2. To what are they redeemed? To the adoption of sons. Eph. i. 4, 5. "According as he hath chosen us in him-having predestinated us to the adoption of children by Jesus Christ." This adoption is from election as its source and spring: "According as he hath chosen us having predestinated us unto the adoption of children.” It is by or through Jesus Christ. He, by his death, procured for those he represented, the removal of their alienation, and their introduction unto the family of God. Was all this arranged and settled in the covenant of redemption? And have reprobates any thing to do with it? Here then is precisely the use which the sacred writers make of election in this part of the system of grace. It regulates and determines who shall be the children of adoption; and further, that all this is by Jesus Christ. He is made the elder brother, head, and representative, of this blessed family. He procures all their privileges. He obtains for them, all needed blessings. He redeems them from the curse of the broken law, and purchases for them salvation. Gal. iv. 5: "To redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons." Did the Lord Jesus Christ thus engage in the everlasting covenant? And what is there in all this for the behoof of the reprobate? What do we find here that Jesus purchased for them ? Again: The sacred writers make a precise use of election in relation both to the end for which those whom Christ represented were redeemed, and the means of obtaining it. The end, salvation. 2 Thess. ii. 13: "God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth." Salvation, in subordination to the divine glory, is the end for the enjoyment of which they were chosen. Now their VOL. I. election is in Christ. He procures for them eternal life and salvation. Is there any thing about the reprobate here? Not any thing. The means in order to the obtaining this end, sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth. These are qualifying and preparing means, of which the elect only will be the subjects. The decree of election contemplates the sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth, as means for its own fulfilment. But is there any thing of all this contemplated, about, or concerning the reprobate? Nothing at all. It is no wonder that Doctor G. endeavours to keep the idea of election out of view, in speaking of the righteousness of Christ. If it is to be equally applicable to all the human race, it is very necessary that election should not appear, or at least, should have nothing to do in the system. For the same reason, representative identification must be kept on the back ground. For if Christ engaged in the covenant of grace for the elect only-if he represented the elect only, the ability and willingness to save the reprobate, so much contended for by Doctor G. must rest on a very precarious foundation. Will Doctor G. be so obliging as to let the world know, what is precisely the use of election in his own scheme of the system of grace? For our own part we sincerely think, that his system would be much more consistent without it. Doctor G. informs us, p. 402, that "a number of modern theologians, make election the measure of the value and imputability of Christ's righteousness." We must beg leave to suspend our belief of this assertion until Doctor G. shall have favoured us with the names, and referred to the writings of some of these theologians. We believe it. will be difficult to find any theologian, either ancient or modern, that "makes election the measure of the 4 C imputability of Christ's righteousness." The righteousness of Christ is imputable to the elect, and to them only, but it is not, simply, as they are elect, but as they are believers. In representing the righteousness of Christ, if not an "abstract righteousness, yet a righteousness abstracted from election, representation, or persons"-as being "the righteousness of the law"-" capable of saving all mankind," but not wrought out, or performed in the name and room of certain elect men, Doctor G. and the whole tribe of Arminians, will exactly harmonize. The truth is, disguise it as you will, the systems of all these men come to this, that the Lord Jesus Christ satisfied law and justice, by yielding to the law, the very righteousness that it demanded. The idea of persons, or the elect, is kept entirely out of the question. Now if this is not an abstract righteousness, I ask, in the name of common sense, what is it? Let us press this inquiry a little, and I think it will puzzle the ingenuity of the most subtle metaphysician to find in it a single idea good or bad. What is the righteousness of the law? A righteousness which the law demands from those who are its subjects. These must be persons, and persons under the law. Jesus Christ never had a human person. For himself, he never could be under the law. On him abstract from representation, it had no claims. It could have none. He never could present the righteousness of the law, for the law must, in every case say to him, thou owest me nothing. I never can accept a payment where I have no demand. This furnishing of the righteousness of the law, where the law has no claim, is therefore, impossible. It never could say in such a case, "" pay me what thou owest," and if it were possible that the law could receive this payment, it would act contrary to law. Το say that a dollar is a dollar let it be paid by whomsoever it may, touches not this subject. The law demands a dollar, only from the person who owes it a dollar. It is evident then, that a supposed fulfilling of the law by the Lord Jesus Christ, without identifying himself with those on whom the law had claims, is incompatible with its very nature, would be a cheating of the law in its just demands upon its own subjects if pleaded by them, and if accepted, would be a violation of the principle of moral righte ousness. The righteousness of the law, as furnished by the Lord Jesus Christ requires, that there be persons on whom the law has demands—that these demands they are unable to fulfil that Jesus Christ so identify himself with them that he and they be viewed as one in law reckoning, and that he, therefore, owe and pay their debt. Did he in this manner owe and pay for the reprobate, as well as for the elect? Did he, for the sake of the reprobate as well as the elect, sanctify himself? (John xvii. 19.) i. e. consecrate himself unto the Lord a priest and a sacrifice without spot or blemish to make atonement for their sin, that they might be sanctified through the truth. Certainly not. If these observations be correct, it will appear that there is a precise use of election made by the sacred writers, which never did enter, and which never could enter into Doctor G.'s scheme. In page 396, Doctor G. proposes the following question: "Does Christ's righteousness derive any of its worth or merit from the dignity of his divine person ?" which question he answers in the negative; and offers four arguments to prove that Christ's righteousness derives no merit from the divinity of his person. He, however, has observed, (for he is a man of reading) "that some of the ancients had given an affirmative answer to this question, and that some modern authors give it a similar answer." What a discovery! Yet we might be permitted to ask, what Calvinistic divine before Doctor G. ever denied it? But the Doctor thinks he sees a cockatrice, putting his head out of his shell, and with the specific instinct of his nature, aiming a bite, before his fangs are grown, or his poison concocted; and therefore, he judges that it may be best to tread on him now, and not to wait till he shall have done some eminent mischief." This cockatrice reader, is the merit of Christ's personal dignity in the work of salvation! If it be a cockatrice, it is an old one, and long, very long indeed, has it been a hatching if it be yet in the shell. The Doctor's four arguments to prove that Christ's righteousness derives no merit from the divinity of his person, are, 1. The idea is contrary to the scriptures. 2. Is absolutely inconceivable. 3. Is dishonourable to Christ. 4. If it were possible, it is not imputable, and therefore can be no part of his righteousness. We cannot weary ourselves much longer in following up these arguments. The thing is absolutely fatiguing. Yet to pass them over altogether, might furnish a conclusion, the very reverse of what we intend. On his first argument the Doctor asks, "What was the riches which Christ laid down, when he became poor P99 66 Of what did he empty himself?" He answers "it could not be his divine nature, for that is impossible-it could not be any perfection of his divinity," &c. He gives a reason why it could not be any of these, "because all the divine perfections inhere in the divine nature, and are bound together by immutable necessity." He answers positively, to the above ques tion, it was precisely his personal dignity. Then, of course, this answer cannot, according to the Doctor, be liable to the above objection. And is it really true, that the personal dignity of Jesus Christ does not inhere in the divine nature? Can the second person of the holy Trinity lay down his divine personality? And is not personal dignity essential to divine personality? A divine person divested of personal dignity! Astonishing! I am afraid a cockatrice shows his head. Is not the personality of the Son of God essential to the very being of the Godhead? And as this personality is divine, is it not necessarily dignified? Our glorious Redeemer could no more part with his personal dignity, than he could with the divine nature. Even in his lowest state of humiliation and degradation, it was the imperative command of Jehovah to the highest class of created beings, that they should do him homage: "Let all the angels of God worship him :" In one sense, the Redeemer had all the personal dignity he ever had. He was, even on Calvary, the " Father's equal-the man that was his fellow." In another sense, his glory was veiled, or he "emptied himself, and took the form of a servant." Bad as metaphysics are, they are sometimes useful, to enable us to make proper distinctions. Let us never forget the two-fold character of our glorious Mediator: Christian, let no subtle theory, no new invention of speculative reasoning, rob you of your Saviour God. In the whole of this reasoning of Doctor G. no notice is taken of the penalty of the broken law-no notice of sin being an infinite evil. The whole tendency of this new theory is towards Socinianism. I tremble for the consequences. God grant that the author may be arrested in time, by the hand of mercy. President Edwards has unan swerably demonstrated, "that, as sin is the violation of infinite obligation to love, honour, and obey God, it must be a crime infinitely heinous." The punishment must be according to the nature of the offence, for God is just. If an adequate satisfaction is made, it must be an infinite satisfaction. Why is the punishment of the damned eternal ? Because infinite cannot be predi- || cated of it, in any sense, but in the want of a limit to its duration. tributed, as he is the person who obeyed and suffered." In his second argument, p. 399, Doctor G. asks, "is not the law itself the alone and only standard of merit? Does the law command more than it commands?" &c. Here, again, the whole argument turns on the claims of the unbroken and not the broken law, losing sight. completely of its infinite requisitions. The Doctor says, in his third argument, p. 400, "It is absolutely ridiculous to suppose that the righteousness of Christ has any other worth, merit, or value, than what it derives from the law." The punishment Christ suffered, and the atonement he made, did not require unlimited duration. Why? Because the infinite dignity of his person, gave infinite value and efficacy to the satisfaction he made. Now, after all this, there will be The claims of the broken law are no impropriety in saying that the infinitely greater than the claims of righteousness of Christ derives its the unbroken law. When Doctor glorious excellency from the dignity G. speaks of "the righteousness of of his person. The law did not the law," and classes "the righteous-give honour to Christ, but received ness of Adam, if it had been completed," our own righteousness, if we could produce it," and "the righteousness of Christ," as if these would be precisely the same thing, it is evident, that the penalty of the broken law is entirely out of view. 66 He certainly makes the claims of the broken and unbroken law, to be exactly the same. Perhaps, here lies the foundation of the greatest error in his book, and when carried out to its legitimate results, has the most direct tendency to lead to Socinianism. "In Christ's person," says the very learned and accurate Turrettin, "there is a fulness of divinity, a fulness of office, a fulness of merit, and of graces: who then can doubt, but that the satisfaction which he has made is one of infinite value and efficacy? For though Christ's human nature, which was the instrument in the obedience and sufferings, was finite, yet this does not lessen the value of the satisfaction, because it derives its perfection from the divine person of Christ, to which all his actions must be at honour from him, when he became its subject: "For he hath magnified the law and made it honourable.” The Redeemer rendered to the law an infinitely more valuable obedience, than it ever could have received from even unsinning man. Doctor G. asks, “Could the president of the United States pass off a dollar for more than one hundred cents ?" Here again, the old mistakenothing of the penalty of the broken law. There is also a strange confounding of penal satisfaction, with pecuniary payment. I shall satisfy myself with presenting to the Doctor's consideration a quotation from the celebrated Turrettin, as translated by Willson, pp. 250, 251. "Christ did not suffer eternal death as to duration, but a death of three days only, and yet he fully paid the debt of everlasting punishment, which we owed. His, which was one of finite duration, was equivalent to an everlasting death suffered by us, because of the infinite dignity of his person. A penal satisfac tion is not of the same nature with a pecuniary payment, which is only valued by the amount paid, without regard to the person who pays. Penal satisfaction is appreciated by the dignity of the person who makes it, and is increased in worth in proportion to his dignity. Money paid by a king is, indeed, of no more avail in the discharge of a debt than money paid by a slave; but the life of a king is of more value than the life of a vile slave, as the life of king David was of more worth than that of half the Israelitish army, 2 Sam. xviii. 3. In this way Christ alone is more excellent than all men together. The dignity of an infinite person swallows up all the infinities of punishment due to us; they sink into it and are lost." Much more might be quoted to the same purpose, but this is sufficient. Doctor G.'s views in this matter are constantly of something finite, and consequently are wholly inconclusive. The Doctor's 4th argument, p. 400, is rather surprising. It is certainly one sui generis. "If it were possible," he says, "that the dignity of Christ's person should amalgamate itself with the merit of his righteousness, that dignity never could become mine, and of consequence, is no part of his imputable righteousness. The law never required me to be a divine person and never will condemn me, for not being a divine person." It is not easy, precisely, to catch the doctor's meaning in these words. 1. The merit of Christ's righteousness is here presented, as an object to be conceived of apart from the dignity of his divine person. To assume such a position, and argue from it with those who deny that the merit of Christ's righteousness can either exist, or be conceived of at all, abstract from the dignity of his person, is certainly a begging the question. 2. He supposes the dignity of Christ's person, as amalgamating with the merit of his righteousness. A case utterly insupposable,by those who differ from him, and who must necessarily grant his position before they can suppose it. 3. In such a case, he says, "that dignity never could become mine.” And the reader has the reason before him, namely, "that the law never required me to be a divine person, nor will it condemn me for not being a divine person." 4. Of consequence it is no part of Christ's imputable righteousness. This may be reasoning, perhaps, and if it be, let it go for all it is worth. I must confess, however, that I can make nothing of it. In the close of his remarks on this subject, p. 404, the Doctor "insists than God has brought the real righteousness of his law into the world, and offered it to mankind without exception." This is the same abstract righteousness again. A righteousness wrought out per se, and ready to be disposed of to any person willing to receive it. I wonder if this belongs to the metaphysics of Christianity. That JesusChrist, with all his righteousness, is freely offered to sinners, I can understand and do believe; but this righteousness of the law ready waiting (like a hundred cents to pay one dollar) for elect and reprobate alike, I cannot comprehend. The last part of this work is, of course, the conclusion, p. 404, and a most extraordinary conclusion it is. It consists of forty-five pages. I cannot think of reviewing all this book of a conclusion. Suffice it to say, in general, that it contains much diversified matter, and many a subject. The author appears not in the least exhausted, but fights manfully to the last. His closing war, his finishing battle, is with confessions of faith. He does not forget, however, to deal many a lusty blow upon church courts who would call a minister to account for "writing and publishing |