MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS

ON

IMPORTANT DOCTRINES.

CHAPTER I.

CONCERNING GOD'S MORAL GOVERNMent, a future state, and the imMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

§ 1. THE God that is the Creator of the world, is doubtless also the Governor of it: for he is able to govern it. He that had power to give being to the world, and set all the parts of it in order, has doubtless power to dispose of the world that he has made; to continue the order he has constituted, or to alter it. He that gave being at first, can continue being, or put an end to it; and therefore nothing can stand in his way. If any thing stands in his way, he can put an end to its being, or diminish it, and weaken it as he pleases. He that constituted the world in a certain order, can, if he pleases constitute things otherwise, in another order, either in whole or in part, at once or gradually; or, what is the same thing, he can cause what alterations he pleases in the state of things, or cause the state of things to proceed in what course he pleases. He that first gave the laws of nature, must have all nature in his hands so that it is evident God has the world in his hands, to dispose of as he pleases. And, as God is able, so he is inclined, to govern the world. For, as he is an understanding being, he had some end in what he did, when he made the world he made the world for some end, otherwise he did not act as a voluntary agent in making the world. And, if this world did not come into being by the voluntary act of some cause, then it was not made. That being never acts voluntarily, that has no end in what he does, and aims at nothing at all in it. Neither God nor man is properly said to make any thing that necessarily or accidentally proceeds from them, but that only which is voluntarily produced. Besides, we see in the particular parts of the world, that God had a particular end in their formation. They are fitted for such an end. By which it appears, that the Creator did act as a voluntary agent, proposing final causes in the work of creation: and he that made the particular parts for certain ends, doubtless made the whole for a certain end. And, if God made the world for some end, doubtless he will choose to have this world disposed of to answer that end. For his proposing the end, supposes, that he chooses it should be obtained. Therefore, it follows, that God will choose to take care that the world be disposed of to the obtaining of his own ends, which is the same thing as his choosing to have the government of the world. And it is manifest, in fact, that God is not careless how the affairs and concerns of the world that he has made proceed, because he was not careless of this matter in the creation itself; as it is apparent, by the manner and order in which things were created, that God, in creating, took care of the future progress and state of things in the world. He contrived that things might so and so proceed and be regulated, and that things might go in such and such a course, and that such and such

events might be produced. So that it is manifest, the Creator is not careles of the state of things in his world. This being established, I now proceed to show, that it must be, that God maintains a moral government over the world of mankind.

First, If it be certain, that God is concerned, and does take care how things proceed in the state of the world that he has made, then he will be especially concerned how things proceed in the state of the world of mankind. This is manifest by three things: 1. Mankind are the principal part of the visible cre ation. They are in the image of their Creator, in that respect, that they have understanding, and are voluntary agents, and can produce works of their own will, design and contrivance, as God does. And the Creator looks upon them as the principal part of his visible creation, as is manifest, because he hath set them at the head of his creation. He has subjected other things to them. The world is evidently made to be a habitation for man, and all things about him are subordinated to his use. Now, if God be careful how the world that he has made be regulated, that his end may be answered, and that it may not be in vain, he will be especially careful of this concerning the principal part of it, and in the same proportion that it is principal or superior in his own account to the rest. Because, if that superior part be in vain, there is much more in vain, than if a less part was in vain; so much more, as his loss (as I may say) is so much the greater, in its being in vain, according as the part is superior in his account.

2. The more God has respect to any part of the world he has made, the more concerned he will be about the state of that part of the world. But it is manifest, by the creation itself, that God has more respect or regard to man, than to any other part of the visible creation; because he has evidently made and fitted other parts to man's use. If God be concerned how things proceed in the world he has made, he will be so chiefly in that part of his world that he has set his heart most upon.

3. It is evident, that God is principally concerned about the state of things in the world of mankind. In creation, he subordinated the state of things in the inferior world, to the state of things in the world of mankind; and so contrived, that the affairs of the former should be subservient to the affairs of the latter. And therefore God will not leave the world of mankind to themselves, without taking any care to govern and order their state so, that this part of the world may be regulated decently and beautifully, that there may be good order in the intelligent, voluntary, active part of God's creation, as well as in the inferior and inanimate parts of it; especially in what concerns it as an intelligent, voluntary, and active, and so a superior part of the creation: or, which is the same thing, he will take care that the world of mankind be well regulated with respect to its moral state; and so will maintain a good moral government over the world of mankind. It is evident, by the manner in which God has formed and constituted other things, that he has respect to beauty, good order and regu lation, proportion and harmony; so, in the system of the world, in the seasons of the year, in the formation of plants, and of the various parts of the human body. Surely, therefore, he will not leave the principal part of the creation, about the state of which he is evidently, in fact, chiefly concerned without making any proper provision for its being in any other than a state of deformi ty, discord, and the most hateful and dreadful confusion. And especially so, in what relates to those things in them, by which alone they are distinguished, and are superior and more valuable than the rest of the world, viz., their intel ligence, and will, and voluntary actions; and therefore, upon the account of

which alone, God has more regard to them, and is more concerned about their

state.

By what has been already said, God is most concerned about the state and government of that which is highest in his creation, and which he values most; and so he is principally concerned about the ordering the state of mankind, which is a part of the creation that he has made superior, and that he values most: and therefore, in like manner, it follows, that he is principally concerned about the regulation of that which he values most in men, viz., what appertains to his intelligence and voluntary acts. If there be any thing in the principal part of the creation, that the Creator values more than other parts, it must be that wherein it is above them, or, at least, something wherein it differs from them. But the only thing wherein men differ from the inferior creation, is intelligent perception and action. This is that in which the Creator has made man to differ from the rest of the creation, and by which he has set him over it, and by which he governs the inferior creatures, and uses them for himself; and therefore, it must needs be, that the Creator should be chiefly concerned, that the state of mankind should be regulated according to his will, with respect to what appertains to him as an intelligent, voluntary creature. Hence it must be, that God does take care, that a good moral government should be maintained over men; that his intelligent, voluntary acts should be all subject to rules; and that with respect to them all, he should be the subject of judicial proceeding. For unless this be, there is no care taken, that the state of mankind, with respect to their intelligent, voluntary acts, should be regulated at all; but all things will be remedilessly in the utmost deformity, confusion and ruin. The world of mankind, instead of being superior, will be the worse, and more hateful, and the more vile and miserable, for having the faculties of reason and will; and this highest part of the creation will be the lowest, and infinitely the most confused and deformed, and detestable, without any provision for rectifying its evils. And the God of order, peace and harmony, that constituted the inferior parts of the world, which he has subjected to man, and made subservient to him, in such decency, beauty and harmony, will appear to have left this chief part of his work, and the end of all the rest, to the reign of everlasting discord, confusion and ruin; contradicting and conflicting with its own nature and faculties; having reason, and yet acting in all things contradictory to it; being men, but yet beasts; setting sense above reason; improving reason only as a weapon of mischief and destruction of God's workmanship. God has so made and constituted the world of mankind, that he has made it natural and necessary, that they should be concerned one with another, linked together in society, by the manner of their propagation, their descending one from another, and their need one of another, and their inclination to society. We see, that in other parts of the creation, wherein many particulars are dependent and united into one body, there is an excellent harmony and mutual subserviency throughout the whole; as in all bodies natural. How then can we believe, that God has ordered so much of the contrary in the principal part of his creation?

Secondly, I would argue, that God must maintain a moral government over mankind, thus:-It is evident, that it was agreeable to the Creator's design, that there should be some moral government and order maintained amongst men; because, without any kind of moral government at all, either in nations, provinces, towns, or families, and also without any divine government over the whole, the world of mankind could not subsist. The world of mankind would destroy itself. Men would be not only much more destructive to each other,

than any kind of animals are to their own species, but a thousand times more than any kind of beasts are to those of any other species. Therefore, the nature that God has given all mankind, and the circumstances he has placed them all in, lead all, in all ages throughout the habitable world, into moral government. And the Creator doubtless intended this for the preservation of this highest species of creatures that he has made; otherwise he has made much less provision for the defence and preservation of this species, than of any other species. There is no kind of creature that he hath made, that he has left without proper means for its own preservation. Every creature is some way furnished for this. But unless man's own reason, to be improved in moral rule and order, be the means he has provided for the preservation of man, he has provided him with no means at all. Therefore, it is doubtless the original design of the Creator, that there should be such a kind of thing as moral subordination amongst men, and that he designed there should be heads, princes or governors, to whom honor, subjection and obedience should be paid. Now, this strongly argues, that the Creator himself will maintain a moral government over the whole, several ways:

1. Without this, the preservation of the species is but very imperfectly provided for. If men have nothing but human government to be a restraint upon their lusts, and have no rule or judgment of a universal omniscient governor to be a restraint upon their consciences, still they are left in a most woful condition, and the preservation and common benefit of the species, according to its necessities, and the exigencies of its place, nature, and circumstances in the creation, is in no wise provided for, as the preservation and necessities of other species are.

2. As the Creator has made it necessary, that there should be some of our fellow-creatures that should have rule over us, he has therein so ordered it, that some of them should have some image of his own disposing power over others. (For, as was shown before, God has the disposing power of the whole world.) Now, is it reasonable to think, that the Creator would so constitute the circumstances of mankind, that some particular persons, that have only a little image and shadow of his greatness and power over men, should exercise it, in giving forth edicts, and executing judgment; and that he who is above all, and the original of all, should exercise no power in this way himself, when mankind stand in so much more need of such an exercise of his power, than of the power of human governors?

3. He has infinitely the greatest right to exercise the power of a moral governor, if he pleases. His relation to man as his Creator, most naturally leads to it. He is infinitely the most worthy of that respect, honor and subjection that is due to a moral governor. He has infinitely the best qualifications of a governor, being infinitely wise, powerful and holy, and his government will be infinitely the most effectual to answer the ends of government.

4. It is manifest, that the Creator of the world, in constituting human moral governments among men, has, in that constitution, had great respect to those qualifications, and that relation, and those rights and obligations, in those that he has appointed to be rulers, and in putting others under their moral government, which he has in himself in a vastly more eminent degree. As particularly, in family government, or the government of parents over their children, which of all other kinds of human moral government is most evidently founded in nature, and which the preservation of the species doth most immediately require, and most naturally and directly lead to. Here God hath set those to be moral rulers, that are the wiser and stronger, and that are the causes of

other beings, and that are their preservers, and that provide for them; and has appointed those to be in subjection that are less knowing and weaker, and have received being from their rulers, and are dependent and are preserved and maintained. Would not he therefore maintain moral government himself over mankind, who is their universal father, is the author of all their beings, is their universal preserver, and maintains all, and provides all with food and raiment, and all the necessaries and enjoyments of life, and is infinitely wiser and stronger than they? Would not he maintain a moral government over men, who need his government, as children need the government of their parents, and who are no more fit to be left to themselves in the world without his rules, directions, his authority, promises, threatenings and judgment, than children are fit to be left to themselves in a house?

Thirdly, As man is made capable of knowing his Creator, so he is capable of a high esteem of his perfections, his power, and wisdom, and goodness, and capable of loving him, and entertaining great respect for him and for his perfections. He is capable of a proper esteem of God for his wise aud excellent and wonderful works, which he beholds; and for their admirable contrivance, which appears in so excellently ordering all things; and of gratitude to him for all the goodness that he himself is the subject of; or, on the contrary, of slighting and despising him, and hating him, finding fault with his works, reproaching him for them, slighting all his goodness which he receives from him; yea, hating him for ordering things in his providence to him as he has done, and cursing and blaspheming him for it.

Now, it is unreasonable to suppose, that God should be an indifferent spectator of these things in his own creature, that he has made in his own image, and made superior to all other creatures, having subjected the rest of the creation to him, and whom he has distinguished from all other creatures, in giving him intelligence, and making him capable of knowing himself; and in a creature that he values above all the rest of the creation, and that he has had more respect to in the creation than to every other species. It cannot be equally agreeable to him, whether he gives him proper esteem, and love, and honor, and gratitude, and pays proper respect to him in his own heart; or on the contrary, unreasonably despises, hates, and curses him. And if he be not an indifferent spectator of these things, then he will not act as a perfectly indifferent spectator, and wholly let men alone, and order things in no respect differently for those ends one way or other. But so it must be, if God maintains no moral government over mankind

Fourthly, As man is made capable of knowing his Creator, so he is capable of knowing his will in many things, i. e., he is capable of knowing his ends in this and the other works of his, which he beholds. For it is this way principally that he comes to know there is a God, even by seeing the final causes of things; by seeing that such and such things are plainly designed and contrived for such and such ends; and therefore he is capable of either complying with the will of his Creator, or opposing it. He is capable of falling in with God's ends, and what he sees his Creator aim at, and co-operating with him, or of setting himself against the Creator's designs. His will may be contrary; as, for instance, it is manifest that it is the Creator's design, that parents should nourish their children, and that children should be subject to their parents.

If a man therefore should murder his children, or if children should rise up and murder their parents, they would oppose the Creator's aims. So if men use the several bodily organs to quite contrary purposes to those for which they were VOL I

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