trust, meet with no advocates among those who feel the importance of divine truth, and who wish to guard the ministerial office against profanation by heretical men. And yet this is the only application of the Bible as the sole test of orthodoxy, consistent with the objection that human creeds are unlawful. To apply it in any other way is a practical abandonment of the objection. We are aware that those who have no written creed may profess to regard the Bible as their test of orthodoxy, but assuredly, if they pay any regard to the purity of the church in admitting persons into the ministerial office, they do the very thing for which they may feel disposed to censure others; they use their sense of the Bible, that is, their creed, as a test by which to try the faith of candidates. They have no written creed; but they have a creed, and to this creed they have recourse in order to detect such errors as they deem sufficient to exclude a person from the ministerial office.

The Confession of Faith not only demands the attention of ministers of the gospel and other officers of our church, to whom it is peculiarly important, but has a claim upon the regard of all private Christians who belong to the Presbyterian church. It is worthy of their careful and diligent study, because it presents a compendious, accurate and lucid exhibition of the great doctrines of divine revelation. It ought to be found in the library of every family, and in the hands of every individual.

J. J. J.

Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect. By Thomas Brown, M.D. F. R. S. Edin. &c. Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Third Edition. Edinburgh, 1818. pp. 569. 8vo.

We shall endeavour to present a fair analysis of this celebrated work.

In his preface the author asserts, "that the invariableness of antecedence and consequence, which is represented as only the sign of causation, is itself the only essential circumstance of causation ;" and, "that in the sequences of events, we are not merely ignorant of any thing intermediate, but have in truth no reason to suppose it as really existing, or, if any thing intermediate exist, no reason to consider it but as itself another physical antecedent of the consequent which we knew before." "This simple theory" he thinks will render the "great doctrines of religion at once more intelligible and more sublime," "by destroying that supposed connecting link between the antecedent will of the Deity and the consequent rise of the world." To attribute to God any work of creation, any act of efficiency would, of course, if this theory is true, be improper; and we must cease from saying, if we would be philosophers of Dr. Brown's cast, that the Deity does what he wills, for he merely wills without producing existencies.

In this treatise, the author endeavours, "in the first place, to fix, what it is which truly constitutes the relation of cause and effect;-in the second place, to examine the sources of various illusions, which have led philosophers to consider it as something more mysterious;-and in the third place, to ascertain the circumstances, in which the belief of this relation arises in the mind." He thinks it "necessary to add, in a fourth part, some remarks on the errors of" Mr. Hume's "doctrine," concerning cause and effect, "and on the errors of those who have ascribed to him a very different doctrine," from the one which Dr. Brown judges he has maintained. This work might very soon have been brought to a close, for the author does little more than assert in a great variety of modes, that invariable antecedence and sequence is that thing, and that alone, which constitutes the relation of cause and effect; so that a cause means nothing but an invariable an

tecedent, and an effect nothing but an invariable sequence. He might have said, that an old milk cart and the horse which has invariably drawn it into the city twice a day, for twenty years, explained his meaning. The borse should have been his cause of the cart, and the cart his effect of the horse.

But we must take a wide range, for "the philosophy, which regards phenomena, as they are successive in a certain order, is the philosophy of every thing that exists in the universe." p. 9. We readily admit, that the doctrine of cause and effect is continually exemplified throughout the universe. Wherever a change takes place, whether in mind or matter, there is an effect; and we never observe an effect, or even conceive of it, without constitutionally judging, that it must have had a cause.

"At every moment of our consciousness, some sensation, or thought or emotion, is beginning in the mind, or ceasing, or growing more or less intense; and if the bodily functions of life continue only while the particles of the frame are quitting one place to exist in another, the functions of spirit, which animates it, may be said as truly to subsist only by the succession of feeling after feeling." p. 10. Every mental operation is an effect, no doubt, but every mental operation is not a feeling. The particles of our bodily frames are continually changing, it must be admitted, and the various functions of animal life, such as breathing, and the circulation of the blood, continue. The functions of spirit also subsist, while there is in the mind a succession of operations; but how the functions of spirit subsist only by the succession of feelings, or indeed of mental operations in general, we know not; unless by function Dr. B. means merely a mode of spiritual action, and then, to be sure, a mode of mental operation subsists only by a succession of similar operations; for that mode of action would cease, if no act of the kind should succeed. If by a func

tion of spirit he means an inherent faculty for any one mental operation, then we deny that it subsists only by the succession of the operations proper to that faculty; and let him prove the affirmative who can. One remark we will here venture, that a person who fills 569 octavo pages with matter which might easily be contained in five, ought to affix some definite meaning to his own terms, before he undertakes to write another volume on the subject of causation and mental philosophy.

From observing the phenomena of antecedents and sequences Dr. B.proceeds to show, that the mind judges concerning the past and future, that whenever certain similar antecedents have existed, or shall exist, certain similar sequences have existed, or will follow them. Hence the mind converts the passing sequences of phenomena into signs of future corresponding sequences. In whatever manner it may arise, and whatever circumstances may or may not be necessary for giving birth to it, the belief itself is a fact in the history of the mind, which it is impossible to deny, and a fact as universal as the life which depends on it." p. 14. It is a fact in mental history, that all men constitutionally judge, that similar causes will, under similar circumstances, produce similar effects. This is an old, and a common axiom in metaphysics, which required not a cart-load of verbiage about it, to bury it up, under the pretence of making it obvious.

It is, however, believed by every man who has not argued himself out of common sense, not only that certain objects which have hitherto been accompanied by certain consequents, were the antecedents of those consequents, but the causes of their existence and mankind will continue to believe, even if they should all take the trouble to read Dr. Brown's work on the Relation of Cause and Effect, that something more than immediate and invariable antecedency of one thing to another is requisite to constitute the antecedent the cause of

the consequent. One interstice between the coggs of the same wheel is invariably the antecedent to one of the coggs, and the consequent to the other; but it is neither the effect of its immediate antecedent, nor the cause of its immediate consequent.

Yet we are told, “it is this mere relation of uniform antecedence, so important and so universally believed, which appears to me to constitute all that can be philosophically meant, in the words power or causation, to whatever objects, material or spiritual, the words may be applied." p.15.

To us it appears otherwise; for the mere existence of God was immediately antecedent to the existence of the first creature, and yet the mere existence of God was not the cause or the existence of the first creature. Our author tells us the mere will of God was the immediate antecedent to the existence of the first creature. Well then, the mere existence of God always was the immediate antecedent to the will of God; and yet the mere existence of God is not the cause of that will.

We must entreat the patience of our readers, that our author may have a fair hearing. "We give the name of cause to the object which we believe to be the invariable antecedent of a particular change; we give the name effect, reciprocally to that invariable consequent; and the relation itself, when considered abstractly, we denominate power in the object that is the invariable antecedent." p. 16. The letter A has always been the immediate antecedent to B in the English alphabet. Is it therefore the cause of B? Is B the effect of A? No; it will be answered; but the author now says, that every change is the effect of that which was immediately antecedent to it; but that the causation of the effect means nothing but the invariable priority of its antecedent. "Power is only a shorter synonymous expression of invariableness of antecedence." p. 467.

"A cause," he says, " in the fullest definition which it philosophically

admits, may be said to be, that which immediately precedes any change, and which, existing at any time in similar circumstances, has been always, and will be always, immediately followed by a similar change. Priority in [to] the sequence observed, and invariableness of antecedence in the past and future sequences supposed, are the elements and the only elements, combined in the notion of a cause." Of course priority in any immediate invariable antecedent is enough to constitute it a cause of the next sequent, whether it has any efficiency in producing it or not. The words property and quality admit of exactly the same definition; expressing only a certain relation of invariable antecedence and consequence, in changes, that take place, on the presence of the substance to which they are ascribed. They are stricly synonymous with power." p. 17, 18. Hence, according to our author, the quality of redness in the morocco cover of my Bible, is the power of the perception of red colour.

66

All will agree, that a cause must exist before any effect can be produced by it; so that a cause is always antecedent to its effect. If, moreover, any change occurs, there must have been some cause of that change, prior to the fact of the change. But a change may take place, without ever being preceded or followed by a similar change: must this change be without cause, for the want of "invariablenes of antecedence in the past and future?" Iron once was made to swim: the fact occurred but once, and probably never will occur again: did it swim without a cause? Yet there was no invariableness of antecedence here. The same effect, it is true, would arise from a similar exertion of almighty energy.

By property we understand any thing which is said to belong to any subject of conception and discourse, whether it be an inherent or merely incidental attribute of that subject; and by quality we denote

some inherent characteristic of any subject. Property includes quality; but quality is only a species of property. These may exist, and be conceived of as existing, in an inactive state. To make them synonymous with power, therefore, we conceive to be a gross abuse of language. We might as well say, that all words denote nothing more than antecedent and consequent; and therefore banish the rest from our vocabulary. Indeed our subsequent extracts will evince how fond the doctor must be of simplifying human language, for he says,

"The powers of substances are only the substances themselves." p. 142. "The powers, properties, or qualities of a substance, are not to be regarded, then, as any thing su peradded to the substance, or distinct from it." p. 20. "The substances that exist in nature, are surely every thing that has a real existence in nature; for they comprehend the Omnipotent himself, and all his living and inanimate creatures." p. 24. But modes, forms, conceptions and imaginations exist, even in Dr. Brown's head: and are they substances? If they are, he must have a thick head. "There are not substances, therefore, and also powers and qualities, but substances alone." p. 27. Of course, every power of the doctor's mind, is a substance. "The priority of relation, which constitutes power," he says, "must be an invariable priority, and not mere priority." p. 31. There must be, he tells us, 66 a mutual connexion that is invariable," between an antecedent and a sequent, to constitute the first a power, a cause, a quality, and the last an effect. p. 32. "Power is this uniform relation and nothing more." "It is only from a confusion of casual with uniform antecedence, that power can be conceived to be something different from that invariable relation; for it is impossible to form any conception of it whatever, except merely as that which has been,

Now if the powers of substances are only the substances themselves, we may banish the word power, and use some specific substance in its place, in every instance. If we should hear one say for instance, "Dr. Brown has logical powers," we might correct him, and require him to say, "Dr. Brown has logical substances:" or if we should hear, that Dr. B. " has great powers for writing," we might conclude the correct meaning to be, that Dr. B. has great substances for writing; such for instance, as a great quill, great sheets of paper, and a great quantity of ink. According to the same theory, the attraction of gravitation, and of cohesion, together with all magnetic, and galvanic influences, and all chemical affinities, must be substances. Pray what kind of substances must they be? Has gravitation thought, or extension, or any of the attributes of mind, or of matter? Until we can find some of the attributes of substances in the attraction of gravitation, we shall be content to call it a property of material substances, and not a distinct substance itself.

our

His doctrine of cause and effect, Dr. B. thinks equally applicable, "to phénomena of every class;" p. 34, and power, when applied to mental operations, or to bodily motions, means nothing more, he says, than the invariableness of antecedence and sequence in those phenomena which are called causes and effects. "When we voluntarily move hand, the antecedent is our will or desire to move it; and we have perfect foreknowledge, that the motion is immediately to take place." p. 47. The desire to move the hand is, he says, the cause or antecedent, and the motion of the hand the effect, or the sequence. One event, and another following event, are here the phenomena; and if we say, as he does, that one is the cause of the other, or the power which produces the second event, we ought to mean no

mity of relation between these two

events. "When I say that I have mentally the power of moving my hand, I mean nothing more, than that when my body is in a sound state, and no foreign force is imposed on me, the motion of my hand will always follow my desire to move it. I speak of a certain state of the mind, as invariably antecedent, and a certain state of the body, as invariably consequent. If power be more than this invariableness, let the test be repeated which I used in a former case;" (p. 49.) that is, let a true proposition be stated concerning the power of moving the hand, which contains some additional information to that which is given, when it is said, there is an invariable relation of antecedency and sequency between the desire to move the hand, and the actual motion of the hand. p. 36. "When a proposition is true, and yet communicates no additional information, it must be of exactly the same import, as some other proposition, formerly understood and admitted." "This test of identity appears to me to be a most accurate one."

We may desire to move our hand, yet judge that it is not best to do it; and so not will to do it; for the will often is (and it would be well were it always) guided by judgment, or conscience, in direct opposition to powerful desires. We could have agreed with our author, had he written, "When I say that I have mentally the power of moving my hand, I mean nothing more, than that when my body is in a sound state, and no foreign force is imposed on me, the motion of my hand will always follow my exertion to move it; and my exertion to move it, will always, under such circumstances, follow my will to move it; and my will to move it will always follow the presentation of some sufficient inducement." We can speedily try the doctor's test, thus: There is an invariable relation of antecedency and sequency between the exertion of a voluntary agent to move his hand, and the actual motion of the hand: and, this sequency of the event will

ed, to the voluntary exertion to produce it, is owing to the agent's possessing and exerting a faculty of efficiency in the case. These propositions we judge to be true, and to communicate some additional information, to all which is contained in the statement of an invariable relation of antecedency and sequency in events.

To maintain his favourite theory, Dr. B. denies the distinction, which is commonly admitted, and which to us seems perfectly natural and just, between a desire, and an act of the will, or a volition. He admits, however, that there is a distinction, and hence he calls those desires, which are immediately followed by some voluntary operation, "brief feelings," in opposition to desires, of longer continuance, which are not succeeded by any such operations.

With this writer desires, volitions, wishes, choice, conceptions, notions, and remembrance, are all feelings, and feelings differing only in the time of their continuance; and in the circumstances of their sequencies. p. 54, 67, 343. It is no wonder that he should make power, causation, energy, and efficiency, mean nothing more than the invariable relation of antecedency and sequency in any two given events. "The theory of power, then," he concludes, or causation, (p. 81.) seems to receive no additional light from a consideration of mental energy, as exhibited in the bodily movements that depend upon the will; for we find, as before, only a sequence of two phenomena, that are believed to be, in the same circumstances, uniformly antecedent and consequent. But the feelings of the mind are followed, not by bodily movements only; they are followed, also, by other feelings of the mind. We have antecedents and consequents, where the whole train is mental;" but still he concludes, that the causation of each and every one of these "feelings," by which he must mean every mental operation, is only the uniform. relation of some antecedent to it as