between the two main armies. The line which separated the detached corps was continued from the mouth of the Katzbach along the Oder to the frontiers of Saxony and Prussia, where it joined the Elbe. The French were of course to occupy Hamburgh, one of the articles stating " that they were in possession of the isles in the Elbe, and every thing which they occupied in the 32d military division on the 8th of June at midnight." The besieged and blockaded fortresses were to be revictualled every five days. By the 10th article it was stipulated, that on the 12th of June, all the corps of the combined army beyond the Elbe, or in Saxony, were to return into Prussia. Buonaparte was thus left undisputed master of the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. The duration of the armistice was fixed to the 20th of July inclusive. It was agreed that six days notice should be given of the resumption of hostilities.

Preparations on an extensive scale were, in the mean time, carried on throughout all the provinces of the Prussian monarchy, as well as the districts of northern Germany, which had been liberated from French influence. The events of the recent campaign afforded on this subject a most salutary and important lesson. Every private object gave place for the moment to the grand views of national safety. Levies for the augmentation of the regular army were made to a very great extent. Á numerous and well-disciplined militia, called Landwehr, was also raised; to which was added a levy en masse, under the appellation of Landsturm.

Austria was scarcely less indefatigable in completing her establishmentsin raising new levies-and in pouring numerous corps into Bohemia. From the moment that the Russian arms acquired the ascendancy, an extraordinary impulse was given to the coun

cils of this power. All the men of influence began to exclaim, that now was the time to retrieve at once so many losses, which had reduced Austria to a state of degradation. Russia offered, now that she had delivered herself, to assist in the liberation of other nations; and from all the neighbouring states ample co-operation might be with certainty expected.— Austria, however, after such a succession of disasters, and so many disappointments, shrunk from taking at once any decided step. She even employed a considerable share of dissimulation to conceal from the French the change which had taken place in her councils.

Buonaparte lavished offers, entreaties, protestations; half of the Prussian monarchy was to be the reward of the co-operation of Austria, which would restore to him all his former ascendancy. Austria turned a deaf ear to such proposals; she recalled the auxiliary corps which had acted with the French army, and remained a mere spectator of the campaign in Saxony and Silesia. She had, however, alrea dy gone too far to render it safe for her that France should resume its former power, and again surround her territories with its armies. Such views of policy rendered her active in nego. ciating an armistice, and in forwarding the assemblage of a congress at Prague. They determined her also to support no terms of peace, which should not have for their basis the limitation of the French influence in Germany. The precise character of the overtures first made by her has not been ascertained; but it is certain that from the moment they reached the ear of Buonaparte, he accounted her his enemy, and determined again to try the fate of arms.

Efforts were made accordingly by the French ruler to draw reinforce ments from every quarter. Some corps of the army of Spain, which had hi

therto been left untouched, began their march for the Elbe. Eugene Beau. harnois repaired to Italy, and assembled an army upon the Adige, with the view of overawing Austria on that side. Buonaparte, at the same time, interposed every species of delay in the negociation, by complaints relative to the character of the persons sent to the congress, and by disputes upon matters of form. His object, which he scarcely hesitated to avow, was, that hostilities should be renewed during the continuance of the negociations. Thus he probably hoped to deceive Austria, and prevent her from immediately taking an active part in the war; and if he should succeed in driving the armies of Russia and Prussia beyond the Vistula, and cutting them off from all communication with the Bohemian frontier, he might then give the law to all his enemies. Austria, however, had formed her resolution, and had fully determined, if the war should be renewed, to take the most decided part in it. At the expiration of the armistice, she proposed an extension of it for three weeks, to which Buonaparte reluctantly acceded. His views evidently were of such a character as to remove all prospects of a pacific termination to the discussions; and Austria had, perhaps, no other object in this delay than to mature her preparations, and arrange the plan of the approaching campaign. Buonaparte still continued to raise difficulties; and as there appeared to be no prospect of his acceding to reasonable terms, the armistice was denounced, and Austria issued her declaration of war. This event, which will be ever memorable in the annals of Europe, and which of itself involved the complete re-establishment of the longlost balance of power, occurred on the 10th of August, 1813.

Before entering on hostilities, the cabinet of Vienna issued a manifesto

explaining its principles and policy. This paper began by declaring his imperial majesty's love of peace, and by assuring the world that he was free from all thoughts of conquest and aggrandisement, and had entered upon war only to avert the danger to which the social system was exposed of becoming a prey to a lawless and ambitious power. The emperor complained of the destructive system adopted by the enemy, by which commercial intercourse, and, indeed, almost all intercourse, was suspended between nations.-The manifesto touched upon the marriage of the Austrian princess to Buonaparte, a marriage consented to with the hope of inclining him to a sense of moderation and justice-a hope in which his majesty was the more justified, because when this union was accomplished, Buonaparte had reached that point of his career, when the desire of preserving his conquests seemed to be more natural than a restless struggle to acquire new possessions. If these flattering prospects were destroyed, the misfortune was not to be imputed to Austria.-The year 1810 was not yet closed, when, in an evil hour, Buonaparte resolved to seize a large portion of North Germany, and to rob the free cities of Hamburgh, Bremen, and Lubeck, first of their political, and then of their commercial existence. This scheme was adopted upon the arbitrary pretext, that the war with England required it; and seemed to be the forerunner of greater usurpations, by which one half of Germany was to become a French province, and Buonaparte the absolute ruler of the continent.-Alluding to the war against Russia, and the motives which determined the policy of Austria in that war, it was remarked in the manifesto, that--" The campaign of 1812 furnished a memorable example of the failure of an undertaking supported by gigantic power, conducted by a captain of the first

rank, when, in the confidence of great military talents, he despises the rules of prudence, and o'ersteps the bounds of nature." Then was brought on an important revolution in all the political relations of Europe. The confederacy of Great Britain, Russia, and Sweden, presented a point of union to all neighbouring states. Prussia seized that favourable moment, and threw herself into the arms of the allies. The hatred of foreign dominion burst forth on all sides. The crisis was not neglected by the Emperor of Austria. In the beginning of December, steps had been taken to dispose Buonaparte to a quiet and peaceful policy. But a striking constrast was soon observed between the sentiments of Austria and the conduct of Napoleon. He declared, he would hear of no proposition for peace that should violate the French empire in the French sense of the word. At the same time eventual conditions, with which this self-created boundary did not seem to have any relation, were spoken of at one time with menacing indignation, at another with bitter contempt, as if it had not been possible to declare in terms sufficiently distinct the resolution of Buonaparte, not to make to the repose of the world even one single nominal sacrifice.

These hostile demonstrations were attended with this particular mortification to Austria, that they placed even the invitations to peace, which this cabinet, with the knowledge and apparent consent of France, made to other courts, in a false and disadvantageous light. The sovereigns united against France, instead of giving any answer to the propositions of Austria, for negociation and mediation, laid before her the public declarations of the French ruler. And when, in March, his majesty sent a minister to London, to invite England to share in a negocia tion, the British ministry replied, they could not believe that Austria still en

tertained hopes of peace, when Buonaparte had, in the mean time, expressed sentiments which could tend only to perpetuate war.

In the month of April, Buonaparte suggested the dissolution of the Prussian monarchy as the natural consequence of a defection from France, and observed, that it depended upon Austria herself to add the most important and flourishing of the Prussian provinces to her own states. Austria, however, felt that the restoration of the Prussian monarchy was the first step to be taken.

With reference to the assertion of Buonaparte, that he had proposed a congress to be held at Prague, the Austrian cabinet declared, that it was only acquainted with this proposal through the public prints. Aware of all the obstacles to a general peace, Austria had long considered the possibility of obtaining the object progressively, and first by a continental peace

not that the Emperor of Austria, "imagined that the continent could exist, if the separation of England were not considered as a most deadly evil." Towards the close of the month of June, the Austrian cabinet (said the manifesto,) sent a minister to Dresden, and a convention was concluded, accepting the mediation of Austria in the negociation of a general peace; if that could not be ef fected, of a preliminary continental peace. The congress was to be opened on the 5th July; and the armistice was afterwards extended to the 10th August. In the mean time Austria resolved once more to try the British government. Buonaparte received the proposal with apparent approbation, and offered a passage to the Austrian messenger through France. But difficulties arose, the passports were delayed from time to time, and at last refused. During the interval, the Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries were

named, and arrived at Prague. The negociations were not to be protracted beyond the 10th August, unless they afforded a confident hope of a favour able result. But it was soon evident that France procrastinated; a French minister arrived, but had no orders to proceed to business until the appearance of a plenipotentiary, who did not join the congress until the 28th of July. Formal and minute discussions

rendered all the endeavours of the mediating power abortive. The powers of the French negociator were unnecessarily circumscribed; and it was not till the 6th of August that he gave in a new declaration, by which the negociation was not brought one step nearer to a close. After an useless exchange of notes, the 10th of August arrived the congress was at an end, and Austria had no remedy, no resource, but to take up arms. Such was the substance of this important document.

The French army, at the close of this discussion, equalled perhaps in numerical amount those of all the other powers united. At no former period, probably, had Buonaparte been at the head of one more numerous. The main body, under his own immediate command, may be estimated without exaggeration at 300,000 men. He had established a strong fortified line to the Bohemian frontier, beginning at Wittenberg and passing through Torgau and Dresden to Konigstein and the entrenched camp at Pirnaa fine military line, no doubt, to resist an army advancing against him from the Silesian frontier. Between this line and the Silesian frontier his main army was stationed; in Upper and Lower Lusatia, Mortier was posted with 70,000 men, including a large force of cavalry at Luckaw; and Ney, with about the same numbers, occupied Bautzen. The Saxons were at Goerlitz. On the Maine there was an army

of reserve under Augereau; and an army of Bavarians, about 25,000 strong, was stationed near Munich. A con. siderable force under Davoust defended Holstein and Hamburgh, and threatened Pomerania. The communication of this corps with the army at Dresden, and the preponderance of the French on the middle Elbe, were imperfectly maintained by the garrison of Magdeburgh.

The allies occupied a line of much greater extent. The accession of Austria, besides making a large addition to their force, brought with it also the advantage of turning the barrier of the Elbe, as that river flows for many miles through Bohemia, and might thus be passed by the allies without opposition. In Bohemia, therefore, the grand army took its position. It consisted of the whole Austrian force, augmented by large Russian and Prussian detachments from Silesia. The head-quarters were at Toplitz, whence the combined armies threatened Saxony and the rear of the French army. Blucher commanded a very large force in Silesia, consisting partly of Russian and Prussian regulars, and partly of a large body of well-organised militia, the whole amounting to about 100,000 men. The Crown Prince of Sweden, who had his head-quarters at Berlin, commanded the army of the north of Germany. This force was composed of the whole Swedish army, of large corps of Russian and Prussian regulars, of the militia of Brandenburgh, and the troops levied in the Hanse Towns and other districts which had thrown off the French yoke. On one side, this army observed Davoust and the garrison of Magdeburgh; on the other it covered Berlin, and was prepared to act as circumstances might require against the French grand army. It was estimated at 120,000 men.

This position of the allies does not, with a view to military movements,