gree venial. Such misfortunes call forth the social affections, and warmly interest the spectator. An accidental misfortune, if not extremely singular, doth not greatly move our pity; the person who suffers, being innocent, is freed from the greatest of all torments, that anguish of mind which is occasioned by remorse.

An atrocious criminal, on the other hand, who brings misfortunes upon himself, excites little pity, for a different reason; his remorse, it is true, aggravates his distress, and swells the first emotions of pity; but these are immediately blunted by our hatred of him as a criminal. Misfortunes that are not innocent, nor highly criminal, partake the advantages of each extreme: they are attended with remorse to embitter the distress, which raises our pity to a height; and the slight indignation we have at a venial fault, detracts not sensibly from our pity. The happiest of all subjects, accordingly, for raising pity, is where a man of integrity falls into a great misfortune by doing an action that is innocent, but which, by some singular means, is conceived by him to be criminal: his remorse aggravates his distress; and our compassion, unrestrained by indignation, knows no bounds. Pity comes thus to be the ruling passion of a pathetic tragedy: and, by proper representation, may be raised to a height scarce exceeded by any thing felt in real life. A moral tragedy takes in a larger field; as it not only exercises our pity, but raises another passion, which, though selfish, deserves to be cherished equally with the social affection The passion I have in view is fear or terror; for when a misfortune is the natural consequence of

some wrong bias in the temper, every spectator who is conscious of such a bias in himself, takes the alarm, and dreads his falling into the same misfortune; and by the emotion of fear or terror, frequently reiterated in a variety of moral tragedies, the spectators are put upon their guard against the disorders of passion.

The commentators upon Aristotle, and other critics, have been much gravelled about the account given

of tragedy by that author; “ That, by means of pity and terror, it refines or purifies in us all sorts of passion.” But no one who has a clear conception of the end and effects of a good tragedy, can have any difficulty about Aristotle's meaning: our pity is engaged for the persons represented; and our terror is upon our own account. Pity indeed is here made to stand for all the sympathetic emotions, because of these it is the capital. There can be no doubt that our sympathetic emotions are refined or improved by daily exercise; and in what manner our other passions are refined by terror, I have just now said. One thing is certain, that no other meaning can justly be given to the foregoing doctrine, than that now mentioned; and that it was really Aristotle's meaning, appears from his thirteenth chapter, where he delivers several propositions conformable to the doctrine, as here explained. These, at the same time, I take the liberty to mention; because, as far as authority can go, they confirm the foregoing reasoning about subjects proper for tragedy. The first proposition is, That it being the province of tragedy to excite pity and terror, an innocent person falling into adversity ought never to be the subject. This proposition is a necessary consequence of his doctrine as explained: a subject of that "nature may indeed excite pity and terror; but in the former in an inferior degree, and in the latter in no degree for moral instruction. The second proposition is, That the history of a wicked person, in a change from misery to happiness, ought not to be represented. It excites neither terror nor compassion, nor is agreeable in any respect. The third is, That the misfortunes of a wicked person ought not to be represented. Such representation may be agreeable in some measure, upon a principle of justice; but it will not move our pity, nor any degree of terror, except in those of th same vicious disposition with the person represented. The last proposition is, That the only character fit for representation lies in the middle, neither eminently

EPIC AND DRAMATIC COMPOSITIONS.

249

good nor eminently bad : where the misfortune is not the effect of deliberate vice, but of some involuntary fault, as our author expresses it.* The only objection I find to Aristotle's account of tragedy, is, that he confines it within too narrow bounds, by refusing admit

, tance to the pathetic kind: for if terror be essential to tragedy, no representation deserves that name but the moral kind, where the misfortunes exhibited are caused by a wrong balance of mind, or some disorder. in the internal constitution; such misfortunes always. suggest moral instruction; and by such misfortunes only can terror be excited for our improvement.

Thus Aristotle's four propositions above mentioned relate solely to tragedies of the moral kind. Those of the pathetic kind are not confined within so narrow limits: subjects fitted for the theatre are not in such plenty as to make us reject innocent misfortunes, which rouse our sympathy, though they inculcate no moral. With respect indeed to subjects of that kind, it may be doubted whether the conclusion ought not always to be fortunate. Where a person of integrity is represented as suffering to the end under misfortunes purely accidental, we depart discontented, and with some obscure sense of injustice : for seldom is man so submissive to Providence, as not to revolt against the tyranny and vexations of blind chance: he will be tempted to say, This ought not to be. Chance, giving an impression of anarchy and misrule, produces always a damp upon the mind. I give for an example the Romeo and Juliet of Shakspeare, where the fatal catastrophe is occasioned by Friar Laurence's coming to the monument a minute too late; we are vexed at the unlucky chance, and go away dissatisfied. Such impressions, which ought not to be cherished, are a sufficient reason for excluding stories of that kind from the theatre. The misfortunes of a virtuous person, arising

* If any one can be amused with a grave discourse which promised much and performs nothing, I refer to Brumoy, in his Theatre Grec, Preliminary Discourse on the Origin of Tragedy,

anne aan to Gulvinar Comae . Seep. 26794280 Ostami Fingal, lk. 2,7.316*317.

Why the difference?

250

ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM.

killed Cohelice, ces many zapal said her mother

in same light of the gedy deaderega

A

from necessary causes, or from a chain of unavoidable
circumstances, are considered in a different light A
regular chain of causes and effects directed by the
general laws of nature, never fails to suggest the hand
of Providence; to which we submit without resent-
ment, being conscious that submission is our duty.
For that reason, we are not disgusted with the dis
tresses of Voltaire's Mariamne, though redoubled on
her till her death, without the least fault or failing on
her part; her misfortunes are owing to a cause ex-
tremely natural, and not unfrequent, the jealousy of
a barbarous husband. The fate of Desdemona, in the
Moor of Venice, affects us in the same manner. We
are not so easily reconciled to the fate of Cordelia in
King Lear; the causes of her misfortune are by no
means so evident, as to exclude the gloomy notion of
chance. In short, a perfect character suffering under
misfortunes is qualified for being the subject of a pa-
thetic tragedy, provided chance be excluded. Nor is
a perfect character altogether inconsistent with a
moral tragedy; it may successfully be introduced in
an under part, if the chief place be occupied by an
imperfect character, from which a moral can be
drawn. This is the case of Desdemona and Mariamne
just mentioned; and it is the case of Monimia and
Belvidera, in Otway's two tragedies, The Orphan, and
Venice Preserved. No.

I had an early opportunity to unfold a curious doc-
trine, That fable operates on our passions, by repre-
senting its events as passing in our sight, and by de-
luding us into a conviction of reality. Hence, in epic
and dramatic compositions, every circumstance ought
to be employed that may promote the delusion; such
as the borrowing from history some noted event, with
the addition of circumstances that may answer the
author's purpose: the principal facts are known to be
true; and we are disposed to extend our belief to
every circumstance. But in choosing a subject that
makes a figure in history, greater precaution is neces-

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sary than where the whole is a fiction. In the latter case, there is full scope for invention: the author is under no restraint other than that the characters and incidents be just copies of nature. But where the story is founded on truth, no circumstances must be added, but such as connect naturally with what are known to be true; history may be supplied, but must not be contradicted: farther, the subject chosen must be distant in time, or at least in place: for the familiarity of recent persons and events ought to be avoided. Familiarity ought more especially to be avoided in an epic poem, the peculiar character of which is dignity and elevation : modern manners make no figure in such a poem.*

After Voltaire, no writer, it is probable, will think of rearing an epic poem upon a recent event in the history of his own country. But an event of that kind is perhaps not altogether unqualified for tragedy: it was admitted in Greece; and Shakspeare has employed it successfully in several of his pieces. One advantage it possesses above fiction, that of more readily engaging our belief, which tends above any other circumstance to raise our sympathy. The scene of comedy is generally laid at home; familiarity is no objection; and we are peculiarly sensible of the ridicule of our own manners.

After a proper subject is chosen, the dividing it into parts requires some art. The conclusion of a book in an epic poem, or of an act in a play, cannot be altogether arbitrary; nor be intended for so slight a purpose as to make the parts of equal length. The supposed pause at the end of every book, and the real pause at the end of every act, ought always to coin