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of the executive government. He would not deny but many occafions might arife, on which it would be imcumbent on Minifters to accede to propofitions for the production of public documents. On all queftions relating to the public revenue, to the application of the expenditure of that revenue, or to the magnitude and difpofal of the public force, it was competent for any noble Lord to move for fuch papers as tended to explain them, and it would be indecorous in Minifters to oppose the production of them. But where no ground of accufation had been laid down, and where the motives for producing them were only to be difcovered in vague and uncertain rumour, he thought it neither parlia mentary nor prudent to trouble his Majefty with an address for fuch purpofes; he would therefore give his diffent to the motion of the noble Earl.

The Earl of Carlisle could not agree with the noble Secretary of State as to the principle which he had laid down, that Minifters were to communicate or withhold information at their difcretion, on all public occafions, except fuch as arofe out of matters that were fairly before Parliament. They, the hereditary council of his Majefty, had a right to demand information, whenever the interests of either the Sovereign or the State were concerned; and it was the duty of Ministers to communicate it, except the publicity of it might operate to the difadvantage of the public fervice. He would even maintain, in oppofition to the noble Lord, that public rumour may be fometimes a good ground for requiring information. He asked, was it not notorious, that in all the circles, from the highest to the lowest in this country, it was ru moured, and generally believed, that Minifters had been extremely remifs in conveying intelligence to India of approaching hoftilities? It was ealily to be afcertained, fo negligent had they been in this refpect, that information of the war had been received from England, by private merchants in India, Seventeen days before the difpatches of Government arrived there. To what but this negligence, on the part of Govern ment, was the efcape of the French fquadron at Pondicherry owing? Admiral Linois, with an inferior force, was at anchor within the British fleet under the command of Admiral Rainier, and from fome information he had received, he had cut his cables, and was, perhaps, at this very moment, engaged in active and fuccessful hoftility against some of the most valuable of our fettlements in that part of the world. Surely if the Englith Admiral had been apprized of the probability, much

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lefs the actual commencement of a war, he would, as it would have been his duty to have done, detained the whole of the French fquadron. The public had a right to be fatisfied on this point, and therefore, unlefs Minifters produced fome better arguments against his motion, he muft perfevere in it.

Lord Hawkfbury muft ftill perfift in oppofing the motion; however, he had no hefitation in faying, that pending the negociation, and previous to his Majelty's meffage, difpatches had been fent to India with all poffible celerity, and by every means of communication, to apprize our naval and military commanders there, of the ftate of it, and the probable refumption of hoftilities. His Majefty's Government, at leaft that department of it, had alfo, in a fubfequent period of the negociation, made fimilar communication; and when hoftilities actually commenced, they transmitted intelligence of it, by all means in their power, to India.

Earl Spencer expreffed much furprife at the determination. of Minifters to oppofe the motion of his noble Friend. They had, if he was well-informed, and he drew his information from a fource which, though not official, was, notwithstanding, in his opinion, too authentic to be queftioned, been guilty of unpardonable neglect in not conveying the earliest intelligence of the war to our fettlements in India. The official difpatches were tranfmitted by a frigate which had to fee a convoy, that was put under her protection, fafe into Lifbon; by which means an unavoidable delay of at least 16 or 18 days was produced. If he would credit authority he had no reafon to doubt, Admiral Rainier was not apprized, on the 12th of Auguft, of what had taken place in Europe on the 10th of March, full five months before. Suppofe the circumstances of the two fleets had been different, and that Admiral Rainier, with an inferior force, had been anchored infide the French fquadron, could any one imagine that Admiral Linois, on the 12th of Auguft, on the night of which he flipped his cables, would have hefitated on the capture of the British fquadron? There was certainly great blame imputable to fome quarter, and it was the duty of the House to examine it thoroughly.

Lerd Hobart oppofed the motion, and maintained that there had been no negligence on the part of Minifters. The frigate which carried out difpatches, failed direct for India, and

an extraordinary quick paffage. Our commanders there had timely notice of the fate of affairs in Europe, and inftructions for their conduct in cafe of the refumption of hotilities. As to the efcape of Admiral Linois' fquadron, he

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was fure no blame could attach either to the Executive Government, or to his Majefty's Commander in those feas upon that account. In fact, Admiral Rainier was apprised of the probability of the recommencement of the war when the French fquadron arrived at Pondicherry, and it was actually under confideration to detain Admiral Linois, when he was fo fortunate as to make his escape.

The Earl of Carnarvon-If there was no argument adduced but what may be drawn from the unwillingness in Government to produce papers whofe dates of tranfmiffion and reception are the principal objects defired, and against which the flightest objection is not pretended, I fhould ftrongly be of opinion that the Houfe fhould require their production; but more fubftantial grounds to fupport my noble Friend's mo tion cannot exist than that of a general prevalent opinion that Admiral Rainier was left till the 12th of Auguft, without an official communication of the fituation in which this country was involved, and without inftructions for his conduct, and that this omiffion enabled Admiral Linois to escape with his fquadron from the fituation in which he might have been detained. The noble Secretary of State has fufficiently confirmed the fuppofed fact, by confining his affirmation to the information which he fays Admiral Rainier had of the rupture with France, without ftating it to be official; and certainly it was not accompanied with inftructions how to act; for the noble Secretary infers the knowledge of Admiral Rainier, from the uncertainty and doubt prevailing in his mind how he should act, under the circumftances of probable hoftility, Admiral Linois' fquadron being in his power. The refult of this is, that report has probably accurately ftated the fact, that Admiral Rainier received private information of a rupture, long before he received official difpatches, which were fent by a frigate impeded by its convoy, and directed to touch at various places in its way; and that he did not receive official information and inftructions till. Admiral Linois had received official information, and in confequence departed fuddenly and privately at midnight. This, if true, is a grofs neglect, which merits the moft ferious inquiry. The capture of the French fleet commanded by Admiral Linois must have been of the utmost importance. The mifchief which our trade may fuffer from their efcape is the probable confequence of this criminal neglect; and strong reports exift that our India trade has greatly fuffered; other mifchiefs which may follow are incalculable. It is admit

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ted by the noble Secretary that private information did arrive in time, but not of fufficient authority to enable Admiral Rainier to have detained Linois' fquadron in port. It is clear from his acknowledged doubts and uncertainty, that he had no inftructions how to act, which occafioned his uncertainty and the lofs of that advantage. That Admiral Linois received his official information fooner, his efcape and a midnight departure proves. Private information received (which could have no other effect than strong and probable report) is a proof that official information might have been received; and private or even official information received, which left him in uncertainty how to act, is a proof that no proper inftructions were fent. I am therefore fully fatisfied, that the motion of my noble Friend thould be fupported, and that the minifterial motive for withholding the information is the criminal matter they will expofe.

Lord Harowby declared, that on the first view of the matter he was inclined to think the motion not fufficiently warranted. From the grounds, however, which had fince been ftated in fupport of it, he could not help giving it his decided fupport.

The Houfe then divided on Lord Carlisle's motion:

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Lord Hobart, previous to the fecond reading of the bill to enable his Majefty to accept the fervices of the Irish militia, moved that his Majefty's meffage on the loyal and spirited offers of the Irifh militia fhould be read. His Lordship then declared, that he prefumed there would be no difference of opinion in that Houfe, with refpect to the principle which gave rife to the prefent bill, and which, carried to a further extent, would fanction the policy of occafional interchanges of the militia of the two countries. But that, was not the question now before them. The prudence or neceffity of fuch reciprocity was not now to be difcuffed; but as it appeared on the face of the bill before the Houfe, they were called upon merely to determine, whether they would

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or would not enable his Majesty to avail himself of the spirited offers that had been made to him from motives of loyalty to his person, and of kindness and attachment to the welfare and interests of this part of the empire. As he prefumed there could be no difference of fentiment on that point, however there may be on others, he would no longer detain their Lordships, but move that the bill be read a second time.

Lord Boringdon felt himfelf under the neceffity of oppofing the fecond reading of the bill, upon many confiderations, but principally two, which in his mind were decifive against the measure. One was, that it would tend, in fome measure, to fubvert the principles upon which the militia force was originally established; and the other was, that it was withdrawing a force which, however inconfiderable in itself, was neceffary for the defence of Ireland, and could afford no material addition to the force already collected for the defence of Great Britain. His Lordship was no enemy to the principle that all parts of the united kingdom thould affift each other reciprocally, but he would rather fee that difpofition manifefted by other measures than a mere interchange of their several militia forces. He wished really to see the principles of the union fairly acted upon. It was now four years fince that great political change had been effected, and what, he would afk, had the Government done for Ireland? If he could argue from certain facts, when he confidered the correfpondence that had paffed between a noble Peer of that Houfe (Lord Redefdale) and the Earl of Fingal, and that the former noble Lord ftill remained in a high official fituation in that country, he was juftified in entertaining fome doubts of the intentions of Minifters towards it. If Minifters approved of the conduct of that noble Lord, why not declare to? If they did not, it was incumbent upon them to difavow the opinions he had promulgated, and to recall him. But this, however defirable in point of juftice or of `policy, he despaired of seeing accomplished, when he recollected that the great vital and effential principle upon which the prefent Minifters held their official fituations was oppofition to the only meafure that could give fatisfaction or permanent tranquillity to Ireland.

The Duke of Cumberland would occupy but a very small portion of their Lordthips' time. He rofe for the purpose of expreffing his approbation of the bill, as tending to eltablish VOL. II. 1803-4.

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