THE great increase which of late years has taken place in the duties to be discharged by the Lord High Chancellor of England, and the serious inconveniences resulting from delay in matters of such high importance, appeared to those best acquainted with the subject to demand the interference of the legislature. It had become evident, that if some remedy were not adopted, the whole of the judicial code of the country must be affected, and great injury done to the subject. There had accumulated at this time in the House of Lords an arrear of 280 appeals, which, computing by the average rate at which such causes had of late been decided, could not be deter mined in less than eleven years.-This in itself was a serious grievance to suitors; but the evil did not stop here, for by the delay in ruling disputed points of law, the number of new appeals was greatly augmented. In the determination of the causes actually under appeal, doubtful principles of law were often involved; and till a decision was obtained, the subject was kept in ignorance of the law of the land, and thus litigation was greatly increased. The delay offered a strong temptation also to present appeals for the mere purpose of postponing the effects of judgments; as it was obvi

ous to unsuccessful litigants, that by moving into the House of Lords they could put off the decision for a term of years. The successful suitor might thus have been deprived of the benefit of the judgment, and of the justice awarded to him for no less a period than eleven years. It was the bounden duty of the legislature, therefore, to establish some remedy for evils of this magnitude.

The nature and extent of the evil could hardly admit of dispute, but as to the most suitable remedy different opinions were entertained. It was suggested that the Lords might, by some new distribution of their business, get over the arrear of causes now before them, and prevent the recurrence of similar arrears in future-To accomplish this it was proposed, that they should sit after the session for the general political business of the country was closed, and continue for a time to discharge their judicial functions. But to suppose that the Lords would remain in town to hear appeals after the other affairs of parliament were dispatched, was absurd. There was a strong constitutional objection also to the measure, viz. that it could not be adopted without trenching upon the prerogative of the crown in the prorogation of parliament. Such a regula

tion must have placed the crown in the delicate and awkward situation of either permitting parliament to sit af ter the national business for which it had been assembled was finished, or of doing injustice to the claimants who were at the bar of the House of Lords. As to another proposal that the House of Lords should appoint a committee or delegation of its members to hear appeals, such a measure would also have been repugnant to the constitution. The public besides had no right to expect from the House of Lords that they would depart from their usual habits of business; nor would the evil have been remedied even had their lordships consented instead of five months to sit for twice that time, un. less the great advantage had been foregone of having the Lord Chancellor as the presiding officer in the House of Peers. Without encountering this most serious inconvenience the remedy first projected would have been only an exchange of one evil for another, and would have transferred the arrears from the House of Lords to the court of Chancery, by occupying that portion of the Lord Chancellor's time in the former, which during the recess he is accustomed to devote to the latter. It was proposed by some persons that the Lord Chancellor should with draw from his high situation in the House of Peers, and confine himself to the business of his own court of Chancery. But to this project there were many obvious objections. The most eminent statesmen who have turned their attention to this point have been agreed in opinion, that such an alteration would derogate from the dignity of the House. No other individual could be found so well qualified to discharge this laborious duty; for although there are several eminent peers capable of performing it, it would have been absurd to think of building a permanent measure upon

the prospect of assistance from peers, not of necessity bound to devote themselves to the public service.-The only other plan, therefore, which could be proposed, was that the Chancellor should be relieved to a certain extent of his duties in the court of Chancery, and be thus enabled to devote more of his time to the other high duties of his office. The question then arose (since it was necessary to provide some aid in the court of Chancery) whether such aid could be drawn from the other courts of law, or whether a new office must be created?n the Court of Chancery itself there was a great, if not a growing, arrear of business—a serious evil, for which there appeared to be no remedy, unless by creating a similar evil in another quarter-for if the Lord Chancellor had not hitherto called in the assistance of the Master of the Rolls, it was only because that could not be done without creating much confusion in the Rolls Court. None of the other courts were in a situation to afford help, but were all so pressed with business, that the judges, with all their diligence, could not fully discharge their duties. The court of Chancery too could only draw aid from a court, the decisions of which rested on principles of equity, and were analogous to its own: But there is no court in Westminster-hall, except the court of Exchequer, which acts upon principles of equity; and so far was that court from being able to afford the aid required, that there had been a serious proposal for requiring an additional effective judge in the Exchequer, the arrear of business being even more pressing in that court than in the court of Chancery. If the court of Exchequer could not supply the want, no other court in Westminsterhall could. It was thought impossible, therefore, that aid could be derived from any of the courts in Westminster-hall, It was in consequence

proposed that a permanent officer should be appointed in aid of the Lord Chancellor. Some persons imagined, however, that such a measure would lead to great innovations in the mode of conducting business in the court of Chancery; but nothing could be more inconsistent with the principles on which the measure was founded, than such a supposition. The appointment of a Vice-Chancellor involved the smallest departure from ancient practice, and was scarcely an innovation The chancellor already had the privilege of calling in the assistance of the nine puisne judges, together with that of two masters in Chancery, and it was intended that he should in future have permanent instead of temporary assist ance. The Chancellor besides had already the privilege of calling in the assistance of the Master of the Rolls; and when that officer assisted the Chancellor, he was as much under his direction as the judges under a commission, or the Vice-Chancellor whom it was now proposed to appoint. The ob. ject of the bill, in short, was to afford to the Lord Chancellor permanent instead of temporary assistance in the transaction of the business of the court of Chancery. This plan did not imply any innovation in the mode of transacting business, although on this ground chiefly it was opposed.

In support of the bill, it was stated "that it would not occasion any additional expense to the public, though it would be productive of so great benefit to the suitors in Chancery; and the question was, whether with those advantages to the suitor, with the removal of the evil complained of, and while no better plan was proposed, parliament should hesitate? One half of the expense of the office would be charged on the profits of the Lord Chancellor, in the business of the court; the other half would be taken from what was called the dead cash,

or suitors' fund, the annual revenue of which at this time was 9000l. The revenue of that fund had on various occasions been applied, under the authority of parliament, for analogous purposes, and could not certainly be devoted to any better use than the support of that officer whose appointment was in contemplation The fund consisted of unclaimed monies in Chancery, which had been allowed to accumulate at interest. The salaries of the masters in Chancery, and of superannuated officers, were paid out of it; and the sum of 9000l. per annum was its present clear revenue unappropriated. Thus, as far as related to economy, there could be no objection to the bill. It had been said that there were other means by which the object of the bill could be more effectually attained, and it had been proposed to take the management of the bankruptcy business out of the hands of the Lord Chancellor. But even allowing that this branch of business might with propriety be taken from the Lord Chancellor, still it would be necessary to have a Vice-Chancellor. But the bankruptcy law was so particularly important in a commercial country, that it would be highly dangerous to entrust it to any authority subordinate to that of the Lord Chancellor. It had been objected, that in the distribution of the business in the court of Chancery the bill enabled the Lord Chancellor to direct the whole at his pleasure; that he might allow the Vice Chancellor to decide upon matters of such difficulty, that no authority short of the Lord Chancellor's should be allowed to dispose of them; or, on the other hand, he might only entrust to him matters of minor importance, and by such an arrangement the character of the new magistrate must be degraded. To this it was answered, that the possible abuse of beneficial powers ought not to be al

ledged as an argument against granting them, and that it ought on the contrary to be presumed that the discretion thus vested in the first law officer of the country would be soundly exercised. It was needless to speak at large on the impropriety of supposing, that any person vested with so high an office as that of Lord Chancellor, could be guilty of such a breach of all the ties of duty and of honour.Much had been said about the increase of appeals which would be occasioned by the adoption of the measure before the House, and the erection of an intermediate jurisdiction. But it was the interest of the suitors to have their causes speedily decided, and the Lord Chancellor would have the power of bringing at once before himself such causes as were most likely to be matter of appeal. At any rate, the objection did not apply with greater force in this case than it did to the courts of the Master of the Rolls, and of the puisne judges acting under commission; and surely the power of distri. buting business afforded such additional means of dispatch, as to counterbalance any evils which might arise from the increase of appeals.-It had been urged, that the measure would transform the first law officer of the kingdom into a mere politician, since he might now entrust the decision of all matters of importance to the ViceChancellor. But never was any opinion more absurd, than that which supposed that a chancellor would abdicate his judicial character; the honour and responsibility of this high officer affords sufficient security against such an event. Why might not the chief Justice of the King's Bench too withdraw from the execution of his duties, and intrust the functions of his office to his assistants? Lord Ellenborough was bound to the performance of the eties of his office only by ties similar those which bound the Lord Chan

cellor; there is no law which prevents his withdrawing himself entirely from his court, yet would any man dream of the possibility of such an event? Was it not a suspicion equally chimerical, to suppose that the Lord Chancellor would remain idle, and leave his business to be transacted by the ViceChancellor? It would be absurd to legislate on such fancies. In Ireland, business was so arranged that the Master of the Rolls afforded the same assistance to the Lord Chancellor which was here proposed to be given by the Vice-Chancellor. When the bill creating such regulations was first proposed, objections had been made to it similar to those now started to the present bill. The object which both the bills had in view was similar, namely, to provide an auxiliary to the Lord Chancellor; and it was then said as now, that the Chancellor (Lord Clare) would become a mere state officer. The best answer to this objection was furnished by the conduct of the four distinguished persons who had since the above period filled that high station. Not one of these eminent characters had ever withdrawn for a moment from his judicial business for political purposes, or ever betook himself to the Master of the Rolls except as an auxiliary. Experience proved that the object had been attained in the case of the Irish bill, so that it was but rational to conclude that the same object would be effectually accomplished by the bill under the con sideration of the House.-Some persons had maintained that the whole expense of the office of Vice-Chancellor should be charged upon the emoluments which the Lord Chancellor derived from the business in the court of chancery. That noble lord (the Chancellor) had stated, at the very commencement of the enquiry, that he wished for no profit which was not purchased by beneficial labour; yet,

when the importance and dignity of his office were considered, and when the extent of the labour attendant on the execution of its duties were estimated, it would appear but reasonable that the Lord Chancellor should live with great splendour. He should have the means of providing for his family for it was to be remembered that there was always much uncertainty as to his continuance in office. The pension of 4000l. to ex-chancellors was by no means sufficient of it self for this purpose, and it should be remembered that there were many distinguished noblemen who owed the rank and fortune of their families to the dignified labours of their ancestors who filled the office of Lord Chancel lor. It seemed to be reasonable that this office should be endowed more liberally than any other; and that its income should not be looked upon with jealousy. The office exposes the holder to greater cares and to more political uncertainty than other judicial situations which are held during life, at least during good behaviour. Under these circumstances parliament would not think of making encroachments upon the revenues de rived by the Lord Chancellor from his office. The measure, therefore, being charged with little or no expense, while it was calculated to remedy two great evils; and coming recommended, as it did, by the sanction of all the great legal characters, seemed to be of such a nature, that all parties might be expected to concur in it."

Mr Canning distinguished himself by his opposition to this measure, and as his speech contains a good summary of the arguments urged against the bill, it shall be inserted in his own words. On the 11th February, when the second reading of the bill was moved by Lord Castlereagh, Mr Carning observed, "It seemed to be maintained that the members of this House were not fit to judge of such a ques

tion. If that disqualification were supposed to apply generally, much more forcibly must it apply to those members (of whom he was one) who could boast of no means of forming a judgment but plain sense unadorned with legal learning. He must, however, protest against any such plea in bar of their discussions; and must deny that the lay part of the House were implicitly to adopt the dicto of certain learned personages in matter not of law but of regulation. He yielded all respect possible to the House of Lords, but could not consent to pass the bill they had sent down without examination. Some considerations indeed there were which might perhaps tend to diminish in this particular instance the general respect due to the authority of their lordships. It appeared on the very face of the bill that it arose out of arrears in their lordships' jurisdiction. They might be better judges of the extent of the evil, but if the evil lay with them the Commons ought not to exercise the less jealousy in the examination of the remedy proposed. A learned friend of his had set out with rebuking an excess of levity, and a want of grave consideration on this subject; but he should have been aware that the sources of ridicule were not merely in things which were themselves ridi culous, but also in the attempted approximation of things which were not in themselves reconcileable-in the comparison of lofty pretensions with paltry means in the contrast of mag. nificent promises with the total inadequacy of the mode suggested for following up and realizing them. If the bill was to be considered as the result of all the experience and wisdom of the other house, undoubtedly on that ground, and in that character, it was to be received with the greatest reverence; but if it was found that all this learned labour had only produced an office, which the legal profession