appear extremely advantageous. Their whole force was divided into three corps, acting separately, at a distance from each other, and maintaining only a circuitous and imperfect communication. The French army was in the centre, completely united, and ready to direct its entire force against any of the allied divisions. Such a position was very unfavourable for offensive movements, which yet were evidently contemplated. To have brought the whole mass of the allied armies into Bohemia, whence offensive operations could best be undertaken, would appear to have been more eligible. Silesia and Brandenburgh might have been covered by small detached corps, quite adequate to such a purpose, since the French army, with so large a force behind it, could not have sent any considerable bodies of troops against them. Such appear, in a military point of view, decidedly the best arrangements.--Other circumstances, however, may have influenced the conduct of the allied chiefs. The force of the Prussian states, consisting in a great measure of militia, may have been un. willing to march into a remote and foreign district; and may also, to render it efficient, have required the addition of regular troops. There may have been advantages in point of supply and subsistence also, in the arrangements which were actually adopted. The allied generals understood and obviated the disadvantages of their position. They were always careful, when the enemy approached in superior force, to retire and watch the favourable moment for attack, when that force had withdrawn to another point. This plan, which depended for success upon accuracy of information, was greatly aided by their possessing in the cossacks the best light cavalry in the world; and, by a happy combination of skill, caution, and valour, they were enabled to prevent the difficulties under which

they laboured, from affecting the final issue of the campaign.

The crisis now approaching promised great events. Military talents of the highest order were to be exerted, armies formed on the most gigantic scale were to be put in motion; and operations, in comparison of which many of the most renowned battles which fill the pages of history were mere skirmishes, were about to be undertaken. Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sweden, Portugal, and Spain, were ranged on the one side; France, Holland, Denmark, Italy, Bavaria, Saxony, and the other states of Germany, on the other; and whether we reflect upon the vast tract of country over which the desolations of war were to sweep, the wide waste of human life, or the vast issue at stake,-the prolongation of a system of oppression and violence which had filled all Europe with woes, or the emancipation of millions of our fellow men from a rapacious and restless ambition,-no preceding period, since the political formation of modern Europe, had borne interests so mighty, and occur. rences so pregnant with curses or blessings suspended in the uncertain balance of military fortune. The allies were strong in the justice of their cause. The right, it is true, does not always prosper; but violent aggression, by a law of Providence and nature, which tyrants have in vain endeavoured. to abolish, creates a power of re-action against itself, which seldom fails ultimately to over-power it. Buonaparte had already felt this without profiting by his experience. He had felt it in Spain; he felt it in Russia; and the mighty preparations now organised against him, were but the effects of that re-action which his attempts upon the sovereignty of the continent had provoked. If ever nations could appeal to the equitable decisions of that power which controls the universe, the

allied nations could make that appeal. If the justice of a cause can inspire vigour into the breasts of those who support it, then the allied armies must have been roused by the force of this motive to deeds of the greatest heroism. And here it is proper to mention, that the cause of the allies was now to have the assistance of a man distinguished as one of the greatest soldiers of modern times. General Moreau having acceded to the wishes of the Emperor Alexander, that he should give his aid on this great occasion, an application was made to the British admiral, Cockburn, for a licence to enable an American ship to proceed to Europe. The licence was granted; and on the 21st of June, Moreau embarked and sailed from America. He landed at Gottenburgh on the 26th of July, and on the 4th of August he again embarked at Ystadt, in a Swedish brig of war, for Stralsund. The Prince Royal of Sweden, who was then at Berlin, set off to give his early friend a meeting, and to concert with him a plan of military operations. It was determined by these two experienced officers, that they should organize a separate corps d'armee, to be composed of French prisoners, and called "Moreau's Legion." This body was to be decorated with the white or national cockade, to bear the motto pro patria, to fight for the deliverance of Europe, and in particular for the emancipation of Frenchmen. A part of the plan agreed upon was, that General Willot, who was expected from America, and General Rewbel, (the commander in chief of the Westphalian army when the Duke of Brunswick escaped, and who was disgraced by Buonaparte on account of that event) should organize such of the French prisoners as they could raise in England, and disembark with them in the north of France. The execution of this plan, however, from which lit.

tle good, after all, could be expected, was soon interrupted by a melancholy event, which closed the career of the unfortunate Moreau.

The first movements of any importance made by the French army after the denunciation of the armistice, were in the direction of Berlin, the headquarters of the Crown Prince of Sweden. All the reports of the secret agents having announced, on the evening of the 21st of August, that the French were concentrating the corps of the Dukes of Reggio, Belluno, and Padua, and of Generals Bertrand and Regnier, amounting to more than 80,000 men, in the environs of Bareuth, and every thing announcing, on the part of these troops, a rapid march upon Berlin; the Crown Prince placed two divisions of the third Russian corps, commanded by Bulow, between Kernersdorf and Klein Berin. One division already occupied Mittenwalde, and another Trebbin, in order to mask the whole movement. The fourth Russian corps, under Tauentzen, united at Blakenfelde. The Swedish army left Potsdam on the 22d, proceeded upon Saarm, passed the defiles, and took post at Ruhlesdorf. The Russian corps followed the Swedish, and took post at Gutergatze. General Tchernicheff guarded Beletz, and Treunbritzen, with 3000 cossacks and a brigade of light infantry.-Affairs were in this state when the enemy attacked General Thumen, at Trebbin, on the 22d in the morning. The superiority of the French determined the general to evacuate that post. The enemy advanced successively, and occupied the interval between Mittenwalde and the Saare, covered by woods and flanked by marshes. The advanced posts of the Crown Prince's army fell back slowly, and covered the front of the line. On the 23d, in the morning, the corps of General Bertrand attacked General Tauenzein; the latter repul

sed him, and made some prisoners.The village of Gross Beren, against which the 7th French corps and a strong reserve was directed, was taken. The Duke of Reggio's corps proceeded upon Ahrendorff. By the occupation of Gross Beren, the enemy was at the distance of 1000 teises only from the centre of the camp of the combined army. General Bulow received orders to attack the village; he executed it with the decision of a skilful general. The cannonade was warm for some hours. The troops ad. vanced under the protection of the artillery, and fell with the bayonet upon the 7th French corps, which had deployed in the plain, and which marched upon the camp. The Russian and Swedish armies were also in battle, and waited the deploying of the other enemy's columns, to attack them at the same time. General Winzengerode was at the head of 10,000 horse, and the Count de Woronzow at the head of the Russian infantry. Marshal Count Stedinck, in front of the Swedish line, had his cavalry in reserve. The village of Ruhelsdorff, situated in front of the Swedish camp, was furnished with infantry to keep open the communication with General Bulow. The other corps of the enemy's army not having moved from the woods, the Russian army could not engage. The enemy, however, having menaced the village of Ruhelsdorff, and having already pushed his tirailleurs against the light Swedish troops placed in front of that village, the Crown Prince ordered some battalions, supported by artillery, to reinforce the advanced posts, and to push on with a battalion of flying artillery to take the enemy in flank; in this movement they succeeded. The French, after having sustained a severe loss, retired without attempting to bring on a general engagement, and fell back in the direction of Dresden.

While the army of the north of Ger

many was thus employed, General Blucher, who commanded the army of Silesia, advanced, passed the Bober, the boundary of Lusatia, and drove in all the French corps by which that river was defended. On the arrival, however, of a great reinforcement, headed by Buonaparte himself, he immediately measured back his steps. Buonaparte then crossed the Bober at Lowenberg, and pushed forward into Silesia. Blucher took up a strong position near Lignitz, on the Katzbach, a river rendered famous by a signal victory gained by Frederick on its banks. Here he was attacked by Buonaparte, and fought with his wonted intrepidity. He made 18,000 prisoners, including a general of division, two brigadier-generals, and a number of colonels. He took also 103 pieces of cannon, 250 waggons, and two eagles. The enemy did not immediately renew the combat, but retreated over the Bober and the Queiss, pursued by the allies. "Silesia is delivered from the enemy," said the old general," let us prostrate ourselves before the Lord of Hosts for the glorious victory he has gained us."

When General Blucher moved from Silesia upon Lusatia, threatening the enemy in front, Buonaparte conceived that he had discovered the grand plan of the allies, and he immediately repaired in person to meet and repel their main attack. But Blucher's orders were to avoid any general engagement, and retire before superior numbers.On learning, after the sharp conflict which has been described, that powerful reinforcements were advancing to support the enemy, who prepared to renew the attack, Blucher withdrew without disorder behind the Katzbach. Buonaparte thought he thus defeated the designs of the allies in Silesia. But their views were otherwise directed. The advance of Blucher was intended to mask their movements in another

tated, and he was carried in a litter to Bohemia ; but after lingering for a few days, he expired in great agony.

The presence of Moreau in the allied army had excited much enthusiasm throughout Europe; and a fate so tragical and untimely produced equal sympathy and regret. Yet when we come to reflect upon his conduct, there may be room for a difference of opinion. Unjust expulsion from the political community may seem to destroy the ties by which an individual is united to it, and to absolve him from the duties of allegiance. When this injustice is exercised by a state against one to whom it has been greatly indebted, the trial to individual fortitude becomes the more severe. Yet the general sense of mankind seems to pronounce that there is something indelible in the relations between men and the country which gave them birth, and that no wrong, no suffering, can ever efface them. Moreau professed, indeed, (and in this he was sanctioned by the declarations of the allies) to make war, not against France, but against the usurper who ruled it. Had the object been to change the government, to restore either a free constitution or the ancient monarchy, Moreau might have had a fair ground of justification. But the allies disclaimed any such intention; they professed no other object but to re-establish against France the ancient balance of power, and to level her present overwhelming preponderance in the system of Europe. They were not thus, perhaps, doing her any real injury, since extended conquest does by no means constitute the real happiness of nations. Yet it is not viewed in this light by mankind in general; and in the mind of a great commander it can scarcely be doubted, that with military successes the grandeur and prosperity of his country will be in a great degree identified. The conduct of Mo

VOL. VI. PART I.

reau, therefore, can scarcely be vindicated by the feelings of patriotism; it can be defended only upon the principles of universal philanthropy. Such principles, however, from their vague and flexible nature, ought to be viewed with extreme suspicion, particularly when they point to some object which may afford gratification to private ambition or resentment. There is one circumstance in the case of Moreau which, if not explained, appears extremely suspicious. He came only to bask in the sunshine of that fortune which had attended the allied arms; for so long as the cause of Europe languished he had taken no part in it. He was not found in Spain, where the most just of causes was to be defended; not even in Russia, when that country was invaded, and in danger of being over-run. He came not till a succession of victories, and the formation of a grand confederacy, had rendered the triumph of the allied cause almost certain. All this may admit of explanation; he may not have been invited; a proper opening may not have been offered to his exertions. But some such explanation seems necessary to account for the inactivity of his philanthropic principles, till the moment when their exertion was less necessary and less meritorious. But whatever opinion may be formed upon this subject, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the allied sovereigns were fully justified in availing themselves of the acknowledged talents of this commander, for the promotion of their own just cause. A very absurd opinion, however, was almost universal at the time, that the success of that cause depended chiefly upon Moreau, and that Buonaparte could only be opposed by commanders trained in the same school with himself. Such an idea is totally inconsistent, not only with subsequent events which could not be then taken into account, but

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