the Jews that they understood not their own Scriptures, which they justly held in such deep reverence, and studied with such intense diligence: if we are assured that the meaning of his own sayings was frequently concealed even from his disciples; if St. Peter has declared, that in all St. Paul's Epistles there were some things hard to be understood, particularly on this topic of the day of judgment: nay, if we must needs confess, that in every thing with which we are conversant, the faculties of our minds, or the structure of our bodies, in all nature, animate or inanimate, there is much which defies our utmost sagacity to comprehend, or rather little which we do perfectly understand-surely, it can be matter of no surprise to us, that in reflecting upon the mysteries of revelation, the deep things of God, (as the Apostle calls them) our minds should frequently be lost and confounded, in endeavouring to penetrate their obscurity, or to reach their sublimity. Without, therefore, attempting to speculate upon the remoteness or proximity of the day of judgment, of which abundant experience has long since demonstrated the folly and presumption: I shall consider the text entirely in a practical very point of view, and draw such inferences from it as should naturally produce the most salutary effects upon our conduct. It is, in fact, as to us, an exhortation to vigilance, with respect to our thoughts, principles, and actions, founded upon the absolute ignorance in which we live, of the period when our present existence will terminate; and of the certainty that we shall hereafter be strictly responsible for those things which will no longer be capable of change or amendment. The hour in which we shall cease to breathe, and that in which our Lord shall come, being, as to us, precisely the same thing. It is a powerful argument in favour of the truth of our holy religion, that its doctrines, when rightly understood, will be found to harmonize with the established order of things; that order I mean which is established by Divine Providence, and not that which depends upon merely human and variable institutions; and the soundness of any doctrines which cannot be reconciled with the former, may justly be regarded with great suspicion. Now, the complete uncertainty of the duration of human life, is a fact which admits not of the slightest question. Almost every man's experience will supply him with numerous instances of its most unexpected termination, and of its equally remarkable prolongation; insomuch, that youth itself affords no ground for confidence in its continuance, nor has age any reason to dread its sudden conclusion.If we apply this as a test to any of the great practical doctrines of our religion, we shall find that it will contribute powerfully to their support; and above all, it will shew the necessity for that vigilance which is so emphatically enjoined by the text. That God has created us, neither for perfect happiness nor for extreme misery, but for that mixed state, in which the good generally so far exceeds the evil, as to attach us sufficiently to life for all the purposes of our present existence; yet, does not so far predominate as to prevent us from quitting it with fortitude, in sure expectation of another, is a doctrine that pervades the whole of the Scriptures, and is agreeable to our constant experience. But could this be true, if our lives consisted of any known definite period, whether long or short? Could such a state of things be compatible with any thing like happiness, or at least with that degree of it, which is commonly attainable by F us? Certainly it could not. The knowledge of the day of our death, at whatever period, would of itself be sufficient to embitter every hour of our existence. This idea would always be present in our minds, and exercise not a salutary, but a depressing and debilitating influence over our thoughts and actions. For although this period, as we advance in years, gradually approaches to certainty, yet, generally speaking, it seldom attains it, at least but for a very short time before its actual arrival; and the having passed our lives in a constant uncertainty in this respect, habituates the mind to a state of indifference on the subject, which must conduce greatly to our comfort. But even were this otherwise with respect to ourselves,-could the knowledge of the allotted length of our days operate so beneficially upon our conduct, as to promote rather than to impede our happiness-what must be its effect upon others-upon those with whom we are connected by the ties of blood or affection? Must it not greatly impair the felicity of the connubial state, and aggravate the sorrows of the separation of parents and children? Not to be able to look upon those whom we love, without a melan choly anticipation of the precise moment, when we must part with them for ever, at least in this world, must be distressing in the highest degree. That, upon the whole, it would sensibly diminish the enjoyment of human life, can admit of no doubt; and, therefore, we cannot but conclude that Providence, in withholding this knowledge from us, has consulted our good only, so far as this life is concerned. But if it be instrumental to our happiness, it must be no less so to our virtue : for the latter is the only real foundation of the former. If many persons will, nevertheless, persist in seeking it, through the medium of their vices, well knowing the tendency which most of them have to shorten their existence, what bounds would they set to the gratification of their passions, were all apprehensions of this sort banished from their minds? Where would the sensualist or the profligate stop, if they were secure of present impunity for all their transgressions? Indeed, in this point of view, a fixed term of life seems not only undesirable, but, humanly speaking, impossible. Another leading doctrine of our religion, inculcates the necessity for that repentance, |