4 general confession from them, in spite of principle; the prejudice of which returning in particular instances, drew them back into their old conclusion, that reason and truth were violated by the magistrate's interfering. I will in charity rather suppose this to be the case, than that a spirit of licentiousness makes them retract in practice what they own in speculation; and shall therefore endeavour to convince them that this coertion, which all parties agree to be necessary, is likewise reasonable and safe. Not at present than to insist on the argument of its justice, drawn from its necessity alone, we say, say that the final end of every rational creature is happiness and that the immediate end of such as are destined to two separate states of existence, is the happiness of that state in which they are existing. Otherwise the good of the creature in that station would not have been consulted by its Creator. But as this cannot be said, it follows that whatever opposes the attainment of that happiness must be repelled; otherwise the purpose of the Creator would be defeated. If this creature (e. g. man) be not only destined to two different states, but composed of two different natures, one of which is solely adapted to his present station, then the states must not only be separate, but different; and so, consequently, must be the happiness attendant upon each. But if the happiness be different, so must the means of attaining it. Thus the means of attaining man's happiness here is civil society; the means of his happiness hereafter is contemplation. If then opinions, the result of contemplation, obstruct the efficacy of civil society, it follows, that they must be restrained. Accordingly, the ancient masters of wisdom, who, from these considerations, taught, that man was born for action, not for contemplation, universally concurred to establish it as a maxim founded in the nature of things, that opinions should always give way to civil peace. Again, if God destined man to two such states of existence, in each of which the happiness of the existing state was to be his end, it is demonstrable, and almost self-evident, that he, at the same time, so disposed things, that the means of attaining the happiness of one state should not cross or obstruct the means of attaining the happiness of the other. From whence we must conclude, that where the supposed means of each, namely, opinions and civil peace, do clash, there one of them is not the true means of happiness. But the means of attaining the happiness peculiar to that state in which the man at present exists, being perfectly and infallibly known to man; and the means of the happiness of his future existence, as far as relates to the discovery of unrevealed truth, but very imperfectly known by him; it necessarily follows, that wherever opinions clash with civil peace, those opinions are no means of future happiness: or, in other words, are either no truths, or truths of no importance. Thus we have proved, that the magistrate's restraint of those opinions which are mischievous to civil society, is both reasonable and safe. Desiring to be understood, when we speak here of a rational creature, to mean the species; and when we speak of a civil society, to mean such as is formed on the principles of public liberty and common rights of subjects. For to unjust and unnatural governments, the most momentous truths will be mischievous and destructive their end being private, not public utility. It is never then, but where the society stands on legitimate foundations, that its peace is to be preferred to opinions: and there, that preference will be always reasonable and just *. I shall now shew, that what a Test-Law restrains doth directly and necessarily affect the peace of civil society. Where a determinate principle of some certain sect is particularly opposed to this or that fundamental maxim or usage of society, the malignity is seen, and confessed on all hands. Thus, of those opinions respectively held by the Atheist, the Papist, Anabaptist, and Quaker, mentioned above, there are few who see not their pernicious consequences; or will not own the restraint of them to be necessary. But where a religious principle opposes, not one certain maxim or usage, but the general constitution of civil society, the mischief of it is not so easily seen; and if it opposes, not so much the nature of civil society, considered alone, as when in union with the Church, the mischief will be less observed: but and if this be a princíple not peculiar to one sect, but common to all, the mischief will be still less understood. This is the case with regard to the pernicious principle * See this further illustrated above, in the proof of the proposition, that truth and utility do necessarily coincide. thus restrained. It being, as we have observed, that which sets every sect on attempting to establish itself on the ruins of all the rest. Hence it is that men see the necessity, and seem to applaud the justice of restraint, in the first case; and yet, in the other, cry out against the tyranny of subjecting sects to civil incapacities, which hold no peculiar opinions pernicious to the state. But they seem not to apprehend, that the first is not the only legitimate reason which may be urged for the equity of restraint. For where is the difference, with regard to the state, between the principle's being peculiar to one sect, or common to all; between its injuriously affecting one certain maxin or usage, or the whole frame and composure of a State in union with a Church; if so be the restraint be common to all, as well as the principle? Henceforth then we hope to hear no more of the injustice of civil incapacities on a sect which holds nothing peculiar, that can injuriously affect the state. Having now overturned the two propositions, upon which this famous objection stands, it will give us no further trouble, but leave us at liberty to conclude, that to abridge a citizen of his civil rights for matters of opinion which affect society, is no violation of justice or natural equity. But if still, our adversaries will persist in affirming a Test to be contrary to the LAW OF NATURE; one may safely undertake to vindicate it, even on that supposition; as having the universal practice of mankiud on our side; who, for the sake of civil society, have ventured, in their municipal laws, to deviate from the law of nature: and this, with as universal approbation. But, to avoid obscurity, it will be necessary to say, in what sense the law of nature is to be understood. For an illiterate tribe of writers have, in this, as in most other matters, done their best to confound all ideas, and remove the marks and boundaries of science: while they make the law of nature, as it respects man alone, (for that we have only to do with) "to signify what right reason, cr taking in all circumstances, dictates, in every case, "to be done." Thus confounding the law of nature with civil, and all other laws. And in this sense, our inquiry into the agreement of a TEST with the law of nature, after a Test hath been proved just and reasonable on the laws of society, would be very impertinent. But, by the LAW OF NATURE, is here meant that, which all the best writers on natural and civil laws, thus define,-What reason prescribes, under the sole consideration of men's nature, and their mutual relations arising from thence, exclusive of all political or civil combinations. And in this sense, an inquiry concerning the conformity of a Test-Law to the law of nature, may be very proper. We say then, that it is a practice as approved as it is universal, for states, in compliance to the necessities of society, to form many of their municipal laws in direct opposition to the law of nature. The writings of the civil lawyers are full of these cases. I shall content myself with one or two. The case of that civil acquisition called PRESCRIPTION is very |