BOOK these are justly held in most esteem, as showing

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the reason of what is said: thus,

Let not a mortal keep immortal ire.

To say that " anger ought not to last for ever," is a sentence: but the opposition of the words "mortal" and " immortal" shows the cause why it ought not thus to endure. Of the same kind is the opinion sententiously enounced

To mortals, views immortal don't belong. 28

From what has been said, we may perceive that sentences are of four kinds, and also on what occasions each kind is to be employed. In matters paradoxical or doubtful, the reason ought always to be given, either prefixed or subjoined. In the foregoing example, it may be prefixed, by saying, "Since time ought not to be unprofitably wasted, nor envy by any means to be incurred, I say that a learned education ought not to be given to youth;" or the sentence, forbidding a learned education, may be placed first, and then followed by the reasons of the prohi-CHAP. bition. In matters not paradoxical or very doubtful, but only obscure, the argument will be more pithy and impressive, when the reason is subjoined; and here, the brevity of laconisms, and the flash of metaphorst are in their proper place: as Stesichorus said to the Locrians, "That they ought to abstain from insolence towards their neighbours, lest their grasshoppers should sing on the ground." 32

ΧΧΙ.

To be sententious, becomes the old only, and those much experienced in the matters of which they speak. In others, the stringing of sentences, as well as the frequent application of fables, is inept or ungraceful; the mark of native imbecillity or a neglected education: witness those ill-bred clowns, often to be met with, who are great hammerers of maxims, and perpetual retailers of proverbs.

To generalise a particular proposition, and thus convert it into a maxim or sentence, is most allowable in the transports of grief and anguish, and in the aggravation of injuries and crimes 33 :

BOOK and the general proposition may either immedi

II.

ately precede, or immediately follow the painful or the provoking circumstances to which it applies. Common sayings and proverbs are also of persuasive efficacy, when employed in their proper place. Their general reception is an indication that all are prepared to admit their force. Thus, when an army is ordered to fight, without the previous sacrifice, the command may be justified, by saying,

The best of omens is our country's cause.

And when led into the field, against a superior enemy, they may be told,

The chance of battle comes alike to all.

And, to justify the punishment of the innocent together with the guilty,

Weakness! to kill the sire, yet spare the son.

Some proverbs, though particular, have the force of general propositions or sentences. Thus, "An Athenian neighbourhood," indicates any neighbourhood that is dangerous or troublesome.34

And Helen, in Ovid, when arraigning the treachery of Paris:-
Certus, in hospitibus, non est amor.

Vo' dir ch'ogni huomo sia perfido & crudele.
Man is made up of perfidy and cruelty.

After their victories over the Persians, the Athenians, it is well known, usurped on their allies, expelled some of them from their territories, and when they suffered the old inhabitants to remain, treated them with much arrogance and cruelty.

It may sometimes be expedient to invert an CHAP. adage, and to propose maxims contrary to those generally received. I mean such common max- Reversing ims as, "Know thyself;" "Avoid extremes." These may be controverted, either with a view to express and excite passion, or to give an amiable exhibition of character. To express passion, a man in anger may declare it to be a false assertion, that we ought to know ourselves; for had this presumptuous child of fortune (naming the object of his indignation) had any knowledge of himself, he never would have aspired to the command of armies. To exhibit character in an amiable view, certain maxims may be inverted, as that, " of living with friends as if they were to become enemies:" this selfish prudence may be reprobated by saying, "that we ought rather to treat our enemies as persons likely to become our friends." And here, much regard is to be paid to the form of expression, that it be easy, natural, and seem to flow spontaneously from the heart. When the expression, by itself alone, is insufficient to manifest the inward feeling and deliberate purpose, it will be necessary to subjoin the reason why the one maxim is to be preferred to the other; thus, "that we ought not to love, as if love, according to the vulgar saying, were liable to change, but as if true. affection were unalterable; for the contrary maxim is that of a traitor: and a real friend will behave, as if his friendship could not experience interruption, or ever come to an end." Again,

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BOOK "nothing too much :" this may be controverted, by saying, "that bad men and their actions cannot be hated too much."

Great efficacy of sayings or

two reasons.

Sentences have great weight in discourse, for The first of these originates in sentences, the vanity of hearers, who delight in general when fitly applied. propositions, embracing and re-echoing truths

conformable to their own private experience and personal observation. The following remark will render this more plain, and at the same time show how such useful sentences are to be investigated. A sentence being the declaration of a general truth, men are highly flattered, and their minds, as it were, expanded, by hearing that pronounced generally, of which they know and have felt the reality, in some particular cases. Thus, a man who had been infested by bad neighbours, or afflicted by bad children, would hear with delight, "that nothing is more troublesome than neighbourhood;" and "nothing more foolish than the rearing of children." Whence we must endeavour to conjecture the various judgments that will be anticipated by persons variously circumstanced; and thus, to adapt our discourse to their humour. The second, and still more important use of sentences, is to exhibit by them our sentiments and character. Sentences moralise a discourse, for they stamp it with our habitual purposes and deliberate preferences; so that honourable and useful maxims indicate qualities of the same kind in him who pronounces them. Thus much concerning sen