of French tyranny: but, that did not hinder him from expecting them to be the enemy of impressing men from on board their ships; and, it should have been shown how this disposition proved them to be a willing instrument of French tyranny, or of any tyranny at all.It is useless to revile; it is useless to fly off to other matter. We impress men on board of American ships upon the high seas; we take out (no matter whether by mistake or otherwise) American seanien as well as English; we force them to fight on board our ships; we punish them if they disobey. And, when they, after years of complaints and remonstrances, take up arms in the way of resistance, we tell them that they show themselves the willing instruments and abettors of French tyranny.I wish sincerely that this passage had been omitted. There are other parts of the "DECLARATION" that I do not like; but this part appears to me likely to excite a great deal of ill-will; of lasting, of rooted, ill-will.—I do not like the word "professed," as applied to the American principles of freedom. The meaning of that word, as here applied, cannot be equivocal, and assuredly would have been better left out, especially as we mever see, in any of the American documents, any expressions of the kind applied to us and to our Government.But, to take another view of the matter, why should His Royal Highness expect the Americans to be disinclined towards France, because they profess principles of freedom? Why should he, on this account, expect that they would lean to our side in the war?Does the Declaration mean to say, that the Government of France is more tyrannical than was that monarchy, for the restoration of which a league was made in Europe in the years 1792 and 1793 ? From its tone, the Declaration may be construed to mean, that our Government is more free than that of France, and that, therefore, we might have expected the Americans, who profess principles of freedom, to be on our side in a contest against "French *lyranny.". -Hem! Mum!--Well, well! We will say nothing about the matter; but, it must be clear to every one, that the Americans may have their own opinion upon the subject; and, they may express it too, until we can get at them with an Ex-Officio. They may have their own opinion upon the matter; and their opinion may possibly differ from ours. They are, to be sure, at a great distance; but, they are a reading and an observing and a calculating people; and, I'll engage, that there is not a farmer in the back States who is not able to give a pretty good account of the blessings of "English liberty."Besides, leaving this quite out of the question; supposing that the Americans should think us freemen and the French slaves, why should that circumstance prevent them from leaning to the side of France? What examples of the effect of such morality amongst nations have the Regent's ministers to produce? How often have we seen close alliances between free and despotic states against states either free or despotic? How often have we been on the side of despots against free States? England was once in offensive alliance with France against Holland; Holland and France against England; and, it ought never to be forgotten, that England, not many years ago, favoured the invasion of Holland and the subjugation of the States General by a Prussian army. Have we not formed alliances with Prussia, Austria, Russia, Spain, Naples, and all the petty princes of Germany against the Republic of France? Nay, have we refused, in that war, the co-operation of Turkey and Algiers? And, as for the old Papa of Rome, "the Whore of Babylon," as our teachers call him, his alliance has been accounted holy by us, and his person an object of our peculiar care and protection. Why, then, are we to expect, that America is to refrain from consulting her interests, if they be favoured by a leaning towards France? Why is she to be shut out from the liberty of forming connexions with a despotism, supposing a despotism now to exist in France ?- -The truth is, that, in this respect, as in private life, it is interest alone that guides and that must guide; and, in my mind, it is not more reasonable to expect America to lean on our side on account of the nature of the Government of our enemy, than it would be to expect a Presbyterian to sell his sugar to a Churchman, because the only man that bade him a higher price was a Cátholic. Here I should stop; but, an article, upon the same subject, in the Morning Chronicle of the 13th instant, calls for observation.--Upon the falsehoods and impudence of the Times and the Courier, that is to say, the principal prints on the side of the Wellesley party and that of the Ministers, I have remarked often enough. I was anxious to hear what the Whigs had to say, and here we have it. Mr. Ponsonby and Mr. Brougham had" because summary, and because it is subpledged themselves to support the war, ject to no revisal-to no adjudicationif America was not satisfied with the repeal" and because the individual seized has no of the Orders in Council; and here we means of redress. By this sort of rea 66 have the grounds of that support. On" soning there is a tacit admission on the this account the article is interesting, and," part of America, that it is not to the act of course, worthy of an attentive perusal." itself which they object so much as 66 "Notwithstanding the tedious length" to the manner of the act; and accord"of the papers on both sides, the questioningly we see various suggestions made by "between the Court of London and the "Americans, for entering into an amicable "Government of the United States is sim-" discussion on the means of getting over ply the right of impressment of seamen on the outrageous way in which the right is "board trading ships-and this is in truth" exercised, and of giving security to both "the sole cause of the war.-If we were to "nations against the abuse in question. "examine the value of this cause to the "On the other side, Lord Castlereagh de"two parties, it cannot be denied but that "clares the readiness of the British Go"to the Americans it is exceedingly slight, "vernment to receive and discuss any pro❝ and to the British highly material. The "position on this subject coming from the "Americans cannot regard it as an insull, “ American Government; though he would " because it is a right which has been at all "not enter into a negociation, a prelimi"times asserted and acquiesced in by Sove66 nary to which should be the concession reign Stales respectively. Then viewed" of this right, and so far we think he was as an injury what is it? That they shall" clearly right.But is it not monstrous go to war to prevent British subjects who" that two people of common origin, and of "have forfeited their allegiance, abandon-" almost inseparable interests, should re"ed their country, and left their families" main at war on a point upon which there "probably starving, from being impressed" is so little difference between them? "on board their merchant vessels-that is "Surely without any sacrifice of etiquette "to say; they claim the right to afford an on either side, the expedients might be "asylum and employ the refuse of the Bri-" canvassed, by which this mighty cause of ❝tish navy-men without principle, for it" war might be removed. Let each party "is only the profligate that are likely to be- " promulgate their thoughts on the subject, "come the objects of their protection. In" and if there be an honest disposition to "this view, then, the point is of little" peace, it must flow.The argument consequence to the Americans, but it is" on both sides is short, and may be put "interesting to the British to assert the "in a few words. The agreement ought power inherent in every State to reclaim" to be so drawn as to make it most danits subjects; and the time may come gerous to the Captain of an American "when the principle would be equally im- "ship to employ a British seaman on board; portant to America herself. But, say -But, say" and, on the other side, to make it equally "the American Ministers, it is not so "dangerous for a British Captain to seize "much the right itself, as the violent and" and carry off an American seaman, under "insulting mode of exercising it that we "pretext of his being a British subject. "complain of; for we have upon reflection" Or, in other words, it ought to be made agreed in the principle of international" their interest to abstain from those two "law, that free bottoms do not make free "causes of national offence. Various modes "goods, and therefore we have no objec-" have been suggested for this purpose.❝tion to the search of our merchant ships "for contraband of war; but in that case, "whenever warlike stores, &c. are found ❝on board an American vessel, she is de"tained and carried into a port, for adju- should be considered in the nature of con"dication by a competent Court. Whe- "traband of war, inasmuch as their na"ther the adjudication be always impartial "tural Sovereign was thereby deprived of ❝ or not is another affair, but in this re- "their service in war, and that that 46 spect nations are on an equal footing, and "should be a cause to detain the vessel for "these Admiralty Courts, well or ill-con- " adjudication. By this the American "ducted, are recognized by all maritime "Captain or his owners would most seri"nations. But with respect to the im-"ously suffer by having British seamen on 04 pressment of seamen, the act is violent board; and, on the other hand, the Bri 66 66 66 "The most effectual undoubtedly would "be to ordain by a treaty, that the sub"jects of each power, if found on board " the merchants' vessels of the other, แ America are of no value? And, when we know, when no man will deny, when official records of the fact exist, that hundreds of native Americans have been impressed and sent to serve on board our ships of war: when this is notorious; when it neither will nor can be denied, what is of value to America if this cause be not of value?-As to the proposition for making English seamen "contraband of war," it is so impudent, it is so shameful, it is even so horrid, that I will do no more than just name it, that it may not escape the reader's indignation.-Indeed, there needs no more than the reading of this one article to convince the Americans, that all the factions in England are, in effect, of one mind upon the subject of this war; and, I am afraid, that this conviction will produce consequences, which we shall have sorely to lament, though I shall, for my own part, always have the satisfaction to reflect, that every thing which it was in my power to do, has been done, to prevent those consequences. WM. COBBETT. "tish Captain would equally suffer, if he OFFICIAL PAPERS. AMERICAN STATES. Declaration of the Regent of England against them. The earnest endeavours of the Prince Regent to preserve the relations of peace and amity with the United States of America having unfortunately failed, His Royal Highness, acting in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, deems it proper publicly to declare the causes and origin of the war, in which the Government of the United States has compelled him to engage. -No desire of conquest, or other ordinary motive of aggression has been, or can be, with any colour of reason, in this case, imputed to Great Britain: that her commercial interests were on the side of peace, if war could have been avoided, without the sacrifice of her maritime rights, or without an injurious submission to France, is a truth which the American Government will not deny.- His Royal Highness does not, however, mean to rest on the favourable presumption to which he is entitled. He is prepared, by an exposition of the circumstances which have led to the present war, to shew that Great Britain has throughout acted towards the United States of America with a spirit of amity, forbearance, and circumstances of unparalleled provocation, conciliation; and to demonstrate the inad- His Majesty had abstained from any meamissible nature of those pretensions, which sure, which the ordinary rules of the law have at length unhappily involved the two of nations did not fully warrant. Never countries in war. It is well known to was the maritime superiority of a Belligethe world, that it has been the invariable rent over his enemy more complete and deobject of the Ruler of France, to destroy cided. Never was the opposite Belligerent the power and independence of the British so formidably dangerous in his power, and Empire, as the chief obstacle to the accom- in his policy to the liberties of all other naplishment of his ambitious designs.He tions. France had already trampled sa first contemplated the possibility of assem- openly and systematically on the most sabling such a naval force in the Channel as, cred rights of neutral powers, as might combined with a numerous flotilla, should well have justified the placing her out of the enable him to disembark in England au pale of civilized nations. Yet in this exarmy sufficient, in his conception, to sub-treme case Great Britain had so used her jugate this country; and through the con- naval ascendency, that her enemy could quest of Great Britain he hoped to realize find no just cause of complaint: and in orhis project of universal empire. By the der to give to these lawless decrees the apadoption of an enlarged and provident sys-pearance of retaliation, the Ruler of France tem of internal defence, and by the valour of His Majesty's fleets and armies, this design was entirely frustrated; and the naval force of France, after the most signal defeats, was compelled to retire from the ocean. -An attempt was then made to effectuate the same purpose by other means; a system was brought forward, by which the Ruler of France hoped to annihilate the commerce of Great Britain, to shake her public credit, and to destroy her revenue; to render useless her maritime superiority, and so to avail himself of his continental ascendency, as to constitute himself, in a great measure, the arbiter of the ocean, notwithstanding the destruction of his fleets. With this view, by the Decree of Berlin, followed by that of Milan, he declared the British territories to be in a state of blockade; and that all commerce, or even correspondence with Great Britain was prohibited. He decreed that every vessel and cargo which had entered, or was found proceeding to a British port, or which, under any circumstances, had been visited by a British ship of war, should be lawful prize: he declared all British goods and produce wherever found, and however acquired, whether coming from the Mother Country, or from her colonies, subject to confiscation: he further declared to be denationalized the flag of all neutral ships that should be found offending against these his decrees: and he gave to this project of universal tyranny the name of the Continental System. For these attempts to ruin the commerce of Great Britain, by means subversive of the clearest rights of neutral nations, France endeavoured in vain to rest her justification upon the previous conduct of His Majesty's Government.- Under was obliged to advance principles of maritime law unsanctioned by any other authority than his own arbitrary will.-The pretexts for these decrees were, first, that Great Britain had exercised the rights of war against private persons, their ships and goods, as if the only object of legitimate hostility on the ocean were the public property of a State, or as if the edicts, and the Courts of France itself had not at all times enforced this right with peculiar rigour. Secondly, that the British orders of blockade, instead of being confined to fortified towns, had, as France asserted, been unlawfully extended to commercial towns and ports, and to the mouths of rivers; and thirdly, that they had been applied to places, and to coasts, which neither were, nor could be actually blockaded. The last of these charges is not founded on fact, whilst the others, even by the admission of the American Government, are utterly groundless in point of law. Against these Decrees, His Majesty protested and appealed; he called upon the United States to assert their own rights, and to vindicate their independence, thus menaced and attacked; and as France had declared, that she would confiscate every vessel which should touch in Great Britain, or be visited by British ships of war, His Majesty having previously issued the Order of January 1807, as an act of mitigated retaliation, was at length compelled, by the persevering violence of the enemy, and the continued acquiescence of neutral powers, to revisit, upon France, in a more effectual manner, the measure of her own injustice; by declaring, in an Order in Council, bearing date the 11th of November 1807, that no neutral vessel should proceed to France, or to any of the coun- security was demanded, that the Berlin tries from which, in obedience to the dic-and Milan Decrees, even if revoked, tates of France, British commerce was ex- should not under some other form be recluded, without first touching at a port established; and a direct engagement was in Great Britain, or her dependencies. At offered, that upon such revocation, the the same time His Majesty intimated his American Government would take part in readiness to repeal the Orders in Council, the war against Great Britain, if Great whenever France should rescind her De- Britain did not immediately rescind her crees, and return to the accustomed prin- Orders.-Whereas no corresponding enciples of maritime warfare; and at a sub-gagement was offered to Great Britain, of sequent period, as a proof of His Majesty's whom it was required, not only that the sincere desire to accommodate, as far as Orders in Council should be repealed, but possible, his defensive measures to the that no others of a similar nature should be convenience of neutral powers, the opera-issued, and that the blockade of May, 1806, tion of the Orders in Council was, by an should be also abandoned. This blockorder issued in April 1809, limited to a ade, established and enforced according to blockade of France, and of the countries accustomed practice, had not been objected subjected to her immediate dominion.- to by the United States at the time it was Systems of violence, oppression, and ty-issued. Its provisions were on the conranny, can never be suppressed, or even checked, if the power against which such injustice is exercised, be debarred from the right of full and adequate retaliation: or, if the measures of the retaliating power, are to be considered as matters of just offence to neutral nations, whilst the measures of original aggression and violence, are to be tolerated with indifference, submission, or complacency.The Government of the United States did not fail to remonstrate against the Orders in Council of Great Britain. Although they knew that these Orders would be revoked, if the Decrees of France, which had occasioned them, were repealed, they resolved at the same moment to resist the conduct of both Belligerents, instead of requiring France, in the first instance, to rescind her Decrees. Applying most unjustly the same measure of resentment to the aggressor, and to the party aggrieved, they adopted measures of commercial resistance against both-a system of resistance which, however varied in the successive acts of embargo, non-intercourse, or non-importation, was evidently unequal in its operation, and principally levelled against the superior commerce, and maritime power of Great Britain. The same partiality towards France was observable, in their negociations, as in their measures of alleged resistance.- -Application was made to both Belligerents for a revocation of their respective edicts; but the terms in which they were made were widely different. Of France was required a revocation only of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, although many other edicts, grossly violating the neutral commerce of the United States, had been promulgated by that Power. No trary represented by the American Minister resident in London at the time, to have been so framed, as to afford, in his judgment, a proof of the friendly disposition of the British Cabinet towards the United States.--Great Britain was thus called upon to abandon one of her most important maritime rights, by acknowledging the Order of blockade in question, to be one of the edicts which violated the commerce of the United States, although it had never been so considered in the previous negocia tions ;-and although the President of the United States had recently consented to abrogate the Non-Intercourse Act, on the sole condition of the Orders in Council being revoked; thereby distinctly admitting these orders to be the only edicts which fell within the contemplation of the law, under which he acted.A proposition so hostile to Great Britain could not but be proportionably encouraging to the pretensions of the enemy; as by thus alleging that the blockade of May 1806, was illegal, the American Government virtually justified, so far as depended on them, the French Decrees. After this proposition had been made, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, if not in concert with that Government, at least in conformity with its views, in a dispatch, dated the 5th of August, 1810, and addressed to the American Minister resident at Paris, stated that the Berlin and Milan Decrees were revoked, and that their operation would cease from the 1st day of November following, provided His Majesty would revoke his Orders in Council, and renounce the new principles of blockade; or that the United States would cause their rights to be respected; meaning thereby, |