That infants are the subjects of moral depravity, is taught, in the most ample manner, in the scriptures; and will not be called in question by those, whose opinion we are considering. But in what, we would ask, does their depravity consist? Does it consist in selfish exercises of the will, in the view of motives? Or does it consist in a corrupt nature distinct from moral acts, and prior to them? The former cannot be asserted without the most evident absurdity-without doing violence to the very first principles of reason. It is a primary dictate of the human understanding, that infants are not capable of moral action; are not capable of moral exercises, either of self-love or of benevolence. It follows, therefore, as a necessary consequence, that all sin is not comprehended in self-love.

2. The divine law requires perfect conformity to all its precepts, and condemns every degree of imperfection, and every omission of duty, no less than positive transgression.

Men are required to possess the knowledge, and the fear of God; to exercise faith, and repentance, and love; and are pronounced guilty not only on account of positive acts of wickedness, but also on account of the want of those principles, and exercises, which the law requires.

Accordingly divines, and Christians, have generally held, that "sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God."

By what efforts of ingenuity, then, can the mere want of conformity to the divine law; or the imperfection incident to the best of men, in the performance of duty, be identified with "positively selfish exercises ?" In fact, no ingenuity can render such a statement even plausible; and consequently "self-love" does not constitute "the sum of wickedness."

3. If it were true that "all sin consists in selfishness," might we VOL. I.

not naturally expect that no disposition or action would be pronounced sinful, except on account of the selfishness which it discovers; and one action would be pronounced more sinful than another, for no other reason than because it discovers more selfishness? This undoubtedly would be the natural consequence. Our moral judgment would condemn no exercises of mind, except those which appeared to us, to be selfish; and the sinfulness of different exercises, would be estimated by the proportion, and intensity of selfish feeling, which appeared to be involved in them.

But does this representation correspond with fact? Do we pronounce wanton acts of malice, malignity, and cruelty towards men; or profaneness, and blasphemy against God, to be more dreadful wickedness, than intemperance, theft, and other crimes, in which private interest is manifest, merely because the former display a greater degree of selfishness than the latter? This cannot be asserted without contradicting the clearest dictates of our minds.

We may illustrate the argument by the following example. In the capture of a city, a soldier of the victorious army is beheld, apart from the immediate scene of danger, anxiously solicitous for his own safety, and diligently employed in collecting whatever he supposes will contribute to his personal gratification; on the contrary, another soldier is beheld in the midst of the greatest carnage, and confusion; alike regardless of his own safety, and the rich spoils around him; intent upon nothing, but a savage, and promiscuous slaughter of the innocent, and defenceless inhabitants.

Every person, without a moments hesitation, would declare the former to be the most selfish, but the latter incomparably the most wicked.

From these instances it appears, that when we judge whether any

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act is sinful or not, and also when we estimate the comparative malignity of different sinful acts, we unavoidably take into the account many dispositions of mind, which are distinct from selfishness.

4. A correct analysis of the active principles of our nature, furnishes the most conclusive evidence that selfishness does not constitute the sum and essence of all sin.*

The original and ultimate principles of human action are numerous, more numerous, perhaps, than they are generally supposed to be. Some of them may be called selfish, using the word in a favourable sense, because their ultimate object is our own happiness.

Some may be called social or benevolent, because their ultimate object is the happiness of others; and some, again, are neither selfish nor benevolent; their ultimate object is neither our own happiness, nor the happiness of others; but something else, which is naturally agreeable

to us.

Of this last kind, the desires of esteem, of knowledge, of power, and of liberty, are remarkable examples. These desires, together with the different benevolent affections, are primary and ultimate principles of our constitution; they are coeval with the first development of our intellectual and active powers, and cannot with any plausibility be deduced from any one principle of action; much less can they be deduced from mere self-love.

When, however, they are directed to improper objects; or when they are indulged beyond the prescribed limits, they become sinful, no less than self-love becomes sinful, when it degenerates into mere selfishness.

Some, indeed, have supposed that esteem, and knowledge, &c. are not desired for their own sake; but merely as means to an end; as in

* See Reid on the Principles of Action.

struments to promote our happiness, by gratifying some original principle of our nature. But when we reflect, that men often sacrifice all the pleasures of life, and even life itself, for the sake of gaining the esteem and applause of their fellow creatures; and sometimes, also, for the sake of knowledge; we shall be convinced, that they are not in all cases regarded as instruments to promote our happiness. It is a pal. pable absurdity to imagine, that any person should sacrifice his happiness to gain the esteem of men, if the latter is desirable solely as a means to acquire the former. Indeed, the single consideration that the praise of men contributes to our enjoyment, is a sufficient proof, that the former is in itself previously desirable.

Many seek posthumous fame at the expense of present and future happiness; by pursuing a course of conduct in direct opposition to the law of God. The passion for military glory is sometimes so strong as to prompt the soldier, voluntarily, to engage in an enterprise, which he knows will end his life; without being the least influenced by "private personal happiness," either in this world or in the world to come. Many other examples might be given; but these are sufficient to show, that the desire of esteem is an original principle of action, distinct from self-love; when, therefore, it is exercised contrary to the law of God, which is very often the case, it is sinful, and consequently all sin cannot, with any propriety, be said to consist in self-love.

When we desire knowledge for the sake of promoting our own private happiness, we are influenced by self-love; when we desire it for the sake of promoting the happiness of others, we are influenced by benevolence; when we desire it for the sake of gaining literary reputation, we are then influenced by a desire of esteem; but when we desire it for its own sake, which alone

can with strict propriety be called the desire of knowledge, we are influenced neither by self-love nor by benevolence: it is then properly denominated an original and ultimate principle of action, of which no other account can be given than that such is the constitution of our nature. It is, however, in this proper sense of the words, that the desire of knowledge most commonly becomes irregular, excessive, and sinful.

The observations which have been made with respect to the love of esteem, and of knowledge, are for the most part, applicable to the love of power, the love of liberty, &c.; they are all primary principles of human action; when influenced and directed by the divine law, and in subordination to the divine glory, they are virtuous, otherwise they are sinful, no less than the unlawful indulgence of self-love.

The love of money sometimes becomes a principle of action: it is so in the miser: he loves money for its own sake, and not on account of its furnishing him with the means of enjoyment. This we believe is universally acknowledged. Misers have been known to deprive themselves of all the enjoyments, and not unfrequently of even the necessaries of life. It must indeed be admitted that such persons are sometimes considered as extremely selfish. This results from the fact, that the temper of the miser, is, in a great measure, incompatible with the exercise of those dispositions, which have a tendency to promote the happiness of others. He is therefore pronounced entirely selfish. But this mode of speaking is manifestly improper; because although nearly destitute of the social affections, he yet loves his money, without any immediate views of private interest. So far, therefore, as he loves money for its own sake, he is entirely free from that disposition which can with propriety be called selfishness.

How this sordid and unnatural passion is acquired, is of no importance in the present argument; it will be sufficient for our purpose, if it be admitted, that the love of money may exist, distinct from “ a re gard to private personal happiness:" for as the love of money is declared by the apostle to be the root of all evil, it follows, unavoidably, that the assertion is very far from being true, that "self-love is the essence or root of every sin."

That all sin does not consist in selfishness, may be proved in the most satisfactory manner from the operations of conscience. All men, who enjoy the exercise of reason, have a sense of moral obligation; they perceive themselves bound to perform some actions, and to avoid others, independently of any considerations of private interest. The moral judgments of their minds are often exceedingly erroneous and perverted; but they continue, notwithstanding, to exercise a commanding influence over many of their most important actions.

A mistaken sense of duty has prompted men to the perpetration of some of the greatest crimes, which appear in the annals of history. "Iverily thought with myself," says the apostle Paul, "that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth."

In speaking of the Hindoos, Mr. Ward, a missionary to India, remarked, that they did indeed possess a conscience; but this, instead of promoting their conversion, rather contributed, on account of its blindness, and depravity, to keep them bound in the chains of Satan; and to urge them to the practice of the grossest superstition, and idolatry.

As therefore it would be a manifest perversion of language, and an outrage upon common sense, to identify conscience with self-love, it follows as a legitimate consequence, that self-love is not the sum of all wickedness.

We will now proceed to make a few remarks upon those affections, which are commonly called social, or benevolent; and it will not be difficult to prove, that their exercise is often sinful.

The natural affections between parents and children, and between other near relations, may be mentioned in the first place; as they cannot with any plausibility, be supposed to originate in self-love. Many instances might be mentioned in which they are sinful; indeed they are sinful in every case, in which they are not exercised in subordination to the love of God, and in conformity to his law. Hence our Saviour says, "he that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me: and he that loveth son or daughter more than me, is not worthy of me." The same remarks may be made in regard to the love between the sexes: accordingly, Milton, who was well acquainted with human nature, makes the transgression of Adam to proceed from his love to Eve.

"How can I live without thee, how forego Thy sweet converse and love so dearly joined,

However I with thee have fix'd my lot Certain to undergo like doom; if death Consort with thee, death is to me as life."

Public spirit, or a love to the community, or country, to which we belong, is another social, and benevolent affection. Whether it is grafted upon other social affections, which regard a more limited range of objects, it will not be necessary to inquire; but that it is distinct from self-love, cannot be questioned.

When directed by a due regard to the rights of others, it is eminently virtuous, highly useful; but, on the contrary, when it is permitted to deviate from the laws of rectitude, it becomes highly criminal, and is often the cause of the most bitter animosities, and desolating

wars.

Admiration for eminent endowments, and splendid achievements,

is a natural sentiment of the human mind. But unfortunately for the interest of virtue, and human happiness, men have too generally admired and applauded, not those who are truly great and good, but the most pre-eminent in wickedness, and the destroyers of their species. Hence it is, that the brilliant, but atrocious exploits of the military conqueror, are celebrated in the most rapturous strains; and the dismal deeds of an Alexander, and a Cæsar, instead of receiving universal reprobation, have exalted them to the rank of heroes and demi-gods.

That this foolish admiration is sinful, cannot be doubted; but how it can be resolved into mere selflove, into "an ultimate and chief regard to one's own private personal happiness," we confess ourselves incapable of comprehending.

We might proceed to show, that sin sometimes springs from the irregular exercise of other social affections; such as friendship, compassion for the miserable, and gratitude to benefactors:-It is thought, however, that enough has been said. to render it evident that self-love, or selfishness, by no means constitutes the sum and essence of all sin.

So far from believing that all sin consists in self-love, we think it might be shown with much more appearance of truth, (although it would not be true) that all sin consists in the exercise of those desires and affections which cannot be deduced from self-love. The thoughts of the great majority of mankind, are almost constantly occupied about external objects; and their desires and affections are strongly attached to them.

There are some principles of human nature so powerful, as not unfrequently, entirely to supersede the usual influence of self-love. Many examples of this might be mentioned. The sense of shame has prompted men to destroy their own lives; a man rather than see his beloved wife and children come

to poverty, has been known to do the same thing. The unsuccessful patriot prefers falling upon his own sword, to witnessing the loss of his country's liberty and glory. In all these cases, and in many more, which might be mentioned, we discover in human nature, principles of moral action which completely overcome the influence of self-love. Not that self-love is extinguished, for this is impossible; but its natural operation is counteracted by a more powerful principle. This is undoubtedly the plain statement of the matter; and as the exercise of these principles in the instances mentioned, constitutes the most dreadful wickedness, we are again led to the conclusion, that all sin does not consist in self-love.

With respect to such phraseology as "disinterested love," " disinterested benevolence," "disinterested affection," so frequently employed by some writers; it may be observed, that the epithet disinterested, adds nothing to what is expressed by the word love, and by the other words mentioned. The terms interested, and disinterested, may be used in reference to the external profession of love; but to the internal disposition of mind itself, they cannot be applied, without an evídent impropriety. Circumstances intimately connected with our personal happiness, may be the occasion of exciting or increasing our love; but whenever it exists, and as far as it prevails, it is disinterested of course. This is true, whether love be holy or unholy; the latter is often quite as distinct from any considerations of private advantage as the former.

Such words, therefore, as selfish or interested, and disinterested, are properly applied in reference to those words and actions which are the usual indications of love; but when applied to the disposition of mind, they amount either to an implied contradiction, or to an unmeaning tautology,

Dr. Barrow in one place advances a theory not much different from that which we have been considering: "If we scan," says he, "the particular nature, and search into the original causes of the several kinds of naughty dispositions in our souls, and of miscarriages in our lives, we shall find inordinate selflove to be a main ingredient, and a common source of them all; so that a divine of great name had some reason to affirm-that original sin doth consist in self-love disposing us to all kinds of irregularity and excess." 99 But in another, he says, reason dictateth and prescribeth to us, that we should have a sober regard to our true good and welfare; -a self-love working in prosecution of such things common sense cannot but allow and approve."

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After quoting these passages, Mr. Stuart makes the following just remark: "Of these two opposite and irreconcilable opinions, the latter is incomparably the least wide of the truth."*

We cannot therefore avoid expressing our extreme regret, that any should attempt to prove the total depravity of all men by nature, by showing that they are the subjects of no moral exercises but those which are selfish. This, we apprehend, is a very slippery foundation, upon which to place a doctrine so important in the Christian religion; and were it susceptible of no other proof, we would reject it, from our creed, without hesitation.

Μαθητης.

FOR THE PRESBYTERIAN MAGAZINE.

ON THE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION OF

CHILDREN.

“The rod and reproof give wisdom: but a child left to himself bringeth his mother to shame."-PROV. xxix. 15.

There is no parental duty of more importance to be observed, than that

* First Preliminary Dissertation, p. 112.