Stralsund. Great Britain on the other hand acceded to engagements already subsisting betwixt Sweden and Russia,-bound herself not to oppose the annexation of Norway to Sweden, but to afford the necessary naval co-operation should the King of Denmark refuse to accede to the grand alliance. The British government also agreed to grant Sweden a subsidy of one million sterling, for the service of the campaign of this year, and to cede to her the possession of the island of Guadaloupe in the West Indies. In re turn for this last concession, Sweden bound herself to observe the capitulation under which the island submitted to Great Britain-to prevent her subjects from engaging in the slave-tradeto exclude ships of war from Guadaloupe belonging to the enemies of England-to protect British subjects and their property in the colony, and not to alienate the island without the consent of Great Britain.

In deciding upon the justice and policy of these proceedings, it is necessary to take a general view of the state of Europe at the period when they occurred. While the storm of French invasion was hanging over the Russian dominions, two things were required to give that empire a chance of ultimate sucess;-peace with Turkey, and the co-operation of Sweden. The first object was effected, in a great measure, by the mediation of England; the other was scarcely less important. It was the interest of France to use all the means in her power to secure the alliance and co-operation of Sweden in the attack upon Rus sia; and Buonaparte, in his usual man. ner, tried the effect of intimidation, by seizing the Swedish Pomeranian dominions. When he found that threats and insults were unavailing, he chan ged his policy, and made the most seducing offers to the Swedish govern ment. The restoration of Finland,

and other advantages, were proposed through the medium of neutral powers, and every attempt was made to gain the accession of Sweden to the French system; but even these insidious offers failed of effect. Much difference of opinion existed among Russian statesmen as to the real value of the conquests which that power had been making for the last twenty or thirty years; but none of them ever doubted that the acquisition of Finland was highly important, with a view even to the security of the Russian dominions. It was reasonable that Sweden should have some compensation for so material a loss, when about to embark in what was considered as almost a desperate cause. She had engaged to unite with Russia against the common enemy; but in these circumstances it was necessary to her safety that Norway should be added to her dominions; and it was agreed, therefore, between Russia and Sweden, that these powers should, in the first instance, make common cause for that purpose, and afterwards bring their united force to bear against France and her allies.

It may be asked-were Russia and Sweden justified in entering into these engagements,-was Great Britain jus. tifiable in acceding to such a treatyand was it wise or politic to accede to it? It seems clear that Russia and Sweden were justified in entering into these engagements. It is an important fact, which has often been kept out of view, that Denmark formed part of the confederacy against Russia. Denmark engaged to assist the object of Buonaparte by occupying the north of Germany with her troops; this was as complete a co-operation with France as if the Danish troops had marched to Smolensko and Moscow. The countries which Denmark agreed to Occupy were in alliance with Russia; the duchy of Oldenberg, for instance, had been in some degree the origin of

the last dispute between Russia and France. Denmark thought it for her interest to adhere to France; she was following the steps and co-operating in the objects of that power.-The accession of Great Britain to the engagements between Russia and Sweden may easily be defended, for England was at war with Denmark; Danish seamen manned the French fleets; Danish ports were shut to the English; Danish privateers covered the ses in that quarter, annoying the trade of England. Was not Great Britain as much justified in conquering Norway as in conquering any other place belonging to her enemies? The project of annexing Norway to Sweden was not new. Sweden had lost Fin land, by her refusal to accede to the treaty of Tilsit,-a treaty by which Sweden was involved in a war both with Russia and France. An expedition sailed from this country, under the late Sir John Moore, to co-operate with Sweden in the conquest of Norway, as a compensation for the loss of Finland. As Sweden had co-operated so powerfully with England, and evinced a determination to support her independence, she had a strong claim upon the liberality of this country to promote her objects in any legitimate contest. Great Britain was fully justified, therefore, in making common cause with Russia and Sweden.

The policy of acceding to the engagements between these two powers was not less manifest. No object, except the independence of the Spanish peninsula, seemed so important to Great Britain, as that Norway should belong to a power able and willing to preserve its independence against France. Norway is a maritime country, full of harbours, from which Eng. land procures a considerable portion of her naval stores. Not that for this reason, solely, the crown of Denmark

ought to have been deprived of this appendage of the monarchy; but if it could with justice be placed in the hands of a power more willing to cooperate in the great cause of Europe, it was highly desirable, with a view to the interests of this country, that such a change should be accomplished.The British government was completely justified in acceding to the treaty for annexing Norway to Sweden; it was for the interest of England that Norway and Sweden should be united; for so long as Denmark declined to sacrifice her German dominions for her insular independence, her dependence on France was inevitable. But it had been the policy of Denmark (whether wise or not signifies little) to cling to her German possessions; and while Norway was annexed to Denmark, it was therefore under the controul of France. In the existing state of Europe it was most important, with a view to the interests of Great Britain, that Norway should belong to Sweden. Even in the course of the autumn of 1812, a Swedish force in the north kept a French Marshal in check; and although an engagement had been entered into by Russia to employ a considerable force solely for Swedish objects, yet at the very moment, when Buonaparte was marching to Smolensko, 18,000 Russians, who were in Finland, were released by the friendship of Sweden, and left at liberty to act against the French. The destruction of the French army on the Beresina may be ascribed to the junction of this Russian corps with Wittgenstein; and to the co-operation and good-will of the Swedes, resisting, as they had, all the offers of France, and making common cause with Russia, might the suc cesses of the Russians in that quarter be ascribed. The Russians felt this, and were anxious that Great Britain should accede to the agreement sub

said he," in directing me to take the command of his army in Pomerania, has charged me to leave in Sweden two corps of the army, sufficiently numerous to ensure the safety of the frontiers of the kingdom, and to act offensively wherever the honour and interests of the country require. In separating from you for some time, it is not to disturb the repose of nations, but to co-operate in the great work of a general peace, for which sovereigns and nations have sighed for so many years. A new career of glory, and sources of prosperity, are opening to our country. Treaties founded upon sound policy, and which have the tranquillity of the north for their object, guarantee the union of the people of Scandinavia.Let us make ourselves worthy of the splendid destiny which is promised us; and let not the people who stretch out their arms to us have cause to repent their confidence. Our ancestors distinguished themselves by their bold, daring, and steady courage. Let us unite to these warlike virtues the enthusiasm of military honour, and God will protect our arms."

On the 18th of May, Bernadotte arrived at Stralsund to take the command of the army. A Swedish force of 3000 men had been stationed near Hamburgh for the protection of that city. On the 21st of May, it was directed by the Crown Prince to fall back; and the commanding officer was ordered to repair to Stralsund, to be brought before a court-martial, for having made an application of his troops which had never entered into the plans of the Swedish government. The Swedish army, in consequence of this order, retired, although Count Walmoden made the most pressing representation to induce them to remain. To explain this resolution, which excited suspicions at the time, it is necessary to state some particulars.

To induce Sweden to take an active

part in the operations on the continent, Russia and Prussia had engaged to place at her disposal an army of 50,000 men. The corps which was organizing in the north of Germany, under the protection, and at the expence of England, was, together with these Russian and Prussian troops, to be placed under the command of the Crown Prince. Bernadotte was thus to have an army of 90,000 men, including his Swedish troops. The Swedes to be brought into co-operation with the allies in Germany were not to exceed 30,000; and of these a proportion necessarily remained at Stralsund, where an entrenched camp was preparing for 15,000 men.-But a part of the Swedish force had not at this time arrived, and Bernadotte had not received the expected reinforcements of Russians and Prussians. He could have detached only a small force, therefore, to the Elbe, which, being exposed to the joint attacks of the French and Danes, might have been entirely cut off. At this period the main armies of the allies were retiring from the Saale and the Elbe; and as the whole course of the Lower Elbe, from Magdeburgh to Hamburgh, was but partially guarded by small detachments, the river might have been easily crossed at any point by a superior French force.By attempting to defend Hamburgh under these circumstances, the Crown Prince must have risked the destruction of his army in detail, as all support from his allies was remote and uncertain.

The importance of preserving Hamburgh on principles of humanity, as well as of general policy, must have been obvious to Bernadotte; and he must have been dissuaded from attempting it on military considerations alone. Every military man would object to a plan by which a corps of troops should be thrown into a large town, unfortified, and placed in a cul de sac, of which

the chief protection, a river, had been destroyed by the appearance of a new enemy who commanded the right bank. It would appear also, that at this period the Crown Prince was left in the dark as to the views of the Russians and Prussians. He had already been disappointed of their promised support; while their inadequate exertions, their retrograde movements, and the experience of their conduct in former contests, gave him reason to appre

hend that an armistice, and afterwards a peace, might be concluded without his concurrence or approbation. In such circumstances, he could not have been justified in committing, beyond the reach of support, or the power of retreat, the disposable military force of Sweden, or in risking the destruction of the whole, or a part of his army, when its only security might have depended on its being kept together in a formidable body at Stralsund.