BLACKWOOD'S EDINBURGH MAGAZINE. No. CCCCXCVI. FEBRUARY, 1857. VOL. LXXXI. THE WAR IN ASIA. THE Russian Empire has two gates, through which her armies may march on their mission of territorial aggrandisement. These are not on her western front. Cossack absolutism, the sway of Muscovite principles, may yet spread to the Atlantic; but, territorially, Russia will never extend her rule westwards in Europe beyond the limits of the Slavonian race. The case is different along her southern frontier. Occupying the vast territories constituting that officina gentium from whence issued the invading hordes which overthrew in succession all the old governments of the civilised world-Hindoo, Persian, Roman, Saracenic, Byzantine--the Russian Empire still seeks expansion in the same direction. Half imbedded in its southern frontier lies the Black Sea, forming a barrier to landward progress nearly 800 miles long, and compelling the downward pressure of the colossal empire to divide into an eastern and western stream. Once the Black Sea is fairly enclasped by the dominions of the Czar, and the Bosphorus closed against hostile fleets, this inland sea will be no longer an obstacle, but a facility, to the southern advance of the Muscovite legions: but at present it is as we say, an impassable expanse which must be turned by marching round its flanks. The regions to the east and west of this sea are the two Gates of Russia, through which the ambition of the Czars has sought and will continue to seek expansion. The one gate opens into Europe, the other into Asia. The former at present is shut the latter stands open. When at war with a restless and ambitious power-with a young and growing state whose rulers and people still prefer territorial extension to commercial development, it is wise, when closing one's own frontier against attack, to leave open some other channel into which the energies of the foe may be directed. This is what the Continental Governments did at the close of the late war. The French Emperor, having served his own immediate purpose in the war, and fearing to face the eventualities which a prosecution of the contest might have produced, resolved abruptly to close it after the fall of Sebastopol. With this end in view, no further blow was allowed to be struck in the Crimea; and, at the same time, not a regiment was allowed to be sent to relieve Kars, or to support Omar Pasha in his important invasion of Georgia. Russia was proud, and would rather push the war to extremities than consent to humiliating terms of peace. The measures of the French Government saved her from such humiliation. The fall of Sebastopol was made a barren victory in the Crimea, and was allowed to be balanced in some measure by the fall of Kars in Armenia; and these facts, duly improved at the Congress of Peace, resulted in that Treaty of Paris which the Moniteur eulogised as "humiliating to none." The fall of Kars, and the withholding of support from Omar Pasha's invasion of Georgia, enabled the Continental Powers, while shutting the door against Russia in Europe, to leave wider open than ever her gate into Asia. The representatives of England, we hope, struggled against this decision, but they struggled vainly (when it comes to a question of votes, the interests of the Continental Powers must always override those of insulated Britain).* And now we already begin to perceive the consequence. Russian prestige is greater than ever throughout western Asia. The capture of Kars enabled General Mouravieff for ten months to keep possession of that fortress and the surrounding region, -to distribute far and wide handbills announcing the triumph of the Czar, and representing it, by a colourable lie, as a victory over the arms of England. The wavering allegiance of the Kurdish tribes of Armenia has been half-won to the Czar. Persia has gone wholly over to the same side. A renewed onset is being made to complete the subjugation of the Caucasus, and render the isthmus between the Euxine and Caspian a broad highway for Russian advance. From Soujouk-kale to Erivan, from Erivan to the mouth of the Araxes, and thence northwards along the shores and upon the islands of the Caspian, an unusual mustering of troops and din of warlike preparation is going on. The eastern Gate of Russia already creaks on its hinges. Perhaps, while we write, the Muscovite battalions are once more entering the thrice-despoiled territories of Persia,-this time all the more dangerously for her, and ominously for us, that they enter not as enemies but in the guise of friends. It is long since Russia began to foray southwards by her eastern Gate. And it is important to note this, for it is only by the light of the past that we shall properly comprehend the true character of Russian aggression in this quarter. It is needless to rail at such aggression, for it is alike natural and inevitable. Russia lies between Europe and Asia like a vast lake, whose waters are slowly but steadily increasing, and which, hemmed in by steep banks on its western side, must inevitably overflow into the vast unbulwarked regions of Central Asia. As Russian wealth, population, and resources increase, the Muscovite tide will swell out more and more into the territories of Turkistan, and encroach more and more upon the native sovereignty of Persia. The tide will never recede, their for it is but the overflowings of the great fountains of Slavonian life, which promise, for ages to come, to continue pouring forth populating streams into the halfvacant basins of Asia. Russian domination over the tribes of These views are not an after-thought, but will be found expressed in our article on 66 The Peace," written before the Treaty of Paris was ratified. Inter alia, alluding to the probable results of the Treaty, we observed-"By guarding the line of the Danube, while leaving open the Transcaucasian frontier and the shores of Anatolia, you change the main line of Russian advance from the western to the eastern side of the Black Sea. You divert it from Europe into Asia, and by so doing change the Powers by whom such southward progress brings her into collision. On the Danube, Russia has Austria for a rival; but for Asia Minor, Austria has no concern,-there Russia will meet no rival but Great Britain, who will be left to struggle with her single-handed." And we characterised this as "the best method for diverting the march of Russia from Europe into Asia, and thereby not only freeing France and her Austrian alliance from the rivalry and pressure of the Czar, but of raising a new and permanent source of antagonism between Russia and England,-every step of the former of those Powers necessarily bringing her nearer to the Indian empire, and line of communication therewith, of the latter. The general public, alive only to the interests of the moment, may underrate the importance of this stipulation, but its consequences will be none the less momentous because not immediate. It is a legacy of hostility between Russia and England which the future will duly honour."--(May 1856, p. 617.) the Steppes and the organised communities of Persia and Anatolia is a mere question of time which may be as surely predicted as that the Russian population will one day be double and treble what it is now. That population will for centuries have room to spread eastward across the Asiatic continent; but it will take that course reluctantly, and will prefer to foray southwards, until it reach a limit where other portions of the European race have become too firmly consolidated to be driven from their ground. Commerce and ambition alike impel Russia to go forth conquering through her eastern gates. A century and a half ago the Czar Peter perceived this, and laid down the outlines of a vast plan of Asiatic conquest for the guidance of his imperial successors. By an error common to minds of high speculative and imaginative power-to whom, seeing clearly the future, distant events often appear too near and their realisation too easy-Peter himself does not seem to have adequately appreciated the obstacles to his projects, and by a bold dash at Khiva in 1717, attempted to win a vantageground which was not destined to be gained by Russia until the present day. The armed mission which he sent to that Khanate to establish relations with the natives and to seize a gold mine, easily reached their destination; but being outwitted by the Khivans, they were induced to separate into detached parties, and were then cut to pieces. Six years after wards witnessed the real commencement of his schemes of aggression. It was in 1723–25, when the power of Persia was prostrated by the revolt of the Affghans and the attacks of the Turks, that Russia first struck her fangs into her prey and during the dismemberment of Persia which then occurred, the Russian forces seized the territories of the Shah lying between the Caspian and the Black Seas. The martial genius of Nadir Shah temporarily checked the progress of Muscovite ambition, and in 1735 compelled the Empress Anne to resign the captured provinces before they had been Russianised. But in due time the advances of Russia VOL. LXXXI. were resumed in a more subtle form; and in 1774 the Empress Catherine commenced a series of intrigues with the states lying to the south of the Caucasus, with a view to induce them to throw off their allegiance to Persia, and to place themselves under the protectorate of Russia. All the usual Muscovite seductions and threats were had recourse to: missions and subsidies were first employed, then the erection of fortresses, and ultimately the introduction of troops; and so successful were those arts that, in 1773, Mingrelia, Imeritia, and Georgia accepted the Russian protectorate. For twelve years Persia submitted to this unjust domination; and when at length, in 1795, Aga Mahomed Khan attempted to recover the Trans-Caucasian provinces, the Russians were victorious, and pushed their way still further along the shores of the Caspian. Thus, ere the death of Catherine, Russia was paramount all over the isthmus between the Caspian and Black Seas, and had secured for herself the longcoveted gate through which she was to push southwards. The advanced posts of Persia and Turkey had been first sapped and then carried, and now Russia was brought in contact with the main body of those empires. The ten years' war with Persia, which terminated in 1814 by the peace of Gulistan, accomplished apparently little,-Russia having then fighting enough in Europe; but during its continuance Muscovite power was consolidated on the isthmus (the Circassians alone remaining unsubdued), and Persia surrendered the right of having ships of war on the Caspian, which handed over that sea to the exclusive domination of Russia. Twelve years more, and again there was war. The treaty which closed the former war became the occasion for commencing a new one, furnishing fresh triumphs to Russia; and at the close of hostilities in 1828, by the treaty of Turkomanchai, the provinces of Erivan (with the strong fortress of that name) and Nakchivan were ceded to the Czar,-thus extending the Muscovite frontier to the banks of the Araxes; while possession was kept of the province of Talish beyond that river, and a heavy indemnity (!) 10 was exacted for the expenses of the war. To sum up,-in the period between 1774 and 1828, Russia advanced her frontier a thousand miles into Asia; so that the Russian regiment stationed at her farthest frontier-post, on the western shore of the Caspian, has as great a distance to march back to Moscow as onward to Attock on the Indus, and is actually farther from St. Petersburg than from Lahore, the capital of the Punjaub. Any one who has seen an empty bottle thrown into a river, will have perceived that at first the vessel shows great repugnance to be immersed by the fluid, and ever strives to leap towards, and keep itself buoyant by, the air; but that at last there comes a moment when, the invading water having fairly overbalanced the rival element, all struggle ceases, and the vessel, losing all motive power of its own, drifts along helplessly as if it were actually part of the engulfing stream. It was in 1828 that this turning-point came to Persia. Prior to that time British influence had been paramount at the Court of Teheran. Of the state of matters before Paskewitch's conquests, we read: "Russia has always viewed with undisguised jealousy the ascendancy of English influence in the councils of Persia. She has not hesitated, at different times, to make it matter of formal complaint even that Persian troops are commanded by English officers, clothed in English uniforms, and supplied with English arms. In short, the whole machinery of the Persian government is put in motion immediately or remotely by English agents and by English influence." How Russia has turned the tables upon us since this was written twentyseven years ago! Moral as well as material causes, we are sorry to say, contributed to produce this result. It was inevitable that the influence of Russia, with her contiguous frontier and great military power, should one day predominate over that of Britain in Central Asia; but it is to be regretted that we ourselves should have furnished discreditable proofs of our inferiority. By the treaty of Gulistan in 1814, England pledged herself that Russia should fulfil the engage ment to restore Talish; but Russia evaded doing so, and, either from weakness or bad faith, we took no steps to compel fulfilment of the promise. Again, at the breaking-out of the war in 1826, England was bound by treaty to assist Persia against any European power with an army from India, or to pay an annual subsidy of £100,000; yet England broke her pledge, on the plea that Persia had provoked the war, although a more transparent case of wolf and lamb never existed. Well might Mr. Kaye remark of this proceeding, that "the backwardness of England was of dubious honesty, as it doubtless was of dubious expediency." And Sir Harford Jones did not much exaggerate the consequences, when he said, that by the treaty of 1828 "Persia was delivered, bound hand and foot, to the Court of St. Petersburg." The turning-point being passed, then began those demonstrations and expeditions against Herat, which have since, not without reason, occasioned us so much disquietude. To annex Herat is the most natural object of Persian ambition, and it is at the same time one which perfectly coincides with the views of the Russian government. Geographically as well as politically, Herat belongs to Affghanistan, of which it is the door. So far from being an appendage of the Shahs, it was, under the successors of Timour, the seat of a great empire; and in the early part of last century, the Affghans even extended their rule by conquest over Persia. Nadir Shah, however, when he set free his country, retaliated by capturing Herat, and planting there a Persian colony; and though the city quickly returned into the possession of its natural owners, the Affghan power no sooner began to decline than the Persian monarchs cast covetous eyes upon this important frontier city. So formidable was the Affghan power even at the commencement of the present century, that the principal object of the treaties between our Indian government and Persia was, that each might help the other if attacked by the dreaded mountaineers; but the civil wars which thereafter broke into fragments the Affghan empire, and arrayed clan against clan, and chief against chief, not only destroyed its aggressive power, but exposed the country to the attack of foreign arms and influence. So matters stood when the treaty of Turkomanchai first demonstrated to the Court of Teheran that Russia was more potent than England in Central Asia, and that it was better policy to propitiate the former than the latter. Accordingly, in 1832, Persia commenced preparations to attack Herat, and a Russian officer of engineers was ready to accompany the expedition. An early exertion of British influence succeeded in preventing the enterprise being carried out; but just four years afterwards, in 1836, the project was revived, the Russian ambassador at the same time urging the Shah to make haste, lest Britain should again interpose. Sir Henry Ellis, who was then our envoy at the Persian court, lost no time in apprising his government of what was in preparation, and of urging them to take vigorous measures to frustrate the project. His own remonstrances with the Persian government were vain: a quarrel was even picked with him à l'Orientale-a horseman under his protection being seized by the Persian Government, just as the wife of Mirza Hashem was eighteen months ago; and, ultimately, like Mr. Murray, he felt compelled to strike his flag, and withdraw from Teheran. Meanwhile the Shah had set out on his famous expedition against Herat, with the Russian ambassador Simonich in his train; while Captain Vicovich, a secret agent of the Russian government, armed with a holograph letter from the Czar, was busily endeavouring to procure the support of the Affghan chiefs. Fortunately, Eldred Pottinger, a young lieutenant of the Bombay artillery, was then in Herat, and conducted the defence of the place with a courage and ability which have immortalized his name. So interested was Russia in this attack on Herat, that she remitted £25,000 of the debt contracted by Persia, in 1828, in order that it might be expended in fitting out the expedition, and engaged to remit the remainder if the expedition proved successful. The Russian Embassy accompanied the expedition, a body of Russian troops (styled "deserters") aided in the siege, and the assaults were led by Russian officers. But all was in vain. From the first investment in November 1836 to the final raising of the siege in September 1837, three desperate assaults were made upon the town, and were repulsed by the garrison, led by the heroic Pottinger, the assailants on one of these occasions losing 1700 men. These bloody repulses, combined with the appearance of a British force in the Persian Gulf, the seizure of the island of Karrak, and a threat of active hostilities on our part, at length led the Shah and his counsellors to abandon the enterprise. Simultaneously with these events in Asia, the dispute arising from the capture of the "Vixen" in the Black Sea showed the irritation subsisting between the British and Russian Governments. And it is instructive to note that all the time that the Russian ambassador was instigating the Shah to attack Herat, and that Russian money, officers, and troops, were assisting him in the enterprise, Count Nesselrode professed to agree with the British Government as to the viciousness of the course pursued by the Persian monarch, and affirmed that the conduct of the Russian ambassador and agents was in opposition to his instructions! A good illustration of the truth of Karamsin's remark, that it is a maxim of the Russian government to repudiate the conduct of its officers until their project is accomplished, thus preventing opposition until it is too late for other governments to interfere. Although this attempt upon Пerat was foiled, it naturally occasioned our Indian Government much disquiet; and it was with a view to strengthen our influence in that important region that the ill-fated invasion of Affghanistan was undertaken. Both in a political and military point of view, the expedition was characterised by the grossest blunders; and the disastrous retreat from Cabool only served to augment the ascendancy of Russia at the Court of Teheran. Indeed, to so low an ebb had all other foreign influence sunk at that court, that M. Ferrier records that, |