XXIV.

tion and

mence.

From the sympathy which men feel with CHA P. those actuated by generous and energetic passions 4, aggravation and vehemence are great 4. The fallacy resultsources of sophistry. In defending ourselves ing from against any imputation, we may paint the thing aggrava imputed to us in such odious colours, and ex- vehepress so warmly our detestation of its turpitude, that notwithstanding strong circumstances against us, it will not be easy to believe in our guilt. On the other hand, without bringing the case home to our adversary, we may denounce the crime charged on him in such emphatic terms, and express such generous indignation against its enormity, that he will often be held guilty upon very defective evidence.

consists in

Another fallacy arises from considering as a 5th fallacy proof, that which is barely a sign. Thus, reasoning Dionysius is a thief, for he is a bad man." from acThe conclusion is illogical; for though every if they thief is a bad man, every bad man is not a thief. 55

Another arises from regarding as essential to the nature or definition of a thing, that which is barely an accident or appendage. Thus Polycrates magnified rats as valuable allies to the state, because they happened to disarm its enemies, by gnawing asunder the strings of their bows. In the same manner, it may be said, that nothing is a matter of more importance than an invita

Conf. Ethic. 1. vi. c. 12.

55 Aristotle gives another example: "Lovers benefit commonwealths; for the lovers, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, destroyed the tyrant Hipparchus."

cidents as

were es

sentials.

BOOK tion to supper; for Achilles, when not invited, II. was exasperated against the Greeks in Tenedos. It was not the denied supper, but the dishonour concurring with it, that provoked the anger of Achilles.

6th fallacy

argues from an ordinary

concomi

were inseparable.

Another fallacy is to reason from an ordinary concomitant. "How high-minded was Paris, who, shunning the multitude, lived alone and tant, as ifit solitary on Ida." The love of solitude often accompanies magnanimity. Again, "There can be no doubt that the accusation of adultery is well founded, for he is exquisitely nice in the adjustment of his person, and has been often seen prowling about in the night;" such things being common with adulterers. In the same way, happiness may be ascribed to beggars, because they are often found singing and dancing in temples; and to men banished, because they may live where they please: since the happy do, or have it in their power to do such things, the doers of them are concluded to be happy : as the manner of living where they please, is omitted, in honour or dishonour, in abundance or penury, this fallacy also deceives through deficiency or concealment.

7th fallacy

treats as

a cause, a mere precursor.

Another fallacy is to assign for a cause that which is not a cause, but merely a precursor. This deception is often practised in popular assemblies. Thus, the administration of Demosthenes was declared by Demades to be the source of all the evils which befel the Athenians. For these evils were brought on by the war, which, as it commenced with the ascend

ency of Demosthenes, Demades pretends to have CHAP. been occasioned by it.

XXIV.

sion.

Another fallacy is to omit any important cir- 8th consists cumstance, such as that of time. Thus, "Paris in omisdid nothing wrong in his elopement with Helen, for her father had committed to her own discretion the disposal of her person." But Helen having submitted to the authority of her husband, the father's permission could not then avail her. In the same way, "to lay violent hands on a freeman, may be declared the height of audacity:" not, however, on all occasions, for this freeman may have been the aggressor. The fallacy arising from deficiency, that is, from Perplexing sophisms not including all the circumstances, and an- thence renouncing that absolutely, which is only condi- sulting. tionally true, is much employed in the captious argumentations of logicians: hence the sophisms to prove that things non-existent exist, because they are non-existent; that things unknowable may be known, because we may know them to be unknowable: which deceptions result from applying the words absolutely in the conclusion, which are taken conditionally in the premises. In the same manner in rhetoric, that which is probable absolutely, is confounded with that which is probable only under certain circumstances or restrictions.

Agathon says,—

Amidst the strange vicissitudes of life,

'Tis likely, most unlikely things should happen:

are unlikely things, therefore, likely? Not

BOOK absolutely but they are likely in a certain and

II.

limited sense; that is, they may be expected sometimes to happen against general likelihood. Probability cannot be opposite to probability, when the words are taken in the same acceptation; but probability used generally and simply, may be opposite to probability with an adjunct or condition, that is, with probability taken in a particular sense. In all such specious and often perplexing sophistry, the deception arises from leaving out of sight the time, place, and other circumstances, the introduction of which would prevent the confusion, and enable us to distinguish between things really different. In teaching the artifices of this captious wrangling, the Rhetoric of Corax is employed. A man, for instance, is accused of an assault. If he appears to be of a feeble frame, how can he be suspected of it? Would he provoke, by blows, the anger of a person stronger than himself? If he appears, on the contrary, to be of an athletic form, exactly calculated for combat, how could he expose himself to an accusation which every one, who looks on him, will be inclined to believe.

In this manner, by neglecting the distinctions above mentioned, one probability may always be opposed by another, and the worse be made to appear the better reason. This sophistry, carried to the utmost height by Protagoras, provoked general indignation; for the probabilities which he assumed were fit only for the schools of disputants, and such as no man ever acted on in the real business of life. So much concerning

enthymemes or arguments; those that are solid, CHAP. and those only specious.

XXIV.

XXV.

and objec

number.

THE subject, naturally following, is that of CHA P. solutions; to explain how knotty arguments may be untied. Arguments may be exposed and Solutions defeated in two ways; either by a contrary ar- tions, their gument, or by an objection. As probable topics nature and may be opposed to each other, the enumeration before given will enable us to maintain any opinion, or its contrary; that is, to state the probabilities on the other side of the question. But arguments may not only be thus attacked by arguments, but resisted by an objection: this is done in four ways; since the objection may be drawn from the thing in question, from something like to it, from something contrary to it; or lastly, from a previous judgment passed on the contested point. First, from the thing itself: should we investigate the nature of love, whether it be good or evil; the objection may be either general, as that love implies want, and that want is an evil; or particular, that if all love were good, we should not hear a Kaunian love branded with infamy. Secondly, from the contrary; should it be argued that a good man benefits his friends, it may be objected, that bad men do not always injure their friends. Thirdly, from the like, that is, from parity of reason, should it be mentioned that men hate those who have done them ill, the objec

The incestuous amours of Kaunus and his sister Biblis.

56