of our knowlege, or the grounds of those opinions on points, where, judging from the conflict of sentiments, truth has not been, nor is likely to be attained.

To discriminate between opinion and knowlege, and to regulate assent on points of an uncertain nature, it is necessary,

1. To inquire into the origin of our ideas.

2. To show what knowlege we possess by means of those ideas.

3. To consider the grounds and degrees of opinion or faith in matters, of which we have no certain knowlege.

If by such inquiries we can find out the powers of the understanding, the extent to which they reach, and the points where they fail, we shall learn to be cautious in meddling with things beyond our comprehension; and resting content with ignorance, where knowlege is out of our reach, avoid perplexing ourselves with questions about things, of which all are and must be equally ignorant.

But though the understanding be unable to embrace all things, yet we have reason to be thankful, that whatever is essential to our well-being, and conducive to the purposes of a virtuous life here and a happy one hereafter, lies within the reach of the mind. Nor shall we have cause to lament the confined limits of our understanding, if we use it aright in those matters where it may be serviceable; while, on the other hand, we shall be guilty of childish peevishness, if we neglect that which is within the grasp of the mind, merely because there are other things beyond it; and if, instead of employing our mental faculties on objects suited to their power, and of being content with probability where certainty is not attainable, we will disbelieve every thing because we cannot know with certainty all things, we shall act as wisely as he did who would not use his legs, because he had no wings with which to fly.

As soon as we know the powers of our mind, we know what to expect from them, and we shall neither sit still in despair of knowing any thing, nor disclaim what we really do know because there still exist some things not understood. It is well for the sailor to know the length of his line; and though he cannot fathom with it the depths of the ocean, he knows it is long enough to reach the bottom in places, where alone exists any danger of running on shoals. When we can learn all that is needful for the guidance of our opinion and conduct, we need not be troubled if other things escape our knowlege.

This examination of the powers of the mind is the more necessary, as it prevents our thoughts from losing themselves in the vast ocean of being; as if in that boundless extent, there was nothing above, below, or beyond its reach; and as if our thoughts, wandering into depths where they can find no sure footing, and floundering in questions that admit of no resolution, must eventually find their only refuge in confirmed scepticism. But if the horizon, which bounds the enlightened and dark part of things, be once discovered, the mind will either rest quietly in ignorance, undisturbed by what it knows to be unattainable; or be more free to direct itself to inquiries advantageous and satisfactory.

I would premise that the word idea,' which frequently occurs in the following treatise, is used to express whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, and includes whatever is meant by phantasm,' notion,'' species,' or whatever the mind can be employed about in thinking. Taking for granted that such ideas are in men's minds, our first inquiry shall be, how they come there.

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The above use of the word idea' was censured by the bishop of Worcester, who says, 'The world hath been strangely amused with ideas' of late; and we have been told that strange things might be done by the help of ideas;' and yet these ideas

CHAPTER II.

No innate Principles in the Mind.

It is the opinion of some that there are certain innate principles, which every man brings with him into the world. It would be a sufficient refutation of this

at last come to be only common notions of things, which we must make use of in our reasoning. You (i. e. the author of the Essay) say in that chapter about the existence of God, you thought it most proper to express yourself in the most usual and familiar way, by common words and expressions. I would you had done so quite through your book; for then you had never given that occasion to the enemies of our faith to take up your new way of ideas, as an effectual battery (as they imagined) against the mysteries of the Christian faith. But you might have enjoyed the satisfaction of your ideas long enough before I had taken notice of them, unless I had found them employed about doing mischief.'

To which our author replies, Your lordship fears that the term ideas may be dangerous, because it has been made use of in arguing against what your lordship defends; for you cannot be fearful of the things signified by the term, inasmuch as they are but the objects of our minds in thinking; and to expect that any one should reason against your lordship without the use of ideas, is to expect that he should reason without thinking.

'But whether it be the name or the thing, from which your lordship apprehends danger, it seems an extraordinary mode of reasoning to write against a book, in which the term 'idea' is not used to a bad purpose, only because it is used against your lordship by others: for I do not see how your lordship's writing against my notions of ideas can hinder your opponents from doing mischief with them.

'Your lordship may be tired of the sound of the word, but you must have a better opinion of the articles of our faith than to think that they can be overturned by a breath formed into any sound whatever. Names are arbitrary, and no one term is more opposed to truth than another;-propositions may be made against truth, and no word is exempt from being used in such propositions; the fault is not in the word, but in those who improperly use it. And when, on my saying that I scarcely use the word idea' in my chapter on the Existence of God, your lordship wishes that I had done so through my book, I must consider that your lordship compliments me in wishing my book to be suited to vulgar apprehension; not that you see any harm in the use of the word instead of notion,' with which you say it agrees in signification; for this would be to make your lordship write only against an impropriety of speech. I acknowlege your lordship's con

supposition, to show that men, by their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowlege they have without the help of any such original principles: for as it

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descension in spending so much valuable time on the subject, and would, to please your lordship, substitute some other term, could I find one equally appropriate. But I do not see how the word idea' is better or worse, because it has been made use of for bad purposes, for the same may be said of the words 'Scripture,' reason,' distinct,' clear,' &c. Nay, the very name of God himself will not escape; for all have been made use of to bad purposes. Should I, indeed, leave the word out of the book altogether, and every where substitute the word 'notions,' might not that word also be used for the purposes of mischief? This I am sure of, that the truths of Christianity cannot be beaten down or endangered by any sound whatever. My new way of ideas,' or my way by ideas,' is an expression of frequent occurrence in your lordship's letter, and may comprehend my whole essay; for as it treats of the understanding, which is the faculty of thinking, it must of necessity treat of ideas, which are the objects of the mind in thinking; and if it be new, it is but a new history of an old thing; for men have always performed the actions of thinking, reasoning, &c. as they do now, though whether the same account has been given of the process I know

not.

'Were I as well read as your lordship, I should have been safe from your reprimand for thinking my way of ideas new for want of looking into other men's thoughts, which appear in their books. I agree with your lordship, that many things may seem new to one that converses only with his own thoughts, which really are not so: but if in spinning them out of his own thoughts they seem new to him, he is the inventor, though another may have thought the same before him; for invention consists not in thinking first, but in not borrowing the thoughts from others. The Chinese had the art of printing before it was known in Europe, but it was subsequently invented in Europe, and not borrowed from the Chinese. How little I affect the honor of originality may be seen in the following words, noticed by your lordship, when, speaking of certainty, I say, I think I have shown in what it is that certainty consists, which, whatever it was to others, was, I confess, to me, heretofore, one of those desiderata which I found great want of.' I spoke of it as new only to myself; and yet if I had assumed to myself the honor of an original, I should have your lordship for a guarantee in that point, who are pleased to write against it as something new.

Truly my book has had most unlucky stars,-to displease your lordship for its novelty, and to subject me to censure for having said what others have said before. As to the way your lordship thinks I should have taken to prevent the having it thought my own invention, when it was common to me with

would be impertinent to suppose the idea of colors innate in a creature who has senses to discern them, so would it be unreasonable to attribute to the impressions of nature those truths which our faculties are fitted to attain. But because censure follows the search of truth when it leads out of the common road, I shall set down, for my excuse, the reasons that made me doubt the truth of that opinion.

It is commonly taken for granted, that there are certain principles in which all mankind agree, and therefore that these principles are innate. But the universal agreement of mankind in any principles would not prove them to be innate, if any other way could be shown by which men may come to that agreement. The argument, however, is against the doctrine of innate principles, for there are none to which men give a universal assent. To begin with speculative principles; the maxims, Whatever is, is,' and It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,' have the reputation of being universally received; yet so far are they from having universal assent, that there are many to whom they are un

others, it so happened that I could not look into the thoughts of other men, as your lordship recommends; for their language in books is but the result, and not the progress, of their minds. I could look into nobody's understanding but my own to see how it wrought. My book is a copy of my own mind, and I publish it because I think that the intellectual faculties operate alike in most men; but if some have different ways of thinking, reasoning, or arriving at certainty, I would bumbly request that they would show us the way of their nobler flights, and their shorter or surer way to certainty, than by observing the agreement or disagreement of ideas.

"Your lordship adds, 'But now it seems nothing is intelligible but what suits with the new way of ideas.' The new way of ideas and the old way of speaking intelligibly are the same, and they consist, 1. in using no words but what are the signs of some determinate object of the mind in thinking; 2. in using the same word steadily for the same object; 3. in joining these words grammatically; and, 4. in uniting sentences in a coherent discourse. Thus only can a man preserve himself from the suspicion of jargon, whether he pleases to call these objects of his mind, which his words do or should stand for, ' ideas' or no.'