tum longiorem. The barbarisms and solecisms he compares (c. 59) to thorns on fruit. Etenim vero dissoluti est pectoris in rebus seriis quærere voluptatem, et cum tibi sit ratio cum male se habentibus atque ægris, sonos auribus infundere dulciores, non medicinam vulneribus admovere. Moreover, even the language of the schools has its abnormities: Quænam est enim ratio naturalis aut in mundi constitutionibus lex scripta, ut hic paries dicatur et hæc scello? etc.-Concerning Gregory Nazianzen, comp. Orat. ii. 105, p. 60. See Ullmann, p. 305, note.-Epiphanius opposed very decidedly the notions derived from the old μavriký (comp. § 32), according to which the inspired writers were entirely passive, and supposed that the prophets enjoyed a clear perception of the divine, a calm disposition of mind, etc. Comp. Hær. 48, c. 3, and Jerome Procem. in Nahum, in Habacuc et in Jesaiam: Neque vero, ut Montanus cum insanis feminis somniat, Prophetæ in exstasi sunt locuti, ut nescirent, quid loquerentur, et quum alios erudirent, ipsi ignorarent, quod dicerent. Though Jerome allows that human (e. g., grammatical) faults might have occurred, yet he guards himself against any dangerous inferences which might be drawn from his premises (Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. lib. ii. ad cap. iii. 1): Nos, quotiescunque solecismos aut tale quid annotamus, non Apostolum pulsamus, ut malevoli criminantur, sed magis Apostoli assertores sumus, etc. According to him, the divine power of the word itself destroyed these apparent blemishes, or caused believers to overlook them. "The opinion of these theologians manifestly was, that the external phenomena do not preclude the reality of the highest influences of divine grace." Rudelbach, p. 42.*

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Theodoret, who may be considered as the representative of this tendency, rejects both the false allegorical and the bare historical systems of interpretation, Protheoria in Psalmos (ed. Schulze), T. i. p. 603, in Rudelbach, p. 36. (He calls the latter a Jewish rather than Christian interpretation.) Comp. Münter, über die antiochen. Schule, 1. c. and Neander, Church History, ii. p. 353. The hermeneutical principles of Theodore of Mopsuestia are here of special weight. See Neander, Dog. Hist. p. 283-5. [Neander, judging from Theodore's general position, conjectured the value of his commentaries in this matter, "if more of them had come down to us." The conjecture has been confirmed by the discovery of the commentaries. See the extracts as given by Jacobi, in the notes to Neander's Hist. of Doctrines, in Ryland's translation, as above.]

⚫ It is remarkable that Augustine, on the one hand, understands all biblical narratives in their strictly historical, literal sense; and, on the other, leaves ample scope for allegorical interpretation. Thus he takes much pains. De Civ. Dei xv. 27, to defend the account of the ark of Noah against mathematical and physical objections (he even supposes a miracle by which carnivorous animals were changed into herbivorous); nevertheless, he thinks that all this had happened only ad præfigurandum ecclesiam, and represents the clean and unclean animals as types of Judaism and Paganism, etc. [Comp.

* Thus Jerome and Chrysostom answered those who would put the epistle to Philemon out of the Canon, because it contained only human matters, who took umbrage at the packóvns which the apostle ordered (2 Tim. iv. 13), that employment in human affairs did no damage to divine things. See Neander, Hist. Dogm. p. 284.

also Davidson, 1. c. p. 138, where another specimen is given.] The passage De Genes. ad Litter, ab. init.: In libris autea omnibus sanctis intueri oportet, quæ ibi æterna intimentur, quæ facta narrentur, quæ futura prænuntientur, quæ agenda præcipiantur, has given rise to the doctrine of a fourfold sense of Scripture; comp. with it De Util. Cred. 3: omnis igitur scriptura, quæ testamentum vetus vocatur, diligenter eam nosse cupientibus quadrifariam traditur, secundum historiam, secundum ætiologiam, secundum analogiam, secundum allegoriam; the further exposition of his views is given ibid. [Davidson, l. c. p. 137]. According to Augustine, seven things are necessary to the right interpretation of Scripture, Doctr. Christ. ii. 7: timor, pietas, scientia, fortitudo, consilium, purgatio cordis, sapientia. But he who will perfectly interpret an author, must be animated by love to him, De Util. Cred. 6: Agendum enim tecum prius est, ut auctores ipsos non oderis, deinde ut ames, et hoc agendum quovis alio modo potius, quam exponendis eorum sententiis et literis. Propterea quia, si Virgilium odissemus, imo si non eum, priusquam intellectus esset, majorum nostrorum commendatione diligeremus, nunquam nobis satisfieret de illis ejus quæstionibus innumerabilibus, quibus grammatici agitari et perturbari solent, nec audiremus libenter, qui cum ejus laude illas expediret, sed ei faveremus, qui per eas illum erasse ac delirasse conaretur ostendere. Nunc vero cum eas multi ac varie pro suo quisque captu aperire conentur, his potissimum plauditur, per quorum expositionem melior invenitur poëta, qui non solum nihil peccasse, sed nihil non laudabiliter cecinisse ab eis etiam, qui illum non intelligunt, creditur......Quantum erat, ut similem benevolentiam præberemus eis, per quos locutum esse Spiritum Sanctum tam diuturna vetustate firmatum est! Even misunderstanding of the Scriptures (according to Augustine) is not corrupting, so long as the regula caritatis is observed; one may err about a text without becoming a liar. He who, with good intent, though with wrong exegesis, is steering loosely towards the one end of edification (the love of God), is like him who runs to the goal across the fields instead of in the beaten road. Yet we must always try to set such an one right, lest he get into the way of wandering from the true road, and so in the end run to perdition; De Doct. Christ. i. 36.

§ 122.

TRADITION AND THE CONTINUANCE OF INSPIRATION.

The belief in the inspiration of the Scriptures neither excluded faith in an existing tradition, nor in a continuance of the inspirations of the Spirit. Not only transient visions, in which pious individuals received divine instructions and disclosures,' were compared to the revelations recorded in Scripture, but still more the continued illumination which the fathers enjoyed when assembled in council.' But as the Scriptures were formed into a canon, so, too, in course of time it became necessary to lay down a canon, to which the ecclesiastical tradition, developing itself on its own historical foundation,

might be made subject, so that every spirit need not be believed. Such an one was more definitely sketched by Vincens of Lerins, who laid down the three criteria of antiquitas (vetustas), universitas, and consensio, as marks of true ecclesiastical tradition; and thus the quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est was fixed as the canon of what had authority in the church.'

A

Comp. Münscher, Handbuch, iii. p. 100: "Such exalted views on inspiration can not appear strange to us, since they existed in an age when Christians believed and recorded numerous divine revelations and inspirations still granted to holy men, and especially to monks."-Such revelations, of course, were supposed not to be contradictory either to Scripture, or to the tradition of the church. Thus the voice from heaven, which said to Augustine; "Ego sum, qui sum," and "tolle lege," directed him to the Scriptures. Confessions, viii. 12.

* The decisions of the councils were represented as decisions of the Holy Spirit (placuit Spiritui Sancto et nobis). Comp. the letter of Constantine to the church of Alexandria, Socrat. i. 9: "O yàp Toйs Tρiakoσíαis йрeσεv ἐπισκόποις, οὐδέν ἐστιν ἕτερον, ἢ τοῦ Θεοῦ γνώμη, μάλιστά γε ὅπου τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τοιούτων καὶ τηλικούτων ἀνδρῶν διανοίαις ἐγκείμενον τὴν Oɛíav Boúλnoiv ¿žεpúτIOεv. The Emperor, indeed, spoke thus as a layman. But Pope Leo the Great expressed himself in the same way, and claimed inspiration not only for councils (Ep. 114, 2, 145, 1), but also for emperors and imperial decretals (Ep. 162, 3. Ep. 148, 84, 1), even for himself (Ep. 16, and Serm. 25). Comp. Griesbach, Opusc. i. p. 21. Gregory the Great, too, declares that he ascribes to the first four Ecumenical Councils equal authority with the four gospels. Concerning the somewhat inconsistent opinions of Gregory of Nazianzum (Ep. ad Procop. 55), on the one hand, and of Augustine (De Bapt. contra Don. ii. c. 3), and Facundus of Hermiane (Defensio Trium Capitul. c. 7), on the other, see Neander, Church Hist. ii. 177, and Hist. Dogm. 278. In accordance with his views on the relation of the Septuagint to the original Hebrew (§ 121), Augustine supposes that the decisions of earlier councils were completed by those of later ones, without denying the inspiration of the former, since "the decision of councils only gives public sanction to that result which the development of the church had reached." Inspiration accommodates itself to the wants of the time. Respecting this "economy," and its abuses, see Münscher, 1. c. p. 156, ss.

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* Commonitorium, or Tractatus pro Catholicæ Fidei Antiquitate et Universitate (composed in the year 433). Vincentius sets forth a twofold source of knowledge: 1. Divinæ legis auctoritas. 2. Ecclesiæ catholicæ traditio. The latter is necessary on account of the different interpretations given to Scripture. The sensus ecclesiasticus is the only right one. Vincentius, like Augustine, also supposes that tradition may in a certain sense advance, so that an opinion, respecting which the church has not as yet pronounced a decision, is not to be considered heretical; but it may afterwards be condemned as such, if it be found contrary to the more fully developed faith of the church. Thus many of the opinions of the earlier Fathers might be vindicated as archaisms. [Baur, Dogmengesch. 159 sq., says that the notion

of tradition was already more methodically and definitely fixed than any other doctrine of the church. The canon of Vincens, he states, was brought forward in relation to the Augustinian predestination-the latter could not stand this test. This canon was mechanical, allowing no room for progress, and it also contradicted the principle of the sufficiency of the Scriptures.]

2. THE DOCTRINE CONCERNING GOD.

§ 123.

THE BEING OF GOD.

The prevailing tendency to dialectic demonstrations led to the attempt to prove, in a logical way, the existence of God, which the Christian faith had received as an uncontested axiom.' In the writings of some of the fathers, both of the preceding and present periods, e. g., Athanasius and Gregory of Nazianzum, we meet with what may be called the physico-theological argument, if we understand by it an argument drawn from the beauty and wisdom displayed in nature, which is always calculated to promote practical piety. But both these writers mistrusted a merely objective proof, and showed that a pure and pious mind would best find and know God. The cosmological proof propounded by Diodorus of Tarsus,' and the ontological argument of Augustine and Boëthius, lay claim to a higher degree of logical precision and objective certainty. The former argument was based upon the principle that there must be a sufficient ground for every thing. Augustine and Boëthius inferred the existence of God from the existence of general ideas-a proof which was more fully developed in the next period by Anselm.

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Even Arnobius considered this belief to be an axiom, and thought it quite as dangerous to attempt to prove the existence of God as to deny it; Adv. Gent. i. c. 33: Quisquamne est hominum, qui non cum principis notione diem nativitatis intraverit? cui non sit ingenitum, non affixum, imo ipsis pæne in genitalibus matris non impressum, non insitum, esse regem ac dominum cunctorum quæcunque sunt moderatorem?

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Athanasius, Adv. Gent. i. p. 3, ss. (like Theophilus of Antioch, comp. § 35, note 1), starts with the idea, that none but a pure and sinless soul can see God (Matt. v. 8). He too compares the heart of man to a mirror. But as it became sullied by sin, God revealed himself by means of his creation, and when this proved no longer sufficient, by the prophets, and, lastly, by the Logos.-Gregory of Nazianzum argues in a similar way; he infers the existence of the Creator from his works, as the sight of a lyre reminds us both of him who made it, and of him who plays it; Orat. xxviii. 6, p. 499; comp. Orat. xxviii. 16, p. 507, 508; Orat. xiv. 33, p. 281. He too appeals to Matth. v. 8. "Rise from thy low condition by thy conversation, by purity

of heart unite thyself to the pure. Wilt thou become a divine, and worthy of the Godhead? Then keep God's commandments, and walk according to his precepts, for the act is the first step to knowledge." Ullmann, p. 317.— Augustine also propounds in an eloquent manner, and in the form of a prayer, what is commonly called the physico-theological argument (Conf. x. 6): Sed et cœlum et terra et omnia, quæ in eis sunt, ecce undique mihi dicunt, ut te amem, nec cessant dicere omnibus, ut sint inexcusabiles, etc. Ambrose, Basil the Great, Chrysostom, and others, express themselves in much the same manner.

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Diodorus karà εiμapμévns in Phot. Bibl. Cod. 223, p. 209, b. The world is subject to change. But this change presupposes something constant at its foundation; the variety of creatures points to a creative unity; for change itself is a condition which has had a commencement: El dé Tis ἀγένητον λέγοι αὐτῶν τὴν τροπὴν, τὸ πάντων ἀδυνατώτερον εισάγει· τροπὴ γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ἀρχόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι τροπὴν ἀναρχον· καὶ συντόμως εἰπεῖν, τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτῶν ζώων τε καὶ σωμά. των ἡ πάνσοφος τροπὴ, καὶ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ χρωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιοτήτων ἡ ποικίλη διαφορά μονονουχι φωνὴν ἀφίησι μήτε ἀγέννητον μήτε αὐτόματον νομίζειν τὸν κόσμον, μήτ' αὖ ἀπρονόητον, θεὸν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ εὖ εἶναι παρασχόμενον σαφῶς εἰδέναι καὶ ἀδιστάκτως ἐπίστασθαι. August. De Lib. Arbitr. lib. ii. c. 3-15. There are general ideas, which have for every one the same objective validity, and are not (like the perceptions of sense) different and conditioned by the subjective apprehension. Among these are the mathematical truths, as 3+7=10; here, too, belongs the higher metaphysical truth-truth in itself, i. e., wisdom (veritas, sapientia). The absolute truth, however, which is necessarily demanded by the human mind, is God himself. [He asserts that man is composed of existence, life, and thinking, and shows that the last is the most excellent; hence he infers that that by which thinking is regulated, and which, therefore, must be superior to thinking itself, is the summum bonum. He finds this summum bonum in those general laws which every thinking person must acknowledge, and according to which he must form his opinion respecting thinking itself. The sum total of these laws or rules is called truth or wisdom (veritas, sapientia). The absolute is, therefore, equal to truth itself. God is truth. Illa veritatis et sapientiæ pulcritudo, tantum adsit perpetua voluntas fruendi, nec multitudine audientium constipate secludit venientes, nec peragitur tempore, nec migrat locis, nec nocte intercipitur, nec umbrâ intercluditur, nec sensibus corporis subjacet. De toto mundo ad se conversis qui diligunt eam omnibus proxima est, omnibus sempiterna; nullo loco est, nusquam deest; foris admonit, inter docet; cernentes se commutat omnes in melius, a nullo in deterius commutatur; nullus de illa judicat, nullus sine illa judicat bene. Ac per hoc eam manifestum est mentibus nostris, quæ ab ipsa una fiant singulæ sapientes, et non de ipsa, sed per ipsam de ceteris judices, sine dubitatione esse potiorem. Tu autem concesseras, si quid supra mentes nostras esse monstrarem, Deum te esse confessurum, si adhuc nihil esset superius. Si enim aliquid est excellentius, ille potius Deus est: si autem non est, jam ipsa veritas Deus est. Sive ergo illud sit, sive non sit, Deum tamen esse negare non poteris. Comp. Ritter, Christl. Phil. i. 407-411.]-Boëthius