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If men would then but a little consider things, surely this scurvy fashion would be soon discarded, much fitter for the scum of the people than for the flower of the gentry; yea rather, much below any man endued with a scrap of reason, not to say with a grain of religion. Could we bethink ourselves, certainly modest, sober, and pertinent discourse, would appear far more generous and manly, than such wild hectoring God Almighty, such rude insulting over the received laws, such ruffianly swaggering against sobriety and goodness. If gentlemen would regard the virtues of their ancestors (that gallant courage, that solid wisdom, that noble courtesy, which first advanced their families, and severed them from the vulgar), this degenerate wantonness and dirtiness of speech would return to the dunghill, or rather (which God grant) would be quite banished from the world. Finally, as to this whole point, about not offending in our speech against piety, we should consider, that as we ourselves, with all our members and powers, were chiefly designed and framed to serve and glorify our Maker (it being withal the greatest perfection of our nature, and the noblest privilege thereof so to do ;) so especially our tongue and speaking faculty were given us to declare our admiration and reverence of him, to express our love and gratitude toward him, to celebrate his praises, to acknowledge his benefits, to promote his honour and service. This consequently is the most proper and worthy use thereof; from this it becomes in effect what the Psalmist so often terms it, our glory, and the best member we have; as that whereby we far excel all creatures here below; that whereby we consort with the blessed angels above, in distinct utterance of praise to our Creator. Wherefore applying it to any impious discourse (tending anywise to the dishonour of God, or disparagement of religion), is a most unnatural abuse thereof, and a vile ingratitude toward him that gave it to us. From which, and from all other offences, God in his mercy preserve us all, through Jesus Christ our Lord; unto whom for ever, with heart and tongue, let us strive to render all glory and praise. Amen.

* Psal. xvi. 9; xxx. 12; lvii. 8; cviii. 1.

SERMON XIV.

AGAINST FOOLISH TALKING AND JESting. EPHES. v. 4.—Nor foolish talking, nor jesting, which are not convenient.

MORAL and political aphorisms are seldom couched in such terms, that they should be taken as they sound precisely, or according to the widest extent of signification; but do commonly need exposition, and admit exception: otherwise frequently they would not only clash with reason and experience, but interfere, thwart, and supplant one another. The best masters of such wisdom are wont to interdict things, apt by unseasonable or excessive use to be perverted in general forms of speech, leaving the restrictions, which the case may require or bear, to be made by the hearer's or interpreter's discretion; whence many seemingly formal prohibitions are to be received only as sober cautions. This observation may be particularly supposed applicable to this precept of St. Paul, which seemeth universally to forbid a practice commended (in some cases and degrees) by philosophers as virtuous, not disallowed by reason, commonly affected by men, often used by wise and good persons; from which, consequently, if our religion did wholly debar us, it would seem chargeable with somewhat too uncouth austerity and sourness: from imputations of which kind, as in its temper and frame it is really most free (it never quenching natural light, or cancelling the dictates of sound reason, but confirming and improving them ;*) so it carefully declineth them, enjoining us, that if there be any things 90σqi (lovely, or grateful to men), any things in (of good report and repute), and if there be any virtue and any praise (any thing in the common apprehensions of men worthy and laudable), we should mind those things," that is, should yield them a regard answerable to the esteem they carry among rational and sober persons.

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Whence it may seem requisite so to interpret and determine St. Paul's mean

* Οἱ μήτ' εἰπόντες μηθὲν γελοῖον, τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντες, ἄγριοι καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.—— Arist. Eth. iv. 8.

a Phil. iv. 8.

ing here concerning organella (that is, | be deemed considerable in this faculty, facetious speech or raillery, by our translators rendered jesting), that he may consist with himself, and be reconciled to Aristotle, who placeth this practice in the rank of virtues; or that religion and reason may well accord in the case; supposing, that if there be any kind of facetiousness innocent and reasonable, conformable to good manners (regulated by common sense, and consistent with the tenor of Christian duty, that is, not transgressing the bounds of piety, charity, and sobriety), St. Paul did not intend to discountenance or prohibit that kind.

and enrolled among the wits, do not only make shipwreck of conscience, abandon virtue, and forfeit all pretences to wisdom; but neglect their estates, and prostitute their honour: so to the private damage of many particular persons, and with no small prejudice to the public, are our times possessed and transported with this humour. To repress the excess and extravagance whereof, nothing in way of discourse can serve better, than a plain declaration when and how such a practice is allowable or tolerable; when it is wicked and vain, unworthy of a man endued with reason, and pretending to honesty or honour.

This I shall in some measure endeavour to perform.

But first it may be demanded, what the thing we speak of is, or what this

For thus expounding and limiting his intent, we have some warrant from himself, some fair intimations in the words here. For first, what sort of facetious speech he aimeth at, he doth imply by the fellow he coupleth therewith; go- facetiousness doth import? To which Loylu (saith he) sorguztia, foolish talk- question I might reply, as Democritus did ing, or facetiousness: such facetiousness, to him that asked the definition of a man, therefore, he toucheth as doth include It is that which we all see and know: folly, in the matter or manner thereof. any one better apprehends what it is by Then he farther determineth it, by ad- acquaintance, than I can inform him by joining a peculiar quality thereof, un- description. It is indeed a thing so verprofitableness or impertinency; μsatile and multiform, appearing in so many arizoriu, which are not pertinent, or shapes, so many postures, so many garbs, conducible to any good purpose: whence so variously apprehended by several eyes may be collected, that it is a frivolous and judgments, that it seemeth no less hard and idle sort of facetiousness which he to settle a clear and certain notion therecondemneth. of, than to make a portrait of Proteus, or to define the figure of the fleeting air. Sometimes it lieth in pat allusion to a known story, or in seasonable application of a trivial saying, or in forging an apposite tale: sometimes it playeth in words and phrases, taking advantage from the ambiguity of their sense, or the affinity of their sound: sometimes it is wrapped in a dress of humorous expression: sometimes it lurketh under an odd similitude:* sometimes it is lodged in a And such a resolution seemeth indeed sly question, in a smart answer, in a especially needful in this our age (this quirkish reason, in a shrewd intimation, pleasant and jocular age), which is so in- in cunningly diverting, or cleverly retortfinitely addicted to this sort of speaking, ing an objection: sometimes it is couchthat it scarce doth affect or prize any ed in a bold scheme of speech, in a tart thing near so much; all reputation ap-irony, in a lusty hyperbole, in a startling pearing now to veil and stoop to that of metaphor, in a plausible reconciling of being a wit to be learned, to be wise, contradictions, or in acute nonsense : to be good, are nothing in comparison sometimes a scenical representation of thereto; even to be noble and rich, are inferior things, and afford no such glory. Many at least, to purchase this glory, to

But, however, manifest it is that some kind thereof he doth earnestly forbid: whence, in order to the guidance of our practice, it is needful to distinguish the kinds, severing that which is allowable from that which is unlawful; that so we may be satisfied in the case, and not on the one hand ignorantly transgress our duty, nor on the other trouble ourselves with scruples, others with censures, upon the use of warrantable liberty therein.

stulta sunt, si simulamus, venusta creduntur.— Eadem quæ, si imprudentibus excidunt, Quint. vi. 3.

our irksome cares, to whet our blunted industry, to recreate our minds, being tired and cloyed with graver occupations; if it may breed alacrity, or maintain good humour among us; if it may conduce to sweeten conversation and endear society; then is it not inconvenient or unprofitable.

persons or things, a counterfeit speech, a | and experience to supply the defect of mimical look or gesture passeth for it: such explication, I shall address myself sometimes an affected simplicity, some- to show, first, when and how such a times a presumptuous bluntness giveth it manner of speaking may be allowed; being sometimes it riseth from a lucky then, in what matters and ways it should hitting upon what is strange; sometimes be condemned. from a crafty wresting obvious matter to I. Such facetiousness is not absolutely the purpose often it consisteth in one unreasonable or unlawful, which minisknows not what, and springeth up one tereth harmless divertisement and delight can hardly tell how. Its ways are unac- to conversation:* (harmless, I say, that countable and inexplicable, being answer- is, not entrenching upon piety, not infrinable to the numberless rovings of fancy ging charity or justice, not disturbing and windings of language. It is, in short, peace.) For Christianity is not so tetria manner of speaking out of the simple cal, so harsh, so envious, as to bar us and plain way (such as reason teacheth continually from innocent, much less and proveth things by), which by a pret- from wholesome and useful pleasure, ty surprising uncouthness in conceit or such as human life doth need or require. expression doth affect and amuse the fan- And if jocular discourse may serve to cy, stirring in it some wonder, and breed- good purposes of this kind; if it may be ing some delight thereto.* It raiseth adapt to raise our drooping spirits, to allay miration, as signifying a nimble sagacity of apprehension, a special felicity of invention, a vivacity of spirit, and reach of wit more than vulgar: it seeming to argue a rare quickness of parts, that one can fetch in remote conceits applicable; a notable skill, that he can dexterously accommodate them to the purpose before him; together with a likely briskness of humour, not apt to damp those sportful flashes of imagination. (When in Aristotle such persons are termed indέžio, dexterous men; and 190701, men of facile or versatile manners, who can easily turn themselves to all things, or turn all things to themselves.)† It also procureth delight, by gratifying curiosity with its rareness or semblance of difficulty (as monsters, not for their beauty, but their rarity; as juggling tricks, not for their use, but their abstruseness, are beheld with pleasure;) by diverting the mind from its road of serious thoughts; by instilling gaiety and airiness of spirit; by provoking to such dispositions of spirit in way of emulation or complaisance; and by seasoning matters, otherwise distasteful or insipid, with an unusual and thence grateful tang.

But saying no more concerning what it is, and leaving it to your imagination

* Et hercle omnis salse dicendi ratio in eo est, ut aliter quam est rectum verumque dicatur. Quint. vi. 3.

† Ευτράπελος λέγεται ὁ ποικίλος, ὁ παντοδαπὸς, ὁ aoTaTos, & cukoλos, ¿ ñávтa zivóμevos.—Chrys. in Eph. Or. 17.

b Eth. iv. 8.

If for those ends we may use other recreations, employing on them our ears and eyes, our hands and feet, our other instruments of sense and motion; why may we not as well to them accommodate our organs of speech and interior sense? Why should those games which excite our wits and fancies be less reasonable than those whereby our grosser parts and faculties are exercised? Yea, why are not those more reasonable, since they are performed in a manly way, and have in them a smack of reason; seeing also they may be so managed, as not only to divert and please, but to improve and profit the mind, rousing and quickening it, yea, sometimes enlightening and instructing it, by good sense conveyed in jocular expression?‡

It would surely be hard, that we should be tied ever to knit the brow and squeeze the brain (to be always sadly dumpish, or seriously pensive), that all divertisement of mirth and pleasantness should

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be shut out of conversation: and how can we better relieve our minds, or relax our thoughts, how can we be more ingeniously cheerful, in what more kindly way can we exhilarate ourselves and others, than by thus sacrificing to the graces, as the ancients called it? Are not some persons always, and all persons sometimes, uncapable otherwise to divert themselves, than by such discourse? Shall we, I say, have no recreation? or must our recreations be ever clownish or childish, consisting merely in rustical ef forts, or in petty sleights of bodily strength and activity? Were we, in fine, obliged ever to talk like philosophers, assigning dry reasons for every thing, and dropping grave sentences upon all occasions, would it not much deaden human life, and make ordinary conversation exceedingly to languish? Facetiousness, therefore, in such cases, and to such purposes, may be allowable.

2. Facetiousness is allowable, when it is the most proper instrument of exposing things apparently base and vile to due contempt. It is many times expedient, that things really ridiculous should appear such, that they may be sufficiently loathed and shunned; and to render them such, is the part of a facetious wit, and usually can only be compassed thereby. When to impugn them with downright reason, or to check them by serious discourse, would signify nothing; then representing them in a shape strangely ugly to the fancy, and thereby raising derision at them, may effectually discountenance them. Thus did the prophet Elias expose the wicked superstition of those who worshipped Baal: Elias (saith the text) mocked them, and said, Cry aloud: for he is a god; either he is talking, or he is pursuing, or he is in a journey, or peradventure he sleepeth, and must be awaked. By which one pregnant instance it appeareth, that reasoning pleasantly-abusive in some cases may be useful. The Holy Scripture doth not indeed use it frequently (it not suiting the Divine simplicity and stately gravity thereof to do so;) yet its condescension thereto at any time sufficiently doth authorise a cautious use thereof. When sarcastical twitches

* Θύε ταῖς χάρισι ita Plato Xenocratem morosiorem monuit.

1 Kings xviii. 27.

are needful to pierce the thick skins of men, to correct their lethargic stupidity, to rouse them out of their drowsy negligence; then may they well be applied: when plain declarations will not enlighten people, to discern the truth and weight of things, and blunt arguments will not penetrate, to convince or persuade them to their duty; then doth reason freely resign its place to wit, allowing it to undertake its work of instruction and reproof.

3. Facetious discourse particularly may be commodious for reproving some vices and reclaiming some persons (as salt for cleansing and curing some sores.) It commonly procureth a more easy access to the ears of men, and worketh a stronger impression on their hearts, than other discourse could do. Many who will not stand a direct reproof, and cannot abide to be plainly admonished of their fault, will yet endure to be pleasantly rubbed, and will patiently bear a jocund wipe; though they abominate all language purely bitter or sour, yet they can relish discourse having in it a pleasant tartness: you must not chide them as their master, but you may gibe with them as their companion; if you do that, they will take you for pragmatical and haughty; this they may interpret friendship and freedom. Most men are of that temper; and particularly the genius of divers persons, whose opinions and practices we should strive to correct, doth require not a grave and severe, but a free and merry way of treating them. For what can be more unsuitable and unpromising, than to seem serious with those who are not so themselves, or demure with the scornful? If we design either to please or vex them into better manners, we must be as sportful in a manner, or as contemptuous as themselves. we mean to be heard by them, we must talk in their own fashion, with humour and jollity: if we will instruct them, we must withal somewhat divert them: we must seem to play with them, if we think to convey any sober thoughts into them. They scorn to be formally advised or taught; but they may perhaps be slyly laughed and lured into a better mind. If by such complaisance we can inveigle those dotterels to hearken to us, we may induce them to consider farther,

If

5. This way is also commonly the best way of defence against unjust reproach and obloquy. To yield to a slanderous reviler a serious reply, or to make a formal plea against his charge, doth seem to imply, that we much consider or deeply resent it; whereas by pleasant reflection on it we signify, the matter only deserves contempt, and that we take ourselves unconcerned therein. So easily without care or trouble may the brunts of malice be declined or repelled.

and give reason some competent scope, | safely eluded, sceptical wantonness is some fair play with them. Good reason more surely confounded in this, than in may be apparelled in the garb of wit, the simple way of discourse. and therein will securely pass, whither in its native homeliness it could never arrive and being come thither, it with especial advantage may impress good advice; making an offender more clearly to see, and more deeply to feel his miscarriage; being represented to his fancy in a strain somewhat rare and remarkable, yet not so fierce and frightful. The severity of reproof is tempered, and the reprover's anger disguised thereby. The guilty person cannot but observe, that he who thus reprehends him is not disturbed or out of humour, and that he rather pitieth than hateth him; which breedeth a veneration to him, and imparteth no small efficacy to his wholesome suggestions. Such a reprehension, while it forceth a smile without, doth work remorse within; while it seemeth to tickle the ear, doth sting the heart. In fine, many whose foreheads are brazed and hearts steeled against all blame, are yet not of proof against derision; divers, who nev-expression, bewitching the fancies of er will be reasoned, may be rallied into better order in which cases raillery, as an instrument of so important good, as a servant of the best charity, may be allowed.

6. This way may be allowed in way of counterbalancing and in compliance to the fashion of others. It would be a disadvantage unto truth and virtue, if their defenders were barred from the use of this weapon; since it is that especially whereby the patrons of error and vice do maintain and propagate them. They being destitute of good reason, do usually recommend their absurd and pestilent notions by a pleasantness of conceit and

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shallow hearers, and inveigling heedless persons to a liking of them and if, for reclaiming such people, the folly of those seducers may in like manner be displayed as ridiculous and odious, why should that advantage be refused? It is wit that wageth the war against reason, against virtue, against religion; wit alone it is that perverteth so many, and so greatly corrupteth the world: it may therefore be needful, in our warfare for those dearest concerns, to sort the manner of our fighting with that of our adversaries, and with the same kind of arms to protect goodness whereby they do assail it. If wit may happily serve under the banner of truth and virtue, we may impress it for that service; and good it were to rescue so worthy a faculty from so vile abuse. It is the right of reason and piety to command that and all other endowments; folly and impiety do only usurp them: just and fit therefore it is, to wrest them out of so bad hands to revoke them to their right use and duty.

4. Some errors likewise in this way may be most properly and most successfully confuted; such as deserve not, and hardly can bear a serious and solid confutation. He that will contest things apparently decided by sense and experience, or who disavows clear principles of reason, approved by general consent, and the common sense of men, what other hopeful way is there of proceeding with him, than pleasantly to explode his conceits? To dispute seriously with him were trifling; to trifle with him is the proper course since he rejecteth the grounds of reasoning, it is vain to be in earnest what then remains but to jest with him? To deal seriously, were to yield too much respect to such a baffler, and too much weight to his fancies; to raise the man too high in his courage and conceit; to make his pretences seem It doth especially seem requisite to do worthy the considering and canvassing. it in this age, wherein plain reason is Briefly, perverse obstinacy is more easily deemed a dull and heavy thing. When quelled, petulant impudence is sooner the mental appetite of men is become dashed, sophistical captiousness is more like the corporeal, and cannot relish any VOL. I.

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