II. BOOK tion may be made, that they do not always love those who have done them good. Fourthly, from a previous decision of the question by persons in high estimation. Thus, should it be pretended, that men ought not to be made answerable for crimes committed by them in a state of intoxication; it may be objected, "the sage Pittacus then decided most unwisely, when he decreed a greater punishment for drunkards.” An argument can be maintained in four ways only. First, as probable, that is, conformable to what happens for the most part; secondly, we may produce an example in its favour; thirdly, we may reason from a simple sign or indication"; fourthly, from a test or criterion. To all these forms of reasoning, except the last, objections may always be made. For that which happens only for the most part, cannot be necessary: arguments from likelihood, therefore, always admit of an answer: their conclusion may be shown not necessarily to follow; and when this is done, the judge will often think the objector in the right, or the case too nice for his decision. For this reason, the defender enjoys an undue advantage over the accuser. The accuser was only bound to prove the probability of his charge, not its certainty; for, to be guided by probability, is to use our best judgment, and to proceed on the surest ground that the nature of the question affords. A fair objection, there 57 The author here repeats, briefly and obscurely, concerning examples and signs, what he had said fully and clearly, in the second chapter of the first book. XXV. fore, is that which opposes a smaller probability CHAP. by a greater; one founded on examples more numerous or of more frequent occurrence. The proof will be the strongest, when both circumstances concur; in which case the adversary must endeavour to show that these examples are of an inferior quality to his own; either less weighty in themselves, or less apposite to the point in question. The last form of argument is alone irrefragable; for the criterion is the test of truth: nothing can resist it, but showing that it does not apply to the subject; for when it does apply, conviction is inevitable. Topics are the principles of enthymemes, the Topics and centre in which they unite, the root from which arguments they branch. To amplify or extenuate, to aug- guished. ment or diminish, is not the business of topics; for there are arguments showing things to be great or little, as well as arguments showing them to be just or unjust, beneficial or hurtful, praise-worthy or blameable. If none of these latter are topics, neither are the former; for a topic is not an argument; but the place as it were of arguments, the principle in which they coincide, the source from which they flow. Neither are enthymemes which refute, different in kind from those which serve to prove: they consist of similar materials; for to refute is only to prove the contrary of that which is asserted; that the thing is not, which is said to be, or that the thing said to have happened, has not taken place; and this it does, either by argument, or by an objection showing that the conclusion is H. BOOK not logical, or that some falsehood has been assumed in the premises. So much concerning examples, sentiments, enthymemes, the invention of arguments, and the refutation of them; that is, of all that part of rhetoric consisting in the thought or matter 58: we now proceed to treat of style and method. 58 This subject is treated in Cicero's two books de Inventione Rhetorica, in his Topica, and in the first and second books de Oratore. It also runs through no less than six books of Quintilian's Institutes. In writing on Rhetoric, these illustrious Romans display their own eloquence; but Aristotle writes on Rhetoric, by no means rhetorically. He is sparing of words, and rich in things: he adheres strictly to his subject, and his explanation of every thing essential to it, is pre-eminently copious, correct, and perspicuous. His Rhetoric, therefore, (as Cicero says with admirable candour,) is distinguished above every other, by his bringing to the study and improvement of an art, which he despised, the same powerful energies of thought, which he had gloriously exerted in the wide field of universal science. De Oratore, 1. ii. c. 38. ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC. BOOK III. ARGUMENT. - Style and Action.— Action not yet an Art. — In Rhetoric, I. THE art of oratory embraces three objects; CHAP. thoughts, words, and the fittest arrangement of them. The thoughts, however various, all centre Transition in one great end, persuasion; which may be jects of to the sub III. style and action. BOOK attained in three ways, and in these only; for men are persuaded, and give assent to our discourse, either when their understandings are convinced; or when their passions are skilfully touched and gained over; or when the orator has exhibited his character in so favourable a light, that his hearers are disposed to confide merely in his authority. Having previously examined the arguments and topics conducive to these three purposes, and discussed the subject of rhetoric in reference to the thoughts, it follows next to speak of the words or diction. Thoughts, proper in themselves, must also be properly expressed; for the effect of a discourse depends greatly on the expression. The things constituting the body of the argument, doubtless, deserved precedence; next comes the form of diction; and thirdly, a subject of great importance, but as yet, little investigated, I mean rhetorical action. Action rhetorical, fol. poetical, and is not yet re an art. This action was only recently considered as a lowed the separate art, even with regard to heroic poetry and tragedy at first, the poets themselves recited and acted their own performances. There duced into is an oratorical action as well as a poetical one, the latter of which has been treated by several writers, particularly by Glaucon of Teios. This art consists in determining the modifications of voice adapted to each affection or passion; when the voice should be raised or lowered, or kept at the middle pitch; what should be its intonations or accents; the acute, the grave, or that tone intermediate between them; and also what should be |