: ergo rationalis creatura facta est a Deo, referendum est ad creatoris bonitatem ct ad creaturæ utilitatem. Comp. Alan. ab Ins. ii. 4 (quoted by Pez, Thes. i. p. 487, 88).—Hugo of St. Victor also said (quoted by Liebner, p. 357, 58) "The creation of the world had man, that of man had God for its end. The world should serve man, and man should serve God; but the service of the latter is only man's own advantage, since in this service he is to find his own happiness. For God being all-sufficient to himself, nor standing in need of the services of any one, man has received both, i. e., all, viz., the good under him, and the good above him, the former to supply his necessities, the latter to constitute his happiness, the former for his benefit and use, the latter for his enjoyment and possession. Thus man, though created at a later period, was nevertheless the cause of all that was under him, and hence the high dignity of human nature." Thomas Aquinas supposed God to have no other object than the communication of his own being, Summa, P. i. Qu. 44, art. 4 Primo agenti, qui est agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem alicujus finis: sed intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quæ est ejus bonitas. Et unaquæque creatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem, quæ est similitudo perfectionis et bonitatis divinæ. Sic ergo divina bonitatis est finis rerum omnium. Comp. Cramer, vii. p. 414, 15. Baur, Trinit. ii. 731, sq. Ritter, viii. 284. [Christl. Phil. i. 650. Bonaventura, on the end of God in creation, argues, "that God's highest end must be his own glory, for it is said, God created all things for himself; not as if it was necessary for him, or to increase his glory, but in order to reveal and communicate it, in which the highest well-being of his creatures consists... Should any one say, that such a highest end is egotistic, the answer is, that it is one thing in God, and another with the creature; for in God there is no distinction between the general and the particular good; he is the original ground of all good, and of the highest good. If He, from whom all other goodness is derived, were not to perform all his acts on account of himself, the effect that proceeded from him would not be truly good. Since the use of the creatures depends altogether on their relation to the supreme good, everything proceeds from the love of God, since he makes all things tend towards himself...What is the highest end of creation must also be the same for human actions." See Neander, Hist. of Dogmas. pp. 564-5.] According to the author of the work, German Theology (cap. 1, from the commencement) the ideas of being a creature, being created, being an ego, and self-hood, are synonymous with love of the world, love of the creature, self-love, self-will, natural carnal sense, and carnal pleasure. The creature must depart, if God is to enter. He thinks it sinful "to esteem created things, and to look upon them as something, while they are in realitynothing." Subsequently he admits, however, that those things have their being only in God: "Out of that which is perfect, or without it, there is no true existence, but all is mere accident, or mere semblance and glitter, which neither is nor has true being, except in the fire from which the shining proceeds, like the brightness which proceeds or flows out from fire, or light, or the sun."-Some of the heretical sects of the middle ages entertained views on these points which bordered upon Manicheism. Thus Berthold, a Franciscan monk, said in a sermon (quoted by Kling, p. 305; Wackernagel, Lesebuch, 1. Sp. 678): Some heretics believe and maintain that the devil created man, when our Lord created the soul in him. Comp. Ermengardi, Opusc. contra Hæreticos, qui dicunt et credunt, mundum istum et omnia visibilia non esse a Deo facta, sed a Diabolo, edited by Gretser in Bibl. Max. PP. T. xxiv. p. 1602. Gieseler, Church History, ii. § 82, note o. [Comp. Vaughan's Hours with the Mystics, 2d ed., 1859.] 7 Henry Suso (c. 54, quoted by Diepenbrock, p. 208) said: "Now let us remain here for a while and contemplate the high and excellent master in his works. Look above you and around you, look to the four quarters of the world, how wide and high the beautiful sky is in its rapid course, and how nobly the master has adorned it with the seven planets, each of which, with the exception of the moon, is much larger than the earth, and how it is beautified with the innumerable multitude of the bright stars. O, how clearly and cheerfully the beautiful sun rises in the summer season, and how diligently it gives growth and blessings to the soil; how the leaves and the grass come forth, how the beautiful flowers smile, how the forest, and the heath, and the field resound with the sweet airs of the nightingale and other small birds, how all the animals which were shut up during the severe winter come forth and enjoy themselves, and go in pairs, how young and old manifest their joy in merry and gladsome utterances. O, tender God! if thou art so loving in thy creatures, how fair and lovely must thou be in thyself!-Look further, I pray you, and behold the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and all the wonderful things in them, the variety and diversity of men, quadrupeds, birds, fishes, and the wonders of the deep, all of which cry aloud and proclaim the praise and honor of the boundless and infinite nature of God! O Lord, who preserves all this? who feeds it? Thou takest care of all, each in its own way, great and small, rich and poor, thou, O God! thou doest it, thou God art indeed God!" John Damascenus, De Fide Orth. ii. 5, ss. treated of the whole range of natural science (cosmography, astronomy, physics, geology, etc.), so far as it was known to him, in the section on creation. Most of the scholastics followed his example. Comp. Cramer, vii. p. 388, ss. But in introducing natural history into the province of dogmatic theology, they thought that they might put limits to physical investigation by the doctrine of the church. Thus it happened that e. g., in the time of Boniface [Bishop of Mayence], the assertion of Virgilius, a priest, that there are antipodes, was considered heretical; see Schröckh, xix. p. 219, 220.* 9 Anselm himself taught that this world is the best (omne quod est, recte est, Dial. de Ver. c. 7); and Abelard agreed with what Plato asserted (in the Timæus): Deum nullatenus mundum meliorem potuisse facere, quam An additional point in reference to the work of creation was the question, whether it is to be assigned to only one of the persons of the Trinity? The theologians of the present period adopted the opinion of the earlier church, that all the three persons participated in it; Thomas Aquinas, Qu. 45, art. 6, Cramer, vii. p. 416. This was, however, scarcely more than a speculative idea. The power of creating was supposed to be more particularly possessed by the Father, for the very reason that power was peculiarly ascribed to him; though various expressions were used, in the liturgical services, e. g. in the hymn: Veni Creator Spiritus. fecerit (Introd. ad Theol. iii. c. 5, quoted by Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, ii. p. 70.) This assertion, however, met with opposition on the part of others. (Com. § 167, note 7.) According to Alexander Hales, every individual possesses its own perfection, though it may appear imperfect compared with the whole, see Cramer, vii. p. 413.-Concerning the nature of evil, Thomas Aquinas expressed himself quite in the sense of Augustine (Qu. 48 and 49): evil is not a thing which exists by itself, but the absence and want of good. Evil is, moreover, necessary to constitute a difference of degrees; the imperfection of individual things belongs even to the perfection of the world (Summa. P. i. Qu. 48, art. 2, quoted by Münscher, von Cölln, p. 74). But Thomas well knew how to make an exception in the case of moral evil: the latter is not only a defect, but the wicked are wanting in something in which they should not be wanting; therefore the idea of evil belongs more properly to the evil of guilt (malum culpæ) than to the evil of punishment (malum pœnæ). (Comp. Tertull. advers. Marc. ii. 14). [According to Duns Scotus, all depends on the freedom of the finite creature, and accordingly, the goodness of God revealed in the perfection of the world, is conditioned by that freedom.", Baur, Dogmengesch. 254.] 10 The scholastics commonly treated of Providence, and of the Theodicy, in connection with the divine attributes, with the divine will in particular. Hugo of St. Victor even said that the Divine providence itself is an attribute, viz. that attribute of God by which he takes care of all the works of his hands, abandons nothing that is his, and gives to every one his due and right. Both the actual existence of good, and the mode of its existence, depend on the arrangements (dispositio) of God. It is not so with evil. Only the mode of its existence depends on God, but not its existence itself: for God does not do evil himself; but when evil is done, he overrules it (malum ordinabile est). De Sacram. c. 19-21, quoted by Liebner, p. 366. Cramer, vii. p. 274, ss. On the Оéλnua πропуоúμεvov,, etc., comp. § 126, note 5, and John Damasc. De Fide Orthod. ii. 29. By the scholastics the θέλημα προηγούμενον was also called voluntas bene placiti, the θελ. ἑπόμε vov (consequens), voluntas signi (expression of one's will). Comp. Liebner, Hugo of St. Victor, p. 386. Peter Lomb. Lib. i. Dist. 45, F. Alex. Hales, Summa, P. i. Qu. 36, Membr. 1.-Thomas Aquinas both denies and admits that evil proceeds from God. So far as evil presupposes a defect, it can not have its origin in God, for God is the highest perfection. But so far as it consists in the corruption of certain things, and this corruption in its turn forms a part of the perfect universe, it proceeds indeed from God-ex consequenti, and—quasi per accidens. The theodicy of Thomas may be comprised in this proposition, Summa theol. P. i. Qu. 15, art. 3: Malum cognoscitur a Deo non per propriam rationem, sed per rationem boni. Comp. Baur, Trinitätslehre, ii. p. 734, ss. Ritter, viii. 285, and the passage there cited. Münscher, by von Cölln, 72. Cramer, 264.* * A peculiar Oriental controversy is that about the created and the uncreated light. The Hesychasts (Quietists) of Mt. Athos, with Palamas, afterward archbishop of Thessalonica, at their head, held that there is an eternal, uncreated and yet communical e light (the light of the transfiguration on Tabor). The monk Barlaam (from Calabria) opposed this assertion, maintaining that the light on Tabor was a created light. A Confession adopted § 172. THE ANGELS AND THE DEVIL. John Damascenus and others' adhered to the classification of the angels given by Pseudo-Dionysius (§ 131, note 8). The council of the Lateran, A. D. 1215, under Pope Innocent III. pronounced as the doctrine of the church, that the angels are spiritual beings, and that they were created holy." But with regard to particular points, such as the nature and the offices of the angels, the relation in which they stood to God, the world, man, and the work of redemption, ample scope was left for poetical and imaginary speculations, sometimes running out into wilful conceits." The idea of the devil penetrated even deeper, than did the belief in angels, into the popular creed of the Germanic nations, sometimes connected in a horrible way with the belief in sorcery and witches, so common during the middle ages, sometimes treated with levity and humor, interwoven with legends and popular tales. In the history of doctrines, this living and national belief in the devil is to be considered as well as the theorems and systems of the schools, founded for the most part upon traditional definitions. In the religious point of view the only point of importance is this, that it was held that the devil can not compel any one to commit sin, while he himself is delivered up to eternal condemnation." He, as well as his associates, the evil spirits, feel their own punishment, but also take pleasure in the torments of the damned; this compensation, worthy of their devilish disposition, is all their joy.' De Fide Orthod. ii. 3. Most of the scholastics adopted this classification. Thus Hugo of St. Victor mentioned and explained the orders and names of angels (according to Pseudo-Dionysius) only very briefly (De Sacr. i. 5), "a proof of his good sense." (Liebner, p. 395). Comp. Lomb. Sent. lib. ii. Dist. 9, A. Thom. Aquinas, Summ. P. i. Q. 108 (quoted by Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, p. 65). 2 Conc. Lateran. IV. Can. i. Mansi, T. xxii. p. 982, quoted by Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, p. 65. at Constantinople in 1341, was favorable to the Hesychasts. Acindynus, Barlaam's coadjutor, resumed the controversy, but lost his case at a second synod at Constantinople. But he almost got the victory at a third synod (after the death of Andronicus, 1341) under the empress Anna; but a fourth synod, under Cantacuzenus, again declared the doc trine of the Hesychasts to be correct. This dispute was connected with that about the voia and vépyeta of the divine nature. Comp. Gass in Herzog's Realencycl., under Hesychasts (after the report of Nicephorus Gregoras), and the essay of Engelhardt, referred to § 153, Note 12. Most of the scholastics adopted the opinion of Augustine, that the angels were created with all other creatures, and only in so far prior to them, as they surpass them in dignity. Thus Hugo of St. Victor (quoted by Liebner, c. 28 and 29, p. 392), Alexander Hales, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura, etc. (quoted by Cramer, vii. p. 426). A fact adverted to about the angels, not unimportant in a religious point of view, is, that the angels are represented only as distinct and isolated creations of God, not forming one whole, like the human race; hence, it is said, the fall of individuals did not involve the fall of the whole angelic world. Comp. e. g. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo 1, ii. 20: Non enim sic sunt omnes angeli de uno angelo, quem admodum omnes homines de uno homine. "There is a human race, but not an angelic race (keine Engelheit):" Hasse's Anselm, ii. 391.—According to the statements of the later scholastics, the angels are distinguished from the souls of men, 1. Physically (they do not stand in absolute need of a body); 2. Logically (they do not obtain knowledge by inferences); 3. Metaphysically (they do not think by means of images, but by intuitive vision); 4. Theologically (they can not become either better or worse). Alexander Hales, however, made this last assertion with reserve. As creatures without body, they are not made up of matter and form; yet actus and potentia are not identical with them as with God. Also (according to Thomas) there are no two angels of the same species; but this is denied by Duns Scotus. The question was raised, whether thinking is the essence of an angel? The reply was in the negative. Yet Aquinas says, the thinking of an angel is never merely potential, but at the same time, actual. The knowledge of angels is purely à priori, and the higher the rank of an angel, so much more universal are the conceptions, by which he knows. Scotus says, that the angels have a capacity for obtaining knowledge empirically (intellectum agentem et possibilem); according to others their knowledge is either matutina (cognitio rerum in verbo), or vespertina (cognitio rerum in se), or, lastly, meridiana (aperta Dei visio). Comp. Bonaventura, Compend. ii. 15. knowledge of some angels, however, is more comprehensive than that of others. Some e. g. foreknew the mystery of the incarnation of Christ, which was unknown to others. The angels also have a language, not, however, born of sense, but intellectual. They have moreover a place, i. e., they are not omnipresent like God, but move with immeasurable celerity from one place to another, and pervade all space more easily than man. It was also asked, whether they could work miracles? whether one angel could exert any influence upon the will of another? etc., see Cramer, 1. c. (These quotations are for the most part taken from Alexander Hales and Thomas Aquinas). See Baur, Trinit. ii. 731, sq.-Peter Lombard and others also retained the idea of guardian-angels, see Sent. ii. Dist. ii. A. (in Münscher, ed. by von Cölln. p. 66). Some entertained the singular notion of a hatred on the part of the angels against sinners of the human race, of which Berthold speaks in one of his sermons, quoted by Kling, p. 18, 20: "They cry daily at the sight of sinners: Lord, let us kill them! But he appeases and exhorts them, to let the tares grow among the wheat."-But the more sober scholastics did not enter into any further inquiries of this kind. Thus Hugo of St. Victor said: "We walk among those things timidly, The |