not) is to all intents and purposes as true true a miracle, and as great an one, as making real changes in the things themselves. 6. How WE ARE TO DISTINGUISH MIRACLES WORKED BY GOD FOR THE PROOF OF ANY DOCTRINE FROM THE FRAUDS OF EVIL SPIRITS. When therefore upon any particular occafion; for inftance, when at the will of a person who teaches fone new doctrine as coming from God, and in teftimony to the truth of that doctrine there is plainly and manifeftly an interpofition of fome fuperior power, producing fuch miraculous effects as have been before-mentioned; the only poffible ways, by which a fpectator may certainly and infallibly diftinguish, whether thofe miracles be indeed the works either im mediately of God himself, or (which is the very fame thing) of fome good angel employed by him; and confequently the doctrine witneffed by the miracles be infallibly true and divinely attefted or whether, on the contrary, the miracles be the works of evi fpirits, and confequently the doctrine a fraud and impofition upon men; the only poffible ways (I fay) of diftinguishing this matter certainly and infallibly are thefe. If the doctrine attefted by miracles be in itfelf impious, or manifeftly tending to promote vice; then without all queftion the miracles, how great foever they may appear to us, are neither worked by God himself, nor by his commiffion; because our natural knowledge of the attributes of God, and of the neceffary difference between good and evil, is greatly of more force to prove any fuch doctrine to be falfe than any miracles in the world can be to prove it true. As, for example, fuppofe a man pretending to be a prophet fhould work any miracle, or give any fign or wonder whatsoever, in order to draw men from the worship of the true God, and tempt them to idolatry, and to the practice of fuch vices as in all heathen nations have ufually attended the worship of falfe gods; nothing can be more infallibly certain, than that fuch miracles, Deut. xiii. 1, &c. ought at first fight to be rejected as diabolical. If the doctrine attefted by miracles be in itfelf indifferent, that is, fuch as cannot by the light of nature and right reafon alone be certainly known whether it be true or falfe; and, at the fame time, in oppofition to it, and in proof of the direct contrary doctrine, there be worked other miracles, more and greater than the former, or at least attended with fuch circumftances as evidently fhew the power by which thefe latter are worked to be fuperior to the power that worked the former; then that doctrine which is attefted by the fuperior power muft neceffarily be believed to be divine. This was the cafe of Moles, and the Egyptian magicians. The magicians worked feveral miracles to prove that Mofes was an impoftor, and not fent of God; Mofes, to prove his divine commiffion, worked miracles more and greater than theirs, or elfe (which is the very fame thing) the power by which he worked his miracles reftrained the power by which they worked theirs, from being able at that time to work all the fame miracles that he did, and fo appeared evidently the fuperiour power; wherefore wherefore it was neceffarily to be believed, that Mofes's commiffion THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THOSE WHO TEACH THAT THE And here at laft the difference between thofe who believe that all miracles neceffarily require the immediate power of God himself to effect them, and those who believe created fpirits able to work miracles, is not very great. They who believe all miracles to be effected only by the immediate power of God, muft do it upon this ground, that they fuppofe God by a perpetual law reftrains all fubordinate intelligent agents from interpofing at any time to alter the regular courfe of things in this lower world (for, to fay that created fpirits have not otherwife a natural power, when unreftrained, to do what we call miracles, is faying that thofe invifible agents have no power naturally to do any thing at all). And they who believe that fubordinate beings have power to work miracles, muft yet of neceffity fuppofe that God reftrains them in all fuch cafes at leaft, where there would not be fufficient marks left, by which the frauds of evil spirits could be clearly diftinguished from the teftimony and commiffion of God. And now, from thefe few clear and undeniable propofitions, it evidently follows: THE |
