Seneca calls it "Scintilla divinæ lucis,"-" a spark of divine light," corresponding to Cicero's expression, Radiatio Dei," a ray of the divinity." And in another place Cicero thus speaks of the human understanding: "Humanus animus, decerptus ex mente divina, cum alio nullo, nisi cum ipso deo, si hoc fas est dictu, comparari potest." "The human soul being extracted from the divine Intelligence, can be compared with no other Being, if it be lawful so to speak, save with God himself."*

SECT. III.

On the enlarged use of the word Reason.

Having now seen the human mind-as far as these extracts will enable us to view it-tracing its affinity through the mists and obscurity of its natural powers, to the Supreme Fountain of Light; and, though groping, as it were, in darkness, claiming for itself the distinction of possessing an internal guide of the same illustrious descent; it should be our next business to inquire respecting the operation of this power, and to consider by what process the partially enlightened heathen supposed that Divine truth was received, that maxims of religious duty were made known,

Ciceronis Tusc. Quæst. 1. 5. s. 13.

and that moral laws of eternal and immutable obligation were discovered :—whether by a process of laborious research, like that by which all outward knowledge is attained, or by an immediately actuating impulse, springing from the inherent principles of the human mind. But on this head I shall only make a brief remark; and, after I have shown by several examples, in what an enlarged sense the word Reason has been used, shall proceed to consider, whether we are wholly the creatures of education, and our knowledge received like pictures on a dark wall, or like liquor into an empty vessel; or whether the mind has not originally in itself the elements or seeds of virtue; which, by proper care and culture, may be developed into various degrees of religious and moral excellence.

It is difficult to imagine that the ancients, whose opinions are quoted, could have expressed themselves as they have done, had they not believed that man possessed, in his own mind, a light, principle, or guide, which, if heeded and obeyed, would instinctively point out to him the truth, so far as it might concern him to know it, and thus lead him to pursue the path of rectitude. For, no sophistry can elude the force of the argument, that fundamental laws of human belief-principles or emotions universally diffused, common to all men in all ages, and entering as much into the constitution of human nature as the appetites, affections, or outward senses, cannot in their origin be traced from without. Consequently, they must be engraven within, and constitute an in

ward law, though discoverable by Reason, yet antecedent to the exercise of Reason, and therefore a natural instinctive revelation from the Source of Wisdom. And, when we consider that this secret intelligence, these instinctive intimations are not designed for mere outward advantage, like the reasoning' faculty, but for the chief ends of man's being-his eternal interests, a priori we should conclude, that such a revelation of the will of God,-not confined to soil or to climate, to tribe or to nation,-not intrusted' only to the casualty and uncertainty of a written law, or only to the learned in outward knowledge, would be communicated to man, rather than that the elements of his moral duty should be left wholly to the tardy deductions of human reason, to be excogitated and propounded by this faculty.

But it is evident that the ancients, who recognised this universal principle, gave it different appellations, as, the Light of Truth, the Divine Spirit, Conscience, and also Reason. It was the God within the soul of Pythagoras and Epictetus; the Genius or Guide of Socrates and Timæus; the Light and Spirit of God of Plato; the Divine Principle of Plotin; the Divine Power and Reason of Philo. Hence, the word Reason comprehended the most excellent powers of the human mind, as it has been used by many of the moderns. It comprehended the whole rational nature of man that elevates him above the brute; in short, it implied the highest degree of perfection to which the human intellect, by whatever means en

lightened, can attain; and included the speculative or discursive faculty, which discovers truth by weighing outward evidence, with nothing but outward facts and observations for its materials, as well as the power which offers its elements or seeds, or first principles of right and wrong spontaneously to the mind, and which sits as a judge of moral actions to approve or to condemn.

In modern works we may notice the same latitude of meaning. And it is scarcely going too far to say that it has been productive of modes of thinking which have led to unfavourable, not to say unphilosophical conclusions, in matters of religion and morality, Notwithstanding the light of Revelation has been so amply afforded, this comprehensive use of the word Reason has led many of the moderns as far from the notions of the ancients, as above detailed, as if it had never been suggested by the heathen philosopher, nor revealed by the Christian law-giver, that a divine spirit which draws not its teaching from men, instructed immediately the human mind.

Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Antoninus, and others, use Reason in this comprehensive acceptation, while they seem to have admitted that Truth may be received without a regular process of reasoning or argumentation, according to the notion of an eminent writer that "there is a sanctity of soul and body of more efficacy for the receiving of divine truths than the greatest pretences to discursive demonstration."*

*More's Divine Dialogues.

It is singular enough that the word Aoyos, used by the Greeks, and translated Reason, is the very Logos, or divine Word, of the evangelist John. At the same time it is generally understood to mean the faculty of Reason, or power of ratiocination; and the word Logic itself, which signifies the science of reasoning, confirms the etymology.

I shall now refer to some examples of this comprehensive use of the word Reason, on which I am commenting, in the writings of the moderns.

Dugald Stewart, in his Philosophy of the Human Mind, makes some valuable observations on the use of the word Reason, which he employs "to denote merely the power by which we distinguish truth from falsehood, and combine means for the attainment of our ends." "The word Reason," he says, "is far from being precise in its meaning. In common and popular discourse, it denotes that power by which we distinguish truth from falsehood, and right from wrong; and by which we are enabled to combine means for the attainment of particular ends. These different capacities are all included in the idea which is generally annexed to the word reason; and the case, so far as I know, is the same with the corresponding term in all languages whatever."-He ob. serves, though in opposition to the high authorities of Dr. Johnson and Dr. Beattie, that "for many years past, reason has been very seldom used by philosophical writers, or, indeed, by correct writers of any description, as synonymous with the power of