ȧрεтns ȧπоνσíαν. Comp. c. 6, c. 22, c. 28, and the Dial. de Anima et Resurrectione.

4

That sin was in contradiction with God's purposes, was the practically weighty position held fast by the church in all its different definitions of sin. "Augustine, too, every where remains true to this denial of the divine origination of sin. Though the opposite opinion has been often imposed upon him in past and present times, on account of his doctrines of the moral incapacity of human nature and of the divine predestination, yet this belongs to these groundless inferences which have been so freely drawn, especially from this great teacher of the church;" Julius Müller, i. 308. A more precise definition is given by the theologians after the time of Augustine. Thus Gregory I. makes a distinction between peccatum and delictum: Peccatum est mala facere, delictum vero est bona relinquere, quæ summopere sunt tenenda. Vel certe peccatum in opere est, delictum in cogitatione; Ezech. lib. ii. Hom. 9, p. 1404. He also distinguishes between peccatum et crimen ;* every crimen is a peccatum, but not vice versa. No one is sine peccato, but many are sine crimine (Tit. i. 6, 1 Joh. i. 8). The peccata only stain the soul, the crimina kill it; Moral. xvi. c. 12. The iniquitas, impietas, etc., are also represented as modifications of sin; Mor. xi. 42, xxii. 10. The deepest root of all sin is pride; pride produces envy, wrath, etc. The seat of sin is both in the soul and in the body; the devil is one of the chief agents in inducing man to commit sin; comp. Lau, p. 379, ss.

6

Augustine still endeavors to reconcile the mystic interpretation of paradise with the historical; De Civit. Dei, xiii. 21. Moreover, he sees all individual sins comprised in the primitive sin; comp. Enchiridion ad Laurentium, c. 45: In illo peccato uno.. ...possunt intelligi plura peccata, si unum ipsum in sua quasi membra singula dividatur. Nam et superbia est illic, quia homo in sua potius esse quam in Dei potestate dilexit; et sacrilegium, quia Deo non credidit; et homicidium, quia se præcipitavit in mortem; et fornicatio spiritalis, quia integritas mentis humanæ serpentina suasione corrupta est; et furtum quia cibus prohibitus usurpatus est; et avaritia, quia plus quam illi sufficere debuit, adpetivit; et si quid aliud in hoc uno admisso diligenti consideratione inveniri potest. Gregory the Great adopts the literal interpretation; Mor. xxxi. comp. Lau, p. 377, ss. The devil tempted our first parents in a threefold manner, gula, vana gloria, and avaritia. The attack itself was fourfold, by suggestio, delectatio, consensus, and defensionis audacia; Mor. iv. c. 27.

* This distinction, however, had beer already made by Augustine; see below, § 111, 2.

§ 108.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIRST SIN, AND FREEDOM OF THE WILL (ACCORDING TO THE THEOLOGIANS OF THE GREEK CHURCH).

A. Hahn, Ephräm der Syrer über die Willensfreiheit des Menschen, nebst den Theorien derjenigen Kirchenlehrer bis zu seiner Zeit, welche hier besondere Berücksichtigung verdienen. (in Illgens Denkschrift der hist. theol. Gesellschaft zu Leipzig. Part 2, Leipz. 1819, p. 30, ss.). [Comp. Landerer, Verhältniss von Gnade und Freiheit, in Jahrb. £. deutsche Theologie, 1857, s. 556, 572, on Chrysostom, s. 549-61. Kuhn, d. angebliche Pelagianismus der voraugustinischen Kirchenväter, in Theol. Quartalschrift, 1853. Wörter, Christl. Lehre über d. Verhältniss von Gnade u. Freiheit. Band i. 1856. Band ii. 1, 1860.]

Even those theologians who kept themselves free from the influence of the Augustinian system, held that the sin of Adam was followed by disastrous effects upon the human race, but restricted these evils (as the fathers of the preceding period had done) to the mortality of the body, the hardships and miseries of life, also admitting that the moral powers of man had been enfeebled by the fall. Thus Gregory of Nazianzum in particular (to whom Augustine appealed in preference to all others) maintained, that both the vous and the

xý have been considerably impaired by sin, and regarded the perversion of the religious consciousness seen in idolatry, which previous teachers had ascribed to the influence of demons, as an inevitable effect of the first sin. But he was far from asserting the total depravity of mankind, and the entire loss of free will.' On the contrary, the doctrine of the freedom of the will continued to be distinctly maintained by the Greek church.' Athanasius himself, the father of orthodoxy, maintained in the strongest terms that man has the ability of choosing good as well as evil, and even allowed exceptions from original sin, alleging that several individuals, who lived prior to the appearance of Christ, were free from it.' Cyril of Jerusalem also assumed that the life of man begins in a state of innocence, and that sin enters only with the use of free will. Simiar views were entertained by Ephräm the Syrian, Gregory of Nyssa, Basil the Great, and others. Chrysostom, whose whole tendency was of a practical and moral kind, insisted most of all upon the liberty of man and his moral self-determination, and passed a severe censure upon those who endeavored to excuse their own defects by ascribing the origin of sin to the fall of Adam."

1 Orat. xxxviii. 12, p. 670, xliv. 4, p. 837, xiv. 25, p. 275, xix. 13, p. 372, Carmen iv. v. 98, and other passages quoted by Ullmann, p. 421, ss. Comp. especially the interesting parallel which is there drawn between Gregory and Augustine, as well as between the expressions of the former in the original, and the (corrupt) translation of the latter. "Gregory by no means taught the

doctrines afterwards propounded by Pelagius and his followers; but if all his sentiments be duly considered, it will be found that he is far more of a Pelagian than of an Augustinian ;" Ullmann, l. c. p. 446.

2

According to Methodius (in Phot. Bibl. Cod. 234, p. 295), man does not possess the power either of having desires, or of not having them (évØvμeïolaι ἢ μὴ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι), but he is at liberty either to gratify (χρῆσθαι) them or not. Comp. Nemes. De Nat. Hom. c. 41: Пãoa тoívvv åváyeŋ tòv čxovτа τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κύριον εἶναι πράξεων. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ κύριος εἴη πράξεων, περιττῶς ἔχει τὸ βουλεύεσθαι.

• Athan. Contra Gent. c. 2, p. 2 : Εξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐκ ἦν κακία, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις ἐστὶν, οὐδ ̓ ὅλως κατ ̓ αὐτοὺς ὑπάρχει αὐτή. cf. Contra Arian. Or. 3 (4). Opp. T. i. p. 582, 83: Пoλλoì yàp oùv åɣio γεγόνασι καθαροὶ πάσης ἁμαρτίας. (He alludes to Jeremiah and John the Baptist: but they can not properly be called #oλλoì.) Nevertheless, death has reigned even over them, who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression (Rom. iv. 14).

Cyr. Cat. iv. 19: Ἐλθόντες εἰς τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ἀναμάρτητοι, νῦν ἐκ προαιρέσεως ἁμαρτάνομεν. 21: Αὐτεξούσιός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ ὁ διάβολος τὸ μὲν ὑποβάλλειν δύναται· τὸ δὲ καὶ ἀναγκάσαι παρὰ παροαίρεσιν οὐκ ἔχει τὴν ἐξουσίαν. Cat. xvi. 23 : Εἰ γάρ τις ἀβλεπτῶν μὴ καταξιοῦται τῆς χάριτος, μὴ μεμφέσθω τῷ πνεύματι ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπιστία. (Oudin, Comm. p. 461-464, attempted in vain to contest the genuineness of the catecheses favorable to Semipelagianism.)-Concerning Ephräm, see the above dissertation.Basil the Great delivered a discourse περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου, the authenticity of which was denied by Garnier (T. ii. p. xxvi.), but in modern times again defended by Pelt and Rheinwald (Homiliarium Patrist. i. 2, p. 192). In this, though he admitted the depravity of mankind, he asserted that human liberty and divine grace must coöperate. Comp. also the Hom. de Spir. S. and Klose, 1. c. p. 59, ss. [cf. Landerer, ubi supra, p. 556]-Gregory of Nyssa also takes for granted a universal bias to sin (De Orat. Dom. Or. v. Opp. i. p. 751, ss.), but finds no sin in infants; Orat. de infantibus qui præmature abripiuntur (Opp. iii. p. 317, ss.).

'See Hom. in Ep. ad Rom. xvi. p. 241; in Ep. ad Hebr. Hom. xii. p. 805. D; in Evang. Joh. Hom. xvii. p. 115 C; in 1 Epist. ad Cor. Hom. ii. p. 514, D; in Ps. 1. Hom. ii. (Opp. T. iii. p. 869, D); all of which are quoted by Münscher von Cölln, i. p. 363, ss.; see also ep. ad Phil. Hom. i.; especially on Phil. i. 6. "Chrysostom was so zealous for morality, that he must have considered it a point of special importance to deprive men of every ground of excuse for the neglect of moral efforts. His practical sphere of labor in the cities of Antioch and Constantinople gave a still greater impulse to this tendency. For in these large capitals he met with many who sought to attribute their want of Christian activity to the defects of human nature, and the power of Satan or of fate." Neander, Church Hist. (Torrey), ii. 658. Comp. his Chrysostomus, i. p. 51, p. 283, ss. But Chrysostom urged quite as strongly the existence of depravity in opposition to a false moral pride. Hom. vi. Montf. T. 12 (in Neander, Chrysostomus, ii. p. 36, 37), comp. Wiggers, i. p 442.

§ 109.

THE OPINIONS OF THE LATIN THEOLOGIANS BEFORE AUGUSTINE, AND OF AUGUSTINE BEFORE THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY.

During this period, as well as the preceding, the theologians of the Western church were more favorable than those of the Eastern, to the Augustinian doctrine. Even Arnobius speaks of a connatural infirmity, making man prone to sin.' Hilary, and Ambrose of Milan, taught the defilement of sin by birth; Ambrose appealed especially to Ps. li. 5, in support of original sin, but without determining to what extent every individual shares in the common guilt.' Nevertheless, neither of them excluded the liberty of man from the .work of moral reformation. Even Augustine himself, at an earlier period of his life, defended human freedom in opposition to the Manicheans.*

1

1 Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, i. 27: Proni ad culpas et ad libidinis varios appetitus, vitio sumus infirmitatis ingenitæ.

› Hilar. Tract. in Ps. lviii. p. 129; in Ps. cxviii. litt. 22, p. 366. 6, and some other passages (in Münscher von Cölln, p. 354). [Hilary in Psalın. i. § 4: Ad hæc nos vitia naturæ nostræ propellit instinctus. In Matth. xviii. 13: Ovis una homo intelligendus est, et sub homine uno universitas sentienda est; sed in unius Adæ errore omne hominum genus aberravit.] Ambrose, Apol. David. c. 11. Opp. i. p. 846: Antequam nascamur, maculamur conta gio, et ante usuram lucis, originis ipsius excipimus injuriam; in iniquitate concipimur: non expressit, utrum parentum, an nostra. Et in delictis generat unumquemque mater sua; nec hic declaravit, utrum in delictis suis mater pariat, an jam sint et aliqua delicta nascentis. Sed vide, ne utrumque intelligendum sit. Nec conceptus iniquitatis exsors est, quoniam et parentes non carent lapsu. Et si nec unius diei infans sine peccato est, multo magis nec illi materni conceptus dies sine peccato sunt. Concipimur ergo in peccato parentum et in delictis eorum nascimur. Sed et ipse partus habet contagia sua, nec unum tantummodo habet ipsa natura contagium. [Ambrose, Apol. David. § 71: Omnes in primo homine peccavimus et per naturæ successionem culpæ quoque ab uno in omnes transfusa est successio.] Comp. De Pœnit. i. 3. Opp. 3, p. 498: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est, sicut habes lectum, dicente David: Ecce enim in iniquitatibus conceptus sum et in delictis peperit me mater mea.-In Ev. Luke i. 17 (Opp. i. p. 737); Epp. Class. ii. (Opp. iii. p. 1190), and some other passages (in Münscher von Cölln, p. 355; after another edition)?

' Hilar. Tract. in Psalm cxviii. lit. 15, p. 329: Est quidem in fide manendi a Deo munus, sed incipiendi a nobis origo est. Et voluntas nostra hoc proprium ex se habere debet, ut velit. Deus incipienti incrementum dabit, quia consummaticnem per se infirmitas nostra non obtinet; meritum tamen adipiscendæ consummationis est ex initio voluntatis. Comp. also Arnobius,

Adv. Gentes, ii. 64: Nulli Deus infert necessitatem, imperiosa formidine nullam tenet...65. Quid est enim tam injustum, quam repugnantibus, quam invitis extorquere in contrarium voluntates, inculcare quod nolint et quod refugiant animis.

De Gen. contra Manich. ii. 43 (c. 29): Nos dicimus nulli naturæ nocere peccata nisi sua; nos dicimus, nullum malum esse naturali, sed omnes naturas bonas esse.-De lib. Arb. iii. 50 (c. 17): Aut enim et ipsa voluntas est et a radice ista voluntatis non receditur, aut non est voluntas, et peccatum nullum habet. Aut igitur ipsa voluntas est prima causa peccandi, aut nullum peccatum est prima causa peccandi. Non est, cui recte imputetur peccatum, nisi peccanti. Non est ergo, cui recte imputetur, nisi volenti... Quæcunque ista causa est voluntatis: si non ei potest resisti, sine peccato ei ceditur; si autem potest, non ei cedatur, et non peccabitur. An forte fallit incautum ? Ergo caveat, ne fallatur. An tanta fallacia est, ut caveri omnino non possit? Si ita est, nulla peccata sunt: quis enim peccat in eo, quod nullo modo caveri potest? Peccatur autem; caveri igitur potest. Comp. de Duab. Animab. contra Manich. 12, and with it the retractationes of the different passages; also de nat. et grat. 80 (c. 67).

§ 110.

THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY.

*Wiggers, G. F., Versuch einer pragmatischen Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus, Berlin, 1821. Hamburgh, 1833, ii. 8. [Vol. i. transl. by Prof. Emerson, Andover.] Lentzen, J. A., de Pelagianorum doctrinæ principiis, Colon. ad Rhen. 1833, 8. J. L. Jacobi, die Lehre des Pelagius, Lpz. 1842. [Theod. Gangauf, Metaph. Psychologie des heil. Augustinus. Augsb. 1852. Neander, in his Church Hist. and Hist. Dogm. 345-75. Jul. Müller, Der Pelagianismus, in Deutsche Zeitschrift, 1855. Bindemann's Augustinus. Zeller, in. Theol. Jahrbücher, 1854. P. Schaff, The Pelagian Controversy, Bibl. Sacra, 1848. Hampden's Bampton Lectures, Lect. iv.]

Towards the commencement of the fifth century, Celestius and Pelagius (Briton, Morgan ?) made their appearance in the West.' The views which they held were partly in accordance with the opinions hitherto entertained by the theologians of the Greek church, but in part carried to a much greater length in the denial of natural depravity. Some of the propositions, on the ground of which the presbyter Paulinus accused Celestius at the synod of Carthage (A. D. 412), had been previously defended by orthodox theologians; others were directly opposed both to the doctrine of Scripture (and especially that of Paul) and the general belief of the church, and thus threatened the fundamental doctrines of the Gospel.' It is, however, difficult to decide how far Pelagius accorded with all these assertions, since he expressed himself very cautiously.' But it is certain that what is commonly called Pelagianism does not so much represent the single notions of a single individual, as a