"I

seats which he visited as his own. "The same," he says, think of the groves where I walk. In a word, all that I desire is the use of things, let who will have the keeping of them." The same may be said of company, and reading, and all the innumerable sources of tasteful enjoyment with which our life is enriched. To renounce all this, without a reason, is like fancying that some meritorious penance lies simply in the choice of pain in preference to pleasure,―in leaving the level pathway to church, for the difficult and offensive mire.

The connexion, also, of taste with displays of human character is obvious and most important. If material objects derive their beauty, in some degree, from their association and analogy with mind, then mind itself must be still more beautiful. On this subject the poets are peculiarly competent to judge; and their chief care, when the art is properly employed, is to excite admiration, as well as sympathy, by the loftiest and grandest exhibitions of virtue. Besides Their own delicate sense of this kind of excellence is often warmly expressed :—

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:

"Is aught so fair

In all the dewy landscapes of the spring,
In the bright eye of Hesper, or the morn,
In nature's finest forms,-is aught so fair
As virtuous friendship? as the candid blush
Of him who strives with fortune to be just?
The graceful tear that streams for others' woes?
Or the mild majesty of private life,

Where peace with ever-blooming olive crowns
The gate? where Honour's liberal hands effuse
Unenvied treasures, and the snowy wings

Of innocence and love protect the scene?"

The same doctrine appears to be recognised by St. Paul, when he represents the modesty, sobriety, and good works of the woman under the notion of her ornaments, and, when speaking of the virtues, he employs the terms "whatsoever things are lovely." And partly for this very reason the virtues are called graces." The man of taste must, therefore, possess a great advantage in the contemplation of either good or bad character. He can enter more fully into the spirit of his subject, at least as regards its beauty or deformity, and may, therefore, be expectedother circumstances being equal, as aforesaid—to admire and love the virtues, and to hate all vice as odious and disgusting, in a degree corresponding with his better light and feeling. He will enjoy

K K

the living picture of beneficence, and be himself the more beneficent; the beauty of a grateful character will touch his sensibility, and dispose him to be grateful. And, delighted with the view of virtuous conduct in others, he will be led, from a sense of interest, to exercise a Christian love and charity for all men. Thus the virtues he contemplates will be reflected by himself, with the added grace of his own tasteful accomplishments, as the foliage on the banks of a river seem softened in the shining stream. That is to say,-for we must never forget it,that where Christianity has previously impressed its superhuman principles upon the heart, taste will thus be found an admirable means of religious improvement, just as a critical acquaintance with the Scriptures may be turned to spiritual advantage in the experience of the man who, independent of this knowledge, is possessed of a spiritual disposition.

AN ESSAY

ON

THE INFLUENCE OF GOD

IN THE

GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD.*

* This Essay, which is presented in an imperfect and unfinished state, appears to have been intended as an introduction to that "on Inspiration" which follows, and which will be found more complete in its form, and richer in its matter.

"WARMS in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,

Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees; Lives through all life; extends through all extent; Spreads undivided, operates unspent ;

As full, as perfect, in vile man that mourns,

As the rapt seraph that adores and burns."

РОРЕ.

AN ESSAY,

&c.

WE are so accustomed to converse with objects of sense, that our attention to the nature and operations of the mind, is, considering the importance which belongs to the subject, greatly disproportionate. It is only when some extraordinary event, or great and unusual effect of human exertion, excites our wonder, and, consequently, our inquiry, that we refer, for the moment, to the cause of the phenomenon. Is it, then, surprising, that men are ignorant, in a high degree, of the springs by which they are actuated? Thus outward things must be acknowledged to be very powerful hinderances, both to the philosophy of mind, and the religion of the heart.

We must be still more duly sensible of the truth and force of these remarks, when we reflect, that even external objects are seldom recognised as causes which affect us. It is the just observation of a living and profound writer, that "the constant and uniform impressions which such objects make upon the senses render us, in a great measure, unconscious of their influence. Their effects are, however," he observes, "not inconsiderable, though they are produced imperceptibly to us. To all those accustomed to trace effects up to their causes, and to perceive and appreciate the extensive influence of causes, in common opinion, of little weight, this assertion cannot appear paradoxical. Indeed, causes, to our observation, of little or no importance, produce the greatest and most extensive effect; and an inaptitude or inability to appreciate their due influence tends considerably to pervert and falsify many opinions to us of the utmost moment." * What, then, must be the deficiency of

* Dr. Cowan, "Anthropaideia; or, A Tractate on General Education," vol. i. p. 188.