lum possis agnoscere. Nos autem quantum in utroque profecerimus, aliorum sit judicium: utrumque certe secuti sumus. Equidem et Platonem existimo, si genus forense dicendi tractare voluisset, gravissime et copiosissime potuisse dicere; et Demosthenem, si illa, quæ a Platone didicerat, tenuisset et pronuntiare voluisset, ornate splendideque facere potuisse. Eodemque modo de Aristotele et Isocrate judico; quorum uterque suo studio delectatus, contemsit alterum.* + CAP. II. Quam late pateant officia: quinam Philosophi de officiis dicere queant. SED cum statuissem scribere ad te aliquid hoc tempore, multa posthac, ab eo ordiri volui maxime, quod et ætati tuæ esset aptissimum, et auctoritati meæ.t Nam cum multa sint in philosophia et gravia, et utilia accurate copioseque a philosophis disputata: latissime pateret videntur ea, quæ de officiis tradita ab illis et præcepta sunt. Nulla enim vitæ pars neque publicis, neque privatis, neque forensibus, neque domesticis in re alone been preserved entire, Cicero says of him, Brut. 31. Nemo Theophrasto dulcior. * Allerum. The study and pursuit of the other. CHAPTER II. + Auctoritati meæ. In several MSS., though not those of highest authority, gravissimum is added; the sense re ceives little improvement by its insertion: most suitable to my character, implies his own high opinion of it. Latissime patere. To have the most extensive influence. bus; neque si tecum agas quid,* neque si cum altero contrahas, vacare officiot potest: in eoque et colendo, sita vitæ est honestas omnis, et in negligendo, turpitudo. Atque hæc quidem quæstio communis est omnium philosophorum. Quis est enim, qui nullis officii præceptis tradendist philosophum se audeat dicere? Sed sunt nonnullæ§ disciplinæ, quæ propositis bonorum et malorum finibus, officium omne pervertunt. Nam qui summum bonum sic instituit, ut nihil habeat cum virtute conjunctum, idque suis commodis, non honestate metitur; hic si sibi ipse consentiat et non interdum naturæ bonitate vincatur, neque amicitiam colere possit, nec justitiam, nec liberalitatem. Fortis vero, dolorem summum malum judicans, aut temperans, volup * Agas quid. The duties imposed by the law of nature have been distinguished by moralists into three classes; Ist. Those which regard the Supreme Being; Ild, ourselves; Ild, other men. Cicero appears to have here in view the second class. + Officio. The noun is derived from the verb obficio, used in a sense long antiquated. The preposition has had, in this instance, the same influence on the verb, as in the composition of oblecto, obsequor, obtempero, obedio ; that of accommodating or making applicable. Hence another secondary application of officium and officiosus in the sense of obligalion or favour. Nullis tradendis. That is, si nulla a se tradantur. This participle has occasionally a present signification, as cap. 8. Ac de inferenda quidem injuria satis dictum est. Nonnullæ. The Epicurean sect is alluded to their opponents imputed to them the opinion that pleasure is the supreme good, and pain the supreme evil. De Fin. II. ii. Tusc. Q. V. 30. tatem summum bonum statuens, esse certe nullo modo potest. Quæ quamquam ita sint in promtu, ut res disputatione non egeat, tamen sunt a nobis alio loco* disputata. Hæ disciplinæ igitur si sibi consentaneæ velint esse, de officio nihil queant dicere. Neque ulla officii præcepta firma, stabilia, conjuncta naturæ tradi possunt, nisi aut ab iis, qui maxime honestatem propter se dicant expetendam. Ita propria est ea præceptio Stoicorum, Academicorum, Peripateticorum: quoniam Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, Herilli jam pridem explosa‡ * In alio loco. In his treatise De Finibus, and Tusc. Quæst. + Expetendam. The Stoics maintained that the ro pérov alone should be pursued; in which opinion Socrates concurs: the Academics and Peripatetics held, that it is to be pursued in the first place. According to all these philosophers, therefore, Virtue is identified with Propriety. In the opinion of Epicurus, it consists in the judicious pursuit of our own interest and happiness, or in the due government of the selfish affections. By a third set of philosophers, called the latter Platonics or Eclectics, Virtue is made to consist exclusively in the exercise of those affections which aim at the happiness of others. In their opinion, disinterested benevolence is the only motive which can stamp on any action the character of Virtue. Under one of these classes, the different accounts of the nature of Virtue, which have been given in ancient or in modern times, may easily be reduced. Adam Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part VII. Sec. 2. discusses the subject at length, and points out the concurrence or discordance of these different systems. Explosa. The taste, which the Romans had formed for public sports, and for the theatre, has led to the adoption of several metaphors from that source. This word sententia est: qui tamen haberent jus suum disputandi de officio, si rerum aliquem delectum reliquissent, ut ad officii inventionem aditus esset. Sequimur igitur, hoc quidem tempore et hac in quæstione, potissimum Stoicos, non ut interpretes; sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum judicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus. Placet igitur, quoniam omnis disputatio de officio futura est, ante definire, quid sit officium quod a Panatio prætermissum esse miror.* Omnis enim, quæ a ratione suscipitur de aliqua re institutio, debet a definitione proficisci, ut intelligatur, quid sit id, de quo disputetur.t CAP. III. Officiorum divisio. OMNIS de officio duplex est quæstio. Unum answers to our hissed off. Aristo, a native of Chios, and Herillus, a Carthaginian, were disciples of Zeno, but carried the Stoical opinions to a degree of extravagance. Pyrrho was the leader of the Sceptics. The opinions of these philosophers are classed together, as tending to disturb the landmarks which distinguish Virtue from Vice. De Fin. lib. ii. c. 13. lib. iii. c. 3. lib. iv. c. 14. and 16 Diog. Laert. lib. vii. and viii. *Panalio-miror. Born at Rhodes; a philosopher of the Stoic sect. No part of his works has reached posterity. Cicero has said of him, De Fin. lib. iv. c. 9., "Homo imprimis ingenuus et gravis, dignus illa familiaritate Scipionis et Læli." + Dispuletur. No direct definition of the word Officium is however given.-In the next Chapter, Cicero proceeds to distinguish and classify duties. genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum :* alterum, quod positum est in præceptis, quibus in omnes partes usus vitæ conformari possit. Superioris generis hujus modi exempla sunt; omniane officia perfecta sint; numquid officium aliud alio majus sit, et quæ sunt generis ejusdem. Quorum autem officiorum præcepta traduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum, tamen id minus apparet, quia magis ad institutionem vitæ communis spectare videntur: de quibus est nobis his libris explicandum. Atque etiam alia divisio est officii. Nam et medium quoddam officiumt dicitur, et perfectum. CHAPTER III. Finem bonorum. The first inquiry is stated to be as to the relation which our several duties bear to the finis bonorum, equivalent to the summum bonum, thus defined by Cicero himself, De Fin. lib. iii." Relinquitur ut summum bonum sit, vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum quæ natura eveniant, seligentem quæ secundum naturam; et si quæ etiam contra naturam sunt, rejicientem; id est, convenienter congruenterque naturæ vivere." According to their tendency to attain this object, the virtues are severally to be valued and classed. This first portion of the inquiry may be termed the theoretical; the second, which may be termed the practical, examines the influence of the several rules of morality on our conduct in life. Medium officium. By the Stoics, the media officia are classed neither among bona nor mala; De Fin. lib. iii. "Sed cum quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse dicamus; consentaneum tamen est fungi officio, cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis: est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile, et quidem ita ut ejus ratio reddi potest. Ex quo intelligitur officium medium quod esse quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in co |