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IX.

ART. that he intended by it to prove our being reconciled to God through the death of Christ; and the medium by which he proved it might be, for aught that appears from the words themselves, only an opinion held true among those to whom he writes. For he only supposes it, but says nothing to prove it: which it might be expected he would have done, if the Jews had made any doubt of it. But further they say, that when comparisons or oppositions, such as this, are made in scripture, we are not always to carry them on to an exact equality: we are required not 1 Pet. i.15, only to be holy as God is holy, but to be perfect as he is perfect:' where by the as is not to be meant a true equality, Matt.v.48. but some sort of resemblance and conformity. Therefore

16.

10. and

through

Mat. iii. 7.

1 Thess. ii.

those who believe that there is nothing imputed to Adam's posterity on the account of his sin, but this temporary punishment of their being made liable to death, and to all those miseries that the fear of it, with our other concerns about it, bring us under, say that this is enough to justify the comparison that is there stated: and that those, who will carry it on to be an exact parallel, make a stretch beyond the phraseology of the scripture, and the use of parables, and of the many comparisons that go only to one or more points, but ought not to be stretched to every thing.

These are the things that other great divines among us have opposed to this opinion. As to its consonancy to the Article, those who oppose it do not deny, but that it comes up fully to the highest sense that the words of the Article can import: nor do they doubt, but that those who prepared the Articles, being of that opinion themselves, might perhaps have had that sense of the words in their thoughts. But they add, that we are only bound to sign the Articles in a literal and Ex. xxxii. grammatical sense: since therefore the words, God's wrath and damnation, which are the highest in the Article, are capathe whole ble of a lower sense, temporary judgments being often so exOld Testa-pressed in the scriptures, therefore they believe the loss of the ment. favour of God, the sentence of death, the troubles of life, and the corruption of our faculties, may be well called God's wrath and damnation. Besides, they observe, that the main Luke xxiii. point of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, and its 1 Cor. xi. being considered by God as their own act, not being expressly taught in the Article, here was that moderation observed, 1Pet.iv.17. which the compilers of the Articles have shewed on many other occasions. It is plain from hence, that they did not 2 Cor. vii. intend to lay a burden on men's consciences, or oblige them to profess a doctrine that seems to be hard of digestion to a great many. The last prejudice that they offer against that Rom. xiv. opinion is, that the softening the terms of God's wrath and damnation, that was brought in by the followers of St. Austin's doctrine, to such a moderate and harmless notion, as to be only a loss of heaven, with a sort of unactive sleep, was an effect of their apprehending that the world could very ill bear

16.

40.

29.

Rom. xiii.

2.

3.

John viii.

10, 11.

23.

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an opinion of so strange a sound, as that all mankind were to ART. be damned for the sin of one man: and that therefore, to make this pass the better, they mitigated damnation far below the representation that the scriptures generally give of it, which propose it as the being adjudged to a place of torment, and a state of horror and misery.

Thus I have set down the different opinions in this point, with that true indifference that I intend to observe on such other occasions, and which becomes one who undertakes to explain the doctrines of the church, and not his own; and who is obliged to propose other men's opinions with all sincerity, and to shew what are the senses that the learned men, of different persuasions in these matters, have put on the words of the Article. In which one great and constant rule to be observed is, to represent men's opinions candidly, and to judge as favourably both of them and their opinions as may be: to bear with one another, and not to disturb the peace and union of the church, by insisting too much and too peremptorily upon matters of such doubtful disputation; but willingly to leave them to all that liberty, to which the church has left them, and which she still allows them.

ART.
X.

ARTICLE X.

Of Free-Will.

The Condition of Man after the fall of Adam is such that he cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural strength and good works to faith and calling upon God. Wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the Grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will.

We shall find the same moderation observed in this Article, that was taken notice of in the former; where all disputes concerning the degree of that feebleness and corruption, under which we are fallen by the sin of Adam, are avoided, and only the necessity of a preventing and a co-operating grace is asserted against the Semipelagians* and the Pelagians. But before we enter upon that, it is fitting first to state the true notion of free-will, in so far as it is necessary to all rational

A new and different modification was given to the doctrine of Augustin by the monk Cassian, who came from the east into France, and erected a monastery near Marseilles. Nor was he the only one who attempted to fix upon a certain temperature between the errors of Pelagius and the opinions of the African oracle; several persons embarked in this undertaking about the year 430, and hence arose a new sect, which were called by their adversaries, Semipelagians.

The opinions of this sect have been misrepresented, by its enemies, upon several occasions; such is generally the fate of all parties in religious controversies. Their doctrine, as it has been generally explained by the learned, amounted to this: "That inward preventing grace was not necessary to form in the soul the first beginnings of true repentance and amendment; that every one was capable of producing these by the mere power of their natural faculties, as also of exercising faith in Christ, and forming the purposes of a holy and sincere obedience." But they acknowledged, at the same time, "That none could persevere or advance in that holy and virtuous course which they had the power of beginning, without the perpetual support and the powerful assistance of the divine grace."t

The disciples of Augustin, in Gaul, attacked the Semipelagians, with the utmost vehemence, without being able to extirpate or overcome them. The doctrine of this sect was so suited to the capacities of the generality of men, so conformable to the way of thinking that prevailed among the monastic orders, so well received among the gravest and most learned Grecian doctors, that neither the zeal nor industry of its adversaries could stop its rapid and extensive progress. Add to its other advantages, that neither Augustin, nor his followers, had ventured to condemn it in all its parts, nor to brand it as an impious and pernicious heresy.' Mosheim.-[ED.]

† • The leading principles of the Semipelagians were the five following:1. That God did not dispense his grace to one more than another, in consequence of predestination, í. e. an eternal and absolute decree; but was willing to save all men, if they complied with the terms of his gospel. 2. That Christ died for all men. 3. That the grace purchased by Christ, and necessary to salvation, was offered to all men. 4. That man, before he received grace, was capable of faith and holy desires. 5. That man, born free, was consequently capable of resisting the influences of grace, or complying with its suggestions. Maclaine.

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agents to make their actions morally good or bad; since it is ART. a principle that seems to rise out of the light of nature, that no man is accountable, rewardable, or punishable, but for that in which he acts freely, without force or compulsion; and so far all are agreed.

Some imagine, that liberty must suppose a freedom to do, or not to do, and to act contrariwise at pleasure. To others it seems not necessary that such a liberty should be carried to denominate actions morally good or bad: God certainly acts in the perfectest liberty, yet he cannot sin. Christ had the most exalted liberty in his human nature, of which a creature was capable, and his merit was the highest, yet he could not sin. Angels and glorified saints, though no more capable of rewards, are perfect moral agents, and yet they cannot sin: and the devils, with the damned, though not capable of further punishment, yet are still moral agents, and cannot but sin: so this indifferency to do, or not to do, cannot be the true notion of liberty. A truer one seems to them to be this, that a rational nature is not determined as mere matter, by the impulse and motion of other bodies upon it, but is capable of thought, and, upon considering the objects set before it, makes reflection, and so chooses. Liberty therefore seems to consist in this inward capacity of thinking, and of acting and choosing upon thought. The clearer the thought is, and the more constantly that our choice is determined by it, the more does a man rise up to the highest acts, and sublimest exercises of liberty.

A question arises out of this, whether the will is not always determined by the understanding, so that a man does always choose and determine himself upon the account of some idea or other? If this is granted, then no liberty will be left to our faculties. We must apprehend things as they are proposed to our understanding; for if a thing appears true to us, we must assent to it; and if the will is as blind to the understanding, as the understanding is determined by the light in which the object appears to it, then we seem to be concluded under a fate, or necessity. It is, after all, a vain attempt to argue against every man's experience: we perceive in ourselves a liberty of turning our minds to some ideas, or from others; we can think longer or shorter of these, more exactly and steadily, or more slightly and superficially, as we please; and in this radical freedom of directing or diverting our thoughts, a main part of our freedom does consist: often objects as they appear to our thoughts do so affect or heat them, that they do seem to conquer us, and carry us after them; some thoughts seeming as it were to intoxicate and charm us. Appetites and passions, when much fired by objects apt to work upon them, do agitate us strongly; and, on the other hand, the impressions of religion come often into our minds with such a secret force, so much of terror and such secret joy mixing with them,

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ART. that they seem to master us; yet in all this a man acts freely, because he thinks and chooses for himself; and though perhaps he does not feel himself so entirely balanced, that he is indifferent to both sides, yet he has still such a remote liberty, that he can turn himself to other objects and thoughts, so that he can divert, if not all of a sudden resist, the present impressions that seem to master him. We do also feel that in many trifles we do act with an entire liberty, and do many things upon no other account, and for no other reason, but because we will do them: and yet more important things depend on these.

Our thoughts are much governed by those impressions that are made upon our brain: when an object proportioned to us appears to us with such advantages as to affect us much, it makes such an impression on our brain, that our animal spirits move much towards it; and those thoughts that answer it arise oft and strongly upon us, till either that impression is worn out and flatted, or new and livelier ones are made on us by other objects. In this depressed state in which we now are, the ideas of what is useful or pleasant to our bodies are strong; they are ever fresh, being daily renewed; and, according to the different construction of men's blood and their brains, there arises a great variety of inclinations in them. Our animal spirits, that are the immediate organs of thought, being the subtiler parts of our blood, are differently made and shaped, as our blood happens to be acid, salt, sweet, or phlegmatic: and this gives such a bias to all our inclinations, that nothing can work us off from it, but some great strength of thought that bears it down: so learning, chiefly in mathematical sciences, can so swallow up and fix one's thought, as to possess it entirely for some time; but when that amusement is over, nature will return and be where it was, being rather diverted than overcome by such speculations.

The revelation of religion is the proposing and proving many truths of great importance to our understandings, by which they are enlightened, and our wills are guided; but these truths are feeble things, languid and unable to stem a tide of nature, especially when it is much excited and heated: so that in fact we feel, that, when nature is low, these thoughts may have some force to give an inward melancholy, and to awaken in us purposes and resolutions of another kind; but when nature recovers itself, and takes fire again, these grow less powerful. The giving those truths of religion such a force that they may be able to subdue nature, and to govern us, is the design of both natural and revealed religion. So the question comes now according to the Article to be, whether a man by the powers of nature and of reason, without other inward assistances, can so far turn and dispose his own mind, as to believe and to do works pleasant and acceptable to God.' Pelagius thought that man was so entire in his

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