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"The next step in tracing the progress of Lord Wellington led to a period full of glory and renown-the battle of Salamanca. But from what circumstances did that battle arise? Did it arise out of his efficiency, or out of his necessity? It arose from the magnificence, the splendour, the greatness of his talents. He struck the enemy with his spear the moment he saw an opening. But was the unexpected coincidence, out of which such great events arose, a solid ground to build a system of policy upon? Lord Wellington's talents, indeed, were a firm and secure rock, on which any hopes, any expectations, however great, however exalted, might be founded but it ill became statesmen to calculate upon chances and occasions presenting themselves for success in operations, upon the prosperous issue of which so much depended. Did the ministers mean to say, that their system was raised solely upon the matchless abilities of their general, and upon the errors of the enemy? Did they mean to affirm, that all their plans amounted only to this? The battle of Salamanca was certainly productive of great events; the evacuation of the south of Spain; the raising of the siege of Cadiz, and the occupation of Madrid by our troops. But did it secure these advantages? Were they permanent? Was Lord Wellington able to pursue Marmont? No. He was not able to do that, which so obviously he ought to have done, because Joseph's army, reinforced by the corps from Suchet, was hanging on his flank, and afterwards on his rear. It was necessary to disperse that army. He did so, and entered Madrid. Could he then march southward to pursue the career of his conquests? No. He found that the corps which he had so lately defeated, the army over which he had so recently triumphed, was strong again, and he was compelled to direct his

course to the north once more, to meet them. Then followed the siege of Burgos; and so far from considering as a disappointment the failure of Lord Wellington in his attempt to reduce that fortress, madness alone could have supposed that a fortress of such a de- z scription should be reduced by a few guns. Lord Wellington's means were confessedly inadequate to the object, according to all the established rules of war.

"Again, when it was understood, so far back as the month of June last, that Lord Wellington was advancing into Spain, could ministers fail to discover, that France, being engaged in a war with Russia, must necessarily detach a great part of her force to that quarter of Europe; and that now was the moment, not only in reference to that event, but also to the temper of the Spanish nation, to send out sufficient reinforcements to enable his lordship to proceed upon a large and effective scale of operations? Without such reinforcements, it was manifestly imprudent to advance into Spain. But how was Lord Wellington reinforced? On the 21st of October he thought it necessary to retire from Burgos; on the 25th he saw the French army, and we knew from his dispatches it was greatly superior to his own force, especially in cavalry, an arm so important to military operations in that country. On the 25th of October, therefore, that army which Lord Wellington had conquered on the plains of Salamanca,

that army which he had driven before him on that memorable day, with a grandeur of military achievement which the language of history or poetry could never equal, and which ranked him among the most renowned generals of this or any other age, that army had received strong and efficient reinforcements since the battle of Salamanca, and was now enabled to turn upon its pursuers. Where were

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Lord Wellington's reinforcements during the same period? Scattered every where: some in port at home, some on the ocean, and some landed at too great a distance to be of any use. Fifteen hundred men reached him on the 24th, four days after he had begun his retreat. Where were the others? One regiment advanced as far as Benevento, and was forced to retreat again to the frontiers. Two regiments were landed at Corunna, and were re-embarked for Lisbon, where they might probably arrive in time to reach Lord Wellington at the commencement of the next campaign.

"Such was the state of the war in the peninsula, such the manner in which it had been conducted,-and it might be asked, whether, if the same exertions had been made by the ministers of this country as were made by the enemy, Lord Wellington might not have been able to prosecute to their full extent his operations against Burgos?-Now for the Sicilian expedition, as it had been denominated. The plan of that expedition had been concerted with Lord Wellington when be was before Badajoz. In consequence of the improved fortune of our affairs in Italy, it was thought that a part of our force might be spared from that quarter to co-operate with our armies in Spain; and, if it had arrived at the proper season on the south-east coast of that country, at the period when Lord Wellington fully expected it, Suchet would have been utterly unable to detach a corps to reinforce Joseph's army: Joseph, indeed, must have hastened to assist Suchet. Such a timely arrival would have been of real service; but, like all the other parts of the system, it was imperfect exactly at that moment when it was most required to be perfect; something was done, but not all; and what was done was therefore of no use. The first division arrived in the course of

June, but was so small that it could effect nothing. Suchet, meanwhile, wrote to Joseph, that he could not proceed with his whole corps, but that he sent him a reinforcement; which reinforcement, it afterwards appeared, had the effect of defeating every great object of the campaign. Suchet had nothing to apprehend from the Sicilian expedition, in the force to which, at that period, it amounted. Some time afterwards, however,-about the end of July-arrived the remainder. They appeared on the coast of Catalonia, and all they accomplished was to excite the Catalonians to a demonstration of attachment to the British and Spanish cause, which led, in the result, to dreadful executions among them. The result had left also, on the minds of the Catalonians, sentiments of suspicion, alienation, and hatred, which it would be difficult to eradicate. It was thought advisable that this expedition should operate either at Barcelona or Tarragona, or at some intermediate point; but at last it arrived where no human being could have anticipated its presence, and then became utterly extinct as to any efficient purpose in the prosecution of the war. No adequate apology could be offered for this fatal indecision: at one time it was thought this place would be the best at which to disembark; and then another was suggested, till at last the very worst place of all was adopted. If it was the greatest trial of a powerful mind to decide among great difficulties, it was the test of a weak mind to be placed between two advantages, and not know which to choose. The singular feature of the present case, however, was, that both the advantages were lost, and only this disadvantage gained,that a warlike province of Spain had been alienated from the Spanish cause by the indecision of the allies. And what had been the result of all those proceedings? It had been said in the

speech from the throne, indeed, that the result was nothing more than the concentration of the French armies, as if Lord Wellington's retreat had been merely a military manœuvre; after which followed the monstrous propo sition, that such events were favour able to the interests and resources of the Spanish nation. Some explanation should be given of that assertion; for it was most injurious both to this country and to Spain. Had the south of Spain been delivered? Did the mi nister mean to say, that, in point of fact, the south of Spain was not now under the dominion of France ?

"In moving from Burgos, Lord Wellington found himself pursued by a force much superior to that under his command; and such being the end of the campaign, what real progress had been made towards the great object of the contest ?-With regard to the object of the war in Spain, three schemes had been successively devised; two were merely talked of, and the third was practised. The first was founded on an idea that it would be imprudent to embark as a principal in the contest, unless some other power, by its co-operation, prevented the force of France from being concentrated towards that one point-the subjugation of Spain. From such a scheme of policy this inference was deducible, that our resources were considered by those who maintained the opinion to be insufficient to carry on the war as principals upon an adequate scale, and that we must therefore wait a more favourable opportunity. The second plan proceeded on the principle that it would be prudent and highly expedient to make exertions upon a large scale, adequate to the destruction of the French power in Spain. Both these plans were different in their principle, and yet each was consistent upon its own principle. If our resources were really inadequate, then the first plan was very

just and proper; but if they were ade quate to extensive operations, then the second plan was obviously the fittest to be adopted. But the plan which all mankind must reprobate, was that of employing our resources, so as to expose the sinews of our strength to hourly danger; bearing hard upon our finances, yet accomplishing no great object. Such a plan as this every one must concur in condemning. It was essentially hostile to the principles of economy; it was expence without advantage; and yet that was the system which had been pursued during the late campaign. A vast expence of blood and treasure had been lavished, and our resources enfeebled, without accomplishing any one definite or precise object. When France was meditating fresh wars in the north of Europe, and when we saw Russia prepared to resist her ambitious designs to the last extremity, what more vigorous or effectual assistance could we have given to Russia, than by prosecuting the war in Spain? The best succour we could give to that country, the most essential aid we could bestow, was by carrying on the war in the peninsula upon a broad and extensive scale of operations; but it was not so carried on, and our present system, therefore, might almost be thought a defection from the cause of Russia. The events of the last campaign had indeed been beneficial to Spain; but those benefits were imperfectly secured, and could not be expected to be permanent "

The speakers on the side of opposition then passed to the affairs of the north, and alluded to the hopes held out of a diversion from Sweden in favour of the operations of Russia. Nothing could be more erroneous in policy, they maintained, than the line of conduct pursued with regard to Sweden. "A more extraordinary act of diplomacy had never occurred than the treaty

which ministers had concluded with the Swedish government. It was a treaty which promised every advantage to Sweden, without guaranteeing any to England. It was, in fact, a treaty in which, as it had been once whimsically observed upon a similar contract, the reciprocity was all on one side; for we had engaged to afford Sweden all the assistance in our power, in her operations against the enemy, or for her own protection, while nothing appeared likely to be done for us, or for our allies, on her part. An expedition was indeed projected, and expected to sail from Sweden, to cooperate with Russia; but that object was seon abandoned; no expedition ever did sail; and in consequence of that abandonment, General Victor, who, with his force, waited in Swedish Pomerania to meet the apprehended diversion, was enabled to withdraw, and his division actually formed a part of the army with which Buonaparte made his way to Moscow. Such were the important effects of the inactivity of Sweden; and for that inactivity, so injurious to the objects of the war, it was for ministers, in their diplomatic management with Sweden, to account. This account, indeed, they were bound, for their own justification, to produce. At a meeting which had taken place at Abo, about the end of July, between the Emperor Alexander, Lord Cathcart, and the Crown Prince of Sweden, it was understood to have been arranged that the expedition already alluded to should be dispatched from Sweden; and so cordially, it seemed, did ministers enter into the project; so powerfully did they determine to forward its progress, with the view of impeding the French army, that transports for the conveyance of the Swedish expedition were ordered to sail from Sheerness on the 19th September, and Buonaparte entered Moscow on the 14th of the same month! So fared this

grand and much-talked-of expedition. What sort of explanation ministers had it in their power to give upon this subject, it was difficult to conjecture; but it appeared most extraordinary, that after the meeting and discussion just mentioned, ministers should not have been enabled to judge of the real disposition of the Crown Prince of Sweden, or that they should not have taken measures to ascertain whether any change had taken place in that disposition before the dispatch of the transports. With respect to Russia, while all must concur in the panegyric pronounced upon the magnanimity displayed by that power, it might be asked, what assistance had our ministers afforded to encourage the display, or to aid the operation, of that magnanimity? This it was difficult to conceive, except sending the Russians about 50,000l. together with Lords Cathcart and Walpole, were to be viewed in this light.

"The war in the north of Europe was the child of that great effort in the peninsula, which had enabled Europe to reflect on its condition, and roused it to struggle for emancipation. There can be but one feeling-that of unbounded admiration-at the great efforts which Russia had made. Noble indeed has been the struggle, and glorious beyond anticipation the results in that quarter; there, even there, where the tyrant anticipated an easy victory, and concluded, from former experience, that one decisive battle would be the precursor of an abject peace,-there, where, thinking that he knew his man, and that he should have only one man to cope with and to cajole, he found, what he had forgotten to take into his estimate, a nation; where, imagining that, having issued a bulletin and taken a fort, his work was done, he unexpectedly found a countless population thronging to the standard of their sovereign, pre

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proposed to regenerate, not merely because it may be apprehended that he might not realize those promises, but simply because he is a foreigner and an invader. If this were to be the sole result of what had taken place in the north, it would be an invaluable addition to, or rather it would be a timely and salutary revival of, those ancient maxims of national independence, which the convulsions of the modern world have almost buried in oblivion. But is this all? Can any man who looks at the present condi tion of Buonaparte, with what ability soever he may have rescued himself o from former difficulties, so chastise his feelings as not to entertain a sanguine;c hope of events most decidedly favour able to the general cause of Europe?"

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With reference to the war with America, it was generally agreed "that a more iniquitous attack never was made upon the peace of any nation than that made by the American govern- r ment upon this country, nor could any cause be figured of which the justice was more apparent, than that which this country had to oppose to America. But the passage in the speech from the throne, which sanctioned the opinion that ministers still hoped for pacification with America, in consequence of something done previously to the declaration of war, created much surprise. Nothing, it was said, appeared more preposterous than the hope that the repeal of the orders in council would serve to pacify America; for these orders were never, in fact, the point at issue. The dispute with America did not turn upon the orders in council, but referred to higher questions, to topics deeply affecting our great maritime rights, to points, indeed, of such importance, that the British government could not accede to the pretensions of America without throwing into her hands the trident of the main. It would not avail mini

pared for exertions and for sacrifices such as the world has seldom, if ever, witnessed before; and opposing, not merely with the arms of a disciplined soldiery, not merely with the physical mass of impenetrable multitudes, but with famine and with fire, with the voluntary destruction of their own resources, and with the conflagration of their own houses, the progress of his desolating ambition. No man can contemplate the recent occurrences in the north of Europe without feeling exultation in his bosom. The invader of Russia flattered himself that a nation, to which he affixed the appellation of barbarous, and which he pictured to himself as in a condition of degrading and disheartening servitude, conld entertain no generous and patriotic sentiment. He had yet to learn, that there is a principle of instinctive patriotism, which prevails even over the vice of positive institutions; he had to learn, that in spite of the doctrines, and, it may be added, of too many of the events of the last twenty years, it is not an universal truth, that before the people of any country determine to resist an invader, they coldly speculate on all the possible improvements to be made by regenerating laws in the actual condition of their society, that they refuse to draw a sword in defence of their altars or their fire-sides, until they have weighed well the question, whether they be worth defending, and entered at full leisure and with all imaginable research into a comparative anatomy of various political constitutions. The invader of Russia has found that the natural feelings of man, the sacred attachment to home, the ties of custom, of family, of kindred, are enough to arouse resistance to a foreign invader, come though he may with splendid promises of freedom and improvement; that he may be resisted, and gallantly and effectually resisted, by those whom he

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