THE rapid advance of the allied armies in the autumn of the year 1813, and the panic which seized the French authorities in Holland, must undoubtedly be considered as the immediate causes of the late revolution. But the eagerness with which the Dutch people seized the opportunity thus afforded them of restoring the Prince of Orange, and the union of formerly discordant parties in his favour, must be traced to more distant sources, and will be found chiefly in the evils which Holland had endured in the course of the preceding nineteen years, and which united all parties in opposition to the influence of France.

The misfortunes to which the Dutch had been exposed by their connection with France were severe almost beyond example. Before the union of Holland with the French empire, all that part of the territory of the United Provinces, which is situated beyond the Waal, had been ceded to France. The kingdom of Holland consisted of the departments of the Zuyder Zee, the mouths of the Maese, the Upper Yssel, the mouths of the Yssel, Frizeland, and the western and eastern Ems; and the population of the whole did not exceed 1,800,000 souls. When Louis

Buonaparte abdicated his throne, he left a regular army and a navy, composed of 18,000 men, who were immediately taken into the service of France; and, in the course of three years and a half, their numbers were increased to 49,920, by the operation of the French naval and military code. Thus about a thirty-sixth part of the whole population was employed in arms. The persons included in the maritime conscription were entirely employed in the navy; the "national guards," a branch of the military force, were always on service, and were generally employed to guard the naval establish ments, and to perform garrison duty,

they were composed of those persons who were exempted from the conscription. The "cohorts," as they were called, were, by law, liable to serve only in the interior of the French empire, which extended from Hamburgh to Rome; but, after the Russian campaign, even this limitation was disre garded, and the French and Dutch cohorts formed a principal part of Napoleon's army at the battle of Bautzen.

The law respecting the ordinary conscription proceeded upon this principle, that every male of a certain age was absolutely at the disposal of

the state. The age fixed upon was a little under or above twenty years, regulated in such a manner, that every youth, who had entered his twentieth year at any time in the calendar year preceding that of the conscription, was liable to be drawn. On an appointed day in the spring of every year, all those who were liable to that year's conscription were required to appear before the proper officers in their respective parishes. Those who were by law exempted from military service, were placed at the depot, and considered as at the disposal of government in cases of emergency. The remainder proceeded to ballot, and the contingent was taken from those who drew the lowest numbers. The surplus was called the "reserve ;" and the individuals composing it escaped for the present, but were still liable to be called upon. They were not permitted to go out of the department without an express permission from the government. It has been calculated, that, on an average, nearly one-half of the male population, of the age of twenty years, was annually claimed by the conscription. Es cape by flight was hardly ever attempt ed; for if a young man quitted his country, to avoid the conscription, his nearest relation or guardian was condemned to heavy fines, and sometimes to imprisonment. Very few exemptions were allowed under this rigorous system, except to those who procured substitutes or deputies (remplacants) A substitute was one who, having drawn a high number in the ballot, on that account belonged to the reserve, but by taking the place of one who had drawn a low number, was called into immediate service. A" remplacant," or deputy, was one who, being entirely exempted from the conscription, agreed, nevertheless, to serve in the place of a conscript. The exemptions thus procured, however, were not secure or complete. Those who had

obtained substitutes still belonged to the reserve; and if a deputy deserted within two years after his arrival at the depot, his principal was obliged to replace him, either by serving in person, or by procuring another deputy, whom he was bound to convey and guard, at his own expense, to the depot to which the deserter belonged; but the principal was still liable to be called upon to serve in the burgher guard, and might be chosen a member of the emperor's guard of honour, which the French government avowedly composed as much as possible of those who had provided deputies for service under the conscription. The most fortunate event which could occur for the principal was, that his deputy should be killed, or taken prisoner, since he thus escaped all military service, except as a member of the guard of honour.

The price of a deputy was subject to variations, arising partly from the difference of the services to which the French troops were exposed, and partly from the number of conscripts required for the year. Sometimes it amounted to so much as 800/. sterling ; but the ordinary price in Holland may be taken at 3000 florins, or about 3001. sterling. The expense, however, did not occasion the only difficulty in providing deputies. It was required that each deputy should belong to the department of his principal; and he was not accepted if his age exceeded thirtytwo years, or if the slightest personal defect could be discovered by an exact and minute examination, which was instituted for that purpose.

The conscripts were told that their service should not extend beyond the term of five years: but as in France no on ever knew an instance of a soldier's being discharged, without having been declared unfit for service, it might reasonably be expected in Holland, that the service of a conscript

would terminate only with his life. The regulations also respecting the conscription were annually changed; and thus the code became intricate and confused. The explanation of any doubt rested with the persons intrusted with the execution of the law, the rigour of which was not mitigated by the construction they adopted.

But the conscription, how oppres sive soever, was general in its opera tion.-Buonaparte's guard of honour was formed in a manner entirely different, and, in many respects, more oppressive. The members were arbitrarily taken from among the most noble and opulent families, and especially from among those who were deemed inimical to the French government ; the individuals who had already provided deputies for the ordinary conscription were generally chosen. But the selection depended altogether on the prefect, who might name the persons most obnoxious to him, without regard to their rank or occupation, or even to their health. No exemption or excuse was allowed to any one, not even to those who, on account of mental or bodily infirmity, had been declared unfit for military duty. The victims, by a refinement of mockery, were considered as volunteers in their services; they were bound to provide themselves with horses, arms, and accoutrements, and to march to the place appointed for their reception, where they were probably considered as host ages for the fidelity of their relations. Such were the conscription laws. The taxes imposed were extremely severe. The most oppressive were those levied on land and houses; of which the former usually amounted to 25, and the latter to 30 per cent. of the clear annual rent. Other direct taxes were levied on persons and moveable property, on doors and windows, and on patents granted for the exercise of trades and professions; and then fol

lowed the long list of stamps, and all the various impositions on bridges, pas sage-boats, and carriages; on spirits, wine, beer, tobacco, and salt; on le gacies and all sales of property, either real or personal, &c. There was much inequality in the operation of the taxes on land and houses, as the amount was fixed for each department, and then divided among the circles and parishes of which it was composed; for if the original rate of taxation, which was 20 per cent. of the rent, did not produce the contingent of each parish, the de ficiency was supplied by increasing the proportion to be paid by each individual. Thus the rate of the land-tax increased in proportion as the rents fell; and as many persons destroyed their houses to avoid paying the taxes levied on them, the weight was thrown with additional severity upon the others. The personal tax was at first levied equally upon every individual inhabiting the same parish, and consisted of the price of three days labour, which was fixed by the prefect at á rate varying in the different parishes, from half a franc to a franc and a half for each day. If this assessment did not produce the contingent of the pas rish, the residue was levied on the per sonal property of those who had been assessed in proportion to the value. The taxes on doors and windows, on the patents on trades and professions, on the manufacture of tobacco, and some other duties, were regulated by tariffs, increasing the amount to be paid in proportion to the population of the parishes in which the taxes were raised. The whole sums annually obtained from Holland, by these means, amounted to about 30,000,000 of florins, being at the rate of about 17 135. 4d. sterling from every individual inhabiting the country.

But the greatest of the misfortunes to which the Dutch were exposed, appeared in the shape of the continental

system; the chief object of which was to destroy the resources, and ruin the prosperity, of Great Britain, by excluding her from all commercial intercourse with the continent. But Eng. land was mistress of the seas, and could not be placed in a state of political excommunication, without compelling the nations of the continent to relinquish their foreign trade. The greatest military force that has ever appear ed in modern Europe under one chief, has been annihilated in this strange attempt, which is not likely to be renewed; but the misery which the experiment inflicted upon Holland cannot be described, and can be fully understood by those only who have witnessed its lamentable results.

The population of Amsterdam was, by this system, reduced from 220,000 to 190,000, of whom a fourth part derived their whole subsistence from charitable institutions, while another fourth part received partial succour from the same sources. At Haerlem, where the population had been chiefly employed in bleaching linen, made in Brabant, and in preparing it for sale, whole streets were levelled with the ground, and more than 500 houses destroyed. At the Hague, at Delft, and in other towns, many inhabitants had been induced to pull down their houses from inability to pay the taxes, or keep their habitations in repair. Ruin was every where imminent. The preservation of the dikes, requiring annually an expense estimated at 600,000l. sterling, was greatly neglected. The sea inundated the Polders, and threatened to resume its ancient dominion over a great part of the country. Meanwhile, all classes of the people were crushed under a load of suffering. Even the most opulent families escaped abject poverty only by diminishing their establishments, and adopting the most rigid œconomy; and there remained no source of wealth or distinction, and

no object of ambition to which a Dutchman could aspire. Commerce was extinguished; and no one would voluntarily enter the army or navy, as he would thus be compelled to fight for the worst enemy of his country. The calamities of the Dutch were aggravated to the highest degree; they were compelled to sacrifice themselves in a cause which they abhorred, and in the service of a power which had robbed them of their independence, and reduced them from freedom to slavery, from prosperity to misery, and from a high pitch of national glory to the lowest state of national degradation.

It is the happy impulse of tyranny, inevitably to pursue the road to its own destruction; and, in Holland, the grie vous oppressions of France inspired every heart with an earnest desire to throw off the yoke. In the continuance of severe suffering, all the parties which agitated and ruined this unhappy country had undergone a salutary change. The remembrance of former evils and discontents had faded away, while the blessings which had once been enjoyed under the mild government of the house of Orange were borne in mind, with regret for the past, and hope for the future. A great portion of the people, including all the lower classes, had retained an undiminished and faithful attachment to this illustrious family, whose ancestors had fought so nobly for their independence, and whose name is inseparably united with almost every memorial of the prosperity and glory of the Dutch. The patriots, by whose factious spirit the country had been first betrayed to the common enemy, had long since been taught, that no hope of freedom. or prosperity could be reposed in France; they were now united in desiring an opportunity of resistance; and, as they were convinced that the restoration of the Prince of Orange could alone afford relief to their ha

rassed country, they held themselves ready to give their sincere and active assistance in promoting his return.The Orangemen, in general, had not only maintained their fidelity, but some of the principal persons had contrived to keep up a clandestine correspondence with his most serene highness. Under these circumstances the leaders of the different parties were closely united. The people, however, bestow ed their confidence upon the old and tried friends of the House of Orange alone. Some of the Orange leaders had, at the express desire of the prince, communicated to them at the peace of Amiens, accepted a share in the government of the Batavian republic, with the view of alleviating the calamities of their country, and preparing the way for the return of the exiled family. Others had been compelled to continue in office by Buonaparte, who, perhaps, hoped to derive some advantage from the employment and co-operation of those who exclusively possessed the confidence of the Dutch nation. It was on these persons, who were well known, and still more on others of the same party, who had steadily refused to accept any share in the government, after Holland was united to France, that the people placed their reliance. The patriots, though converted from their former opinions, were treated with suspicion by those who had no means of being acquainted with their sincerity. But, in fact, all important differences of opinion had been obliterated; the wishes of the patriots corresponded with those of the people; and, at the end of the year 1813, it may safely be affirmed, that the Dutch nation was unanimous in the desire of expelling their oppressors, and recalling the Prince of Orange. When the crisis arrived, the prejudices of the people made it necessary to intrust the manage. ment of the revolution to the Orange

party alone; but much assistance was willingly afforded, not only by the members of the old patriot party, but also by many persons who had voluntarily entered into the service of Buonaparte, and obtained the confi dence of the French government. The French authorities very soon discovered that they were betrayed on every side, and that most of the natives of Holland, in the service of Buonaparte, how contrary soever it might seem to their interest, were his secret or avowed enemies. All confidence was thus destroyed, and, after the first explosion of popular feeling, terror and vacillation marked the conduct of the persons against whom it was directed.

Such were the causes which prepared the Dutch people for the happy change accomplished in their government towards the close of the present year. Even before this period, however, some important proceedings had taken place, of which it may be proper to give a short account.

The disasters experienced by the French army in the Russian campaign having inspired hopes that the deliverance of Holland might, at some future period, be effected, the chiefs of the Orange party at the Hague met frequently, in secret, towards the end of the year 1812, to consult respecting the measures which might enable them to seize the first favourable opportunity of shaking off the yoke of France, and restoring the Prince of Orange. They found means of communicating with several respectable persons in different towns of Holland, whom they knew to be well disposed to their cause, and who promised their assistance so soon as they were informed of the object which the confederates had in view. The confederates were well aware, that, while the power of France continued, any attempt at insurrection, on the part of the Dutch nation, would be hopeless; but, as there seemed to be a