dogmatic basis; the distinction of the Persons tended to become formal, and was stated with a kind of legal precision. Augustine's great work may be said to give expression to this conception of the Divine Trinity. It is quite true that the analogies adduced by Augustine from the phenomena of consciousness are of a "modalistic" kind, i.e. they emphasise rather the relationships of the Three Persons to one another than the distinctness of their hypostatic subsistence. Augustine is more concerned to sustain monotheism than to insist, as earlier writers had done, on the distinct functions of the different Persons. The enduring influence of Augustine's work on later theology can only be explained when we consider that the de Trinitate was an attempt to find expression for the facts of spiritual experience; it was not a mere effort to formulate a philosophical tradition.1

§ II. THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION AND
ITS TERMINOLOGY

There are certain technical expressions relating to the mystery of the Incarnation which may be briefly discussed at this point.

The Incarnation 2 is variously described by the terms ἐνανθρώπησις, ἐνσάρκωσις, ἔνσαρκος παρουσία οι ἐπιδημία, σwμаτIKỲ Tаρоvoía (præsentia corporalis, Aug. de Trin. iv. 27), etc. These expressions all imply the union (evwois) of human nature with the Divine in one Divine person. They are, of course, mostly derived from S. John's Gospel, i. 14, ó λóyos σàp§ èyéveto; Verbum caro factum est. S. John's phrase éyévero does not imply

1 Harnack says (Grundr. p. 190): "Er selbst nie auf die Trinität gekommen wäre wenn er nicht an die Überlieferung gebunden gewesen wäre." 2 Cp. Ath. Orat. c. Ar. i. 44, 64; ii. 6; ii. 10, etc. A list of terms is given by Casaubon on Greg. Nyss. Ep. ad Eustath (notes).

conversion into flesh; it is obviously to be qualified by such expressions as ἔλαβεν, ἐπιλαμβάνεται (Heb. ii. 16), and so limited éyévero means the assumption of a new nature, without connoting the abandonment of an existing one. S. John's words in fact teach (a) the reality of the human nature assumed, σàpę meaning the entirety of human nature;1 (b) the oneness of the person who became flesh; while, at the same time, they exclude the idea that the flesh existed before it was thus assumed.

We now come to consider the term of most prominent importance-evwois, unitio (later unio2): the union of two natures in one person. Before the terminology had been precisely fixed the Eastern writers employed various synonyms for ἕνωσις : such as σύνοδος (conventus), συνδρομὴ εἰς ἑνότητα, σύμβασις οἰκονομική, συμφυΐα. The general intention of theologians in using these forms of expression was to exclude certain other modes of describing the connection between the two natures in our Lord. Thus evwots is carefully distinguished (a) from συνάφεια, conjunction, or σχετικὴ ἕνωσις, union of relation, terms in which Nestorius desired to embody his view of the relation between the Godhead and manhood in Christ;3 (6) from κράσις or σύγχυσις, blending of the two natures ;4

1 Aug. de Trin. ii. 11: "Caro enim pro homine posita est in eo quod ait Verbum caro factum est, sicut et illud Et videbit omnis caro pariter salutare Dei. Non enim sine anima vel sine mente: sed ita omnis caro ac si diceretur omnis homo."

2 Unio was more often used in the West as equivalent to unitas. The unity of Christ's person would thus be unio persona. Cp. unio divinitatis in Tert. de Res. ii.

3 * Cp. p. 71.

On the other hand, it is noticeable that Latin writers frequently use misceri, mixtura. See esp. Tert. de carn. Chr. 15, Apol. 21; Cyp. de idol. van. 2; Leo, de nativ. Serm. 3; Aug. ep. ad Volus., de Trin. iv. 16, 30. See also Thomassin, de Incarn. Verbi, iii. 5. σúykpaσis is used by Greg. Naz. Ep. ad Cled. i. 4. 6; ad Cled. ii. 2.

(c) σáркwσis, conversion into flesh of the Divine substance; (d) ȧrobéwois, exaltation of the manhood to Divine rank; (e) évoírnois, mere indwelling of God in a human nature, as Augustine says (de Trin. ii. 11), "Aliud est enim Verbum in carne, aliud Verbum caro.” 1. The result of the mysterious union thus described is the person of Christ. The catholic doctrine teaches that the union of natures in the incarnate Lord is hypostatic, i.e. personal, by which is meant that the result of the union of natures is one indivisible person. The union is therefore described as ἕνωσις ὑποστατική οι καθ' ὑπόστασιν, ἕνωσις φυσικὴ or κατὰ φύσιν ἕνωσις οὐσιώδης or Kar' ovoíav, i.e. real; resulting in one really subsisting being. But the expression which prevailed is evwois kal ÚTÓσTaσw, i.e. union in a person (personalis unitas).2 The one person of the Redeemer is Divine, the Divine nature being the seat of His personality. This is the foundation of all that Christians hope and believe concerning redemption and the possibility of acceptance with God. Christ, then, is a Divine Being-the Son of God (púσei viós). The redemptive work of Christ secures its infinite worth, its meritorious efficacy, from the fact that His person is Divine. The acts and sufferings of Christ owe their transcendent power and value to the fact that they are the acts and sufferings of God. On the other hand, the manhood of Christ is impersonal. ence before it was assumed by the created in the act by which it was

It had no existLogos; and it was assumed.3 Thus it

1 Quoin in this connection implies that the union is (1) true or real, i.q. ¿λŋons, as opposed to the simulated union taught by Nestorius; (2) personal, not merely moral or relative.

2 See generally Petav. de Incarn. iii. 4.

3 Jo. Damasc. de orth. fid. iii. 2. : οὐ γὰρ προϋποστάσῃ καθ ̓ ἑαυτὴν σαρκὶ ἡνώθη ὁ θεὸς λόγος. Ibid. iii. 11, 12: ἀπαρχὴν ἀνέλαβεν τοῦ ἡμετεροῦ φυράματος, οὐ καθ ̓ ἑαυτὴν ὑποστᾶσαν . . . ἀλλ ̓ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσει inápaσav. Cp. the older statements of Hippol. c. Noet. xv.: ov0' ʼn σàp§

is not unusual with the catholic writers to speak of the manhood of Christ as an accident or instrument of the Godhead. As Dr. Newman expresses it, " In comparison of the Divine person who had taken flesh, what He had taken was not so much a nature . . . as the substance of a manhood which was not substantive." 2 The human nature became personal (évvπóστаTоs) only by being incorporated with, assumed by, the person of the Logos.3 In later theology it is insisted that the personality of the human nature was extinguished or absorbed by the person of the Word.1

2. It is important to observe further that while theology denies that Christ's nature is composite,5 in order to guard the absolute integrity and permanence of the two natures, Divine and human, conjoined in the person of the Word; it allows that there is in Christ a composite personality (composita hypostasis), resulting from the conjunction of two natures. Our Lord is acknowledged to be of dual nature (Simλoûs), and consequently

καθ' ἑαυτὴν δίχα τοῦ λόγου ὑποστῆναι ἠδύνατο διὰ τὸ ἐν Λόγῳ τὴν σύστασιν Exew, and of Leo M. Ep. xi.: "Natura nostra non sic assumpta est ut prius creata, post assumeretur, sed ut ipsa assumptione crearetur."

1 Petav. iii. 4, §§ 15, 16.: "Adventitia et accessionis instar velut substantiæ accidens." Thus Jo. Damasc. applies the verb pooтpéxew to the manhood of Christ. We find already the phrases συμβεβηκός, όργανον in Ath. Orat. c. Ar. ii. 45. Ath. seldom even speaks of the manhood as a nature (púois), and Cyr. Alex. follows Ath. in this point by calling the Logos alone púous. Ath. in fact distinguishes in one passage between puois and oáp (Orat. c. Ar. iii. 34). Cp. Newman, Ath. Treatises, vol. ii. p. 293f. 2 Ath. Treatises, vol. ii. p. 327.

s Thus the manhood is described sometimes as ἑτεροϋπόστατος οι συνυπόσ τατος, ε.ε. ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ὑποστάσει ὑποστᾶσα.

See pp. 160, 161.

5 See Jo. Damasc. de orth. fid. iii. 3; Petav. de Incarn. iii. 14, § 7. 6 Cyr. Hier. Cat. iv. 9; Greg. Naz. Orat. xxxviii. 15; Petav. iii. 15, §7: "Non est imperfectum Deus verbum, quia non ut perficeretur assumptione carnis indiguit, sed ut caro perficeretur in melius commutata, carni se uniens compositus factus est qui ante erat sine dubio summe simplex et incompositus perfectusque per omnia utpote Deus."

though His person is one, it may be described as composite (μία ὑπόστασις σύνθετος ἐκ δύο φύσεων).

In fact the word puois in relation to the doctrine of the Incarnation was open to misconception. As applied to the persons of the Trinity puois was employed as a synonym for ovoía.1 The substance (ovoía) of God was no other than Himself. The person or nature of the Father, for instance, was identical with His substance. Hence as applied to God both ovcía and púois tended towards the meaning Person; and consequently when employed in connection with the Incarnation the word puois had a double signification, which led to the confusions of monophysitism.

(a) Thus in Cyril's famous phrase, μía púσIS TOû Aóyov, Cyril practically means the person of the Word, or rather that Divine nature or substance of the Word, which, as one with His person, took to itself manhood.3 Indeed it is fair to say that with Cyril pois and ὑπόστασις τοῦ Λόγου practically coincide:4 φύσις means the Divine nature as it subsists in the person of the Logos. Cyril guarded the reality of the human nature by the word which Eutyches seems to have ignored, σεσαρκωμένη. There can be no doubt that by his unfortunate use of the term púois he intended simply to secure the oneness and continuity of the person who became incarnate; but his monophysite followers stereotyped a misleading phrase, and identified φύσις with ὑπόστασις.

1 In Aug. de Trin. vii. 7 natura is used as synonymous with substantia. 2 Aug. de Trin. vii. 11: "Neque in hac Trinitate cum dicimus personam Patris, aliud dicimus quam substantiam Patris. Quocirca ut substantia Patris ipse Pater est, non quo Pater est, sed quo est; ita et persona Patris non aliud quam ipse Pater est."

See above, pp. 93 ff. Routh, Rel. Sacr. iii. p. 323, gives examples in which even ovala=the person of Christ. Conversely Melito, ap. Routh, Rel. Sacr. i. p. 121, speaks of Christ's two natures as ovoíaı.

4 Cp. Harnack, Grundr. der Dogm. § 41; Petav. de Incarn. iv. 6; see also Bright's S. Leo, note 35.