range of the artillery than ever, and as this will sometimes involve its being posted at a greater distance from the point at which the action eventually takes place, a corresponding greater degree of judgment will be required on the part of the commandant, both in selecting the mode and direction of his advance, and the final evolution immediately preceding the charge.

We alluded above to a treatise of Radetzky's having acted as a sort of leaven, and thrown the elements of cavalry tactics into a species of fermentation, from which at length sounder principles have been evolved. This action has been naturally confined to the Austrian army, and one of its immediate consequences has been that, including the old cavalry regulations issued by the Archduke Charles in 1806 or thereabouts, and which remained in use up to 1851 or 1853, and that issued in the course of the last year, 1864, the Austrian cavalry has had six different regulations and systems of drill and instruction within twelve years, or at the rate of one every two years on an average. This must no doubt have been very inconvenient to the officers, especially to the old hands, a matter in which we are not much interested, except that it seems highly probable that having once broken the ice ourselves, we may probably not arrive at a new settlement until we have undergone more than one transformation; but in the end much good has been achieved by all these changes, the subject has been thoroughly ventilated, and each new book of regulations in succession has been more concise and simple than its predecessor, until the last one appears a perfect model, in this respect at least.

It would, however, scarcely suit our purpose merely to lay before our readers the detail of the Austrian cavalry regulations of 1864, without having first pointed out the principles on which it is founded, and showing how they were gradually worked out of the mass of pedantic and "uncavalry-like" detail mentioned in the old system; but the reader need not fear that we are about to inflict on his patience all the detail of all these regulations, indeed we cannot even pretend to observe anything like chronological order in the enumeration of these general principles, a matter of little consequence after all, and we, therefore, content ourselves with setting them down in the order in which we ourselves recognized them.

The first object sought to be attained seems to have been to diminish as much as possible the number of intermediate movements, so as to be enabled to pass directly from one formation to another, and this led gradually to the abandonment of all the more complicated formations, whether good in themselves or not, and laid the foundation for the great simplicity of form ultimately attained.

The second great principle recognized was to the effect, that inasmuch as the grand characteristic of cavalry action is movement to the front, the detail of all formations must be brought into harmony with this principle, that is to say, the divisions and subdivisions of a body should be all of them always moved during a formation in

the direction in which this latter having been completed, the whole body is to be subsequently moved.

Thirdly, it became evident that no real improvement or progress could be attained unless all formations and changes of formation were made practicable on the move, and without the necessity of halting; of course the possibility of carrying them out at the halt is not excluded.

One of the immediate consequences of the above principles was, that the distinction between movements to the front and movements to the rear ceased pretty nearly to exist; in fact, the latter have become precisely identical with the former, the front being simply reversed.

But this could not be fully attained until the fourth great principle had been adopted, the most important of all, and that without which the others remain more or less imperfect; this is the principle of inversion, one long since brought forward and recommended, but always opposed successfully by the pedants and sticklers for form. This once adopted and carried out to its utmost limits, all the lumber of reserve and pivot flanks, front and rear, countermarches, reversing front, change in the formation of column, left in front, right in front, were got rid of and consigned for ever, let us hope, to the dust-bin of the old scholiasts.

But it seems to have cost a great struggle in the Austrian army to carry this measure, for it has been evidently done piecemeal and at long intervals; and in order to show to what length this principle of inversion may be safely and has been carried, we propose laying before our readers the organization of the Austrian cavalry as it existed before these innovations took place, and also show the changes that have resulted from their adoption.

According to the old system, a regiment was in reality the tactical unit of the cavalry in Austria, and these regiments were either light or heavy, the former usually with eight, and the latter with six squadrons; but the term squadron was evidently used merely to designate an administrative and not a tactical body, unlike the English squadron, which is a purely tactical body, consisting of two half squadrons or troops, cominanded and administered each by its own captain independently. The Austrian squadron was, and still is, commanded and administered altogether by its chief, a firstclass captain, with higher pay and emoluments, there existing under him, as in our Artillery, a second-class captain, who might or might not be present with the squadron, but had no proper command. The squadron was, indeed, divided into two wings, nearly equivalent to our troops, and the second captain was nominally attached to one of these specially, but the really important subdivision of the squadron was into four platoons (Zug, pl. Züge), each under the command of a subaltern, who was altogether charged with its drill and instruction. The strength of the Austrian squadrons varying in old times from 150 to 170 horses for the heavy, and

160 to 200 ditto for the light regiments, these platoons were virtually equivalent to our troops on the usual peace establishment, having from thirty-five to forty-five horses each. The Austrian squadron may, therefore, be looked upon as consisting of four troops, commanded by four subalterns, under the superior command and administration of a first captain, who had a second captain

as assistant.

The squadron was, however, as has been already pointed out, not an independent tactical unit as in other armies, but formed with another of similar strength, (just as our two troops a squadron) what was called a division, and this was led in all tactical movements by a field-officer who took the words of command directly from the commandant of the regiment, just as the chefs de bataillon of foreign infantry regiments do from their colonel. Each platoon had its own fixed place in the squadron, each squadron in the division, and each division in the regiment, and the order in which they were all placed was definite, and supposed never to be changed, except in cases of great emergency; in fact, inversion was considered to be an anomaly.

The first step in advance made, was to declare the division an independent tactical unit, and permit these bodies being inverted in the regiment, so that line, column, &c., could be formed, the divisions taking up any place that was convenient, and not being bound to follow their numeral order. This was found to answer perfectly well, and be free from any serious inconvenience. We cannot state whether it was originally intended to carry out this principle still further, but it is necessary to point out that one great obstacle to this being done still existed. It was for a long time an unaccountable peculiarity of the Austrian cavalry, and one to which it clung with great tenacity, that of the six squadron officers four were posted in the front rank, and two as serre files in the rear of the squadron, the notion being to furnish the flanks of half squadrons with "officier guides," the inner flanks of the platoon having "non-commissioned officier guides" in both ranks, and the whole mechanism of the tactical movements and words of command depending on these arrangements, it was scarcely possible to carry out the principle of inverting further than above stated without making a total change in this respect.

This appears to have been effected in an indirect manner, and as it were casually. In 1860 three regiments of what were called volunteer light cavalry were formed and organized specially for outpost serving, patrols, and similar light services. This kind of duty required the employment of independent squadrons, and, therefore, in these new regiments the divisional organization was abandoned by degrees, and the squadrons posted with intervals between them, these latter bodies having now become tactical unities. At the same time, and for the same reasons, the officers were all taken out of the front and posted as leaders, the first captain before the centre of

was

the squadron, and each subaltern before that of his platoon, as in the Prussian and other continental cavalries. Thus the last obstacle to this complete development of the principle of inversion removed, and this system of organization was subsequently extended to the whole cavalry, and made the basis of the new system of exercise and instruction published last year.

(To be continued.)

PETROLEUM AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR COAL FOR
STEAMSHIPS.

At a recent meeting at the United Service Institution the attendance of some of the most distinguished members of the Military and Naval professions, but especially of the latter, showed that a subject of the highest importance was to be treated of: the subject was that indicated by the title at the head of this article, and the contributors of the papers read were Captain J. H. Selwin and Mr. Richardson, the latter, the inventor of the grate respecting which we shall speak presently.

Every reader of this Magazine knows perfectly well that in the event of a war, especially in the event of a war with America, which is that most likely to occur, the usefulness of our ironclads will depend mainly on their being abundantly supplied with fuel; it is therefore evident that if we can find an efficient substitute for coal which will enable them to remain at sea twice as long without replenishing, we shall derive an advantage it would be difficult to overestimate. The substance which it is thought will meet this want is petroleum. The advantages it possesses, or is said to possess, as a steam fuel are contested, and it is not unlikely that these have in some instances been exaggerated by those who advocate its substitution for coal, but making due allowance for this, enough remains to make it worthy of the attention of the Admiralty Board, an attention which is accorded to new discoveries affecting the navy much more readily than some of the over-zealous friends of private shipbuilders and disappointed inventors, whose inventions are manifestly worthless, or have been tried and condemned long previously, give it credit for. The first consideration, as we have already said, is the gain of space, or, what amounts to the same thing, the power of stowing in the same space hitherto occupied by coals a fuel capable of keeping the machinery in motion for a much longer period. That the use of petroleum will give an advantage in this respect is not denied, the dispute is as to the amount of this advantage, and this can only be satisfactorily settled by a prolonged trial on board ship, where it would be used under the same conditions on which coal is burnt. A comparison might be made on land,

but if it be true, as is averred, that nearly the whole of the petroleum would be burned beneath the boilers of a steamer the comparison would be much more favourable to the oil because we know that a large portion of the coal used on board ship is absolutely wasted, partly in the form of unconsumed carbon which goes to form the dense black cloud which we see hanging above the wake of a steamer, which in war time would betray the whereabouts of ironclads long before anything could be perceived from their decks, and partly in the form of dust thrown overboard with the ashes. Next as to the comparative amount of heat generated by the two kinds of fuel. We are told that the result of the experiments made by order of the French Government to test its value as fuel for steamships of their navy, showed that a given quantity will generate in half the time. as much steam as could be produced by burning twice the weight of coal. The commissioners appointed by the American Government to enquire into the practicability of using petroleum instead of coal as fuel in steamers, report that the heating effect of petroleum is 103 per cent greater than coal; and that the economy would be such as with a vessel like the Persia, to save in a single voyage across the Atlantic about £2400, taking into account the space gained for freight. They say that the steam can be got up with it in about half the ordinary time. If the use of petroleum will, in combination with other causes, enable a greater speed to be attained than can be reached by the use of coal, it is quite clear that it would be advisable to use it in our navy for that reason alone, inasmuch as the slower vessel, whatever her strength may be, will be useless for offensive purposes, the swifter vessel always having it in her power to fight or not as her commander might think proper, choose her own positions of attack, and if she got the worst of it, to run away; except in what would be the rare case of her machinery being damaged, while in the event of her getting the best of the fight (and the power of choosing her position would be several points in her favour), she might continue the engagement at comparatively little risk, until the combat terminated in her favour by the surrender of the slower vessel.

We are all familiar with the fact that the speed shown by a steamship in her trial trip is never retained on a cruise at sea; this arises from various causes. The vessel when tried at the measured mile is in her best trim; the engineers, the maker of the engines, and even the captain, from different motives are all anxious to make the vessel do her best, and to accomplish this the fuel is not spared. Once at sea, however, economy in the use of fuel becomes a necessity, but however great the economy, the exhaustion of the store proceeds, and as it proceeds the vessel rises in the water, her trim is altered and her rate of speed diminished, especially in a heavy sea, by the partial emergence of the screw. If petroleum is found to be an efficient substitute for coal, the unsinkable principle can be adopted in the construction of our ships to its fullest extent;