THE British government had unwillingly embarked in the war with America, and was still desirous of bringing the contest to a speedy and amicable conclusion. With this view negocia tions had been opened during the last year; but such were the pretensions of the American government, that every attempt at conciliation was frustrated. The British ministers were anxious to justify their conduct, on this occasion, in the face of the world; and to exhibit a fair account of the origin and 'causes of the war. On the 9th of January, therefore, they issued a Declaration on this subject, which contained an excellent summary of the whole of our transactions with America, and an ample vindication of the conduct of Great Britain.

The Declaration stated, that no desire of conquest could be imputed to Great Britain; that her commercial interests were on the side of peace, if war could have been avoided; that she had throughout acted towards the United States of America with a spirit of amity, forbearance, and conciliation. That it had been the invariable object of the ruler of France

to destroy the power and independence of the British empire, as the chief ob stacle to the accomplishment of his ambitious designs; that he first contemplated the possibility of assembling such a naval force in the channel, as, combined with a numerous flotilla, should enable him to disembark in England an army sufficient, in his conception, to subjugate this country; but by the adoption of an enlarged and provident system of internal defence, and by the valour of his majesty's fleets and armies, this design was entirely frustrated, and the naval force of France, after the most signal defeats, was compelled to retire from the ocean. That an attempt was then made to effectuate the same purpose by other means; a system was brought forward, by which the ruler of France hoped to annihilate the commerce of Great Britain, to shake her public credit, and to destroy her revenue; to render useless her maritime superiority, and so to avail himself of his continental ascendancy, as to constitute himself, in a great measure, the arbiter of the ocean, notwithstanding the destruction of his fleets.

That with this view, by the decree of Berlin, followed by that of Milan, he declared the British territories to be in a state of blockade; and all commerce, or even correspondence, with Great Britain was prohibited. He decreed that every vessel and cargo which had entered, or was found proceeding to a British port, or which, under any circumstances, had been visited by a British ship of war, should be lawful prize. He declared all British goods and produce, wherever found, and however acquired, subject to confisca tion. He further denationalized the flag of all neutral ships which should be found offending against these his decrees; and he gave to this project of universal tyranny, the name of "the Continental System."

That under circumstances of unparalleled provocation, his majesty had abstained from any measure which the ordinary rules of the law of nations did not fully warrant. Never was the maritime superiority of a belligerent over the enemy more complete and decided than was that of Great Britain; and France had already trampled so openly and systematically on the most sacred rights of neutral pow. ers, as might well have justified the placing her out of the pale of civilized Dations. Yet, in this extreme case, Great Britain had so used her naval ascendancy, that her enemy could find no just cause of complaint; and in order to give to these lawless decrees the appearance of retaliation, the ruler of France was obliged to advance principles of maritime law, unsanctioned by any other authority than his own arbitrary will.

That against these decrees his majesty protested and appealed; he called upon the United States to assert their own rights, and to vindicate their independence, thus menaced and at tacked. The order of January 1807, was then issued, as an act of mitigated

retaliation, after which followed the order of the 11th November, of the same year. At the same time his majesty intimated his readiness to repeal the orders in council, so soon as France should rescind her decrees, and return to the accustomed principles of maritime warfare; and afterwards, the operation of the orders in council was, by an order issued in April 1809, limited to a blockade of France, and of the countries subjected to her immediate dominion. That systems of violence, oppression, and tyranny, can never be suppressed, if the power against which such injustice is exercised, be debarred from the right of full and adequate retaliation. That the government of the United States did not fail to remonstrate against the orders in council of Great Britain. Applying most unjustly the same measure of resentment to the aggressor, and to the party aggrieved, it adopted measures of commercial resistance against both-a system of resistance which, however varied in the successive acts of embargo, non-intercourse, or nonimportation, was evidently unequal in its operation, and principally levelled against the superior commerce and maritime power of Great Britain.

That the same partiality towards France was observable in negociation as in the measures of alleged resistance.-Application was made to both belligerents for a revocation of their respective edicts; but the terms in which these applications were made were widely different.-Of France was required a revocation only of the Berlin and Milan decrees, although many other edicts, grossly violating the neutral commerce of the United States, had been promulgated by that power, No security was demanded, that the Berlin and Milan decrees, even if revoked, should not, under some other form, be re-established; and a direct engagement was offered, that upon

such revocation the American government would take part in the war against Great Britain, if Great Britain did not immediately rescind her orders. No corresponding engagement was offered to Great Britain, of whom it was required, not only that the orders in council should be repeal ed, but that no others of a similar nature should be issued, and that the blockade of May 1806 should be also abandoned. This blockade, established and enforced according to accustomed practice, had not been objected to by the United States at the time it was issued. Its provisions were on the contrary represented by the American minister resident in London at the time, to have been so framed, as to afford, in his judgment, a proof of the friendly disposition of the British cabinet towards the United States.-Great Britain was thus called upon to abandon one of her most important maritime rights, by acknowledging the order of blockade in question to be one of the edicts which violated the commerce of the United States, although it had never been so considered in the previous negociations, and although the president of the United States had recently consented to abrogate the non-intercourse act, on the sole condition of the orders in council being revoked, thereby distinctly admitting these orders to be the only edicts, which fell within the contemplation of the law, under which he acted. That a proposition so hostile to Great Britain could not but be encouraging to the pretensions of the enemy; as, by thus alledging that the blockade of May 1806 was illegal, the American government virtually justified, so far as depended on them, the French decrees.

That after this proposition had been made, the French minister for foreign affairs, if not in concert with the Ãmerican government, at least in con

formity with its views, in a dispa dated the 5th of August 1810, addressed to the American mini resident at Paris, stated that the Be and Milan decrees were revoked, that their operation would cease fi the 1st day of November followi provided his majesty would revi his orders in council, and renounce new principles of blockade; or t the United States would cause ti rights to be respected; meaning th by, that they would resist the reta tory measures of Great Britain That although the repeal of the Fre decrees thus announced was eviden contingent, either on concessions be made by Great Britain, (con sions to which it was obvious Gr Britain could not submit) or on m sures to be adopted by the Uni States of America, the Ameri President at once considered the peal as absolute. Under that F tence the non-importation act strictly enforced against Great I tain, whilst the ships of war and m chant ships of the enemy were ceived into the harbours of America The American government assum the repeal of the French decrees to absolute and effectual, most unjus required Great Britain, in conform to her declarations, to revoke her ders in council. The British gove ment denied that the repeal, wh was announced in the letter of French minister for foreign affai was such as ought to satisfy Gr Britain; and in order to ascertain true character of the measure adop by France, the government of United States was called upon to p duce the instrument, by which the ledged repeal of the French decr had been effected. If these decr were really revoked, such an inst ment must exist, and no satisfacto reason could be given for withho ing it.

That at length, on the 21st of May 1812, and not before, the American minister in London did produce a copy, or at least what purported to be a copy, of such an instrument. It professed to bear date the 28th of April 1811, long subsequent to the dispatch of the French minister for foreign affairs of the 5th of August 1810, or even the day named therein, viz. the 1st November following, when the operation of the French decrees was to cease. This instrument expressly declared that these French decrees were repealed in consequence of the American legislature having, by their act of the 1st of March 1811, provided that British ships and merchandize should be excluded from the ports and harbours of the United, States.

That by this instrument, (the only document produced by America as a repeal of the French decrees,) it appeared beyond a possibility of doubt or cavil, that the alledged repeal of the French decrees was conditional, as Great Britain had asserted; and not absolute or final, as had been maintained by America; that they were not repealed at the time they were stated to be repealed by the American government; that they were not repealed in conformity with a proposition simultaneously made to both belligerents, but in consequence of a previous act on the part of the American government in favour of one belligerent to the prejudice of the other. That the American government having adopted measures restrictive upon the commerce of both belligerents, in consequence of edicts is sued by both, rescinded these measures as they affected that power which was the aggressor, whilst it put them in full operation against the party aggrieved, although the edicts of both powers continued in force; and, lastly, that they excluded the ships of war

belonging to one belligerent, whilst they admitted into their ports and har bours the ships of war belonging to the other, in violation of one of the plainest and most essential duties of a neutral nation.

That although the instrument thus produced was liable to the strongest suspicions, yet as it was presented by the American minister, the British government conditionally revoked the orders in council; and in order to provide for the contingency of a declaration of war on the part of the United States, previous to the arrival in America of the said order of revocation, instructions were sent to his majesty's minister plenipotentiary accredited to the United States (the execution of which instructions, in consequence of the discontinuance of Mr Foster's functions, was at a subsequent period entrusted to admiral Sir John Borlase Warren) directing him to propose a cessation of hostilities should they have commenced; and further to offer a simultaneous repeal of the orders in council on one side, and of the restrictive laws on British ships and commerce on the other. They were also respectively empowered to acquaint the American government, in reply to any enquiries with respect to the blockade of May 1806, that whilst the British government must continue to maintain its legality, yet in point of fact this par. ticular blockade had been discontinued for a length of time, and that his majesty's government had no intention of recurring to this, or to any other of the blockades of the enemy's ports, without a new notice to neutral powers in the usual form.

That the American government, before receiving intimation of the course adopted by Great Britain, had in fact proceeded to the extreme mea sure of declaring war, and issuing letters of marque, notwithstanding they