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in their narrowest limits. To justify any great reform, therefore, it is necessary to prove, that the object could not have been attained by a less violent departure from the established usages, to which the manners and habits of the people have been accommodated through a succession of ages.

There is always a risk that great changes, directly accomplished in the institutions of society, may be followed with many consequences which cannot be foreseen by the projectors. The relation of cause and effect has been but imperfectly traced, even in the material world; in the intellectual almost every thing is involved in doubt and obscurity. But a very few links of the chain can be surveyed at once, even by the most penetrating and comprehensive understanding; the forces which act and re-act in all directions, are so fine as to elude the grasp, and so multifarious as to baffle the arrangements, of the most skilful statesman. There are laws, indeed, which the material world obeys; if there were not, there could be no physical science. There are laws also which govern the moral and intellectual nature of man; but their influence upon his understanding and his passions remains hitherto in a great degree unascertained. Of any great change in political institutions, it must be difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the consequences a priori; and it is almost certain, that results which have been wholly unforeseen, will follow upon sudden or extensive innovation. Great changes have, no doubt, been accomplished in all civil institutions; but the best of them have been effected slowly, and in such a manner as almost to elude observation. Every sensible mechanician would hesitate in anticipating the operations of a machine entirely new to him, although constructed with the strictest regard to the principles of his art, and the most exact conformity to the laws

which apparently govern the material world. How can we expect then, that a great institution, almost new to the people, and destined to act not on coarse or vulgar materials, but upon the understanding, the passions, and the prejudices of men,-an institution which is to operate, not independently, or by itself, but to be grafted on the frame of our laws and manners, all the parts of which have been gradually accommodated to each other;-how can we expect that such an engine will be put in motion, without producing consequences which it was beyond the discernment of the projectors to anticipate, and out of their power to control?

It is of great importance, therefore, that when we advance to the hazardous undertakings of reform, we should carefully secure a retreat in case of disappointment. Should the new institution be found unsuitable to the state of society in which it has been introduced

should it prove useless or pernicious should it be found unequal to the remedy of the grievance for which it was intended, or bring along with it consequences which were not at first anticipated, there might still be some consolation in the prospect, that it could be easily dispensed with, and that it had never been permitted to take deep root in the social system. Those who insist on leading us through untried paths, ought to give some assurance that they can, without difficulty, extricate us from the embarrassments in which we may be involved by our willing obedience. But it is not easy, after having once advanced, to retreat without inconvenience and disgrace. It is not enough in such cases that the new measure should, from the beginning, be declared temporary; for although its further operation may thus be checked, the effects which it must have produced in the interim will not be so easily counteracted.

This general remark may be illustrated by referring to the judicial institution lately created for Scotland. It is provided by the act of parliament, that the experiment shall, in the first in stance, be tried for seven years only; if it is found to answer, the act will of course be renewed; if not, the ancient forms of procedure will be universally re-established. Even should this become necessary, however, and should jury-trial in civil causes be found unsuitable to Scotland, much inconvenience must result from the experiment. The jury are to try questions involving both law and fact; this provision seem ed indispensable to give any value what ever to the institution. Should the new court succeed in drawing to itself any considerable share of the public business, the consequence must be, that juries will, for seven years to come, have the law of Scotland in some measure under their control. Whether they may prove well qualified for an undertaking so arduous, is a different ques tion; but as it is possible that the experiment may not answer the expectations of its authors, the revolution, which in the meantime may thus be effected in our civil code, surely deserves consider ation.

Nor is this all; for as the introduction of jury-trial in civil causes may be construed as amounting to a recognition by the legislature of the alleged imperfections of the supreme civil court with its present constitution, there may be some difficulty in silencing complaints in future, when the remedy, which has in the first instance been resorted to, shall be abandoned as hopeless. No person will believe, that if a serious grievance had not existed, wise and learned men would rashly have encountered the hazard of innovation; the existence of a great evil is therefore announced in the formation of a new tribunal. The experiment, how

ever, may fail; but this will afford no reason to the minds of ignorant and sanguine persons for refusing to try another. The evil of repeated changes is thus encountered; and if there be no real grievance to justify them, this circumstance will only perplex the more those, who, by coming forward on the present occasion, may seem to have pledged themselves to the suggestion of an indefinite number of new expedients, till the imaginary grievance shall have been removed. The retreat of projectors, therefore, is not handsomely secured by a simple provision, that their experiment shall cease, if, after a certain number of years, it is found to be mischievous; and if security against the evils of reform can with difficulty be obtained, this consideration affords a farther inducement to the exercise of extreme caution in such undertakings.

The genius of the present age seems decidedly bent on changes of all descriptions; and without endeavouring to repress a spirit, which, when wisely directed, leads to the happiest results, no opportunity should be omitted of pointing out with candour the dif. ficulties which are involved in all innovations on the fabric of society, and the conditions on which alone any great reform can be safely attempted. The love of change is contemptible; the desire of improvement is every way laudable; and it becomes of importance, therefore, to fix deeply in the mind those considerations which distinguish the one from the other. It is a mere truism, which has been a thousand times repeated with different degrees of smartness by the more zealous advocates of reform, that the spirit, which blindly opposes all innovation, must, if it had possessed universal influence, have kept the world in its pri mitive state of barbarism; and that we are indebted for the enjoyments of a

civilized life, to the ardent love of improvement, which has had more or less influence in all ages. Who has denied this? But let it be recollected, that we owe so many blessings not to a love of change, but to a well-regulated desire of improvement, that by a mere change of political institutions, the world never did, and never could profit, but that, on the contrary, as in every state in which human beings have herded together, there has been something good, of which a change might deprive them, so the shallow and presumptuous reformer is the most dan. gerous enemy of the species. He reproaches the opponents of sudden and inconsiderate reforms, with bigotry, with a weak and superstitious attach ment to existing institutions. There may be some foundation for this charge, when it is not uttered as a sweeping condemnation, nor bandied about as the watch-word of a faction; but a very little philosophy will teach every one, that among large bodies of men, passions and prejudices are nearly balanced. The opposite factions may have different objects in view; but in both, the excess of intemperate feeling will reduce them to the same common standard of human frailty. The one is attached to existing establishments, the other is enamoured with the political creations of his own fancy, the former clings to that which he knows, the latter to that which he imagines. There is certainly something good in the objects to which the one pays so high a regard; there may be nothing but what is bad in the idols which are worshipped by the other. Mixed up with what is good, there may be much that is useless or bad in existing institutions; and he, who without distinc tion defends all, is so far a weak man and a bigot. But the visionary, who obtrudes his own idle fancies upon the world,-who would tear up by the foundations the whole fabric of socie

VOL. VI. PART I.

ty, or substitute, without due consideration, his own crude fancies for actual institutions, the utility of which has been proved by a long experience, is a bigot of a far more dangerous class.It is not the strength of the attachment which constitutes bigotry-for it is only by an abuse of language that this word can be applied to the most sincere regard for that which is useful and expedient. An overweening fondness for what is bad, or inexpedient, or dangerous, can alone constitute the bigot; and we put it to any one, whether, when the universal and equal operation of the passions among all classes is considered, and the difference betwixt an attachment to what we know by experience, and a violent desire of that which has been tried only in the brain, is duly weighed, the greater number of bigots, in the true sense of that word, may be expected among the supporters, or the reformers of our laws and constitution.-The singular and stupendous political revolutions which have occurred within the last 25 years, have had their influence in producing that restless spirit, which seeks for change as a good in itself. The example afforded by the result, is not indeed very encouraging; but when the minds of men are once accustomed to witness and admire sudden and mighty revolutions, they despise the calm but firm march of true wisdom, and sigh for the turbulence and bustle which had so long delighted them. They acquire the hardiness of veterans in the contests of reform, and although they have seen how barren of every thing that is good, and how fraught with evils, are all sudden innovations, they are not deterred. The entire failure of their projects, when reduced to practice, disturbs them but little; for they have always some consolation left them in the imputed blunders of the leading actors, the impenetrable stupi. dity of the instruments, or the general

folly and bigotry of the age. Such persons come to the task of reform with very dangerous prejudices; they are firmly persuaded, that there is no thing good in existing institutions that it is mere bigotry which supports them, and that no change can be for the worse. The great and undisputed progress made in the arts and sciences the overthrow of scholastic prejudices the rapid advances of speculative truth, by which many of our crude opinions have been shaken or eradicated, furnish them with triumphant arguments from analogy. They forget, however, the distinction which providence has made betwixt that knowledge which is indispensable to the existence of society, and that which is merely subservient to its comforts and embellishments. A wide field is opened for the exertions of human genius in the researches of physical science, and the pursuits of a more elevated philosophy; discoveries, at once useful and sublime, have hitherto rewarded, and will continue to reward its efforts. Not so in morals, and the sciences more immediately connected with the conservation of society; no great or sudden discovery has been made in these sciences in any age of the world. The principles of justice, and truth, and fidelity, are implanted in the human breast by the hand of nature; they may vary a little in their form and operation in different periods of society, but as they are still essentially the same, so also they form the basis of all that is, or ever will be good in social institutions. The best methods of ensuring the full developement of these qualities, have been too long the study of great and good men, to permit us to expect from the genius of modern reform any great discovery. Institutions, no doubt, must change with the state of society; the state of society, however, changes but slowly, and so must the institutions which

ought to correspond with it. The benefits, therefore, of all great and sudden reforms in public institutions are disproved by experience, and appear to be visionary, even upon the principles of abstract reasoning.

Of all the departments of the state which the spirit of innovation may invade, there is none, perhaps, where it is so dangerous as in the institutions for the administration of justice. The people have a strong interest that the tribunals by which their rights and property are to be secured should be free from every blemish; even the political constitution has not so immediate an influence over their prosperity and happiness. Despotic government, when well administered, may be found consistent with some share of individual happiness; as the chief of the state has absolute power, he cannot, if he be disposed to exercise it mildly, be opposed by any obstacle to the execution of his benevolent purpose. But in subordinate institutions, no exercise of wisdom or beneficence in the administration can atone for the radical errors of the constitution; for limited power is inadequate to the correction of abuses.— Inwell-regulated governments, besides, the executive power can seldom touch the person or property of the subject, but through the medium of courts of justice. The judges are thus placed as a barrier between the great function. aries of the executive government, and the mass of the people; and it is their duty to take care, that the shock of power do not fall too severely upon those who are intrusted to their protection. Bad laws may, by their pow. erful interference, sometimes be mitigated in practice; and the judges will naturally be the first to give an impressive warning to the supreme authority, should its enactments prove unsuitable to the genius, or inconsistent with the prosperity of the people.

They stand betwixt the governors and the governed, to break the fall of pow. er as it descends. They may be compelled for a time to execute a bad law; but it must be their own fault, and it will evince a want of firmness and integrity on their part, if they continue under an enlightened government, and in an age of freedom, to execute it long.

The errors and defects of the political constitution, when they lead to unjust or impolitic measures, have an equal influence on all classes of society; as all are injured, all are ready to combine for redress; and when this happens, the remedy cannot be far distant. But a faulty or perverse constitution of the tribunals, although it must continually produce injustice, does so only towards a few individuals at a time; and as the people, in general, are not immediately interested, and seldom complain unless when the injustice is flagrant, abuses are allowed to continue. In the course of a certain period, however, all ranks of society, and perhaps every individual in his turn, is thus made to suffer much inconvenience and injustice. The vices and corruptions of courts of justice, are in some respects far more formidable than the excesses of political tyranny itself; for although no despotism that ever existed ventured to push to an extreme degree its interference with the lives and the properties of its subjects, this is every day done to individuals by the courts of justice. No tax has ever been imposed which deprived an individual of his all; but courts of civil judicature have the estates and fortunes of men at their disposal, and may at once reduce persons of very great opulence to want and misery. Thus it is that they touch so nearly the interests of the people, and that their wise and sound constitution, and the integrity and talent by which their functions are administered, be

come of so much importance. The science also, which they profess, has, in all ages, been considered as the peculiar property of the learned, while the general maxims of political knowledge become, in an age of free discussion, common almost to every rank in society. The errors, real or supposed, therefore, of a popular legislature, such as we happily possess in this country, are boldly and warmly censured by persons of every description, while the mysteries of a court of justice are seldom pried into by the uninitiated.The public, therefore, is in greater danger from the abuses of the tribunals, than from those of the legisla ture.

The inferences fairly deducible from these considerations cannot be mistaken. The most obvious one is, that if there be, in truth, any gross abuses, or corruptions in our courts of law, it is of high importance that they should be removed, while the application of the cure is a matter of the greatest delicacy. Another inference, no less just, although, perhaps, it will not be so readily drawn by some persons, is this,

that when our judicial establishments have already been matured, and have become conspicuous for those qualities which are required in such institutions, (and this stage we have doubtless attained in Scotland), it is extremely dangerous to interfere with them-the danger to be dreaded from any change being exactly proportioned to the multitude and importance of the benefits of which we are already in possession. Where great abuses do exist in the courts of justice, they never fail to produce dissatisfaction.The murmurs may not be loud-the reasoning by which the complaints are supported may not be clear-the subtlety which is supposed to belong to the profession may shelter it from the disgrace of a glaring exposure; but that restlessness and discontent, which

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