Here I would obferve, that the opinion of Chrift retaining all his divine powers while he was on earth, held by Origen, Clemens Alexandrinus, and all the ancients, is a proof, that, in their opinion, the logos was no created spirit, or any principle that could be confined in its operations, by any circumftances in which it could be placed. Otherwife, as they found that, when Chrift was upon earth, he applied to his Father upon all occafions, they would have more naturally thought that his own proper powers were fufpended; and that the function which he had before discharged was for a time difcontinued, or transferred to fome other, which feems to be the opinion of all the modern Arians, and certainly beft agrees with their principles. For what occafion had Chrift to apply to his Father, to enable him to do nothing more than his own natural powers could

patre totum implens et continens mundum, totus fibi in utero virginis ædificans domum: fcriptum eft enim, fapientia ædificavit fibi domum; totus in patre fempiterno, totus in homine fufcepto, totus in cœlo, totus in mundo, totus etiam in inferno. Ad Trafimundum, lib. 3. cap. 8, P. 468.

have performed, if those powers had been at liberty, and if he had continued to have the full use of them. We never think of praying to God for power to move our hands or feet, whenever we have occafion to make use of them, though we daily thank God for having given us that power. We know, and feel, that it is a power at the command of our own will, and therefore we look no farther than to ourselves for the immediate exercise of it. fame would neceffarily have been the cafe with Chrift, if he had cured diseases, and raifed the dead, by a power as properly his own, and as much at his command, as that

The

which we move our limbs. His praying to the Father, therefore, and the miracles that he wrought being ascribed to the Father, who only, as he said, did these works, is a proof that, while he was on earth, he had not the power of doing them himself. Yet, contrary to the plaineft evidence, all the ancient Fathers supposed that Christ then had that power, and they made his exertion of it a proof of his divinity.

SEC

Of the Ignorance of Christ concerning the Day of Judgment.

A Peculiarly difficult question occurs with refpect to the union of the divine nature of Chrift to his human foul; for as both were capable of knowledge, it might be fuppofed that, whatever was known to the one, must also have been known to the other, if there was any proper union between them. This confequence was fo natural, that it would, I doubt not, have been maintained, if it had not been faid, (Luke ii. 52.) that Jefus increased in wif dom, and our Lord had not fo expressly faid, that he did not know the time of the day of judgment.

With respect to the former, it feems to have been allowed, that the human foul of Chrift acquired knowledge gradually, as other human fouls do. But fometimes the Fathers fhow a confufion of ideas on the fubject. Origen, who believed the pre-exiftence

pre-existence of all fouls, but that they had loft all their attainments in their prior ftate, feems to have thought the same of the foul of Chrift. "Jefus," he says," not

yet a man, because he had emptied him"self, advanced [in wisdom]. For no one "who is perfect can make advances, but "we who stand in need of improvement *." In this Origen could not mean the logos, because he supposed that to be omniscient, and even omniprefent, while it was connected with Christ on earth.

Afterwards, it was generally thought that even the foul of Chrift knew every thing, in confequence of its union to the logos, and that Chrift's knowledge showing itself more and more was all that was meant by his increafing in wisdom. This is expreffed by Nicephorus †.

* Ιησες εκ ανηρ γενόμενος, αλλ' επι παίδιον ων, επει εκενωσεν εαύλον, προεκοπίεν. εδεις προκοπίει τελελειωμενος, αλλά προκοπίει δεομεν posons. In Jerom. Hom. 1. Comment. vol. 1. p. 57

† Ιησες δε προεκοπίε σοφια και χαρίι, τω καλα μικρον αυτα παρα δεικνυσθαι, 8 τω λαμβάνειν επιδυσιν. Hift. lib. I. cap. 14. vol. 1. p. 79.

As

As Chrift exprefsly fays, that he did not know the day of judgment, he certainly either was, or pretended to be, ignorant of fomething which, at least in his divine nature, he must have known. Here, then, is a question, worthy of an Apollo to anfwer; and it may be amufing to obferve what different folutions have been given of this difficulty.

Irenæus evidently fuppofed, that the time of the day of judgment was altogether unknown to the Son, and he advifes us to acquiefce in our ignorance of many things, after his example *. "If any one," fays he, "afks the reason why the Father, who "communicates every thing to the Son, "is alone faid to know the day and the

* Irrationabilitur autem inflati, audaciter inenarrabilia dei myfteria fcire vos dicitis: quandoquidem et dominus, ipfe filius Dei, ipfum judicii diem et horam conceffit fcire folum patrem, manifefte dicens: de die autem illa, et hora nemo fcit neque filius, nifi pater folus. Si igitur fcientiam diei illius filius non erubuit referre ad patrem, fed dixit quod verum eft; neque nos erubefcimus, quæ funt in quæftionibus majora fecundum nos, refervare Deo. Lib. 1. cap. 48. p. 176.

"hour