called kinneah, was adequate, because it was a combination of simple ideas, without regard to any archetype. His own choice having made that combination, it had in it all he intended it should.

These words, kinneah and niouph, by degrees grew into common use, and then the case was somewhat altered. Adam's children had the same power that he had to make complex ideas, and to make what sounds they pleased the signs of them: but the use of names being to make our ideas known to others, this can only be done when the same sign stands for the same idea in two who converse together. Those children of Adam, therefore, who found the two words kinneah and niouph in use, must conclude they stood for something. If therefore they would use the words as names of species already established, they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds signified by these names, to the ideas they stood for in the minds of others, as to their patterns; and then their ideas of these complex modes were liable to be inadequate, as not being conformable to the ideas in other men's minds using the same names.

Let us now consider, after the same manner, the names of substances. One of Adam's sons finds a glittering substance, which he carries to Adam, who finds it to be hard, of a yellow color, and great weight. These are all the qualities he first takes notice of, and he gives it the name of zahab. In this case Adam acts differently from what he did before, in forming those ideas of mixed modes to which he gave the name kinneah and niouph. For there he puts the ideas together only by his own imagination; but in forming his idea of this new substance he has a standard made by nature; and therefore he puts no simple idea into his complex one, but what he has the perception of from the thing itself. This piece of matter, denominated zahab, being different from any he had seen

before, nobody will deny to be a distinct species, and to have its peculiar essence. But the essence Adam made the name zahab stand for, was nothing but a body hard, shining, yellow, and very heavy. But not content with the knowlege of these qualities, he beats it, and finds it will yield to blows, but not easily separate into pieces. Ductility is now added to his former idea, and makes part of the essence of the species that the name zahab stands for. Farther trials discover fusibility and fixedness, which are also added to the complex idea. If these must be added, then must all other properties which farther trials may discover in it; which properties, because they are endless, it is plain that the idea made after this fashion will be always inadequate. It would also follow that the names of substances would be supposed to have different significations as used by different men: for if every distinct quality discovered in any matter were supposed to make a necessary part of the complex idea signified by the common name given it, it must follow that men must suppose the same word to signify different things in different men. To avoid this, therefore, they have supposed a real essence belonging to every species, and would have their name of the species stand for that. But having no idea of that real essence, their words signify nothing but the ideas they have; and that which is done by this attempt is only to put the name in the place of the thing. To conclude; what liberty Adam had at first to make any complex ideas of mixed modes by no other pattern but by his own thoughts, the same all men have had ever since; and the same necessity of conforming his ideas of substances to things without him, that Adam was under, the same are all men ever since under too.

CHAPTER VII.

Of Particles.

Besides words, which are the names of ideas in the mind, there are others made use of to signify the connexion that the mind gives to ideas or propositions one with another, and to intimate some particular action of its own at that time relating to those ideas. This it does several ways, as 'is,' 'is not,' are marks of the mind affirming or denying; besides which, the mind does, in declaring its sentiments to others, connect not only the parts of the proposition, but whole sentences one to another, with their several relations and dependences, to make a coherent discourse.

The words signifying that connexion the mind gives to several affirmations and negations that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration, are called particles; and it is in the right use of these that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good style. To express the dependence of his thoughts and reasonings, one on another, a man must have words to show what connexion, restriction, distinction, opposition, emphasis, &c. he gives to each respective part of his discourse.

These cannot be understood rightly, without a clear view of the postures, stands, turns, limitations, exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind. Of these there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of particles that most languages have to express them by; for which reason it happens, that most of these particles have divers, and sometimes almost opposite significations, Thus the particle but' in English has several very different, and sometimes almost opposite significations; as, But to say no more:' here it intimates a step of the mind in the course it was going, before it came to the end of it. I saw but two planets:' here it shows that the mind limits the sense to

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what is expressed, with a negation of all other. 'You pray, but it is not that God would bring you to the true religion, but that he would confirm you in your own' the former of these intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be; the latter shows that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before. All animals have sense; but a dog is an animal :' here it signifies the connexion of the latter proposition with the former. To these, divers other significations of this particle might be added, if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude.

I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs: the instances I have given in this one, may give occasion to reflect on their use and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in discoursing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles, some whereof constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them.

CHAPTER VIII.

Of abstract and concrete Terms.

The ordinary words of language, and our common use of them, would have given us light into the nature of our ideas, if they had been but considered with attention. The mind, as has been shown, has a power to abstract its ideas whereby the sorts of things are distinguished. Now each abstract idea being distinct, so that the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive knowlege, perceive their difference: and therefore in propositions, no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another; nor does the common use of language permit that any two abstract words, or names of abstract ideas, should be affirmed one of another. All our affirmations are only inconcrete, which is the affirming one abstract idea to be

joined to another; which abstract ideas, in substances, may be of any sort, though the most of them are of powers in all the rest these are little else but relations.

All our simple ideas have abstract, as well as concrete names, as whiteness, white; sweetness, sweet, &c. The like also holds in our ideas of modes and relations, as justice, just; equality, equal, &c. But as to our ideas of substances, we have very few abstract names at all. Those few that the schools have forged, as animalitas, humanitas, &c. hold no proportion with the infinite number of names of substances, and could never get admittance into common use, or obtain the license of public approbation; which seems to intimate the confession of all mankind, that they have no ideas of the real essences of substances, since they have not names for such ideas. It was only the doctrine of substantial forms, and the confidence of mistaken pretenders to a knowlege they had not, which first coined and then introduced animalitas, humanitas, and the like; which yet went very little farther than their own schools, and could never get to be current amongst understanding men.

CHAPTER IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

From what has been said it may be perceived how the very nature of words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be of doubtful signification. To examine their perfection or imperfection, it is necessary to consider their use and end. We have, in a former part of this discourse, mentioned a double use of words; one for recording our thoughts, and another for communicating them. For the recording our own thoughts any words will serve our turn: for since sounds are voluntary signs, man may use what words he pleases to signify to himself his own ideas; and there will be