wisely and cautiously ascribed power to the Father and wisdom to the Son. Likewise men, hearing of God the Holy Spirit (Spiritus) might think of him as a snorting (Germ. schnaubend) and restive being, and be terrified at his supposed harshness and cruelty. But then Scripture coming in and calling the Holy Ghost loving and mild, tranquillized them" (De Sacram. c. 26). The passage is cited by Liebner, p. 381 and 382, where further particulars may be compared. Hugo, however, rejected, generally speaking, all subtile questions, and had a clear insight into the figurative language of Scripture. Nor did Richard of St. Victor indulge so much in subtile speculations in his work, De Trinitate, as many other scholastics. It is true, he adopted the same views concerning the trias of power, wisdom, and love, but he laid more stress upon the latter, and ascribed to it the generation of the Son. In the highest good there is the fullness and the perfection of goodness, and consequently the highest love: for there is nothing more perfect than love. But love (amor), in order to be charity (charitas), must have for its object, not itself, but something else. Hence where there is no plurality of persons, there can be no charity. Love toward creatures is not sufficient, for God can only love what is worthy of the highest love. The love of God to none but himself would not be the highest love; in order to render it such, it is necessary that it should be manifested toward a person who is Divine, etc. But even this is not yet the highest love. Love is social. Both persons (who love each other) wish a third person to be loved as much as they love each other, for it is a proof of weakness not to be willing to allow society in love. Therefore the two persons in the Trinity agree in loving a third one. The fullness of love also requires highest perfection, hence the three persons are equal.....In the Trinity there is neither a greater nor a less; two are not greater than one, three are not greater than two. This appears indeed incomprehensible, etc. Compare also the passage De Trin. i. 4, quoted by Hase, Dogmatik, p. 637, and especially Engelhardt, l. c. p. 108, ss. Baur, Trinit. ii. 536. Meier, 292.— The other scholastics who manifested a leaning to mysticism, argued in a similar way. Thus Bonaventura, Itiner. Mentis, c. 6. Raimund of Sabunde, c. 49.* (Compare also Gerson, Sermo I. in Festo S. Trin. quoted by Ch. Schmidt, p. 106).

[On Raymund Lulli's view of the Trinity, see Neander, Hist. Dog. 563,

On Raimund's Doctrine of the Trinity, see Matzke, p. 54 sq. Among other things he compares the three persons with the three forms of the verb; the Father is the active, the Son the passive, and the Holy Spirit the impersonal verb! Matzke, p. 44. [Matzke, p. 55, Note, quotes from Tit. 51, on the Trinity: Et quia dare non potest esse sine recipere, neque dans sine recipiente, ideo necessario in esse divino et in natura divina sunt duo, scilicet unus dans et alter recipiens, unus producens et alter productus, etc. And >n the Holy Spirit (p. 56), from Tit. 52: Et cum ex dare et recipere, quando sunt perfecta, oportet quod procedat et sequatur aliud, quod non est dare neque recipere, seilicet amor, ideo, cum in divina nature sit dare et recipere, oportet quod procedat amor a dante in recipientem et a recipiente in dantem, et sic est ibi processio amoris ab uno in alterum et e converso, et sic est ibi tertia res producta scilicet amor, quæ quidem res non est pater neque filius, sed procedens necessario de ambabus, quia pater non potest non amare Buum filium ab ipso productum, nec filius non amare patrem qui genuit eum æqualem per omnia sibi.]

sq.-In his Liber Preverbiorum, on the Son: Quælibet divinarum rationum est principium per patrem in filio et per filium est medium et per Spiritum Sanctum est quies et finis. Id propter quod spiritus sanctus non producit personam, est, ut appetitus cojuslibet rationis in illo habeat finem et quietem. Quia pator et filius per amorem se habent ad unum finem, ille finis est Spiritus Sanctus......Quia Deus est tantum Deus per agere, quam per existere, habet in sua essentia distinctas personas. Nulla substantia potest esse sine distinctione: sine distinctione non esset quidquam.]

15 Savonarola showed in a very ingenious manner (Triumphus Crucis, Lib. iii. c. 3, p. 192-96, quoted by Rudelbach, p. 366, 67), that a certain procession or emanation exists in all creatures. The more excellent and noble these creatures are, the more perfect the said procssion; the more perfect it is, the more internal. If you take fire and bring it into contact with wood, it kindles and assimilates it. But this procession is altogether external, for the power of the fire works only externally. If you take a plant, you will find that its vital power works internally, changing the moisture which it extracts from the ground into the substance of the plant, and producing the flower which was internal. This procession is much more internal than that of fire; but it is not altogether internal, for it attracts moisture from without, and produces the flower externally; and though the flower is connected with the tree, yet the fruit is an external production, and separates itself from the tree.-The sentient life is of a higher order. When I see a picture, a procession and emanation comes from the picture which produces an impression upon the eye; the eye presents the object in question to the imagination or to the memory; nevertheless the procession remains internal though it comes from without. Intelligence is of a still higher order; a man having perceived something, forms in his inner mind an image of it, and delights in its contemplation: this gives rise to a certain love which remains in the faculty of thinking. It may indeed be said that even in this case there is something external (the perception). But from this highest and innermost procession we may draw further inferences with regard to God, who unites in himself all perfection--that the Father, as it were, begets out of himself an idea-which is his eternal Word (Logos), and that the love, which is the Holy Spirit, proceeds from the Father and the Son. This procession is the most perfect, because it does not come from without, and because it remains in God.* Comp. Meier, Savonarola, p. 248, ss.

10 Wessel (de Magnitudine Passionis, c. 74, p. 606, quoted by Ullmann, p. 206) expressed himself as follows: "In our inner man, which is created after the image of, and in resemblance to God, there is a certain trinity: understanding (mens), reason (intelligentia), and will (voluntas). These three are equally sterile, inactive, and unoccupied, when they are alienated from their prototype. Our understanding without wisdom, is like the light with

* But Savonarola also pointed out in very appropriate language the insufficiency of our conceptions: "God treats us as a mother treats her child. She does not say to him: Go, and do such and such a thing; but she accommodates herself to the capacity of the child, and makes her wishes known by broken words and by gestures. Thus God accom modates himself to our ideas." See Rudelbach, 1. c. p. 369.

out the eye, and what else is this wisdom but God the Father ?* The Word (the Logos) is the law and the norm of our judgments, and teaches us to think of ourselves with humility according to the true wisdom. And the Spirit of both, the divine love, is the food of the will (Spiritus amborum, Deus charitas, lac est voluntati)." The practical application follows, of

course.

The three persons in the Trinity were referred in a peculiar way to the development of the history of the world. According to Hugo of St. Victor, (De tribus Diebus, quoted by Liebner, p. 383, note), the day of fear commenced with the promulgation of the law given by the Father (power); the day of truth with the manifestation of the Son (wisdom); and the day of love with the effusion of the Holy Spirit (love). Thus there was a progressive development of the times towards greater and greater light!-Amalrich of Bena and the mystico-pantheistic sects, on the other hand, interpreted these three periods after their own notions, in connection with millennarian hopes. (Comp the Eschatology.) [A similar view was advanced by Joachim of Flore, and forms (says Baur, Dogmengesch. 253), the chief contents of his three works, viz., Concordia Vet. et Nov. Test., Expositio in Apocalyps., and Psalterium decem Chordarum. The Father is the principium princi pale, the Son and Spirit are the principia de principio. In the period of the Father (the more materialistic), God appears as the mighty-the terrible God of the law. The Son assumes human nature, to reveal the merciful love of God; and the Spirit appears in the form of the dove, the figure of the holy mother, the church. This revelation is a progressive one, gradually subduing the fleshly and material, and transforming it into the spiritual, etc.]

Although the doctrine of the Trinity was generally reckoned among the mysteries, which could be made known to us only by revelation (compare § 158), yet there was still a controversy on the question, whether God could make himself known to the natural consciousness as triune, and in what way? Compare on this, Baur, Trinitätslehre, ii. 697, sq. [This is entirely denied by Aquinas, and admitted in a qualified way by Duns Scotus.]

[The scholastics, says Baur, Dogmengesch. 252, give to the Trinity a more refined character, but in a sense not congruent with the dogma of the church. What they called persons, were not persons in the sense of the church, but relations. To construct the Trinity, they (with the exception of Anselm and Richard), did not get beyond the psychological distinction of intelligence and will, putting these into a merely coordinate relation, instead of endeavoring to grasp the different relations, in which God as Spirit, stands to himself, from the point of view of a vital spiritual process in its unity and totality. The more profound mystics struggle after such a conception, in what they say of a speaking of God, etc., see above, note 13.]

§ 171.

THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION, PROVIDENCE, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD.-THEODICY.

The pantheistic system of John Scotus Erigena,' found no imitators among the orthodox scholastics; they adhered rather to the idea of a creation out of nothing. Later writers endeavored to define this doctrine more precisely, in order to prevent any misunderstanding, as if nothing could have been the cause of existence.'

* Here he calls the Father Wisdom; the scholastics applied this term to the Son. Comp. above, note 14.

The Mosaic account of the creation was interpreted literally by some, and allegorically by others.* The opinion still continued generally to prevail, that the world is a work of divine goodness, and exists principally for the sake of man. Though mysticism tended to induce its advocates to regard the independence of the finite creature as a separation from the Creator, and consequently as a rebellion, and thus to represent creation as the work of Satan (after the manner of the Manicheans), yet these pious thinkers were roused by the sight of the works of God to the utterance of beautiful and elevating thoughts, and lost in wonder and adoration. On the other hand, the schoolmen, fond of vain and subtle investigations, indulged here also in absurd inquiries.-Concerning the existence of evil in the world, the scholastics adopted for the most part the views of Augustine. Thus, some (e. g., Thomas Aquinas) regarded evil as the absence of good, and as forming a necessary part of the finite world, retaining however, the difference between moral evil and physical evil, (the evil of guilt, and the evil of its punishment).* Others adopted, with Chrysostom, the notion of a twofold divine will (voluntas antecedens et consequens)."

1

1 Comp. above § 165, 1, and De divina Natura, ii. c. 19, quoted by Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, p. 63.

* God is not only the former (factor), but the creator and author (creator) of matter. This was taught by Hugo of St. Victor (Prolog. c. 1. Liebrer, p. 355), and the same view was adopted by the other mystics. The advo cates of Platonism alone sympathised with the notions of Origen.

3

Fredegis of Tours defended the reality of nothing, as the infinite (allembracing) genus, from which all other genera and species of things derive their form: comp. his work De Nihilo, and Ritter, Gesch. der Christl. Phil vii. 189, sq. Alexander Hales (Summa, P. ii. Quæst. 9, Membr. 10), drew a distinction between nihilum privativum and negativum; see on this point Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, p. 61, 62.-Gieseler, Dogmengesch. 495. [The nihil privativum abolishes the object of the act, the negativum, the act itself: the creation from nothing is in the former sense.] Thomas Aquinas (Pars. i. Qu. 46, art. 2), represented the doctrine of a creation out of nothing as an article of faith (credibile), but not as an object of knowledge and argumentation (non demonstrabile vel scibile), and expressed himself as follows, Qu. 45, art. 2: Quicunque facit aliquid ex aliquo, illud ex quo facit, præsupponitur actioni ejus et non producitur per ipsam actionem......Si ergo Deus non ageret, nisi ex aliquo præsupposito, sequeretur, quod illud præsuppositum non esset causatum ab ipso. Ostensum est autem supra, quod nihil potest esse in entibus nisi a Deo, qui est causa universalis totius esse. Unde necesse est dicere, quod Deus ex nihilo res in esse producit. Comp. Cramer, vii. p. 415, ss. Baur, Trinitätslehre, ii. p. 716: "The fact that Thomas considered God the first cause and type of all things, plainly shows that in his opinion the creation, which is designated as a creation out of nothing, was not a sudden transition from non-existence to existence." Quæst. 44, art. 2:

Dicendum, quod Deus est prima causa exemplaris omnium rerum.... Ipse Deus est primum exemplar omnium.-While Thomas and still more Albertus Magnus draw no distinct line of demarcation between the idea of emanation and that of creation (Baur, l. c. p. 723, ss.), Scotus adheres to the simple notion that God is the primum efficiens; nevertheless he distinguishes between an esse existentiæ and an esse essentiæ; but both can not be separated in reality, and the latter presupposes the former; see lib. ii. Dist. 1, Qu. 2, and other passages in Baur, 726, sq.

4

Thus Hugo of St. Victor thought that the creation out of formless matter in six days might be literally interpreted. The Almighty might have made it differently; but in this way he would teach rational beings in a figure, how they are to be transformed from moral deformity into moral beauty...... In creating the light prior to all other works, he signified, that the works of darkness displeased him. The good and evil angels were separated at the same time, when light and darkness were separated. God did not separate light from darkness, till he saw the light, that it was good. In like manner, we should first of all see to our light, that it is good, and then we may proceed to a separation, etc. Observing that the phrase “and God saw that it was good," is wanting in reference to the work of the second day in the Mosaic account of the creation, this mystic scholastic was led into further inquiries respecting the reason of this omission. He found it in the number two, which is an inauspicious number, because it denotes a falling away from unity. Nor is it said, in reference to the waters above the firmament, as is done with regard to those under the firmament, that they were gathered together unto one place-because the love of God (the hea venly water) is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost. This love must expand itself and rise higher; but the waters under the firmament (the lower passions of the soul) must be kept together. Fishes and birds are created out of one and the same matter, yet different places are assigned to them, which is a type of the elect and the reprobate, from one and the same mass of corrupt nature: Comp. Liebner, p. 256, 57.-Friar Berthold saw in the works of the first three days of the creation, faith, hope, and love; see Kling, p. 462, 63.

Joh. Dam. De Fide Orth. ii. 2, (after Gregory of Nazianzum and Dionysius Areopagita) : Ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὑπεράγαθος Θεὸς οὐκ ἠρκέσθη τῇ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρία, αλλ' ὑπερβολῇ ἀγαθότητος εὐδόκησε γενέσθαι τινὰ τὰ εὐερ γετηθησόμενα, καὶ μεθέξοντα τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθότητος, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παράγει καὶ δημιουργεῖ τὰ σύμπαντα, ἀόρατά τε καὶ ὁρατὰ, καὶ τὸν ἐξ ὁρατοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου συγκείμενον ἄνθρωπον.—Petr. Lomb. Sententt. ii. Dist. i. C. Dei tanta est bonitas, ut summe bonus beatitudinis suæ, qua æternaliter beatus est, alios velit esse participes, quoniam videt et communicari posse et minui omnino non posse. Illud ergo bonum, quod ipse erat et quo beatus erat, sola bonitate, non necessitate aliis communicari voluit...... Lit. D: Et quia non valet ejus beatitudinis particeps existere aliquis, nisi per intelligentiam (quæ quanto magis intelligitur, tanto plenius habetur), fecit Deus rationalem creaturam, quæ summum bonum intelligeret et intelligendo amaret et amando possideret ac possidendo frueretur......Lit. F.: Deus perfectus et summa bonitate plenus, nec augeri potest nec minui. Quod