MORAL ESSAYS. [IT may be well to preface such introductory remarks as appear called for by the series of poems comprehended by Warburton under the general title of Moral Essays, by a statement of the chronological order in which they were originally given to the world. It will thus be seen at a glance, that their present arrangement was due solely to the editorial ingenuity of Pope's friend and commentator, to whose suggestions, as he informs us, the poet readily agreed. The 5th Epistle of the Moral Essays (to Addison) was written in 1715, and first published, with the lines on Craggs added, in Tickell's edition of Addison's Works in 1720. The 4th Epistle of the Moral Essays (to the Earl of Burlington) was published in 1731, under the title of Taste, subsequently altered to Of False Taste, and ultimately to Of the Use of Riches. The 3rd Epistle (Of the Use of Riches, to Lord Bathurst) followed in 1732. In the same year appeared the first two Epistles of the Essay on Man, the third succeeding in 1733. In this year also came out the Epistle On the Knowledge and Characters of Men, addressed to Lord Cobham, now the first of the Moral Essays. The 4th Epistle of the Essay on Man was published in 1734, when the whole Essay on Man was also brought out in its present form. The Epistle (now the 2nd of the Moral Essays) to a Lady, On the Characters of Women, appeared in 1735; and finally the Universal Prayer, which now appropriately follows the Essay on Man, was not published till the year 1738. Pope died before the entire series had been published in its present order in the complete edition of his works. From Pope's own statement with regard to the design of his work, repeated in various passages of his correspondence, it is certain that what he actually wrote only formed part of a great scheme which he had long carried about either on paper, or in his mind; but which he never accomplished in its fulness. So much it is impossible to doubt, without in the least degree falling in with the belief that the system as developed at length by Warburton, who in his Commentary, became a kind of moral sponsor to the Essay on Man, was ever clearly in Pope's head. Warburton states that the Essay was intended to have been comprised in four books: the first (which we have in the four Epistles bearing the general title) treating of man in the abstract and considering him under all his relations; the second taking up the subject of Ep. I. and II. of the first, and treating of man in his intellectual capacity at large (of this a part might be found in Bk. IV. of the Dunciad); the third resuming the subject of Ep. III. of the first, and discussing Man in his social, political and religious capacity (which Pope afterwards thought might best be done in the form of an Epic poem); the fourth pursuing the subject of Ep. IV. of the first, and treating of practical morality. Of this fourth and last book, he continues, the epistles, bearing the title of Moral Essays, were detached portions, the two first (on the Characters of Men and Women) forming its introductory part. In any case, therefore, and even supposing the above scheme to have been Pope's own, the four Epistles which bear the title of the Essay on Man claim to be regarded as complete in themselves. The system which the Essay on Man (to restrict the application of that title in the remainder of these remarks to those four Epistles) developes, or purports to develope, was explained at great length in Warburton's Commentary. Pope's own words (in a letter to Warburton of April 11, 1739) are sufficient to shew the relation between the work and the exegesis: 'You have made my system as clear as I ought to have done and could not. It is indeed the same system as mine, but illustrated with a ray of your own, as they say our natural body is still the same when glorified. I am sure I like it better than I did before, and so will every man else. I know I meant just what you explain, but I did not explain my meaning so well as you. You understand me as well as I do myself, but you express me better than I could express myself. Pray accept the sincerest acknowledgments.' It therefore becomes necessary to enquire in the first place, what is the system which the Essay on Man actually places before us; and secondly, from what sources the poet derived the philosophy which he has endeavoured to express. The following brief summary, founded chiefly on Aikin's Introduction, may supply an answer to the former question. The first Epistle is especially occupied with Man, with respect to the place which he holds in the system of the Universe; and the principal topic is the refutation of all objections against the wisdom and benevolence of the Providence which placed man here, objections derived from the weakness and imperfection of his nature. The first principle of philosophical enquiry is reasoning from what we know to what we do not know. But if we are to inform ourselves as to man's place in the universe, we are hampered by our ignorance of the latter itself, of which we know only a small part, viz. our own earth. Observation, however, teaches that the Universe contains a scale of beings, rising in due gradation one above the other, and each endowed with the faculties necessary for its station. Those, who in their imperfect knowledge are fain to interfere with that scale, presumptuously demand to re-settle the Order of Heaven. It is this Pride which surveys the system of the Universe solely from its own point of view, assuming everything to exist for the benefit of the individual as he conceives it. Man cannot read the riddles of Providence; he must therefore accept the double truth that the Universe and all its several parts constitute a divine and perfect Order, but that this order is not visible or recognizable in its perfection to imperfect man. The second Epistle proceeds to lead up to the special truth illustrating the general truth enunciated by its predecessor, viz. that even in the passions and imperfections of man, the ends of Providence and its scheme of universal good are fulfilled. (It is this special part of the scheme of the universe which man is qualified to study; God he may not scan.) In human nature, two principles contend for mastery: selflove, which stimulates, and reason, which restrains. In both, although to us the one appears evil and the other good, the scheme of Creation is working out its beneficent ends. The third Epistle once more resumes the general proposition of which the second presented us with a special application, and insists that the end of divine government is the production of general good, although by means of which we are not always able to distinguish the correlation. The main argument of this Epistle tends to illustrate this, by proving that in the divine scheme self-love and social work to the same end. The fourth Epistle offers, so to speak, the practical application of the fundamental idea of the entire Essay. The scheme of the Universe being perfect, is of course designed for the happiness of all; all happiness therefore is general, and all particular happiness depends on general. It is therefore necessary, in order to estimate the happiness of the individual at its true value, to estimate it, not according as it is felt by the individual, but as it finds its place in the general system. All men are equally happy who recognize the Order which assigns to them their place; and God has given to all that happiness which springs from taking the right means towards attaining to it. Thus the poem at its close recurs to its fundamental idea of the benevolent system of the Universe, in which every virtue, as well as every passion, has its object and end. If the above fairly represent the outline of the argument of this celebrated essay, it will be sufficient to add only a very few words, in order to shew where it halts. The optimistic conclusion of the first Epistle cannot be said to be logically drawn from its premises. The presumptuousness of attempting to judge the system of the Universe from the peculiar point of view of Man, is incontestably demonstrated; but the perfection of the entire system is merely generalised out of a few phenomena, which man may misjudge as utterly as, according to the poet, he misjudges extraordinary occurrences which seem evils to him. And from an ethical point of view, the result, if logically followed out, is pure fatalism; and man, as completely as every other organic part of creation, reduced to a puppet. To avert this conclusion, Pope in the Universal Prayer addresses Providence as binding nature, i. e. the rest of nature, fast in fate, but leaving the human will free! With regard to the application of the general proposition to the special case of human nature in the second Epistle, it is obvious that the distinction drawn between self-love and reason, is wholly illogical; inasmuch as reason, being a power of the mind, may be employed by self-love for its own purposes, so that, as has been well pointed out, it depends upon the use of reason, not upon the direction given to self-love, what tendency the moral being of man will assume. The third Epistle, resuming the argument of the first, lands us in the same result. The theory that self-love and social are the same, amounts to nothing short of this: that civilisation is only the product of man's instinct of self-defence and selfadvancement, that the institutions of society are merely means adopted for satisfying in the most convenient manner the necessities of the individual; and that men are therefore, like Mandeville's bees, only being guided by another power to co-operate in a system of which they unconsciously form part. This view, which since Pope's day has reappeared in many forms, may be true or false; it is certain that it is not the view which Pope designed to enforce. The truth is, that Pope endeavoured to develope a moral system which (whether perfect or imperfect in itself) was at all events imperfectly understood by him. The Essay on Man, even if the anecdote be untrustworthy according to which its scheme was originally drawn up in writing by Bolingbroke, was undoubtedly due, if not to the suggestion, at all events to the influence and conversation, of that nobleman upon Pope's receptive mind. The philosophic stamina of the Essay, to use Johnson's expression, belonged to Bolingbroke; and it was only with regard to the execution that the latter could have expressed to Swift (letter of November 19, 1729) that the work, in Pope's hands, would be an original.' Bolingbroke's most recent biographer, Mr Macknight, has therefore not said too much when he avers: 'There is no doubt whatever, but that Pope received from Bolingbroke the leading principles of his Essay on Man. Pope, indeed, acknowledges his obligations in the fullest sense at the beginning of the first, and the end of the fourth Book; and, notwithstanding Warburton's defence, the Essay on Man and the principles of Bolingbroke must be considered one and the same, though they are less openly expressed in the poem, and disguised with poetical ornament. It is impossible to find in any couplet any acknowledgment of revealed religion; but, on the contrary, all that admiration of nature, of looking upward |
