than a Moral Sense, and at another be dignified with that of a Holy Spirit. At the same time, its mode of action is, and ever will be, a mystery. For "as the wind blows where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but knowest not whence it cometh and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the spirit:"-so little does any man know of its power and influence upon the mind. It is distributed in different measures. Therefore it is not one thing in the Jew and another in the Greek. In Scythian and Barbarian, Christian and Heathen, bond and free, it is the same; varying only in degree of intensity and manifestation; like the light of the great luminary of the world from the faintest ray to the brightest beam. Even those who have been enlightened may become dark. "Take heed that the light in thee be not darkness."

I have stated that philosophers differ in their speculative notions respecting the nature of this moral principle. With regard also to Virtue, that perfection of human conduct in thought, word, and deed, for which we may suppose the principle in question was implanted, there is a like diversity of opinion, perhaps consisting more in name than in reality.

Dr. Adam Smith observes, that "it is the opinion of some, that Virtue is recommended to us by the principle of Self-Love, as the former tends to promote our private interest: others think that Reason points out the difference between one character and another in the same way that it does that between truth and

falsehood; and others think that the virtuous character is recommended by a peculiar faculty of percep tion called a Moral Sense; which is gratified or pleased, as the contrary disgusts and displeases it.”

Dr. Clarke makes Virtue to consist in acting according to the fitness of things; Shaftesbury, in maintaining a proper balance of the affections and due regulation of the passions. Cudworth and Hutcheson place Virtue in Benevolence. Hume places it in

Utility; and Paley, in Expediency.

In this way, finding that they could not account for the origin or primary source of moral sentiments, by the operation of a discursive Faculty or Reason, philosophers have had recourse to various theories to explain it; some referring it to one principle and some to another. Shaftesbury and Hume refer it to Taste; Dr. Hutcheson and others to a Moral Sense; Dr. Adam Smith, to Sympathy; Dr. Richard Price, following Cudworth, conceived that moral distinctions were perceived by the Understanding, and to it ascribed the origin of the ideas of right and wrong, but not by any discursive process; taking the Understanding in a more comprehensive signification than is usually attached to the word.

Dugald Stewart remarks, that "if the distinction between the moral faculty and our other active powers be acknowledged, it is of the less consequence what particular theory we adopt concerning the origin of our moral ideas; and, accordingly, Mr. Smith, though he resolves moral approbation ultimately into

a feeling of the mind, represents the Supremacy of Conscience as a principle, which is equally essential to all the different systems, that have been proposed on the subject. Upon whatever we suppose our moral faculties to be founded, whether upon a certain modification of Reason, upon an original instinct, called a Moral Sense, or upon some other principle of our nature, it cannot be doubted that they were given us for the direction of our conduct in this life. They carry along with them the most evident badges of this authority, which denote that they were set up within us to be the Supreme arbiters of all our actions, to superintend all our senses, passions, and appetites, and to judge how far each of them was either to be indulged or restrained. It is the peculiar office of these faculties to judge, to bestow censure or applause upon all the other principles of our nature.'

Upon the preceding passage I shall only remark, that, although it may be of little consequence what theory may be adopted concerning the origin of our moral ideas, it must be of great importance to a Christian to know how and where, in other words, to what principle, and by what mental exercises, he is to look for the due regulation of his conduct in the sight of God and his fellow-creature; and whether he has an infallible guide and teacher in his own breast, or is left to wander, as it were, at large in outward speculation, for a knowledge of his duty.

* See Outlines of Moral Philosophy, Sect. 6.

The general inference, from all these different opinions, is, that no speculative theory of moral sentiments, excogitated by human ingenuity, has hitherto explained, or is ever likely to explain, the difficulties of the subject: and that no true explanation can be given but by the light which is afforded in Scripture.

I shall therefore proceed to illustrate the foregoing views in the best manner I am able by this supreme authority.

CHAP. IX.

OF THE DIVINE SPIRIT IN THE SOUL.

SECT. I.

Introductory Remarks.

WE have seen in the foregoing review of opinions on the origin of what is called moral sentiment, in other words, the living operation of divine Truth in the soul, that human testimony, unaided by revelation, is much divided, and leaves us comparatively in darkness; some referring it to one source and some to another. For, Reason, natural Conscience, Benevolence, Sympathy, and Taste, have all had their respective advocates; and it cannot be said that satisfactory ground is afforded for acquiescence in any of the different systems.

After this statement of opinions and allusion to the doubts and intricate questions which the subject, as one of speculation, involves, it is natural that we should enjoy a degree of liberty and satisfaction in contemplating the brighter prospect presented to us in