quoque venire in quæstionem potest, utrum anima ex patre, an potius ex matre, an vero ex utroque generetur. Nihil enim ex his tribus verum est, quia neque ex utroque, neque ex alterutro seruntur animæ. Corpus enim ex corporibus nasci potest, quoniam confertur aliquid ex utroque; de animis anima non potest, quia ex re tenui et incomprehensibili nihil potest decedere. Itaque serendarum animarum ratio uni ac soli Deo subjacet : "Denique cœlesti sumus omnes semine oriundi, ut ait Lucretius; nam de mortalibus non potest quidquam nisi mortale generari. Nec putari pater debet, qui transfudisse aut inspirasse animam de suo nullo modo sentit; nec, si sentiat, quando tamen et quomodo id fiat, habet animo comprehensum. Ex quo apparet, non a parentibus dari animas, sed ab uno eodemque omnium Deo patre, qui legem rationemque nascendi tenet solus, siquidem solus efficit; nam terreni parentis nihil est, nisi ut humorem corporis, in quo est materia nascendi, cum sensu voluptatis emittat vel reci piat, et citra hoc opus homo resistit, nec quidquam amplius potest; ideo nasci sibi filios optant, quia non ipsi faciunt. Cetera jam Dei sunt omnia: scilicet conceptus ipse et corporis informatio et inspiratio animæ et partus incolumis et quæcunque deinceps ad hominem conservandum valent; illius munus est, quod spiramus, quod vivimus, quod vigemus.-In opposition to Traducianism, he appeals to the fact, that intelligent parents have sometimes stupid chil dren, and vice versa, which could not well be ascribed to the influence of the stars!-In accordance with this opinion Hilary asserts Tract. in Ps. xci. § 3: Quotidie animarum origenes [et corporum figulationes] occulta et incognita nobis divinæ virtutis molitione procedunt. [Sec, also, Tract. in Psalm. cxviii. cap. i. Igitur vel quia in terræ hujus solo commoramur, vel quia ex terra instituti conformatique sumus, anima quæ alterius originis est, terræ corporis adhæsisse creditur.] Pelagius, and the Semipelagians, Cassian and Gennadius, adopted substantially the same view, see Wiggers, Augustin und Pelagius, i. p. 149, ii. p. 354. Pelagius taught (in Symb. quoted by Mansi, iv. p. 355): Animas a Deo dari credimus, quas ab ipso factas dicimus, anathematizantes eos, qui animas quasi partem divinæ dicunt esse substantiæ; Augustine agreed with him as far as the negative aspect of this proposition was concerned, Retract. i. 1: (Deus) animum non de se ipso genuit, sed de re nulla alia condidit, sicut condidit corpus e terra; he here refers, however, directly to the creation of our first parents. But Augustine does not expressly state, whether he thinks that the soul is newly created in every case; on the contrary, he declined to investigate this point: Nam quod attinet ad ejus (animi) originem, qua fit ut sit in corpore, utrum de illo uno sit, qui primum creatus est, quando factus est homo in animam vivam, an semper ita fiant singulis singuli, nec tunc sciebam (in his treatise Contra Academicos) nec adhuc scio. Comp. Ep. 140 (al. 120), ad Honorat. (T. ii. p. 320). When Jerome (Contra Error. Joann. Hierosolym. § 22) derives Creatianism from the words of Christ in John v., "My Father worketh hitherto," Augustine will not allow this argument to be valid, since the working of God is not excluded even upon the Traducian hypothesis; comp. Neander, Hist. Dogm. (Ryland), 365. [The opinion of Augustine upon this point has been much debated: Bellarmine and Staudenmaier contend that he was for creation; Melancthon, Klee, and others reckon him among the Traducianists; Gangauf (u. s.), Wiggers, and Ritter say that he was undecided. Bellarmine cites for Creatianism, Epist. 190, ad Optat. cap. 14: Illi, qui animas ex una propagari asserunt, quam Deus primo homini dedit, atque ita eas ex parentibus trahi dicunt, si Tertulliani opinionem sequuntur, profecto eas, non spiritus, sed corpora esse contendunt, et corpulentis seminibus exoriri, quo perversius quod dici potest? But this applies strictly only to Tertullian's corpulenta semina. He recognizes the connection between Traducianism and original sin, De Lib. Arb. lib. iii. cp. 56: Deinde si una anima facta est, ex qua omnium hominum animæ trahuntur nascentium, quis potest dicere, non se pecasse, cum primus ille peccavit. In his De Anima et ejus Orig. lib. 1. cp. 19, Num. 34, he says that he could accept Creatianism if four difficulties were removed; and in De Orig. Anim. cp. 28, he designates the chief of these difficulties, in connection with the doctrine of the salvation of children not baptized: Sed antequam sciam, quænam earum potius eligenda sit, hoc me non temere sentire profiteor, eam, quæ vera est, non adversari robustissimæ ac fundatissimæ fidei, qua Christi ecclesia nec parvulos homines recentissime natos a damnatione credit, nisi per gratiam nominis Christi, quam in suis sacramentis commendavit, posse liberari; comp. De Genesi ad Lit. Lib. x. cp. 23 Num. 39, and Epist. 169 ad Evodium, cp. 13. In Epist. 190 ad Optat. cp. 17, he says: Aliquid ergo certum de animæ origine nondum in scripturis canonicis comperi. And in Genes. ad Lit. x. 21, he says: Jam de ceterarum animarum adventu, utrum ex parentibus an desuper sit, vincant, qui poterunt; ego adhuc inter utrosque ambigo, et moveor aliquando sic, aliquando autem sic.]-The phrase mentioned before (note 2): Tv v x à v συνδημιουργηθῆναι τῷ σώματι, which was used by the Greek church, and is also found in the works of Theodoret (Fab. Hær. v. 9, p. 414), implies the doctrine commonly called Creatianism. Yet Traducianism continued to be professed not only by heterodox writers, e. g., Eunomius and Apollinaris, but also by some orthodox theologians, such as Gregory of Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. c. 29). The last directs our attention to the fact, that body and soul belong essentially together, and can not be possibly be imagined to be separated from each other: Αλλ' ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τοῦ διὰ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος συνεστηκότος, μίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοινὴν τὴς συστάσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑποτίθεσθαι, ὡς ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ προγενέστερός τε καὶ νεώτερος γένοιτο, τοῦ μὲν σωματικοῦ προτερεύοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου ἐφυστεpíšovτos, etc., which he proves by analogies drawn from nature. The views of Anastasius Sinaïta on this point are very materializing (Hom. in Bandini Monum. Eccles. Gr. T. ii. p. 54, in Münscher von Cölln, i. p. 332): Tò μὲν σῶνα ἐκ τῆς γυναικείας γῆς (Thiersch conjectures γονῆς, see the review in Zeitschrift f. d. luth. Theol. 1841, p. 184) kai aipaтos ovvioтaτaι ʼn dè ψυχὴ διὰ τῆς σπορᾶς, ὥσπερ διά τινος ἐμφυσήματος ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου áрpýτws μεтaðíðοтal. According to Jerome, Ep. 78, ad Marcellin. (Opp. T. ἀῤῥήτως μεταδίδοται. iv. p. 642, ap. Erasm. ii. p. 318), even, maxima pars occidentalium (probably of earlier times?) held the opinion, ut quomodo corpus ex corpore, sic anima nascatur ex anima et simili cum brutis animantibus conditione subsistat. But Jerome himself rejects all other systems, and designates Creatianism as the orthodox doctrine; Epist. ad Pammach. (Opp. T. iv. p. 318, ap. Erasm. ii. p. 170): Quotidie Deus fabricatur animas, cujus velle fecisse est et conditor esse non cessat...... Noli despicere bonitatem figuli tui, qui te plasmavit et fecit ut voluit. Ipse est Dei virtus et Dei sapientia, qui in utero virginis ædificavit sibi domum. The advocates of Creatianism saw in the birth of every human being something analogous to the miracle of Christ's incarnation on its physical side, without putting the one on a level with the other (which Jerome would have been the last to do); those who adopted Traducianism were compelled to consider Christ's birth as an exception to the rule; and even this exception seemed to require some limitation of the position, that Christ's human nature is consubstantial with ours. Many theologians, therefore, preferred obviating these difficulties, following Augustine's example, by directing attention to the impossibility of comprehending the origin and processes of existence. Thus Gregory the Great, Epp. vii. 59, ad Secundinum (Opp. ii. p. 970), says: Sed de hac re dulcissima mihi tua caritas sciat, quia de origine animæ inter sanctos Patres requisitio non parva versata est; sed utrum ipsa ab Adam descenderit, an certe singulis detur, incertum remansit, eamque in hac vita insolubilem fassi sunt esse quæstionem. Gravis enim est quæstio, nec valet ab homine comprehendi, quia si de Adam substantia cum carne nascitur, cur non etiam cum carne moritu? Si vero cum carne non nascitur, cur in ea carne, quæ de Adam prolata est, obligata peccatis tenetur? (he thus deduces Traducianism from the doctrine of original sin, the correctness of which he assumes, while the latter, on the contrary, was generally inferred from the former.) Hilary of Poitiers asserts (in Matth. Can. v. § 8), that the soul, whether in the body or out of the body, must always preserve its corporeal substance, because every thing that is created must exist in some form or other (in aliquo sit necesse est); reminding us of the views of Tertullian. Yet else where he views the soul as a spiritual, incorporeal being; comp. in Ps. lii. § 7, in Ps. cxxix. § 6 (nihil in se habens corporale, nihil terrenum, nihil grave, nihil caducum).-Augustine frankly acknowledges the difficulty of defining the relation in which the soul stands to the body, De Morib. Eccles. Cath. c. 4: Difficile est istam controversiam dijudicare, aut si ratione facile, oratione longum est. Quem laborem ac moram suscipere ac subire non opus est. Sive enim utrumque sive anima sola nomen hominis teneat, est hominis optimum quod optimum est corporis, sed quod aut corpori simul et animæ aut soli animæ optimum est, id est optimum hominis.-On the psychological views of Augustine, comp. Schleiermacher, Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 169, ss. [also Gangauf, Metaphysische Psychologie des heiligen Augustinus, Augsburg, 1852]; on those of Claudius Mamertus and Boëthius, ibid. p. 174.-According to Gregory the Great, man is composed of body and soul (Mor. xiv. c. 15). The principal properties of the soul are. mens, anima et virtus; comp. Lau, p. 370. * Leo the Great likewise declares it to be the doctrine of the church (Ep. 15, ad Turrib. Opp. Quesnel, p. 229, quoted in Münscher ed. by von Cölln, p. 331, note 11: Catholica fides...omnem hominem in corporis et animæ substantiam formari intra materna viscera confitetur. 6 Greg. Nyss. in verba: Faciamus hominem, Orat. 1, Opp. i. p. 143: Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν· τουτέστι, δώσομεν αὐτῷ λόγου περιουσίαν... Οὐ γὰρ τὰ πάθη εἰς τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰκόνα παρελήφθη, ἀλλ' ὁ λογισμὸς τῶν παθῶν δεσπότης. Athanasius speaks in the same manner, Orat. contra Gent. § 2. Cyrill. Hier. Cat. xiv. 10. The dominion over the animals was included. Gregory, 1. c. says: öπov тov aρxεiv dúvaμç, ¿Kεi ʼn Toй Oεov εikúv. Comp. Theodoret, in Genes. Quæst. 20. Chrys. Hom. viii. in Genes. (Opp. ii. p. 65, ss.). Aug. De Catechizandis Rudib. xvii. 20; De Genesi contra Manich. c. 17; de Trin. xii. 2; Sermo xlviii. (De Cura Anima); Quæ est imago Dei in nobis, nisi id quod melius reperitur nobis, nisi ratio, intellectus, memoria, voluntas.-The Semipelagians, Gennadius and Faustus, made a distinction between imago and similitudo, see Wiggers, ii. p. 356.— Gregory the Great regards the image of God, in which man was created, as soliditas ingenita (Mor. ix. c. 33), which was lost by the fall (Mor. xxix. c. 10), see Lau, p. 371. On the other traits of the first man as to body and soul, ibid. p. 372. Whether there is here a hint of the doctrine of donum superadditum, afterwards fully developed? ibid. p. 376. * Audœus (Udo), who lived at the commencement of the fourth century in Mesopotamia, a rigid and zealous ascetic, seems to have fallen into these notions through his essentially practical tendency; comp. Epiph. Hær. 70, who speaks very mildly of Audæus and his followers: οὔ τι ἔχων παρηλλαγ μένον τῆς πίστεως, ἀλλ ̓ ὀρθότατα μὲν πιστεύων αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἅμα avr. Theodoret takes the opposite view, Hist. Eccles. iv. 10 (kaiv☎v EVρETIS doуuáтwv), comp. Fab. Hær. iv. 10. Schröder, Diss. de Hæresi Audianor. Marb. 1716, 4. Neander, Kirchengeschichte, ii. p. 705. 7 Augustine, Sermo xlviii.: Anima etiam non moritur, nec succumbit per mortem, cum omnino sit immortalis, nec corporis materia, cum sit una numero. • Lact. Instit. Div. vii. 5 (in Münscher von Cölln, p. 336, comp. p. 338). Nemesius likewise (cap. i. p. 15), accedes in this point to the opinion of the earlier Greek theologians: Εβραῖοι δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε θνητὸν ὁμολογουμένως, οὔτε ἀθάνατον γεγενῆσθαί φασιν, ἀλλ' ἐν μεθορίοις ἑκατέ ρας φύσεως, ἵνα ἂν μὲν τοῖς σωματικοῖς ἀκολουθήσῃ πάθεσιν, περιπέσῃ καὶ ταῖς σωματικαῖς μεταβολαῖς· ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς προτιμήσῃ καλὰ, τῆς ȧ0avaoíaç ağıwon, K. T. λ. On the other hand, Gregory the Great teaches, that even if the soul lose blessedness, it cannot lose the essentialiter vivere (Dial. iv. c. 45). The body of man, too, was originally immortal, and became mortal through sin; comp. Moral. iv. c. 28, sq. Lau, ubi supra, p. 371, sq. [Comp. Wiggers, in Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theol. 1854.] § 107. ON THE DOCTRINE OF SIN IN GENERAL. Concerning the nature of sin, the generally received opinion was, that it has its seat in the will of man, and stands in the most intimate connection with his moral freedom. Augustine himself defended this doctrine (at least in his earlier writings),' which was opposed to the Manichean notion, that evil is inherent in matter. Lactantius, on the contrary, manifested a strong leaning towards Manicheism by designating the body as the seat and organ of sin.' The ascetic practices then so common, sufficiently indicate that the church tacitly approved of this view. Athanasius regarded sin as something negative, and believed it to consist in the blindness and indolence of man, which prevent him from elevating himself to God. Similar (negative) definitions were given by Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa. But sin was most frequently looked upon as opposition to the law of God, and rebellion against his holy will,' analogous to the sin of Adam, which was now generally viewed as an historical fact (contrary to the allegorical interpretation of Origen).. 1 Aug. de Duab. Animab. contra Manich. § 12 : Colligo nusquam nisi in voluntate esse peccatum; De Lib. Arb. iii. 49: Ipsa voluntas est prima causa peccandi. In many other passages he regards sin from the negative point of view as a conversio a majori bono ad minus bonum, defectio ab eo, quod summa est, ad id, quod minus est, perversitas voluntatis a summa substantia detortæ in infimum. See the passages in Julius Müller, die Lehre von der Sünde, i. p. 340, ss. 2 * Lact. Inst. Div. ii. 12, vi. 13; De Ira Dei 15: Nemo esse sine delicto potest, quamdiu indumento carnis oneratus est. Cujus infirmitas triplici modo subjacet dominio peccati, factis, dictis, cogitationibus. 3 Athan. contra gent. 4 (Opp. i. p. 4) : Ὄντα δέ ἐστι τὰ καλὰ, οὐκ ὄντα δὲ τὰ φαῦλα· ὄντα δέ φημι τὰ καλὰ, καθότι ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος θεοῦ τὰ παραδείγματα ἔχει· οὐκ ὄντα δὲ τὰ κακὰ λέγω, καθότι ἐπινοίαις ἀνθρώπον οὐκ ὄντα αναπέπλασται. Ibid. c. 7, p. 7 : Ὅτι τὸ κακὸν οὐ παρὰ θεοῦ οὐδὲ ἐν θεῷ, οὔτε ἐξ ἀρχῆς γέγονεν, οὔτε οὐσία τίς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ ἄνθρωποι κατὰ στέρησιν τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φαντασίας ἑαυτοῖς ἐπινοεῖν ἤρξαντο καὶ ἀναπλάττειν τὰ οὐκ ὄντα καὶ ἅπερ βούλονται. Comp. that which follows. Athanasius traces the sinful propensity of man to indolence, c. 3, p. 3: Oi đè ἄνθρωποι κατολιγωρήσαντες τῶν κρειῖτόνων, καὶ ὀκνήσαντες περὶ τὴν τούτων κατάληψιν, τὰ ἐγγυτέρω μᾶλλον ἑαυτῶν ἐζήτησαν. Indolence is allied with sensuality, because it clings to what is nearest, viz., the bodily and the visible. Comp. the subsequent part of the chapter. In the same manner Basil M. Hexaëmeron Hom. ii. p. 19 (Paris edit. 1638), says: Ov μὴν οὐδὲ παρὰ Θεοῦ τὸ κακὸν τὴν γένεσιν ἔχειν εὐσεβές ἐστι λέγειν, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων παρὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου γίνεσθαι, οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ θάνατον γεννᾷ, οὔτε ὁ σκότος φωτός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ, οὔτε ἡ νόσος ὑγείας δημιουργός.... . Τί οὖν φαμεν; Ὅτι κακόν ἐστιν οὐχὶ οὐσία ζῶσα καὶ ἔμψυχος, ἀλλὰ διάθεσις ἐν ψυχῇ ἐναντίως ἔχουσα πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀπόπτωσιν τοῖς ῥᾳθύμοις ἐγγινομένη.—Gregory of Nyssa, Orat. Catechet. c. 5 (Opp. iii. p. 53): Καθάπερ γὰρ ἡ ὅρασις φύσεών ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ πήρωσις στέρησίς ἐστι τῆς φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κακίαν ἀνθέστηκεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλην κακίας γένεσιν ἐννοῆσαι, ἢ |