commercial credit in the dust. At a single move they have augmented the national expenditure, and not so much crippled, as shattered the national resources. With a population already very poor, a decrepit agriculture, the whole commercial and industrial system shaken to its foundation, employment cut away from under the people when most needed to support them, a vast expenditure, a failing revenue, and a government at once incapable and desperate, we see not where their salvation is to come from. One hope, only one, remains. It lies in a prompt and energetic counter revolution. It is, perhaps, well for France that the cloven foot should have been shown so soon-that the downward progress of her new rulers should have been so rapid, and the abyss to which they are hurrying so apparent, so yawning, and so near. The provisional government and its hearty well wishers we firmly believe to form at this moment a small and, but for their position, an insignificant minority of the nation. The men of property, the friends of order, merchants, manufacturers, country gentlemen and their peasants, a great proportion of the National Guard, and nearly all the army, look on their proceedings with discontent, anger, and alarm. The circular of Ledru Rollin, the decree for the dissolution of the Compagnies d'élite, and the attempts of the people to disarm those regiments of the line which remained in Paris, and which have been since ordered away, show clearly that the provisional government is well aware of this wide-spread feeling of dissatisfaction and hostility. A rallying point-a standard of revolt is alone wanting. If the royal family had been less heartily disliked and despised than they are; if any one of them had the spirit to remain for the chance of a revulsion of popular feeling; if there were any great or daring man either among the civil or the military notorieties of the country to commence an opposition, or simply to speak out boldly and loudly what so many millions of his countrymen are thinking, we believe that a single week would suffice to transfer the members of the provisional government from the Hotel de Ville to Vincennes or the Salpetriere, with an impeachment hanging over their heads, and to save France from the universal ruin which threatens to engulph it. But can such a salient, central, initiative man be found? But though despairing about France, we are sanguine about the rest of Europe. If only war can be kept at bay, we are hopeful of the constitutional regeneration of both Italy and Germany. We have hopes for both (notwithstanding the known reluctance and perfidy of Ferdinand, and the known incapacity of Francis), because in both countries the people seek to extort con cessions from their rulers, not to supersede them; because they seek to govern in concert with their sovereigns, not instead of them; because, intellectually and morally, despite long ages of degradation, they are a far finer race of men than the French; because, cruelly as they have been oppressed, they struggle for real reforms, they demand liberty, not equality-the abolition of oppressive privileges, not of harmless titles or beneficial rank. We have hopes especially for Italy, because slight as is their experience, small their science in self-government, it is at least equal to that of their rulers, and because, with much poverty, there is little real destitution or sordid misery. We have hopes especially for Sicily, because there the revolution has been effected by the united action of all classes; it has been led by the nobles, and consecrated by the priests; and because the insurgents know what they want, and their demands have been steady and consistent. We have hopes for Germany, because the Germans are a loyal and honorable people, with the sense of justice and of brotherhood strong and genuine within them; because they are a reflective, a peaceful, and a moral race; embued with the habits of municipality, and with just notions of real personal liberty. Finally, we are full of hope both for Italy and Germany, because it is evident that though France has forgotten the lessons of the past, they have not, but retain a lively recollection, a wholesome horror, and a wise distrust, of French sympathy and French fraternization. While these are our feelings with regard to the present movement in Italy and Germany,― while we have no hopes for France, we have no fears for England. Though there are many abuses and anomalies in our government, and much sad and terrible misery among our people, every Englishman is conscious that the first are in daily course of exposure and ratification, and that all classes are laboring earnestly and sincerely, if not always wisely, to amend and mitigate the last. Every one is obliged to admit that no phase of moral suffering exists among us without finding many who perseveringly struggle to publish, to alleviate, and to remove it. The poorest have friends in the senate, in the council chamber, in the palace; the lowest can make their voice heard and their wants known, without having recourse to violence and tumult. Moreover, our system of administration is municipal, not central; order is beloved by us; property is sacred with us; we are accustomed to govern and defend ourselves: we respect the rights of others, and know how to maintain our own. Therefore, we have no fears for England. The wise course for England and Europe to pursue throughout the present crisis seems to us both obvious and simple. We must regard France as suffering in the paroxysm of a strange dis II. ease, and draw a cordon sanitaire around her, till the violence of the malady shall have spent itself, and the danger of contagion shall be past. PUBLIC CREDIT AND PUBLIC ORDER, THE ONLY GUARANTEES FOR COMMERCIAL PROSPERITY, FULL EMPLOYMENT, AND GOOD WAGES. We have spoken freely of the misfortunes, | able return for it: the industry, enterprise, inthe faults, and the crimes of France, and have glanced at the enormous advantages possessed by this country, in the character of its people and its institutions. We have shown the grounds why we are without hope for the one, and without fear for the other. How far the marked difference between the two countries is the result of the different constitutions under which they have existed, it is impossible to say. But, considering the great variety of races of which this country has been composed, and the prevailing sameness of social and moral character which is now found among all alike, we are disposed to attribute infinitely more to the moulding which the national characteristics of this country have received from its laws, its customs, its institutions, its local government, the spirit of individual responsibility and self-reliance which have permeated all classes of society, all ranks of life, from the crown to the peasant, than to any original difference in the race itself. But all experience has shown that there are two great elements of public prosperity in this country, which it has always been a first essential to maintain, and without which all the other advantages and blessings which we have enjoyed would have crumbled and disappeared, in spite of the best form of government. We allude, first, to the maintenance of PUBLIC CREDIT, and secondly, to the maintenance of PUBLIC ORDER. With regard to the PUBLIC CREDIT. -It has been doubted by some, whether the extensive credit system which has prevailed of late years in this country, is not, on the whole, a greater evil than a good; whether the disadvantages which arise from periodical revulsions, which are no doubt aggravated, though not created by that system, do not overbalance the benefits derived from the system itself. We will not stop to solve this question were we to do so, we should have little difficulty in showing that such a notion is wholly erroneous. But taking the country as it is, we have now no choice. The huge accumulations of capital in the hands of individuals, their necessity of obtaining a profit telligence, and commercial spirit of other large portions of the community, not possessed of sufficient capital of their own, in order to give full exercise for their powers, bring these two classes together in the characters of creditors and debtors, of lenders and borrowers, by an impulse too strong and certain to be controlled. They are brought together in various forms; some in the simple shape of the capitalist lending, and the active merchant or manufacturer borrowing; some in the shape of sleeping partnerships; some in the shape of large wholesale dealers who employ large capitals in furnishing credit to smaller dealers, who distribute commodities to the consumers. But in the most numerous cases the capitalist uses the banker or the bill broker, as his medium for insuring a safe occupation for his capital. In all these cases credit is the very life and soul of our commercial system. The desire of the capitalist to employ his capital with such an amount of safety and at such a rate of profit as coincide with his own wants and his own ideas of comfort and ease, on the one hand; the willingness of the more active and energetic man, possessed of knowledge and ability, but not of capital-to pay a portion of his gains for its use, on the other hand, form the inseparable tie between these two great classes. And it is a tie not only essential to be maintained, if we are to advance in prosperity, but the dissolution of which would at this time throw the country into anarchy and confusion, greater than the history of the world could furnish any example of. The intimate sympathy between public and private credit is now fully understood and felt by all. It requires not to be enforced by any words of ours. Let the funds fall one per cent. on the Stock Exchange, the rate of discount, and the facility of obtaining loans and discounts in Lombard-street are instantly affected. The first letter which every banker throughout the country opens is that of his London agent; the first column of the daily papers which is referred to by him is the city article; the price of the funds, the fluctuations on the Stock Ex change, determine, or at least influence his transactions for the day. The till is opened freely, or closed cautiously, bills are discounted or "declined," two months' acceptances only are put to account, and longer dates refused, according to the indications of the great barometer of the money market Consols. And this is no whim, no caprice. The banker holds a large portion of his reserve, and that on which he most relies in the case of emergency, in public securities. But if he bought Consols at 90, and they are falling every day, and approaching 80, he cannot aid himself in the case of need, without an enormous sacrifice. His only course is to limit his accommodation; to increase his reserve, by not issuing his capital in fresh discounts so rapidly as former advances fall due and are repaid. He is influenced again by other considerations. Consols at 80 are a tempting investment. Many of his customers, who have usually funds in his hands for employment, are tempted by the low price, and withdraw them for a new investment. And thus, even if he should not himself be tempted to direct an unusual portion of his means from commercial channels into the public funds at so low a price, there are many considerations over which the banker has no control, which render a contraction of credit at such a time a matter of necessity, and of common prudence. The consequences of such occurrences are felt most seriously by the commercial and manufacturing classes, whose obligations are to pay fixed sums of money, whatever the depreciated value of goods, at fixed dates. The consequence of the discredit of last year, and the havoc which it created, have left traces which will require a long period to efface. The revenue accounts for the year ending the 5th April are now before us. Their publication, although not worse than we had a right to expect, was attended by a fall in the funds, attributed partly to the result of these accounts and partly to other causes. These accounts show a deficiency of income, compared with the last year, of 2,218,511l. They, moreover, show that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will require an advance of 1,435,398l. on deficiency bills from the Bank of England, in order to pay the dividends now due; whereas on the fifth of January (three months before) he had a surplus of 882,548.; so that taking the income of the quarter and the expenditure of the quarter, the latter exceeds the former by the sum of 2,317,9461. So far as regards the advance from the Bank of England, in its present condition it cannot be attended with any inconvenience whatever. And so far as regards the general falling off in the revenue, the extraordinary occurrences of the two past years are quite suffi cient to account for it, without creating any fear or uneasiness as to the permanent prosperity and ability of the country. But the fact, that so considerable a deficiency, which, it is to be feared, will rather be increased than diminished as the year advances, is still left unprovided for, is, we must own, a source of grave anxiety; and especially when we view it in connection with the disturbed state of politics throughout Europe. The deep and strong conviction which we have always felt, and which the occurrences of last year tended so much to confirm, that the true interests of the commercial and industrious classes of this country are best consulted by maintaining public credit above the most remote suspicion, in consequence of the intimate sympathy subsisting between it and private credit, has induced us for some months past to press upon the public and the government as a first and imperative duty, to make the income of the country equal to the expenditure. The government, on their part, made the attempt; so far they are not to be blamed (however much some may be disposed to think they erred in not persevering in the attempt) if the finances of the country are in an unsatisfactory state. But we must say, and a feeling of duty compels us to be explicit on this point, that we think the commercial classes never pursued so unwise a policy as to resist the attempt to increase the income and property tax to five per cent. Out of a sum of 5,500,000, which may be taken as the proceeds of this tax at present, the proportion paid by trades and professions, after deducting for landed properties and mortgages in Ireland, and property in the colonies and otherwise out of England, all of which are included in schedule D, cannot be taken at more than 1,500,000l. Therefore, if we estimate that the additional two per cent. would have given 3,500,000l., then trades and professions would have contributed the sum of 950,000l.; while real property, the funds, and other sources, would have contributed towards the whole amount 3,500,000l., raised in aid of the public revenue, no less a portion than 2,500,000l. As a matter just in principle and possible in practice, we are still ready to contend that the gross profits of commerce or professions, are not incomes in the same light as rents of real property or dividends from the public funds, and that they should be classified and charged differently. For this principle and practice we have always contended; and no argument that we have yet heard has convinced us either that it is wrong, or that it is impracticable. But when we consider how small a portion of the whole tax is really derived from trades and professions, and therefore how.comparatively small any proportionate reduction would be on the amount contributed from that source, we cannot avoid coming to the conclusion that the commercial classes, looking only to their own interests in the first place, would have acted wisely in accepting the tax in the form in which it was proposed, rather than rejecting it altogether. How is our commerce to be extended, and the demand for labor be increased? We have already seen what results have flowed from the financial policy of the last seven years. No one will pretend to deny that, however great our sufferings have been, and still are, under the unparalleled difficulties of the last two years, they would have been monstrously aggravated, had our commercial system retained the restrictive principles which it did up to 1842. During that period our exports have increased upwards of 10,000,000l. That fact, at least, implies a much larger employment of capital and labor. But how are we to render a perseverance in the same policy possible? Only by maintaining the finances of the country in such a condition as shall enable the government safely to make temporary sacrifices, by a reduction of duties on the great articles of our import―to cheapen their price to the general consumer, and thus to increase the consumption and the demand for our products in exchange for them. Those who are advocates for a reduction of the present enormous duty on tea- for an extension of our trade to China those who wish to see our fiscal code deprived of the extraordinary temptation which, in consequence of extremely high duties it holds out for fraud and crime- -can only hope to have their wishes accomplished by the policy proposed, and, unfortunately we think, abandoned by the government in the recent discussions on the budget. But there is another and a most essential view to which we must claim the attention of the commercial classes, with regard to the safety and perfect confidence which it is desirable to see belonging to our public finances. We have already referred to the intimate sympathy which subsists between public and private credit. Of this the commercial classes have had serious experience at various periods in this and in other countries. The effects of a pressure on credit, and the want of confidence, during some parts of last year, upon the commercial interests, have been most ruinous. Look to France at the present moment. Two months have sacrificed banking and commercial capital - the accumulations of at least a quarter of a century. Real property stands comparatively untouched and uninfluenced amid the general ruin of governments, bankers, and merchants. The former is tangible and permanent; the latter depends for its value upon confidence and credit. We can appeal for a lesson to the havoc of last year. What was the consideration of an income tax of three or even five per cent. compared with the losses to which all connected with commerce were subjected from public panic and discredit only, in spite of the most prudent and sagacious course having in many cases been followed? No prudence, no sagacity, can save individuals from a participation in such general losses. It is on these considerations that we feel more than ever assured that the country has committed a great error in rejecting the recent propositions of the government to persevere in the same policy, and to maintain the public income equal to the expenditure. But perhaps the class which, more than all others, is deeply interested in preventing the recurrence of commercial panics and alarms, is the working population. Their immediate subsistence depends more upon the maintenance of order and security than that of any other class whatsoever. In this country, where so much of the employment arises out of credits given to customers in distant markets, and which, in their turn, depend upon the ability of the manufacturer and merchant to obtain the usual accommodation and facilities which are always interfered with by any cause of discredit, the laboring classes are the first to suffer from any suspension of usual activity in business. Every steamengine stopped-every furnace blown out every mine shut up-cuts off at once, and without any previous notice, the entire of the daily food of large numbers of persons. The suspension of commerce and credit not only deprives them of their immediate means, through wages, but in the long run renders scarcer and dearer the articles on which they depend for subsistence. Other classes of society have always some resources on which they can fall back, but with the great bulk of the laboring population of every country, any thing that deprives them of employment, deprives them of the daily necessaries of life. Without credit and confidence, commerce cannot be maintained, manufactures must languish, wages must cease, and the masses of the working classes must be subjected to the greatest suffering and privation. But PUBLIC CREDIT and PUBLIC ORDEK are essentially bound up with each other, and with the maintenance of general prosperity. An infringement of either, or both, is the first and surest signal of derangement in commerce, and lessened employment. At the present moment, when the state of Europe furnishes so many sad examples of the misery and ruin which have resulted to the commercial and working classes, it is of the gravest importance that we should form a just estimate of the consequences which would result in this country to the various classes of society, from any important interruption to that peace and order for which it has been generally so much distinguished, and under which, in comparison with those countries which have been exposed to continual outbreaks, it has risen to so much social and general prosperity. It is above all things necessary that we should well estimate the consequences of any want of confidence which is likely to arise from any serious breach of the peace, when such meetings, with such avowed objects, are proposed to be held, as that which was attempted on Kennington Common. It might be that all the apparent and visible consequences of such a meeting, and of the tumult and mischief which would in all probability result from it, considering the declared objects of its chief promoters, would be the shutting of all the shops, and the suspension for the day of all the manufactories in the neigh bourhood where the meeting is proposed to be held, and through which it is intended the procession shall pass to the houses of parliament. But though such were the only visible effects, the real consequences would be much more extensive and serious. Public confidence weakened, public securities depressed, the more timid and prudent among merchants, dealers, and employers would each in his turn suspend for a time his operations, and the whole effect would instantly fall back upon those who live by their daily labor. We are very far from denying the great distress which at this time exists amongst all classes connected with trade in any one of its forms; which if it be more visible to the common observer among small tradesmen and the working classes, it is only because the other classes have greater independent resources of their own to fall back upon on an emergency. But does not that fact of itself prove how detrimental to these very classes of small tradesmen and workmen any alarm or outbreak must be, that further destroys confidence or interferes with credit? But again, while we most readily admit the sufferings of these classes, we would most earnestly implore all parties to consider in what way those sufferings can be best and most rapidly relieved. The country has been impoverished, and confidence has been shaken by a failure of two successive harvests, to an extent unparalleled in the history of the last century. The commercial panic which followed and accompanied the derangement of the trade and monetary affairs of this country, has been succeeded by political events, calculated still more to destroy confidence, injure our commerce, and lessen the whole amount of employment. At such a crisis, what is the only clear and obvious | path to relief? Patient industry, to repair as quickly as possible, under the blessings of Providence, the dilapidations of our fortunes and means - profound peace and perfect order, to restore confidence. We have seen no attempt to point out any other means by which industry can now be aided, by which the reward of labor can be rendered more secure and more efficient, but by an extension of our trade, and by more abundant employment. We have now no longer to complain that the cost of the food of the people is artificially enhanced, and that their employment is artificially restricted for the benefit of privileged classes. Fortunately, much has been done to remove the just complaints which so long were preferred against the ruling classes of the country. It is true that time has not yet sufficiently elapsed to secure to the country the advantages which those measures are calculated ultimately to confer upon it. But the greater facilities which free trade has offered, in our efforts to overcome the disastrous consequences of the recent visitations of Providence upon this and other countries, cannot, and should not, be overlooked. And if we would secure to the country the full and ample blessings which must result from a free and unimpeded commerce, sustained by untiring and unremitting industry, and to each its due reward, we can only hope for such results, if perfect peace and order, and, with them, confidence and credit, are fully maintained. But while we have endeavoured to show how much more sensitive the commercial and industious classes are of any cause whatever which threatens an interruption to PUBLIC CREDIT and PUBLIC ORDER, we should fail in our duty if we did not remind the owners of land how much their interests are ultimately, and at no very distant day bound up with the others to which we have referred. If commerce languishes, and trade is slack-if employment be scarce and wages low-it is not long before markets begin to sicken, and produce to fall in price — when rents become difficult to pay, and discontent and deterioration become visible in the rural districts. What an example of this we have now in Ireland—or at least in some parts of it. What is there the true difference between nom│inal rents and net incomes? In short, the more we reflect upon the stake of the various classes of society, the more are we convinced that the true interest of all is the same, and that all are equally, if not so immediately, interested in maintaining, at any cost, PUBLIC CREDIT and PUBLIC ORDER, that confidence may abound, as the only means by which capital and industry can be secured in their just rewards.-Economist. |