The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology

Przednia okładka
Thomas M. Lennon, Robert J. Stainton
Springer Science & Business Media, 22 sty 2008 - 290

In his Second Paralogism of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant described what he called the “Achilles of all dialectical inferences in the pure doctrine of the soul”. This argument, which he took to be powerful yet fatally flawed, purports to establish the simplicity of the human mind, or soul, on the basis of the unity of consciousness. In Kant’s illustration, the unity had by our perception of a verse cannot be accounted for if the words of the verse are distributed among parts thought to compose the mind. The argument, or at least the unity of consciousness that underpins it, has a history extending from Plato to the present. Moreover, many philosophers have extended the argument, some of them using to argue such views as immortality.

It is the aim of this volume to treat the major figures who have advanced the argument, or who have held views importantly bearing on it. Original essays by scholars with expertise on the relevant authors treat Plato, Aristotle, the Neoplatonists, the medievals, Descartes, Locke, Cudworth, Bayle, Clarke, Spinoza, Leibniz. Hume, Mendelsohn, Kant, Lotze, James, as well as those working in contemporary cognitive science on what is called the binding problem of how the human brain can unify the elements of experience into a single representation.

Z wnętrza książki

Spis treści

Introduction
1
Aristotle on the Unity of Consciousness 43
42
The Neoplatonic Achilles
59
The Unity of the Soul and Contrary Appetites in Medieval Philosophy
75
Hume Spinoza and the Achilles Inference 93
92
Locke and the Achilles Argument
115
The Reverse Achilles in Locke 133
132
The Achilles Argument and the Nature of Matter in the Clarke
159
Leibnizs Achilles 177
176
Humes Reply to the Achilles Argument
193
Kant and Mendelssohn on the Implications of the I Think
215
Kant on the Achilles Argument 235
234
Achilles in the 21st Century
257
Bibliography
277
Prawa autorskie

Inne wydania - Wyświetl wszystko

Kluczowe wyrazy i wyrażenia

Popularne fragmenty

Strona 130 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places...
Strona 128 - Matter then, by its own strength, cannot produce in itself so much as motion : the motion it has must also be from eternity, or else be produced, and added to matter by some other being more powerful than matter; matter, as is evident, having not power to produce motion in itself.
Strona 126 - Next, it is evident, that what had its Being and Beginning from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its Being from another too. All the Powers it has, must be owing to, and received from the same Source. This eternal Source then of all being must also be the Source and Original of all Power; and so this eternal Being must be also the most powerful.
Strona 128 - But let us suppose motion eternal too; yet matter, incogitative matter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk, JOHN LOCKE 151 could never produce thought. Knowledge will still be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power of nothing or nonentity to produce.
Strona 122 - It is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge : and he who will give himself leave to consider freely, and look into the dark and intricate part of each hypothesis, will scarce find his reason able to determine him fixedly for or against the soul,s materiality.
Strona 112 - But all my hopes vanish •when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness.
Strona 112 - It follows, therefore, that the thought alone finds personal identity ; when reflecting on the train of past perceptions that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together and naturally introduce each other.
Strona 122 - I say not this, that I would any way lessen the belief of the soul's immateriality : I am not here speaking of probability, but knowledge ; and I think not only, that it becomes the modesty of philosophy not to pronounce. magisterially, where we want that evidence that can produce knowledge...
Strona 111 - I have said concerning the first origin and uncertainty of our notion of identity, as apply'd to the human mind, may be extended with little or no variation to that of simplicity. An object, whose different co-existent parts are bound together by a close relation, operates upon the imagination after much the same manner as one perfectly simple and indivisible, and requires not a much greater stretch of thought in order to its conception. From this similarity of operation we attribute a simplicity...

Informacje bibliograficzne