The great advantage of reprefentatives is their being capable of difcuffing affairs. For this the people collectively are extremely unfit, which is one of the greatest i..conveniences of a democracy. It is not at all neceffary that the reprefentatives, who have received a general inftruction from their electors, fhould wait to be particularly inftructed in every affair, as is practifed in the diets of Germany. True it is, that by this way of proceeding, the fpeeches of the deputies might with greater propriety be called the voice of the nation; but, on the other hand, this would throw them into infinite delays, would give each deputy a power of controlling the affembly; and on the most urgent and preffing occafions, the fprings of the nation might be flopt by a fingle caprice. When the deputies, as Mr. Sidney well obferves, reprefent a body of people, as in Holland, they ought to be accountable to their conflituents: but it is a different thing in England, where they are deputed by boroughs. All the inhabitants of the feveral districts ought to have a right of voting at the election of a reprefentative, except fuch as are in to mean a fituation, as to be deemed to have no will of their own. One great fault there was in moft of the ancient republics; that the people hid a right to active reiolutions, fuch as require fome execution; a thing of which they are abfolutely incapable. They ought to have no hand in the government, but for the chufing of reprefentatives, which is within their reach. For though few can tell the exact degree of men's capacities, yet there are none but are capable of knowing, in general, whether the perfon they chule is better qualified than most of his neigh bours. Neither ought the reprefentative body to be chofen for active refolutions, for which it is not fo fit; but for the enacting of laws, or to fee whether the laws already enacted be duly executed; a thing they are very capable of, and which none indeed but themfelves can properly perform. In a ftite, there are always perfons diftinguished by their birth, riches, or honours; but were they to be confounded with the common people, and to have only the weight of a fingle vote like the rett, the common liberty would be their flavery, and they would have no intereft in fupporting it, as most of the popular refolutions would be against them. The fhare they have, therefore, in the legislature, ought to be proportioned to the other advantages they have in the ftate; which happens only when they form a body that has a right to put a stop to the enterprizes of the people, as the people have a right to put a stop to theirs. The legislative power is therefore committed to the body of the nobles, and to the body chofen to reprefent the people, which have each their affemblies and deliberations apart, each their feparate views and interefts. Of the three powers above-mentioned, the judiciary is in fome measure next to nothing. There remains therefore only two; and as thofe have need of a regulating power to temper them, the part of the legi flative body, compofed of the nobility, is extremely proper for this very purpose. The body of the nobility ought to be hereditary. In the first place it is fo in its own nature and in the next, there must be a confiderable intereft to preferve its privileges; privileges that in themselves are obnoxious to popular envy, and of courfe, in a free ftate, are always in danger. But as an hereditary power might be tempted to purfue its own particular interefts, and forget thofe of the people; it is proper that, where they may reap a fingu lar advantage from being corrupted, as in the laws relating to the fupplies, they fhould have no other fhare in the legislation, than the power of rejecting, and not that of refolving. By the power of refolving, I mean the right of ordaining by their own authority, or of amending what has been ordained by others. By the power of rejecting, I would be understood to mean the right of annulling a refolution taken by another, which was the power of the tribunes at Rome. And though the perfon poffefled of the privilege of rejecting may likewife have the right of approving, yet this approbation paffes for no more than a decla ration, that he intends to make no ufe of his privilege of rejecting, and is derived from that very privilege. The executive power ought to be in the hands of a monarch: because this branch of government, which has always need of expedition, is better administered by one than by many: whereas whatever depends on the legislative power, is oftentimes better regulated by many than by a single perfon. But But if there was no monarch, and the executive power was committed to a certain number of perfons felected from the legiflative body, there would be an end then of liberty; by reafon the two powers would be united, as the fame perfons would actually fometimes have, and would moreover be always able to have, a fhare in both. Were the legislative body to be a confiderable time without meeting, this would likewife put an end to liberty. For one of these two things would naturally follow; either that there would be no longer any legislative refolutions, and then the ftate would fall into anarchy; or that these refolutions would be taken by the executive power, which would render it abfolate. It would be needlefs for the legislative body to continue always affembled. This would be troublefome to the reprefentatives, and moreover wou'd cut out too much work for the executive power, fo as to take off its attention from executing, and oblige it to think only of defending its own prerogatives, and the right it has to execute. Again, were the legislative body to be always affembled, it might happen to be kept up only by filling the places of the deceated members with new reprefentatives; and in that cafe, if the legislative body was once corrupted, the evil would be paft all remedy. When different legislative bodies fucceed one another, the people, who have a bad opinion of that which is actually fitting, may reafonably entertain fome hopes of the next: but were it to be always the fame body, the people, upon feeing it once corrupted, would no longer expect any good from its laws; and of course they would either become defperate, or fall into a flate of indolence. The legislative body should not affemble of itself. For a body is fuppofed to have no will but when it is affembled: and befides, were it not to affemble unanimously it would be impoffible to determine which was really the legislative body, the part affembled or the other. And if it had a right to prorogue itself, it might happen never to be prorogued; which would be extremely dangerous in cafe it thould ever attempt to encroach on the executive power. Besides, there are feasons, fome of which are more proper than others, for affembling the legislative body: it is fit therefore that the executive power fhould regulate the time of convening as well as the duration of thofe affemblies, according to the circumstances and exigencies of state known to itself. Were the executive power not to have a right of putting a ftop to the encroachments of the legislative body, the latter would become defpotic; for as it might arrogate to itfelf what authority it pleated, it would foon destroy all the other powers. But it is not proper, on the other hand, that the legislative power fhould have a right to ftop the executive. For as the executive has its natural limits, it is ufelefs to confine it; befides, the executive power is generally employed in momentary ope rations. The power, therefore, of the Roman tribunes was faulty, as it put a flop not only to the legislation, but likewife to the execution itfelf; which was attended with infinite mischiefs. But if the legislative power, in a free government, ought to have no right to top the executive, it has a right, and ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws have been executed; an advantage which this government has over that of Crete and Sparta, where the Cosmi and the Ephori gave no account of their administration. But whatever may be the iffue of that examination, the legislative body ought not to have a power of judging the perfon, nor of courfe the conduct, of him who is intrufled with the executive power. His perfon fhould be facred, because, as it is necellary for the good of the fate to prevent the legislative body from rendering themfelves arbitrary, the moment he is accused or tried, there is an end of liberty. In this cafe the ftate would be no longer a monarchy, but a kind of republican, though not a free government. But as the perfon intrufted with the executive power cannot abufe it without bad counfellors, and fuch as hate the laws as minifters, though the laws favour them as fubjects; thefe men may be examined and punithed. An advantage which this government has over that of Gnidus, where the law allowed of no fuch thing as calling the Amy mones to an account, even after their adminiftration +; and therefore the people could never obtain any fatisfaction for the injuries done them. Though, in general, the judiciary power ought not to be united with any part of the legislative, yet this is liable to three excep. tions, founded on the particular intereft of the party accufed. The great are always obnoxious to popular envy; and were they to be judged by the people, they might be in danger from their judges, and would moreover be deprived of the privilege which the meaneft fubject is poffefle of, in a free ftate, of being tried by their peers. The nobility, for this reason, ought not to be cited before the ordinary courts of judicature, but before that part of the legislature which is compoted of their own body. It is poffible that the law, which is clearfighted in one fenfe, and blind in another, night in fome cafes be too fevere. But as we have already obferved, the national judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere paffive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or rigour. That part, therefore, of the legislative body, which we have just now obferved to be a neceflary tribunal on another occafion, is alfo a neceffary tribunal in this; it belongs to its fupreme authority to moderate the law in favour of the law itself, by mitigating the fentence. It might also happen, that a fubject intrufted with the adminiflration of public affairs, might infringe the rights of the people, and be guilty of crimes which the ordinary magiftrates either could not, or would not punith. But in general the legislative power cannot judge; and much lets can it be a judge in this particular cafe, where it reprefents the party concerned, which is the people. It can only therefore impeach: but before what court fhall it bring its impeachment? Muft it go and abafe itself before the ordinary tribunals, which are its inferiors, and being compofed moreover of men who are cholen from the people as well as itfelf, will naturally be fwayed by the authority of fo powerful an acculer? No: in order to preferve the dignity of the people, and the fecurity of the fubject, the legislative part which reprefents the people, muft bring in its charge before the legillative part which reprefents the nobility, who have neither the fame interelts nor the fame paffions. Here is an advantage which this government has over moil of the ancient republics, where there was this abufe, that the people were at the fame time both judge and accuter. The executive power, pursuant to what has been already faid, ought to have a fhare in the legislature by the power of rejecting, otherwife it would foon be ftripped of its prerogative. But fhould the legiflative power ufurp a fhare of the executive, the latter would be equally undone. If the prince were to have a fhare in the legislature by the power of refolving, liberty would be loft. But as it is nece fary he fhould have a fhare in the legilature, for the fupport of his own preroga tive, this fhare muft confiit in the power of rejecting. The change of government at Rome was owing to this, that neither the fenate, who had one part of the exccutive power, nor the magiitrates, who were intrufted with the other, had the right of rejecting, which was entirely lodged in the people. Here then is the fundamental conftitution of the government we are treating of. The legislative body being composed of two parts, one checks the other by the mutual privilege of rejecting: they are both checked by the executive power, as the executive is by the legislative. Thefe three powers thould naturally form a late of repofe or inaction. But as there is a neceflity for movement in the courfe of human affairs, they are forced to move, but fill to move in concert. As the executive power has no other part in the legislative than the privilege of rejecting, it can have no fhare in the public debates. It is not even neceffary that it fiould propofe, becaufe, as it may always difipprove of the refolutions that fhall be taken, it may likewife reject the decifions on thofe propofals which were made against its will. la fome ancient commonwealths, where public debates were carried on by the people in a body, it was natural for the executive power to propofe and debate with the people, otherwife their refolutions must have been attended with a strange confufion. Were the executive power to ordain the raifing of public money, otherwife than by giving its confent, liberty would be at an end; becaufe it would become legislative in the most important point of legiation. If the legillative power was to fettle the fubfidies, not from year to year, but for ever, or ftarve the revolted troops; for as they are not quartered in towns capable of furnifhing them with neceflary fubfillence, this fubfiftence is of courfe piecarious. ever, it would run the risk of lofing its liberty, because the executive power would no longer be dependent; and when once it was poffeffed of fuch a perpetual right, it would be a matter of indifference, whether it held it of itfelf, or of another. The fame may be faid, if it should fix, not from year to year, but for ever, the fea and land forces with which it is to intruft the executive power. To prevent the executive power from being able to opprefs, it is requifite that the armies with which it is intruited should confiit of the people, and have the fame fpirit as the people; as was the cafe at Rome till the time of Marius. To obtain this end, there are only two ways; either that the perfons employed in the army fhould have fufficient property to answer for their conduct to their fellow-fubjects, and be enlisted only for a year, as was cuftomary at Rome: or if there fhould be a ftanding army, compofed chiefly of the most defpicable part of the nation, the legiflative power fhould have a right to difband them as foon as it pleafed; the foldiers should live in common with the rest of the people; and no feparate camp, barracks, or fortrefs, fhould be fuffered. When once an army is established, it ought not to depend immediately on the legislative, but on the executive power; and this from the very nature of the thing; its bufinefs confifting more in acting than in deliberation. Whoever shall read the admirable treatife of Tacitus on the manners of the Germans, will find that it is from them the English have borrowed the idea of their political government. This beautiful fystem was invented firit in the woods. As all human things have an end, the ftate we are fpeaking of will lofe its liberty, it will perish. Have not Rome, Sparta, and Carthage perished? It will perish when the legislative power fhall be more corrupted than the executive. It is not my bufinefs to examine whether the English actually enjoy this liberty, or not. It is fufficient for my purpofe to obferve, that it is eftablished by their laws; and I enquire no further. Neither do I pretend by this to undervalue other governments, nor to say that this extreme political liberty ought to give uneafinefs to thofe who have only a noderate fhare of it. How fhou'd I have any fuch defign, I, who think that even the excefs of reafon is not always defirable, and that mankind generally find their account better in mediums than in extremes? Harrington, in his Oceana, has alfo inquired into the highest point of liberty to which the conflitution of a ftate may be carried. But of him indeed it may be faid, that for want of knowing the nature of real liberty, he bufied himself in purfuit of an imaginary one; and that he built a Chalcedon, though he had a Byzantium before his eyes. Montefquieu. $ 249. Of COLUMBUS, and the Difcovery of AMERICA. From a manner of thinking that prevails amongst mankind, they let a higher value upon courage than timoroufnefs, on activity than prudence, on ftrength than counfel. Hence the army will ever defpife a ferate, and refpect their own officers. They will naturally flight the orders fent them by a body of men, whom they look upon as cowards, and therefore unworthy to command them. So that as It is to the difcoveries of the Portufoon as the army depends on the legifla- guele in the old world, that we are indebttive body, the government becomes a mi-ed for the new; if we may call the conquest litary one; and if the contrary has ever of America an obligation, which proved to happened, it has been owing to fome ex- fatal to its inhabitants, and at times to the traordinary circumftances. It is becaufe conquerors themselves. the army has always kept divided; it is because it was compofed of several bodies, that depended each on their particular province: it is because the capital towns were strong places, defended by their natural fituation, and not garrifoned with regular troops. Holland, for instance, is fill fafer than Venice: the might drown This was doubtlefs the most important event that ever happened on our globe, one half of which had been hitherto itrangers to the other. Whatever had been efteemed moft great or noble before, feemed absorbed in this kind of new creation. We ftill mention with respectful admiration, the names of the Argonauts, who did not perform the hundredth part of what was done by the failors under Gama and Albuquerque. How many altars would have been raifed by the ancients to a Greek, who had difcovered America! and yet Bartholomew and Christopher Columbus were not thus rewarded. Columbus, ftuck with the wonderful expeditions of the Portuguete, imagined that fomething greater might be done; and from a bare infpection of the map of our world, concluded that there must be another, which might be found by failing always weft. He had courage equal to his genius, or indeed fuperior, feeing he had to ftruggle with the prejudices of his contemporaries, and the repu fes of feveral princes to whom he tendered his fervices. Genoa, which was his native country, treated his fchemes as vifionary, and by that means lot the only opportunity that could have offered of aggrandizing her power. Henry VII. king of England, who was too greedy of money to hazard any on this noble attempt, would not liften to the propofals made by Columbus's bro ther; and Columbus himself was rejected by John 11. of Portugal, whofe attention was who employed upon the coaft of Alca. He had no profpect of fuccefs in apping to the French, whofe marine lay totally neglected, and their affairs more confuled than ever, during the minority of Charles VIII. The emperor Maximi. lian had neither ports for fhipping, money to fit out a fleet, nor fufficient courage to engage in a fcheme of this nature. The Venetians, indeed, might have undertaken it; but whether the natural averfion of the Genoefe to thefe people would not fuffer Columbus to apply to the rivals of his country, or that the Venetians had no idea of any thing more important than the trade they carried on from Alexandria and in the Levant, Columbus at length fixed all his hopes on the court of Spain Ferdinand, king of Arragon, and Ifabella, queen of Caftile, had by their marriage united all Spain under one dominion, excepting only the kingdom of Grenada, which was ftill in the poffeffion of the Moors; but which Ferdinand foon after took from them. The union of thefe two princes had prepared the way for the greatnefs of Spain: which was afterwards Begun by Columbus; he was however obliged to undergo eight years of inceffant application, before Ifabella's court would confent to accept of the ineftimable beneft this great man offered it. The bane of all great projects is the want of money. The Spanish court was poor; and the prior, Perez, and two merchants, named Pinzono, were obliged to advance teventeen thousand ducats towards fitting out the armament. Columbus procured a patent from the court, and at length fet fil from the port of Palos in Andalufia, with three fhips, on Auguft 23, in the year 1492. It was not above a month after his departure from the Canary islands, where he had core to an anchor to get refreshment, when Columbus discovered the frit ifland in America; and during this fhort run, he fuffered more from the murmurings and difcontent of the people of his fleet, than he had done even from the refufals of the princes he had applied to. This ifland, which he difcovered, and named St. Salvador, lies about a thousand leagues from the Canaries; prefently after, he likewife discovered the Lucayan islands, together with thofe of Cuba and Hifpaniola, now called St. Domingo. Ferdinand and Ifabella were in the utmoft furprize to fee him return, at the end of nine months, with fome of the American natives of Hifpaniola, feveral rarities from that country, and a quantity of gold, with which he prefented their majefties. The king and queen made him fit down in their prefence, covered like a grandee of Spain, and created him high admiral and viceroy of the new world. Columbus was now every where looked upon as an extraordinary perfon fent from heaven. Every one was vying who fhould be foremost in affifting him in his undertakings, and embarking under his command. He foon fet fail again, with a fleet of feventeen ships. He now made the difcovery of feveral other new iflands, particularly the Caribbees and Jamaica. Doubt had been changed into admiration on his first voyage; in this, admiration was turned into envy. He was admiral and viceroy, and to thefe titles might have been added that of the benefactor of Ferdinand and Ifabella. Nevertheless, he was brought home prifoner to Spain, by judges who had been purpofely fent out on board to obferve his conduct. As foon as it was known that Columbus was arrived, the people ran in foals to meet him, as the guardian genius of |