would have no connection with the former, as it precedes them fo many years. To conclude, let us fuppofe that the paffage in queftion is interpolated, and that Jofephus has really made no mention at all of our Saviour; from his filence an unanfwerable argument may be deduced; he speaks of all the impoftors, and heads of particular fects that fprung out from the reign of Auguftus to that of Vefpafian. Judas Gaulonite, Theudas, Eleazer, have all a place in his hiftory. He even mentions St. John the Baptift, as has been obferved, the holiness of his life, and the concourfe of people that followed him. Why would he pass over the name of Chrift, and the religion he preached? Certainly that party, of which our bleffed Saviour was the head, was far more confiderable than any of those we have juft mentioned. Sects, which were no fooner formed, than they were difperfed, and which never spread themfelves beyond the limits of Judea. Wherefore was Jofephus filent (fuppofing it really fo) on this occafion only? Either he thought that what the difciples related of Christ was false, or he believed it true. If the former, every confideration must have prompted him to detect those impoftures, which fapped the very foundations of his religion. He must have been powerfully inftigated thereto by the regard due to his nation, whom the difciples of Jefus Chrift accufed of putting to an unjuft, cruel, and ignominious death. By expofing the impoftures of the apoftles, Jofephus would have rendered himself moft agreeable to his countrymen who held Chrif tianity in horror: he would have undeceived the Chriftians themselves whom the difciples of Jefus had feduced. Is it reafonable to think that a man fo interefted, fhould remain thus filent, efpecially when the mention of our bleffed Saviour prefented itself fo naturally in the courfe of his history? Some powerful motives must have with-held his pen, as the fear of difpleafing his own nation, the Romans, and the emperors; confequently his filence (fuppofing it fuch) is of as much weight, as his teftimony would have been. It may be alledged that Jofephus could never fpeak fo juftly of our Saviour, and ftill continue in his error. To this we can only fay, that it remains to be proved that a man never acted inconfiftently, and particularly fuch a one as Jofephus, who always made intereft his rule of faith. If we have been long in this narration, it was with a view only to give an answer to every objection that ever we have seen against the text, to fhew how weak is the fophiftry of the incredulous, and that the argument might not pafs as unanswerable, which often fupplies the defect of a solid reply.' What has been faid on the other fide of the question, the learned reader may find in the first volume of Lardner's Jewish and Heathen Teftimonies. In the fubfequent part of this tract the author confiders the character of St. Cyprian, the edicts faid to have been pub lished ished by Tiberius and Marcus Antoninus in favour of the Chriftians, the behaviour of the martyrs towards their judges; and many other points of importance in ecclefiaftical history. He appears, on this occafion, to be well acquainted with the writings of the fathers; and zealous to defend them in every material circumstance. The Doctrine of Philofophical Neceffity illuftrated; being an Appendix to the Difquifitions relating to Matter and Spirit. To which is added An Answer to the Letters on Materialism, and on Hartley's Theory of the Mind. By Jofeph Priestley, LL. D. F. R. S. 8vo. 45. in boards. Johnfon. THE freedom of the will is that power or faculty, by which the mind is capable of acting or not acting, chooling or rejecting whatever it thinks proper. Every man must be senfible, that he has this power, because he finds himself perfectly at liberty to begin or forbear, continue or end certain actions by a mere thought. He can fpeak, or he can be filent; he can move his hand, or keep it in the fame pofition; he can fit down, or he can walk; he can do a good action, or a pernicious one. In these, and the like cafes, he finds himself abfolutely free, uncontrolled by any force, influence, or infligation whatever. And he is as well fatisfied, that he has this power, as that he exists. The author of this tract, in his Difquifitions relating to Matter and Spirit, has maintained, that man is wholly a material being; he now endeavours to prove, what indeed is a neceffary confequence of that hypothefis, that man is a mechanical being; and that the notion of philofophical liberty is abfurd. We shall state his opinion in his own words. All the liberty, or rather power, that I fay a man has not, is that of doing Jeveral things when all the previous circumftances (including the fate of his mind, and his views of things) are precifely the fame. What I contend for is that, with the fame flate of mind, the fame ftrength of any particular paffion, for example, and the fame views of things, as any particular objec appearing equally defirable, he would always, voluntarily, make the fame choice, and come to the fame determination. For inftance, if I make any particular choice to-day, I should have done the fame yefterday, and fhall do the fame to-morrow, provided there be no change in the ftate of my mind refpecting the object of the choice. See Crit. Rev. vol. xlv. p. 178, 273. • In other words, I maintain that there is fome fixed law of nature respecting the will, as well as the other powers of the mind, and every thing else in the conftitution of nature; and confequently that it is never determined without fome real or apparent caufe, foreign to itself, i. e. without fome mutive of choice, or that motives influence us in fome definite and invariable manner; fo that every volition, or choice, is constantly regulated, and determined, by what precedes it. And this conStant determination of mind, according to the motives prefented to it, is all that I mean by its necessary determination. This being admitted to be the fact, there will be a necessary connection between all things paft, prefent, and to come, in the way of proper cause and effect, as much in the intellectual, as in the natural world; fo that, how little foever the bulk of mankind may be apprehenfive of it, or ftaggered by it, according to the eftablifhed laws of nature, no event could have been otherwise than it has been, is, or is to be, and therefore all things paft, prefent, and to come, are precifely what the Author of nature really intended them to be, and has made provifion for.'. • With the fame state of mind, and the fame views of things, a man, he says, would always make the fame choice." This is by no means a confequence. Whenever the mind is fufpended, as it were, in equilibrio; or whenever an object is of no importance, and the mind is not fuffered to deliberate, it is not in the leaft neceffary, that a man should invariably make the fame choice. The mind, in these instances, is influenced by no paffions, or prejudices; nay, the choice is generally made without any reason, any motive, or any views whatever. But fuppofe we really deliberate, before we form our determination, and are influenced by some motive, it does not from thence follow, that we are guided by neceffity. Because the motives, by which we act, are not neceffarily obtruded upon us; but fought out, or even formed by ourselves. We view an object in a partial light, or on one fide only. It pleases us; we wilfully refufe to view it on any other, and we confequently make our choice. Where is there, in all this, any neceffary determination, when the caufes, by which we are actuated, are abfolutely formed, altered, and modelled, by our own elective powers ? This confideration, if we mistake not, entirely fuperfedes the argument, which the author deduces from what he calls, ⚫ a chain of caufes and effects, which cannot be broken.' And it is idle to declaim on the certainty of an effect, when the whole difpute is about the origin of the cause. In ftating the argument for neceffity, drawn from divine prefcicace, the author-fays: • As • As it is not within the compass of power in the author of any fyftem, that an event should take place without a cause, or that it fhould be equally poffible for two different events to follow the fame circumftances, fo neither, fuppofing this to be poffible, would it be within the compafs of knowledge to forefee fuch a contingent event. So that, upon the doctrine of phi. lofophical liberty, the Divine Being could not poffibly foresee what would happen in his own creation, and therefore could not provide for it; which takes away the whole foundation of divine providence, and moral government, as well as all the foundation of revealed religion, in which prophecies are fo much concerned. • That an event truly contingent, or not neceffarily depending upon previous circumftances, fhould be the object of knowledge, has, like other things of a fimilar nature, in modern fyftems, been called a difficulty and a mystery; but in reality there cannot be a greater abfurdity, or contradiction. For as certainly as nothing can be known to exift but what does exift, fo certainly can nothing be known to arise from what does exift, but what does arife from it, or depend upon it. But, according to the definition of the terms, a contingent event does not depend upon any previous known circumftances; fince fome other event might have arisen in the fame circumstances.' This argument is only applicable to beings of a finite capacity. It is a prefumption to affert, that, upon the doctrine of philofophical liberty, the Divine Being cannot poffibly forefee, what will happen in his own creation. If we believe the Deity to be infinite and omniscient, where is the abfurdity in fuppofing, that he fees through all eternity with one extensive view? That in the conception of the divine mind all futurity is prefent, this earthly fcene concluded, and the last trump already founded? If this is admitted, the foreknowledge of God is not in the leaft inconfiftent with the free agency of man: for it will be easily allowed, that the bare infpection of one being does not influence the conduct of another. · Nothing, fays the author, can be known at prefent, except itself, or its neceffary caufe, exift at prefent.' Upon this principle very few things can be foreknown: for the causes of almoft all future events are yet in a state of non-existence. This notion therefore feems to be extremely derogatory to the divine perfections. But, it feems, every thing in the world is tranfa&ted by the Deity. For, fays the author in the dedication, there is but one will in the whole univerfe, and this one will, exclufive of all chance, or the interference of any other will, difpofes of all things, even to their minuteft circumftances. That That Providence interferes in human tranfactions, in a manner to us infcrutable, will be readily granted: but that there is only one will in the univerfe, is a pofition which we cannot admit. For the fcripture tells us, that the will of the Aleth, or the will of man, is not the will of God. In confidering the propriety of rewards and punishments, and the foundation of praife and blame, on the fcheme of neceffity, the author proposes the following case : • I have two children, A and B. My object is to make them virtuous and happy. All my precepts, and the whole of my discipline, are directed to that end. For the ufe of difcipline is by the hope of fomething that the fubjects of it know to be good, or the fear of fomething that they know to be evil, to engage them to act in fuch a manner as the perfon who has the conduct of that discipline well knows to be for their good ultimately, though they cannot fee it. In other words, I must make ufe of prefent good, and prefent evil, in order to fecure their future and greatest good: the former being within the apprehenfion of my children, and the latter lying beyond it, and being known to myself only. This I take to be precifely the nature of difcipline; the person who conducts it being fuppofed to have more knowledge, experience, and judgment, than thofe who are fubject to it, Now, fince motives have a certain and neceffary influence on the mind of A, I know that the profpect of good will certainly incline him to do what I recommend to him, and the fear of evil will deter him from any thing that I wish to diffuade him from; and therefore I bring him under the course of discipline above described with the greatest hope of fuccefs. Other influences, indeed, to which he may be expofed, and that I am not aware of, may counteract my views, and thereby my object may be fruftrated; but, notwithstanding this, my dif cipline will, likewife, have its certain and necessary effect; counteracting in part, at leaft, all foreign and unfavourable inHuence, and therefore cannot be wholly loft upon him. Every promise and every threatning, every reward and every punishment, judiciously adminiftered, works to my end. If this dif cipline be fufficient to overcome any foreign influence, I engage my fon in a train of proper actions, which, by means of the mechanical ftru&ure of his mind, will, at length, form a ftable kabit, which infures my fuccefs. But in my fon B I have to do with a creature of quite another make; motives have no neceffary or certain influence upon his determinations, and in all cafes where the principle of freedom from the certain influence of motives takes place, it is exactly an equal chance whether my promises or threatenings, my rewards or punishments, determine his actions or not. The selfdetermining power is not at all of the nature of any mechanical influence, that may be counteracted by influences equally me chanical, |